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SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER
IN SOUTH AMERICA

1730-1806.

BY
BERNARD MOSES

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

THE BEGINNINGS OF A NEW SOCIETY

- I. Relation of the Spaniards to the Indians. II.
Spaniards, Creoles, and Mestizos. III. The new society.
1-11

CHAPTER II

STATE OF THE SPANISH DEPENDENCIES IN SOUTH AMERICA, 1730-1750

- I. Peru in the beginning of the period. II. The after-
math of Antequera's rebellion. III. The controversy
concerning Colonia. IV. Montevideo and Tucuman. V.
Two decades of Chilean affairs. VI. The University of
Chile. VII. New Granada under the last colonial presi-
dents. VIII. The state of Quito. IX. The reëstablished
viceroyalty of New Granada. X. Santo Thomé and the
missions of the plains. XI. The little revolution of
Trinidad. 12-72

CHAPTER III

THE SPANISH-PORTUGUESE BOUNDARY TREATY OF 1750 AND THE WAR OF THE SEVEN REDUCTIONS

- I. Terms of the treaty of 1750. II. Protests of the
Indians against removal. III. The boundary commis-
sioners and the disposition of the Indians. IV. Active
hostilities of the Spanish and Portuguese against the
Indians of the seven reductions. V. "Emperor" Nich-
olas Nanguirú, further hostilities, and preparations for
exile. VI. Failure of the campaign and the abrogation
of the treaty. 73-96

SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER

CHAPTER IV

THE EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS

- I. Viceroy Amat and the monopoly of alcohol. II. Juan Diaz Herrera and the revolt in Quito. III. The controversy respecting the Jesuits. IV. The decree of expulsion. V. The removal of the Jesuits from the towns of Rio de la Plata. VI. The missionaries of the Chaco and the region about Sierra de la Cruz. VII. The expulsion of the Jesuits from the reductions of Paraguay. VIII. The Jesuits of Peru. IX. The Jesuits of Chile. X. Their removal. XI. The expulsion from Ecuador. XII. The Jesuits removed from Bogotá and the other towns of New Granada. XIII. The Jesuits of the *Llanos*. XIV. The Jesuits in exile. 97-152

CHAPTER V

THE CREATION OF THE VICEROYALTY OF RIO DE LA PLATA

- I. The need of a new viceroyalty, and the functions of the viceroy. II. The audiencia of Charcas and the creation of the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata. III. Viceroy Ceballos and his army. IV. The Spanish-Portuguese treaty of 1777. V. The commercial code of 1778. VI. Viceroy Vertiz. VII. Fernandez general intendant of the army and the royal treasury. 153-173

CHAPTER VI

THE REVOLT OF TUPAC AMARU

- I. Abuse of the Indians by the Corregidores. II. Areche as visitador-general. III. Tupac Amaru. IV. The beginning of hostilities. V. The events of Oruro and Sangarara. VI. Hopes and aims of Tupac Amaru. VII. The overthrow and execution of the Inca. VIII. The sieges of Sorata and La Paz. IX. Results of the war. 174-203

CONTENTS

v

CHAPTER VII

THE REBELLION OF THE COMMUNEROS IN NEW GRANADA

- | | |
|---|--------------------------|
| I. Viceroy Flórez and the visitador-regente Piñéres. | |
| II. The outbreak in Socorro. | III. Organization of the |
| <i>Comun</i> under Berbeo, and the battle of Puente Real. | |
| IV. The advance on Bogotá, and the flight of the regent. | |
| V. The negotiations and the agreement. | VI. Galán and |
| VII. The Indians of Nemocon, and the | |
| conclusion of the conflict. | 204-226 |

CHAPTER VIII

THE CONSPIRACY OF GRAMUSET AND BERNEY

- | | |
|--|--|
| I. The revolt under Amat, governor and captain-general of Chile. | II. The conspiracy of Gramuset and Berney. |
| III. The arrest and imprisonment of the conspirators. | 227-240 |

CHAPTER IX

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE VICEROYALTY OF RIO DE LA PLATA

- | | |
|--|---|
| I. The <i>Ordinanza de Intendentes</i> . | II. Status and |
| functions of the intendants. | III. The ordinance applied |
| in Peru and Chile. | IV. The reformed ordinance of |
| 1801. | V. The state of Buenos Aires and the adjacent |
| | country. |
| | 241-255 |

CHAPTER X

AWAKENING INTEREST IN SCIENCE AND POLITICS: MUTIS AND NARIÑO

- | | |
|---|--|
| I. Beginnings of literary cultivation. | II. <i>El Mercurio Peruano; Papel Periodico</i> . |
| III. Mutis' arrival and early years in New Granada. | IV. Mutis turns to Botany; correspondence with Linnaeus. |
| V. Work of Caballero y Góngora for progress. | VI. The Botanical |

- Expedition. VII. The viceroy ordered to protect the Isthmus against invasion. VIII. The viceroy's commercial views. IX. Botanical Bureau's headquarters transferred to Bogotá. X. The Spanish Botanical Expedition to Peru. XI. Nariño and the young reformers and their trial. XII. Nariño in Europe; his return to New Granada and imprisonment. 256-291

CHAPTER XI

LIMA AND SANTIAGO AT THE END OF THE CENTURY

- I. The position and external form of Lima. II. The earthquake of 1746. III. The court of the viceroy and the institutions of Lima. IV. Social characteristics. V. Santiago de Chile. VI. The classes. 292-309

CHAPTER XII

THE STATE OF VENEZUELA AND MIRANDA'S EXPEDITION

- I. External attempts to overthrow Spanish rule. II. The captaincy-general of Venezuela. III. The revolt led by España and Gaul in 1797. IV. Manners and sentiments of the inhabitants of Venezuela. V. The unemployed and the remedy. VI. The economic confusion in the province. VII. Miranda's project. VIII. Plans of Great Britain and the United States. IX. The expedition from the United States. 311-336

CHAPTER XIII

THE BRITISH CAPTURE AND LOSS OF BUENOS AIRES

- I. The trade of Buenos Aires. II. Plans of Great Britain respecting South America. III. The British advance and capture of the city. IV. Liniers and the overthrow of Beresford. V. The cabildo and Liniers in power. VI. British reinforcements and the recall of Popham. VII. The final British attack. 337-370

CONTENTS

vii

CHAPTER XIV

PERU AND CHILE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY .

- I. The viceroys. II. *El Mercurio Peruano*. 3. Ambrosio O'Higgins. IV. The Araucanian question. V. Agriculture and the system of encomiendas. VI. Fear of foreign trade and foreign ideas. VII. The last viceroy of the eighteenth century. VIII. The population. IX. Commerce and industry. X. Titles of nobility and entailed estates. XI. Life in the country. XII. Hindrances to production. XIII. Royal drafts on the resources. 372-426

INDEX

427

SPAIN'S DECLINING POWER IN SOUTH AMERICA

INTRODUCTION

Spanish South America in the last decades of its dependence on Spain gave evidence of a decline in Spain's governmental authority and efficiency. The practice of the crown in conferring important offices in America only upon persons sent from Spain moved the creoles and mestizos gradually to constitute themselves a society apart from the Spaniards. This society drifted inevitably into opposition to the established administration, and led revolts against the government. These revolts, in many instances, were immediately occasioned by the imposition of specific fiscal burdens, and they indicate that the colonies were slipping from the grasp of Spain even before the creole-mestizo element in the population had clearly formed a design for emancipation. The expulsion of the Jesuits deprived the dependencies of their ablest and most effective teachers, and took from the industrial and commercial life some of the most energetic and far-sighted entrepreneurs. By this act, moreover, the government removed the only body of resi-

dents who manifested any clear conception of the proper relations to be maintained between the Spaniards and the Indians. The manner in which the development of interest in science and politics contributed to the spirit of patriotic independence is illustrated by the careers of Mutis and Nariño. The outlook towards independence is further presented in the negotiations and expedition of Miranda and the heroic defense and recapture of Buenos Aires by the citizens after Viceroy Sobremonte had ignominiously abandoned the field.

The stage on which these scenes were enacted was the part of the territory of South America then held by Spain and now claimed by Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. It embraces three of the four great river systems of the southern continent; those of the Orinoco, the Magdalena, and the Rio de la Plata. The principal geographical features of Venezuela are the mountains and the hilly country, occupying the northern and western parts of the territory, and the *llanos*, or plains, comprising the basin of the Orinoco, and extending from the western mountains to the delta of that river, an area of two hundred thousand square miles. In some parts of the plains there are low mesas, the remnants of an ancient plateau that has been gradually worn away by erosion. Other parts of this region are as level as the undisturbed ocean. Here nature, by the vigorous growth that follows the abundant rains,

resists the encroachments of man's cultivation, and hitherto has tolerated only the pastoral life of semi-nomads. In agreeable and fertile valleys, between the mountain ridges and the plains, lie a number of the principal centers of population that were slowly developed during the colonial period. Caracas, the most important of these, is about six miles from the port of La Guayra, at an elevation of three thousand feet above the level of the sea. Although within the tropics, this elevation ensures it a mild climate; the temperature ranges annually from 66° to 75°. In the colonial period, a road over the mountain was practically the only line of connection between the city and its port, but traffic by this route was greatly diminished by the opening of a railroad between the two places in 1883. Valencia and Barquisimeto are two other towns that lie within this zone of eternal spring. The former, near Lake Valencia, at an elevation of sixteen hundred and twenty-five feet, is a little warmer than Caracas, having a range of temperature from 66° to 87°, with an annual mean of 76°. Barquisimeto lies about two thousand feet above the sea. These interior towns have outrun in prosperity the earlier settlements of Coro and Cumaná, near the coast.

The part of the viceroyalty of New Granada that became the territory of Colombia extended along the Atlantic between fifteen hundred and sixteen hundred miles, and had a Pacific coast of

nearly the same extent. But in spite of the kingdom's more than three thousand miles of ocean coast, the real entrance to the country was, and has continued to be, the Magdalena River. It was by this water route that Quesada advanced to the land of the Chibchas, and founded Bogotá on the plateau of Cundinamarca. Santa Marta and Cartagena on the coast, the former east of the river and the latter west of it, were founded before any interior settlements, and remained important, particularly Cartagena, throughout the colonial period. Cartagena, with its excellent harbor, became the halting place for vessels engaged in trade with Peru, bound from Spain to the Isthmus. It was regarded as the bulwark of the country, and vast sums were expended on its walls and other defences. But Bogotá, established far from the coast and at an elevation of eight thousand six hundred and eighty feet above the level of the sea, became the political and ecclesiastical capital, and was reached from the northern coast only by a long journey on the Magdalena River to Honda, and by a difficult mountain trail from Honda to the plateau on which the city stands. Of the valleys of the tributaries of the Magdalena, that of the Cauca River was destined to become especially important by reason of its fertility and agreeable climate. The independent river Atrato, running through the low lands near the western coast and flowing into the gulf of Urabá, was sometimes regarded as furnishing, with the river San

Juan, a possible water-way from the Atlantic to the Pacific, but its low and marshy valley never acquired great significance in the life of the vice-royalty. It was at the elevated and isolated capital that the real struggle for civilization in this part of South America was carried on.

During the later decades of the colonial period, the territory of Ecuador was subject to the viceroy of New Granada, but in some part of the period Quito was the seat of an audiencia. This city derived some of its significance from the fact that it was the capital of a Quichua kingdom before the Spanish invasion. Its position in the Andean region that extends southward from Bogotá, at an elevation of 9350 feet above the level of the sea, gives it a temperate climate, although it lies directly on the equator. It is one hundred and fourteen miles from the coast and one hundred and sixty-five miles northeast of the port of Guayaquil. Through this port Quito had its connection with the traffic of the sea. Over this long and difficult route it sent out its products, particularly its textile fabrics, and imported much that it consumed of European wares. The road begun by Maldonado and designed to reach the port near the mouth of the river Esmeraldas was never completed, and in consequence of the difficulty of communication with the other dependencies and with Spain, the city and the region about it remained of only secondary importance in the colonial empire. The positions of both

Bogotá and Quito were determined by previous establishments of the Indians. The position of Lima, on the other hand, was fixed solely by considerations of convenience and advantage as they appeared to the Spaniards. Its founders, after due deliberation, decided in 1535 to plant it where it now stands, six miles from its port, five hundred feet above the sea, and on the banks of the river Rimac. In this they broke with the tradition of the Indians, who preferred the high lands, the slopes of the Andes, to the sandy coast of the Pacific, and who had already in Cuzco a considerable city. But the Indians had no need of commerce by the ocean, while this commerce was necessary to make useful for the Spaniards the wealth of the country. The ocean to the Indians was a limit of their lands, not a highway to a market. Under the Spaniards Lima became a market and a governmental residence. The wealth of the country was drawn from the mines in the mountains of Upper Peru, now Bolivia, and exchanged at Lima for imported European wares. This process gave character to two centers of civilization in Peru: Lima, the seat of the exchange, and cities, such as Chuquisaca, Oruro, and Potosí, that came into existence and flourished near the mines. They flourished while the mines continued to pour out their treasures, but, as the regions where they were established were unfavorable for agriculture, they declined when the mines ceased to yield in abundance. With the failure of the mines in

any given part of the high lands of Upper Peru there was no other form of production to provide an economic basis for society in the region in question. In Chile a different state of things prevailed. There was much profitable mining in the early decades, and the fertile soil offered abundant rewards for cultivation. When, therefore, the mines failed, the colony was able to rely on agriculture. The population in the mining regions of Peru increased with the prosperity of the mines, and diminished with their decline; in Chile it suffered no such fate; it had a slower but continuous growth; the wheat fields furnished a product for exportation hardly less valuable than that of the mines. The Pacific coast of Chile extends a distance of some three thousand miles from north to south, and the narrow land that lies along the foot of the Andes, between the mountains and the sea, forms, in the middle part of the country, one of the world's most favored fields for civilization. The desert lands of the rainless region of the north are in striking contrast with those settled in the period of Spanish colonization. In the vast nitrate deposits they have a source of great wealth, but none of the natural conditions that promote the establishment and growth of progressive society. In that part of the long valley where the city of Santiago lies at an elevation of two thousand feet, the fertile soil and the mild climate make this part of Chile an especially attractive seat of human cul-

ture. The lower levels of the southern districts of Chile present a rare and fruitful combination of field, forest, lake, and river, but the stout resistance of the Araucanians prevented the full exploitation of this region in the period here under consideration.

In the southeastern part of the continent, as well as in Chile, agricultural resources induced only a late social development. The barren mountains of the northern part of the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata supported flourishing and populous cities, while the rich lands drained by the La Plata River system showed few signs of progress. But the later state of the low-land cities, compared with the mining cities of the high lands, furnishes a further confirmation of the fact that the race is not always to the swift. Decade had followed decade throughout the greater part of the eighteenth century, with little change except what might be observed in the increasing herds of the plains and the growth of contraband trade through Colonia. The pampas, or plains, of Argentina, extending six or seven hundred miles from the foothills of the Andes to the Rio de la Plata and the Atlantic, with a regular incline in that distance of somewhat more than two thousand feet, and stretching fourteen hundred or fifteen hundred miles from north to south, has no equally extensive rivals in fertility and possible productiveness except the valley of the Mississippi and the plains of Russia. The rich pastures

of Argentina and Uruguay, in the course of decades became covered with vast herds, the natural increase of the horses and cattle that had been abandoned by the early settlers of Buenos Aires. In these herds the inhabitants had for the taking an abundance of flesh for food and hides for the limited foreign commerce. Supplied with this form of food without great effort, and with the danger of extreme want removed, the bulk of the inhabitants became preëminently flesh-eaters. For many years there was lacking an effective incentive to the production of articles that would adequately furnish a more varied diet. But through the stimulus of a freer commerce and an enlarged market, agriculture was gradually developed, and became a rival of pastoral cultivation. Under the larger freedom of commerce accorded by the code of 1778, Buenos Aires distanced all other ports of this southeastern part of Spain's possessions. Asuncion in Paraguay, that had flourished in the earlier decades, became a stagnant capital of an earthly paradise. With its herds and fruits, its tobacco and maté, Paraguay presented physical conditions that seemed to favor prosperity and progress. Its impediments were its isolation in the interior of the continent, about a thousand miles up the river from the more favored ports of Buenos Aires and Montevideo, its preponderance of Indian blood in the population, and the unreasonable internal conflict between secular and ecclesiastical factions.

But an economic awakening, after two hundred years of stagnation, appeared in this region, with the failure of Spain's policy of restriction and the adoption of the code of 1778. Prior to this change, the government in Spain had been illustrating throughout these vast dominions, how human cultivation and progress may be throttled and suppressed in the presence of material resources greater than any that had previously appeared in the history of the world.

Within this territory there were developed different political groups whose varying social characteristics were due in a large measure to the natural environment of the several groups and to the different qualities of the Indians who became amalgamated with the Spanish invaders. The history of these groups, or political entities dependent on Spain is a part of Spanish history; at least some changes effected in the course of their growth were ordered by the supreme political authority, and may be observed from the viewpoint of Spain. But there were other changes or events in this development that proceeded from the conscious designs of the colonists, from the efforts of settlers in a strange country to adjust themselves to their new circumstances, and from the unconscious influences of the widely varying nature in the different provinces. These latter events and forces seldom rose above the Madrid horizon, and this fact makes it necessary to assume a position outside of that horizon in order

to obtain a complete view of the life that went on in the colonies. From the viewpoint of the king and the Council of the Indies, an account of the history of the dependencies may very well have a larger measure of unity than when presented from the viewpoint of colonial life that varied greatly in the different dependencies. But by emphasizing the events or movements affecting all the colonies, such as the growth of a creole-mestizo society, an awakening intellectual interest in nature and politics, the overthrow of a religious order established in all of the colonies, and the rebellions and conspiracies of the last decades of the century, as features common to many political divisions, the history of Spanish South America, even when considered from the viewpoint of colonial conditions, may seem to have a certain unity, in spite of the wide geographical separation, and the differing qualities of the inhabitants, of the several dependencies.

Spain's power in America gave evidence of declining before the colonies showed any signs of an effective organization designed to supplant legitimate authority. For decades the principal indication of change was the indisposition of officials in the colonies to carry out, or force the strict execution of, the laws. In very many instances there was apparently no thought of creating a new power, only a protest against the conduct of the existing government. In the period here examined, from 1730 to 1806, the decline

was hardly stayed even by the energy of Charles III. In fact, that king's most positive show of administrative strength, the expulsion of the Jesuits, did not hinder but rather hastened the decline of Spanish power in the colonies. The king and the Council of the Indies continued to issue decrees in the spirit of Spain's governmental traditions, but the officials in America displayed increasing reluctance to execute them exactly. The colonists frequently supported this attitude of the officials, because it was often materially advantageous to them that the royal decrees should not be carried out. The history of these last decades of Spanish rule in South America shows the affairs of the colonies drifting towards the crisis reached in the war of independence.

CHAPTER I

THE BEGINNINGS OF A NEW SOCIETY

- I. The Relation of the Spaniards to the Indians. II. Spaniards, Creoles, and Mestizos. III. The new society.

I

A CIVILIZED nation of this century, attempting to adjust itself to a less developed people, has for its instruction a number of experiments by other modern nations, but when the Spaniards undertook the control of Indians in America, they were pioneers; they had for their guidance only the experience of Spain in her internal affairs. They had known a society where classes were widely separated, and such a society they fostered in the New World. They undertook to transfer to America the social distinctions that were the legitimate product of a long differentiating social growth. They exerted powerful influences to make life in the colonies grow into conformity with the European type. They put forth distinct efforts to counteract any democratic influence, or any non-European social forms, that might issue from the conditions of a new country. They created a titled nobility, and, where titles were not formally granted, the relation of the encom-

endero to his dependents offered a distinctly recognized superior and inferior. And whatever influence the church exerted was clearly in favor of centralized authority; it was in no sense suggestive of equality or of a democratic social organization. In fact, in all the activity of the earlier phases of colonial life in South America, there was no anticipation of a point of view different from that which had been traditional in Spain.

The Indians were adopted as an element in the society of the colonies. The absence of any conception of equality was important. It left a place in the social order for the Indians. In New England, on the contrary, the notion of equality appeared. The Indian could not, in any time allotted to him, rise to equality with the European; and the New Englander, by not providing a lower subordinate or vassal class, left no place for him.

The Spaniard built magnificent churches, filled them with decorations, and organized brilliant processions to attract the barbarians. The government, moreover, provided penalties for keeping Indians from the churches on certain specified occasions. The New Englander built churches, and insisted on the absence of artistic decoration. To these churches he went in solemn and exclusive devotion, armed and munitioned against any Indian who might dare to appear. In the Spanish colony inequality was recognized from

the beginning, and the Indian had a place in the lower divisions of the social structure. In the English colonies the spirit of equality excluded him.

The retention of the Indians as an element in Spanish-American society provided occasion for the rise of a class of mestizos to bridge the social chasm between the Europeans and the Indians. In dealing with this class the Spaniards displayed a degree of wisdom not always shown in later colonizing by other nations. In Java, for instance, under the Dutch, a distinct line of discrimination was drawn between the European and the Javanese. All persons having any measure of European blood were counted as Europeans. They held themselves aloof from the natives of pure blood, but neither their attainments nor their ambitions enabled them to participate, without prejudice, in the activities of the Dutch. The Spaniards gave no such artificial position to the mestizos. These products of Spanish-Indian unions were numerous. Their origin and qualities were recognized, but they were not separated either from the Indians or the Spaniards by any hard and fast line. They were allowed to take their chances of rising or falling in the communities of their residence. Neither custom nor law hedged them about in a restricted position. The population of the Spanish dependencies was thus shaded off through the creoles, the mestizos, and the semi-civilized Indians down to the untamed savages.

II

The Spaniards did, however, draw a line of demarcation, but in this discrimination the differences of races played no part. The line was drawn between Spaniards born in Spain and Spaniards of the same stock born in America; in a word, between Spaniards and creoles. It was conceived that a great gulf was fixed between the Spaniards who were born in Spain and the members of the same people who were born and lived in a Spanish colony.

The depreciation of the creoles was so extreme and general that Spanish parents who emigrated held in very different regard their children who were born in Spain and those who were born later in America. In public affairs the same prejudice was manifest. The Spanish-creole conflict extended even to the monks in the monasteries. The occupants of the monasteries and of the numerous religious houses of all kinds were composed of two diverse elements, Spaniards and creoles, who lived in almost perpetual hostility. The high civil and ecclesiastical offices were given to Spaniards but not to creoles. But in the course of time the creoles became a numerous class. They acquired wealth; and many of them, taking advantage of the facilities for instruction in Lima, Cordova, Santiago, Bogotá, and Caracas, as well as in different parts of Europe, became men of extensive intellectual attainments and cultivation.

They knew the circumstances and needs of the colonies, and were conscious of their own fitness to have a part in the colonial government. When, therefore, they were excluded from public office, they very naturally felt that they were the victims of an unjust discrimination. By this attitude of the Spanish government, all persons thus unjustly affected, their relatives, their friends, and their dependents were drawn together into the solidarity of an increasingly powerful opposition.

Even in her virtuous solicitude for the welfare of her unmarried daughters, Spain strengthened this opposition and helped to prepare for a social revolution in America. By positive law and by the restraints of an efficient administrative system, unmarried Spanish women were prevented from emigrating; but a large number of the men who went to the colonies were unmarried. The inevitable consequence of this state of affairs was the rise of a large class of mestizos, who became affiliated with the increasing class of creoles.

Another consequence of the amalgamation of the Spanish and Indian peoples was the creation of marked differences among the populations of different districts. The differing Indian peoples in their union with Spaniards produced descendants of varying qualities. Much of the character of the bold, hardy, independent Araucanian reappeared in the Chilean mestizo. The gentle Peruvian Indians, on the other hand, under the severe discipline of their rulers, were unfavorably

placed for developing heroic qualities; and they passed on to their mestizo descendants the virtues of gentleness and amiability rather than the sterner qualities of a warlike people. Thus, in the course of time, within the limits of her South American dominions, Spain had to deal not with one homogeneous people, but with a number of nations, who, although using a common language, were about as unlike one another as are the nations of Western Europe. These differences of character among the inhabitants of the several political divisions imposed a heavy administrative task upon Spain at a time when she was undertaking to govern her vast colonial empire under a system that took no account of social differences or the varying demands of unlike climatic conditions. Under this state of things Spain's government of her dependencies became gradually more ineffective, and this lessening of the disciplinary power of the legitimate régime permitted the growth of the creole-mestizo party of opposition, and the development in it of community self-consciousness and a certain sense of independence. While the application of Spain's rigid system of colonial government might find favor in one quarter, it tended to provoke dissatisfaction and a temper of revolt in another. It pleased Lima, because the merchants of that city enjoyed important commercial privileges; but Buenos Aires had no privileges, had not even the advantages of freedom of trade, and consequently manifested a rapidly declining loyalty; and, as

subsequent events proved, the chain of provincial administrations in the colonies was no stronger than the weakest link. The triumphant self-assertion of the new society in one province meant its ultimate domination in all other provinces. The line of cleavage between the new society and the old, between the creole-mestizo element and the Spanish element, appeared, from one viewpoint, as the line between privileges and no privileges, between the recipients of political favors and those who were excluded from such favors.

In view of the fact that many of the Indians, notably the Chibchas, of Colombia, and the Aymaras of Peru, represented a certain phase of civilization, the mestizos shaded off imperceptibly into the Indians of pure blood. In connection with this fact, one is able to see the importance of that feature of Spain's policy which provided for the adoption of the Indians as members of the colonial society. This was in marked contrast with the English plan. The Spaniards accepted the Indian but assigned him a social position like that held by a dependent class recognized in the European feudal order. With the Indians in feudal subjection to Spaniards it was thought to be possible to preserve in Spanish America differentiated classes corresponding with those of Europe. But the more important result of the adoption of the Indians into the body of colonial society was the fact that, separated by their dependent position from the Spanish encomenderos and the official class, they became attached to, or embodied in,

the creole-mestizo element, and thus constituted an effective part of the new society.

In what may be called the germ of colonial society, there was no middle class between the encomendero and his dependent Indians; but the lack was supplied in the course of time by the appearance of the mestizos, the landless creoles, and the adopted Indians. The development continued until the population of Spanish South America embraced, on the one hand, a class of Spanish officials and other Spaniards who conserved the interests and traditions of Spain, and, on the other hand, the combined classes of creoles, mestizos, and Indians. When this point had been attained, a far-reaching social change was impending. Its practical crisis, or the self-assertion of the hitherto suppressed party, was delayed by the isolation of the colonies and the consequent absence of free intellectual activity. During the seventeenth century this isolation was practically complete, except for the infrequent communication that was maintained between the colonies and Spain. No enlightenment came at this time to the mass of the people from the English colonies, for these colonies were still in the period of their feeble beginnings; and the subjects of other European nations were effectually excluded. The importation of books of information was prohibited, and no ray of light reached them except that which passed through the distorting mind of the Spanish ecclesiastics.

III

A revival of nationalism in Spain in the second quarter of the eighteenth century tended to confirm the loyalty of the colonial officials; but it did not remove the alienation of the increasing body of creoles, mestizos, and Indians. The line of separation became fixed. The old policy of privilege and unjust discrimination was continued. The viceroys, the captains general, the judges, the high ecclesiastics, the bulk of the priests, in short, all the holders of desirable offices continued to be sent from Spain, and men born in the colonies, whatever might be their attainments or fitness for the posts in question, were neglected, were left without political recognition. The line excluding the creoles, the mestizos, and the Indians from any participation in the public affairs that concerned them, was becoming every year more distinctly recognized.

Although the Spanish government appears to have been entirely unaware of the fact, in the neglected members of the colonies were laid the foundations of a new society. From this point onward through the succeeding decades of Spanish colonial politics we observe the decline of one section of the population and the rise of the other section. We observe, moreover, the attempt on the part of Spain to govern the colonies in accordance with her original plan, and the recurring evidence of her inability to adapt herself to the

changing conditions and the changing needs of the colonies. Three facts in this history, however, assured the superiority and ultimate domination of the creole-mestizo class. One of these was the continuation by the Spanish government of its uncompromising, repelling, and exclusive attitude towards that class, thus keeping alive class antagonisms; another was the fact that the number of persons born in the colonies, creoles and mestizos, in a given period was in excess of the number added to the population by immigration; a third was the fact that the creoles and mestizos were practically the only persons who were sufficiently openminded to receive the liberal ideas that gradually drifted into the colonies from foreign countries, particularly from Great Britain and the now awakened British colonies in America. The failure of the Spaniards living in the colonies to be influenced by imported ideas was not due to any intellectual inferiority on their part as compared with the creoles, but to the fact that they were placed in a non-receptive mood by the offices or commercial privileges which they enjoyed, and by their natural adherence to the ideas and spirit of Spain. All the higher officials, civil, military, and ecclesiastical, were opposed to any access of liberalism, since their privileges were created and upheld by the government's conservative policy; and coming, as they did, from Spain, they very naturally stood for the ideas dominant in the country they had left. Thus

the enlightenment which gradually streamed in through the breaking walls of Spain's exclusiveness influenced especially the members of the new society. Their attainment of more liberal ideas through their growing connection with Great Britain and the British colonies carried them farther and farther from the position of those who represented the old order of things. The new society became more and more clearly conscious of the separation. It became conscious, moreover, that its interests were opposed to the purposes of the Spanish government; and that these interests would be properly safeguarded only by its control of the public affairs which concerned its members.

The discussions, the agitation, the rebellions, and the military campaigns of the later decades of the eighteenth century and the early years of the nineteenth century gave evidence of dissatisfaction with the old order of affairs, and reveal efforts, often misdirected, to realize new ideals. The ideas and sentiments of the new society, or the opposition party, determined the most conspicuous events in the history of the last quarter of the century. This creole-mestizo element of the population resented the centuries-long manifestation of Spain's arrogance and exclusiveness; it resented the injustice of her social discrimination; and this resentment inspired the rebellions and conspiracies that seemed to presage the end of Spanish rule.

CHAPTER II

STATE OF SPANISH SOUTH AMERICA IN THE MIDDLE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

- I. Peru in the middle of the century.
- II. The aftermath of Antequera's rebellion.
- III. The controversy concerning Colonia.
- IV. Montevideo and Tucuman.
- V. Two decades of Chilean affairs.
- VI. The University of Chile.
- VII. New Granada under the last colonial presidents.
- VIII. The state of Quito.
- IX. The reestablished viceroyalty of New Granada.
- X. Santo Thomé and the missions of the plains.
- XI. The little revolution of Trinidad.

I

IN the later decades of Spanish rule the native element in the population became conscious of its real position, of its exclusion from places of authority, and gradually constituted itself a party of opposition and reform in the several dependencies. The activity of the French merchants in the beginning of the century had shown to the colonists the advantages of a large measure of freedom in commercial affairs. The officials in the Indies failed to execute the decrees of the superior authorities, designed to restrict trade with the colonies to Spanish merchants, and in this they were upheld by the colonists. After the

first important shock, the ancient system providing for monopolies and the exclusion of foreign trade never regained its lost vigor and effectiveness.

Near the middle of the century the internal affairs of the viceroyalty of Peru were overwhelmed in confusion. Lima and Callao were destroyed by the earthquake of 1746, and four years later the inhabitants of the capital were threatened with destruction by an uprising of the Indians. The plans of the leaders of the insurgents were revealed to the viceroy, and this information was confirmed by the testimony of a person who had succeeded in gaining access to a meeting of the hostile junta. Six of the principal conspirators were executed. Others escaped and moved the province of Huarochiri to revolt. They killed a number of the officials and other Spaniards, destroyed roads and bridges, and attempted to defend themselves in the fastnesses of the mountains. They were, however, driven out by a force of four hundred men sent against them. Having been defeated, some were killed on the spot, and others suffered the extreme penalty in Lima.

During the middle decades of the century, the viceregal authority in Peru was exercised by Armendáriz, the Marquis of Castel-Fuerte (1724–1736), Mendoza, the Marquis of Villagarcía (1736–1745), and Velasco, the Count of Superunda (1746–1761).

Juan and Ulloa's report, the *Noticias secretas*, presents a series of contemporary views of Peru's internal condition at this time. It emphasizes the frivolity, the greed, and the irregular living of at least a part of the clergy. It reveals the partisan conflicts that disturbed the monasteries and the convents, particularly on the occasion of elections. It sets forth the merciless exactions of the corregidores as the sole traders within their respective districts; makes clear the oppression and cruelty suffered by the laborers in the manufacturing establishments; and indicates some of the burdens borne by the Indians under the system of the mita. In this period occurred, moreover, the expeditions and assaults of Anson and Vernon.

II

In the province of Paraguay, the career of Antequera had left a legacy of rebellion and anarchy. Nevertheless, a few weeks after Antequera's departure, Bishop Palos wrote to the king concerning the insurrection, and informed him that the province had been pacified "without bloodshed by the prudent conduct of the governor of Rio de la Plata, Don Bruno Maurice de Zabala, who in obedience to the pressing orders of Joseph Armendáriz, the Marquis of Castel-Fuerte, your viceroy, came here with sufficient force for that purpose."¹ But the peace announced by Bishop

¹ Charlevoix, Pierre François Xavier de, *The History of Paraguay*, London, 1769, II, 220.

Palos "was no more than a deceitful calm; which was soon followed by a storm a great deal more furious than that which had been allayed."² The supporters of the revolutionary movement wished to transfer the Indians of the reductions from ecclesiastical to secular authority, from the Jesuits to encomenderos. In 1729 the viceroy of Peru sent Martin de Barúa to Paraguay with a special commission to pacify the province. At the same time Bartolomé de Aldunate was ordered to proceed to Paraguay, but affairs in Buenos Aires, where he was a captain of infantry, required his presence in that city, and the government of Paraguay remained in the hands of Barúa. But Barúa failed to execute the viceroy's orders. This fact and the partisan support accorded to him by the insurgents indicated that he had departed widely from the purpose of his mission. The insurgents, or comuneros, wished to make the wealth of the reductions, or missions, available to persons not belonging to the Society of Jesus. With this end in view, it was proposed that Spanish corregidores and regidores should be established in all of the reductions, where, it was affirmed, there were one hundred and fifty thousand Indians who paid no tribute to the king. It was proposed, moreover, that there should be maintained in Asuncion an office where the tribute to be paid by the Indians might be received. These propositions having been considered by the Council of the Indies, a royal decree was sent to

² Charlevoix, *History of Paraguay*, II, 222.

the governors of Paraguay and Rio de la Plata, ordering them to collect the imposts and tribute payable by the Indians in accordance with the laws in force throughout the kingdom of Peru. They were also ordered to inquire into the reasons why this had not been done before; and they should report to the viceroy. But when these decrees arrived at Buenos Aires events had occurred in Paraguay that made their execution impracticable.³

The comuneros had usurped the governmental power in Asuncion, and excluded the legitimate authorities. In July, 1730, Ferdinand Mompo, or Mompox, arrived at Asuncion. He was born in the kingdom of Valencia; he had practised law in Lima; had been confined for a period in the prison of the inquisition; had acquired by association somewhat of Antequera's spirit; and in virtue of this association he was received with special favor in Paraguay. He was given a seat in the cabildo, and was consulted on all important matters by the comuneros. When it had become known that Soroeta had been appointed governor of Paraguay, Mompo sent to the viceroy a memorial framed in the name of the commune, setting forth the grave inconveniences and disturbances that would result from Soroeta's appearance in Asuncion. Mompo urged, moreover, that as Soroeta was a partisan of the Jesuits and a friend of Diego de los Reyes, he ought not to be permitted

³ Zinny, Antonio, *Historia de los gobernantes del Paraguay, 1535-1887.* Buenos Aires, 1887, 165.

to enter the province, and that Barúa should continue to be the governor. A copy of this memorial was sent to Santa Fé by a messenger, who placed it in the hands of Soroeta. The messenger was instructed not to wait for a reply. But in spite of the warning contained in this memorial, Soroeta determined to continue his journey to Asuncion. This act of defiance made definite the breach between the commune and the legitimate government, and created a revolutionary interregnum, lasting from 1730 until the arrival of Governor Manuel Augustin de Ruiloba y Calderon in July, 1733. During these three years, the party known as the comuneros dominated the affairs of Paraguay.

When Governor Ignacio Soroeta arrived at the Tebicuary, he halted to await replies to the communications previously sent to Barúa, to the bishop, and to the cabildo. The bishop advised him to postpone his advance in view of the embarrassment and danger that would arise from his presence in Asuncion. Barúa presented certain documents concerning the state of affairs, one of these documents affirming that, during the absence of the Jesuits from the college, peace and order had prevailed, but that disturbance and sedition had followed their return. The cabildo expressed its determination to obey the orders of the king; but it has been suggested that the words of the cabildo rather than its acts were favorable to peace and harmony. After further correspon-

dence, relating in part to a safe-conduct demanded by Soroeta, a force of four hundred soldiers appeared at the Tebicuary on the 17th of January, 1731, under the pretext of furnishing the safe-conduct required, but in reality to escort Soroeta to Asuncion as a prisoner. As Soroeta approached the city, he found that his escort had been increased by fifteen hundred persons of all classes and conditions, not merely Spaniards, but also negroes, mulattos, mestizos, and Indians. This demonstration was evidently designed to terrify Soroeta, but no such result was observable: he proceeded, without apparent anxiety, to the cathedral, where he was received by the bishop and other members of the clergy. The pretense of loyalty displayed by Barúa and the cabildo was a mere sham. When Soroeta went to visit Barúa, he was attended by a squad of eight or ten soldiers, who entered the reception room and caused the governor great embarrassment by participating in the conversation. During the four days and a half which Soroeta spent in the city, he was virtually a prisoner in his own house. He left Asuncion on the 28th of January, accompanied by the second alcalde and a regidor as far as the river Tebicuary, whence he passed to Nuestra Señora de Fé, and then to Lima by way of Chile.

Although apparently in full sympathy with the revolutionary party, Barúa appeared to be reluctant to exercise the gubernatorial power beyond the legal term of his office; and after the

STATE OF SPANISH DEPENDENCIES

departure of Soroeta, the civil government Paraguay was directed by the cabildo of Asuncion while the military affairs were controlled by the maestro de campo appointed by the commune.⁴

The comuneros, who had been more or less guided by the advice of Mompo, finally discovered in him the evil genius of their confusion, and saw the need of an efficient organization. They determined to elect a president, and the choice fell on the alcalde Barreiro, who was regarded as the chief of the radicals. But they had later to abandon their mistaken view. Barreiro's first important service was to rid the province of Mompo. By the ruse of a journey to Yaguaron, he conducted him to the Tebicuary where he was arrested and sent to Buenos Aires. This act, apparently in the royal service, provoked a conspiracy against Barreiro. This had an unfavorable outcome for the chief conspirators, Bartolomé Galán and Miguel de Garay, on whom Barreiro caused the sentence of death to be pronounced. In the bitter partisan conflict that ensued, Barreiro raised the standard of the king, but this elicited only a limited response of loyalty, and Barreiro's cause was lost. He fled to the missions, and Miguel de Garay took his place. Feeding that the newly awakened hostilities in Asuncion

⁴ Regarding the conduct of this government, Lozano remarked: "Lo que en este célebre gobierno pasó solo Dios lo sabe todo porque era tal el desconcierto que ni aun los mismos oficiales hacían capaces de todo lo que sucedía." *Historia de las revoluciones de la provincia de Paraguay*, (1721-1735), Buenos Aires 1905, ii, 54.

cion might be directed against them, the Indians of the missions were assembled for defense at the Tebicuary. This act in turn alarmed the comuneros, in whose eyes the four thousand mission Indians were magnified to a force of ten thousand men. In giving expression to their fear the comuneros spread the report that the Indians were about to invade Asuncion and put the inhabitants to the sword.

In the meantime Antequera, the former leader of the rebellion, was a prisoner in Lima. His execution and that of Juan de Mena, after an imprisonment of five years, helped to inflame rather than to allay the passions of the opposing parties. The daughter of Mena, now the widow of Ramon de las Llanas, changed her mourning costume for gala dress on hearing of the death of her father, thus making public proclamation of her view that he had died gloriously for the country. The memory of Antequera and Mena, in the following months, excited the comuneros to new zeal, and revived their hostility to the Jesuits. The aroused partisans of Antequera's views proposed new crimes in the name of the public weal: in February, 1732, they expelled the Jesuits from their college and plundered their property.

The details of the social confusion following these events reveal a society in process of dissolution. The Jesuits of the missions feared an irruption of the comuneros, and prepared for defense. The comuneros, on the other hand,

fancied that the missions in their activity were, in fact, preparing for conquest. There was no authority in Paraguay commanding general respect or obedience; and that security of property which encourages production and economy was wanting. To political confusion was added increasing poverty.

In order to put an end to hostilities, Governor Zabala called a council of war in Buenos Aires. The result of its deliberations was an order to the commandant of Corrientes to take a force of two hundred men and join the troops stationed on the Tebicuary. But the missions were not in immediate danger of invasion. The king and the Council of the Indies were apparently convinced that the Paraguayans were not competent to work out their social salvation independently. Therefore, in order to make peace and restore the province to a normal state, they intrusted the government to Manual Agustin Ruiloba. The viceroy recognized the difficulty of the undertaking, and urged Governor Zabala and the provincial of the Jesuits to give Ruiloba all possible assistance. The arrival at Asuncion of Bishop Arregui and the withdrawal of the troops encamped on the Tebicuary seemed for the moment to promise peace; but discord and the spirit of contention were too profoundly rooted in the community to yield to any other remedy than force. This fact was clearly recognized by Governor Ruiloba; for, on arriving at San Ignacio in

1733, he ordered the large bodies of Indian troops to maintain their position, and he provided that all other men capable of bearing arms should be enlisted. The policy of waiting for the evils to cure themselves had apparently come to an end; and in contemplating the new policy, the comuneros experienced a sudden conversion. When Ruiloba had reached the Tebicuary, deputies from Asuncion appeared, conveying to him the congratulations of the cabildo and General Sebastian Fernandez Mantiel, who assured him of their determination to obey the orders of the king.

Ruiloba's favorable beginning was followed by less fortunate conduct. His severe and uncompromising attitude was effective in silencing the old opposition, but a new opposition was aroused by his indiscreet utterances after his arrival in Asuncion, and by replacing important officials with persons in his confidence. He, moreover, described as rebellious and criminal acts held by the actors to be patriotic. The comuneros were thus brought to face the alternatives of humiliating subserviency and a new uprising. They chose the latter. And when the governor was informed of this movement, he proceeded to suppress it with the limited military force at his command, a force especially limited at this time by reason of the large number of soldiers who had deserted to the ranks of the commune. At this stage, when an active conflict appeared to be imminent, Bishop Arregui assumed the role of mediator. Governor

Ruiloba was, however, not in a mood to make concessions, and when the comuneros discovered his position in this regard, they attacked him, dragged him from his horse, and made him pay the penalty of his stubbornness with his life (September 15, 1733).

The removal of Governor Ruiloba left the community without a controlling authority, and then followed the evils and crimes incident to a headless society. In this state of affairs, Arregui was elected governor, and a council was created. Arregui had been appointed bishop of Buenos Aires, and as a bishop clothed with the executive power in Paraguay, he found himself approving, at least formally, measures entirely inconsistent with his character as the religious and moral guide of a community. In his name as governor, property was confiscated, and many innocent persons were thrown into hopeless poverty. Antagonism to the Jesuits prompted the council to formulate two orders respecting them for the approval of the governor. One was that they should remove all their property from the province. The other was that the seven pueblos, or reductions, San Ignacio Guazu, Nuestra Señora de Fé, Santa Rosa, Santiago, Itapuá, La Trinidad, and Jesus, should be removed beyond the Paraná, leaving free the lands they had occupied in Paraguay.

The bishop-governor signed these orders; but he began to appreciate the absurdity of his posi-

tion, particularly after Bishop Palos of Paraguay and the provincial of the Jesuits had labored to enlighten him. He saw that he had been the tool of a reckless community. He also became conscious of the necessity of renouncing the part he had played in its proceedings. Believing that there would be opposition to his retirement, he made it appear that his presence in Buenos Aires was required, and, leaving in his place Cristoval Dominguez de Obelar, he departed for Buenos Aires in December, 1733, followed a little later by Bishop Palos.

The measures projected against the property of the Jesuits and the missions induced Governor Zabala to provide for their defense. He ordered the Indians of military training to guard their frontiers and organize new forces. When the viceroy was informed of the tragic death of Rui-loba, he commanded that all communication with Paraguay should be cut off, and that the effects of the Paraguayans at Corrientes and Santa Fé should be confiscated. Zabala assumed command of the missions, and caused their military efficiency to be increased by the introduction of military instruction. He took one hundred and fifty soldiers from Buenos Aires, and, with seven thousand Indians, established his camp twelve or fifteen miles from the Tebicuary, in January, 1735. The comuneros, alarmed by the approach of so large a force, prepared to enlist for defense all persons capable of bearing arms. Against the

forces of the commune, that had taken up a position near the frontier, Zabala sent a detachment of fifty veterans, two hundred and eighteen Paraguayans who had joined him, and two hundred Indians from the missions. These were under the command of Captain Martin José de Echaurri. When they arrived at the encampment of the enemy, they found it deserted. Bernardino Martinez led the pursuit, attacked the retreating troops, and took the artillery and a large number of prisoners; the rest fled in confusion. Zabala found many of the leading insurgents among the prisoners, five of whom were put to death, and fifteen were sent into exile. The result of this conflict was nothing less than the subjugation of the whole province of Paraguay to the legitimate government.

The Paraguayans had long enjoyed the privilege of electing their governor in case of vacancy, but the exercise of this privilege disturbed the peace and orderly conduct of the province. Zabala recognized this fact, and ordered the abolition of the practice. He, moreover, established regulations designed to counteract the tendencies of the revolutionary spirit. He caused the murderers of Ruiloba to be executed, and restored the confiscated property to its owner. Bishop Palos, who had fled to Buenos Aires, learned with satisfaction of the extermination of "the wolves that had destroyed his flock,"⁵ and

⁵ Funes, Gregorio, *Ensayo de la historia civil de Buenos Aires, Tucuman y Paraguay*, Buenos Aires, 1856, II, 37.

returned to Asuncion, where the Jesuits were reinstated in their college, and order and the reign of law was once more established. For the reconstructed province, Martin José de Echaurren was appointed governor, and, with his mission accomplished, Zabala departed for Buenos Aires in 1735.

Although order was restored in Paraguay, the hostility of the parties was not abated. The surviving antagonism was especially manifest in charges against the Jesuits, designed to discredit them and their work in the mind of the king. The province, long distracted by internal conflicts and confusion, was now tormented by repeated incursions of the barbarous Indians. With all these afflictions, it lost its prestige. The controversy between Spain and Portugal concerning the boundary; the war of the seven reductions; and the final expulsion of the Jesuits maintained the notoriety of Paraguay for a period; but it then lapsed into obscurity for half a century.

III

During the period of internal disorder in Paraguay, Uruguay was the scene of an international contest. The Portuguese held a large part of the coast; they were gradually pressing down from the north; and they appeared to be firmly established in possession of Colonia. Two circumstances had rendered them bold and aggressive: one was the weakness and demoralization

of Spain under Charles II; the other was the attitude of England as the protector of Portugal's commercial and maritime interests. With a sense of security thus established, they persisted in advancing their boundary and in increasing their contraband trade. They were moved to this latter undertaking by the high prices in the Spanish colonies caused by Spain's restrictive commercial policy.

Other European nations, England, France, and Holland, found an advantage for themselves in Portugal's position, since Colonia furnished them a place of secure deposit for their wares, and a base for contraband trade with Spanish colonial markets. In view of the fact that the Portuguese court supported this encroachment and settlement on territory claimed by Spain, the governor of Rio de la Plata had little hope of maintaining his rights by negotiation, and consequently resorted to force. He captured the Portuguese commander, Lobo, and all his garrison, caused the fortifications of Colonia to be destroyed, and transported the prisoners with their arms and artillery to Buenos Aires. But the protests of Portugal, supported by England and France, cowed the government of Spain. In spite of the energy displayed in maintaining the rights of Spain, Governor Gorro was recalled, and appointed governor of Chile. But before entering upon the duties of his new office, Gorro was obliged to suffer the humiliation of being detained in Cordova at the request of the Portuguese gov-

ernment; and Spain, wishing to avoid further conflict, entered into a treaty with Portugal. This treaty not only annulled all the advantages that might have been derived from the taking of Colonia, but also obliged Spain to restore that settlement to Portugal. This was for Spain an unpropitious beginning of a long controversy.

By the treaty of 1701, Colonia was formally ceded to Portugal, but in the war of the Spanish succession, Portugal took the side of England against France and Spain, and, for this reason, the viceroy of Peru, then holding jurisdiction over the whole of Spanish South America, assumed that he was not bound by the treaty, and ordered the governor of Rio de la Plata to mobilize his forces and take possession of the post. Under the command of Captain García Ros, the Spanish forces laid seige to Colonia on October 17, 1704, and the members of the Portuguese garrison, finding they were unable to withstand the attacking party, took to their boats and fled. The artillery and the munitions of war fell into the hands of the victors.

Philip V had very little knowledge of America and apparently no appreciation of the importance of Colonia. When, therefore, the British, still having in mind the commercial opportunities which the possession of the place offered, urged that, in spite of the Spanish victory, it should be given up to the Portuguese, the king of Spain assented, and this cession was confirmed by the treaty of Utrecht. The sixth article of this treaty

provided, "That His Catholic Majesty ceded forever and in perpetuity the Plaza de la Colonia with the territory necessary for its defense and security, to His Majesty the king of Portugal and to his successors by whatever line and right they might come to occupy the throne, without this cession in any case and for any reason being able to be invalidated."

IV

The advance of the Portuguese and their evident determination to establish themselves at a point commanding the mouth of the Rio de la Plata induced the Spaniards to endeavor to prevent this by seeking to increase the population of Montevideo. This little village already contained a number of families who had arrived from the Canaries in the early years of the eighteenth century. Special inducements were now offered to persons who would settle there. Among other advantages they would have free transportation thither for themselves and their families. Lots in the town and land for cultivation would be granted to them. Each settler would receive two hundred head of cattle and one hundred sheep, a quantity of grain for seed, and certain articles of food for the first year.⁶ It was provided by the

⁶ Bauzá, Francisco, *Historia de la dominación española en el Uruguay*, Montevideo, 1895, I, 483; Mitre, *Historia de Belgrano*, I, 47; Zinny, Antonio, *Historia de los gobernadores de las provincias argentinas desde 1810 hasta la fecha*, Buenos Aires, 1879, I XXXII; De-Maria, Isidoro, *Historia de la república O. del Uruguay*, Montevideo, 1895, I, 75-87.

cabildo that the holders of lands destined for cultivation should pay into the treasury a specified sum annually. This was the beginning of the *Contribución imobiliaria*, or the land tax, in that region.

Under these incentives a few families removed from Buenos Aires to Montevideo, but too few to satisfy the wishes and plans of Governor Zabala (1726-1734). In a letter to Philip V, January 6, 1727, he announced that he had distributed lands and implements to the settlers at Montevideo, and on the 15th of July, 1728, the king replied, expressing his approval of the governor's acts. The population grew slowly, and during the following year the ceremonies were held in which Montevideo was officially declared to be a city. A cabildo, or council, was created for its government, and on the 1st of January, 1730, Zabala appointed the members of the cabildo, who, having taken the required oath, were installed in their office.

From the beginning, conflicts between the civil and military authorities disturbed the peace of Montevideo. The officers of the garrison represented the absolutism of Spanish rule, while the members of the cabildo, although appointed by the governor, stood for the settlers and represented their aspiration for local liberty. When the members of the superior Spanish government learned that Montevideo showed signs of prosperity, they were solicitous lest foreign commerce

might derive advantage from it, and in April, 1730, issued orders that great zeal and care should be exercised to prevent illicit exportation or importation, or any violation of rules respecting the royal treasury.

The strict execution of these orders deprived the inhabitants of Montevideo of their expected advantage. The Portuguese were gradually appropriating the resources of the country, and by these restrictions the Spaniards were prevented from even sharing in the prosperity of their neighbors. Colonia, under the command of Pedro Antonio de Vasconcellos, had become an important center of an increasing contraband commerce. In its population there were twenty-six hundred adults. These included a garrison of about nine hundred men, which, with its eighty guns mounted on the walls, seemed to furnish an adequate defense.

The inhabitants of Montevideo were embarrassed not only by the restrictions of the Spanish government and by the encroachments of the Portuguese, but also by the hostility of the Indians. This was provoked, as had often been the case elsewhere, by the aggression of Europeans. The result of the campaign against the Indians was for the Spaniards a disaster. The little town lost a large part of the men fit for military service. In the midst of these difficulties, Miguel de Salcedo succeeded Zabala as governor, in 1734, bringing to the government of the province only

mediocre ability, whether in the field of civil administration or military affairs. But under specific orders from the Spanish government, he gathered a force for the purpose of besieging Colonia. This force consisted of four thousand Indians from the missions, one thousand men from Buenos Aires, and one hundred and fifty men from Corrientes. It was supported by the frigates *Armiena* and *San Esteban*, sent from Spain with two hundred dragoons, and other vessels with munitions and a company of one hundred infantry. After a year of fruitless war, carried on with indifferent energy, France, England, and Holland, as mediating powers, intervened near the end of 1737, and at Paris adjusted terms of an armistice.

Zabala, leaving the governorship of Rio de la Plata to Miguel de Salcedo (1734–1742), was promoted to the presidency of Chile, but before assuming the duties of his new office, he was directed, as we have seen, to intervene in the affairs of Paraguay. Having restored order in Asuncion, he embarked for Buenos Aires, but died before he reached Santa Fé. His claim to distinction among the governors of Rio de la Plata rests on efforts to stem the encroachments of the Portuguese; on his work in founding the city of Montevideo; on pacifying Paraguay; and, in general, on the energy and wisdom displayed in his administration.

Montevideo had been designated a city, but

it had acquired at this time few of a city's characteristics. The fort as described by Colonel Domingo Santo de Uriarte, the commandant, was a fort only in name. Its wall was about a yard and a half high, built of stone without mortar or cement; it had no moat, and was in a place where it would protect neither the city nor the harbor.⁷

The Portuguese improved the opportunity offered by the armistice of Paris to strengthen the fortifications of Colonia, and to occupy additional territory. But in the presence of these advances and preparations for future resistance Governor Salcedo limited his activity to laying formal siege to Colonia and guarding the coast to prevent contraband trade. During his administration, moreover, the cabildo of Montevideo had to contend with three enemies. These were the Indians, the Portuguese, and the military authorities. The evils arising from these sources were fostered by the weakness, the indolence, and the stupidity of Salcedo, who was finally arrested and removed from office in 1742, when Domingo Ortiz de Rosas (1742–1745) became his successor. Taking advantage of this change, the cabildo petitioned that the limits of jurisdiction between the civil and the military authorities might be fixed, and that foreigners might be expelled from the city. To this petition the governor replied that the instructions of Zabala should be maintained, which conferred the ordinary jurisdiction in the first instance on

⁷ See Bauzá, *Dominación española en Uruguay*, II, 32.

the alcaldes, with an appeal to the governor, and that the commandant of the garrison should not interfere. In replying to the second point of the petition, the governor repeated an order for the expulsion of foreigners from the city. Rosas' brief administration was followed by that of José de Andonaegui (1745–1756).

In the interior of the continent, the affairs of the Spaniards were no more satisfactory than in Montevideo and the adjacent lands. Wanting the increasing trade of the ports, whether legitimate or contraband, the province of Tucuman failed to attain even the slow progress of Buenos Aires. The overland communication between Buenos Aires and Lima and the traffic in mules with Peru were the only channels for receiving information respecting the outside world. Cordova, having become the educational, ecclesiastical, and political capital, alone furnished an exception to the general monotony and stagnation of the province. Decade had succeeded decade with nothing to relieve the dull uniformity of existence; even the incursions of the Indians and the repeated campaign against them were monotonous.

V

In Chile the age of exploration, conquest, and settlement had been succeeded by monotonous years marked by cultivation of the soil and the beginnings of a few primitive industries. Cano

de Aponte entered upon the fifteenth year of his administration as governor of Chile in 1730. He had been appointed to this office by Philip V, October 31, 1715. He was at this time fifty years of age, and had been for thirty-three years in the military service of Spain. In this service he had acquired somewhat of the recklessness and the spirit of adventure that characterized the soldiers of his time. At the close of the war of the Spanish succession, he had attained the rank of field-marshall. Near the end of 1717 he arrived at Santiago, having made the journey from Spain by way of Buenos Aires and Mendoza. He was accompanied by his nephew, Manuel de Salamanca, who, by favor of his uncle was advanced in a brief period from the position of a lieutenant in a cavalry regiment to the highest military office under the governor and captain-general. The rapid promotion of Salamanca over officers of longer service and superior merit provoked discontent; and his irregular conduct in dealing with the affairs of the army and of the Indians gave rise to scandals believed to involve the governor. Cano's treatment of the Indians was not conciliatory. He proposed to remedy the lack of laborers by drafting the Araucanians into service, in spite of the prohibition of royal decrees. His agents treated them with contempt. Salamanca forced them to sell their ponchos to him alone, and at prices fixed by himself, thus depriving them of their promised freedom in trading. These

regulations and the order that the Indians should go to Concepcion to be employed under Spanish masters completed their exasperation, and led them to plan for the expulsion of the Spaniards from Chile. The Jesuit missionaries were not as blind to the consequences of these acts as were the governor and Salamanca. The superior of the Chilean missions wrote to the bishop of Concepcion, warning him of the tempest that was threatening, and adding that it might still be averted by granting the Indians immunity from forced labor and other abuses. The bishop visited the governor, and informed him personally that an uprising of the Indians was impending and was inevitable, if they were not given complete satisfaction. The governor was indignant, treated the report as a calumny, and demanded the bishop's source of information. The governor then wrote to the Jesuit superior of the missions and later to the provincial of the Society. In these communications he showed his irritation, and declared as exceedingly impertinent the freedom of the missionaries in intervening in affairs that did not concern them and that they did not understand.

The incursions of the French traders and the expeditions of Clipperton and others in the early years of the century had shown the inability of Spain to maintain her ancient commercial régime. The abundance of wares imported had aroused a spirit of speculation, and even stimulated trading with the Indians, and in this trading their rights

were not always scrupulously regarded. This trading had been facilitated by an armistice, or peace, with the Indians that had been maintained during the early years of the century. By their use the Indians had learned to appreciate certain articles offered them by the Europeans, particularly alcoholic liquors. The active demand for these articles and their extensive consumption did not contribute to the maintenance of peaceful relations between the two peoples. Another cause of disorder and hostility appeared in the practice of exploiting the ignorance of the Indians by making exchanges with them to their disadvantage; and the gravity of the situation was enhanced by the fact that the majority of the persons engaged in trafficking with the Indians were officials, who often proceeded with violence to take from them their cattle and even to carry off their children for menial service or base uses. These and other abuses, more or less common in the relations of a superior to a less developed people, had the inevitable result in discontent and revolt. A general uprising of the Indians appeared in 1723, followed by elaborate military preparations on the part of the colonists. The decisive action in the conflict was the abandonment by the Spaniards of the forts that had been established south of the river Biobio.

But in the course of events the Indians discovered that the state of war was attended by inconveniences not experienced in years of truce.

They could not exchange their cattle for articles furnished by the colonists. They were subject to hostile raids and the loss of property without compensation. Both parties were desirous of peace, but when a treaty was finally concluded, in 1726, with elaborate ceremonies, neither party was in a mood to abide by it: the Indians, because they were not in a position to comprehend its complicated provisions; the Spaniards, because they were not disposed to abandon their project to extend their frontier towards the south.

In the later years of his service as governor, Caño de Aponte sought to improve the conditions existing in Chile, where, in spite of its excellent soil and climate, there was little or no progress. A large part of the inhabitants were poor; there were few industries; there was a lack of roads; and misery was everywhere evident in the filthy cities. An effective hindrance to progress in Chile, in fact, to progress in all of the Spanish colonies, was their failure to use for their own welfare or advantage the funds raised by their taxes. These were largely diverted from expenditure in the colonies to the coffers of either corrupt officials or the government in Spain. The troops in Chile were demoralized by delays in payments due them. The money sent by the viceroy for this purpose was sometimes several years overdue. That which arrived in Chile in 1702 was for the year 1694; for years later than this the soldiers had then not been paid.

Adding to the general misfortune, came the earthquake of July 8, 1730. The shocks of this date were the destructive beginning of a series of shocks that continued many months. Churches and other buildings were thrown down in the cities of central and northern Chile; but the full force of the movement was experienced in the south, in the region of Concepcion, Chillan, Valdivia, and the forts of the frontier. At Concepcion, then on the coast at the site of the modern town of Penco, the sea receded half a league from the shore, and returned with terrific fury, throwing down many structures that the movement of the earth had left standing. The agitation of the sea was observed as far north as Callao, where the water rose slowly over the walls of the shore, and as slowly retired.

Besides the earthquake, Chile was afflicted at this time (1730) with an epidemic of smallpox. It began at the capital and spread to the country, extending even to the territory of the Indians, where it caused greater destruction than in the chief cities. The inhabitants of the towns fled to the rural districts, but only to encounter the disease, and to die neglected; for those who had not been attacked fled in terror, and abandoned those who had fallen ill. By epidemics like this and the lack of sanitary conditions of living, the growth of the population of Chile was materially hindered. In 1740, the number of the inhabitants was estimated to be between one hundred and ten

thousand and one hundred and twenty thousand, excluding the Indians.⁸

After almost sixteen years as governor and captain-general of Chile, Cano de Aponte died November 11, 1733. In accordance with a law of the Indies, the oldest member of the audiencia, Francisco Sanchez de la Barreda y Vera, was charged with the government. He had been a member of that body for more than twenty years, and during this service he had acquired much knowledge of the country, but he was "esteemed rather for his moderation of character and his religious spirit than for his information and his intelligence."⁹ His rule was short, for when the viceroy, the Marquis of Castel-Fuerte, learned of the death of Cano de Aponte, he bestowed the office of governor and captain general upon Manuel de Salamanca to be held until the arrival of Bruno Mauricio de Zabala. The scandals provoked by Salamanca's transactions with Indians and foreigners were evidently not considered of sufficient importance by the viceroy to deter him from making the appointment, yet during the two years of his administration, prolonged on account of the death of Zabala, his rule became noteworthy for his illegitimate interference in the trade of the colony rather than for any acts important for the public welfare. These transactions made an unfavorable impression in

⁸ Barros Arana, Diego, *Historia general de Chile*, Santiago, 1886, VI, 137.

⁹ Barros Arana, *Hist. de Chile*, VI, 89.

Madrid, and when information of Zabala's death reached the Court in September, 1736, the king, instead of confirming Salamanca in the office he had held temporarily, appointed General José Antonio Manso de Velasco. Manso had served for thirty-one years in the army of Spain. He sailed from Cadiz February 3, 1737, and made his formal entry into the city of Santiago in his capacity as governor and captain-general on the 15th of November. The next day he was recognized as president of the audiencia.

The residencia, or judicial examination of Salamanca's career, imposed by royal order upon Governor Manso, was held under such conditions as to convince the governor of the entire inefficiency of that form of trial. This opinion might very well have been derived from reports of similar trials in the past, where the results had been determined by collusion, favoritism, or various other forms of fraud.

In the early months of his administration, moreover, the governor proceeded to the frontier, and confirmed the peace that followed the uprising of 1723, by a ceremonious *parlamento* celebrated with the Indians in the early part of December, 1738.

In this first half of the century, Chile and Peru had acquired three new markets: that of France, made available through contraband trade; that of Spain, liberalized by the provisions established with reference to ships of register; and the mar-

ket of the eastern side of the continent, opened by the development of the route between Buenos Aires and Chile by way of the Andes and the Argentine plain. The ships of register were vessels that might sail to America singly, but they were required to depart from, and return to, the port of Cadiz. They were permitted, however, to sail to any American port where the merchants wished to sell their wares. Through these new regulations for shipping, Buenos Aires became in a measure liberated from the narrow restrictions which Spain had imposed upon its trade. Buenos Aires, moreover, became an important port for the reception and distribution of goods destined for transportation to Chile and Upper Peru. In connection with the change in shipping regulations relating to the Indies, there was created at Madrid a Ministry of the Indies and Commerce; and the power to grant licenses to ships of register was withdrawn from the Casa de Contratacion, and referred to the council of ministers. This was a breach in the forces defending the ancient monopolies, and very naturally called forth protests in Cadiz and Lima.

For a number of years Chile had had an advantageous trade with Peru. An important item in that trade was the exportation of wheat, after the earthquake of 1687. But in the early decades of the eighteenth century, the Peruvian fields became once more productive, and there arose a demand in Peru for protection against the impor-

tation of Chilean wheat. The production in Peru was, however, insufficient to satisfy the need for consumption. The viceroy then proposed to fix a maximum price at which wheat might be sold in the country. To this the Chileans made an effective protest. Another attempt to check the importation of Chilean wheat was to require that payment for importations should be made with Peruvian products, and not with money. By this requirement Chile would be in a large measure deprived of a circulating medium of exchange. To counteract this disadvantage, the cabildo of Santiago proposed that the precious metals mined in Chile should be coined in Chile; and in 1732, it was resolved to petition the king to authorize the establishment of a mint in Santiago.

The new markets, the new routes, and the discontent caused by the action of the viceroy led to a discussion of commercial and industrial questions, suggesting the advantage of a greater degree of commercial freedom, and making prominent and drawing public attention to, industrial and commercial interests. This stimulated an opposition to traditional restrictions, and caused a complete break with the ancient commercial régime. At the same time the merchants of Chile petitioned for the establishment of a consulado in Santiago, to facilitate the administration of justice in commercial and industrial cases, by enabling them to avoid the delay involved in resorting to the consulado of Lima. The viceroy,

Villa García, having been empowered by royal order to make the necessary rule in the matter, determined that the merchants might elect each year one of their number to be their deputy, who might pronounce decisions in economic disputes; and that these decisions might be appealed to the consulado of Lima. This was not a satisfactory solution, on account of the delays that would be caused by the appeals, and of the liability of new issues arising in connection with them. Although the merchants aspired to a larger measure of independence than was granted by this legislation, still in December, 1737, they elected Juan Francisco de Lorrain to be their deputy.

In spite of the limited population, Governor Manso was engaged, in 1740, in confirming the conquest of the country by establishing towns in different regions. Some of those founded under his direction were Santa Rosa de los Andes, San Felipe el Real, Los Angeles, Cauquenes, Talca, San Fernando, Melipilla, Rancagua, Curicó, and Copiapó. In order to raise funds to meet the initial expenses of the new towns, the king authorized Governor Manso to sell six titles of count or marquis. In view of the general poverty of the country and the fact that there were then only four families in Chile possessing titles, the governor did not expect to be able to increase the list, and, therefore, determined to offer these titles for sale in Lima. But it proved to be unnecessary to carry out this plan; for rich Chilean merchants

and the owners of landed estates bought the titles. The governor by this transaction collected the sum of one hundred and twenty thousand dollars, eighty thousand of which he distributed among the towns, and sent forty thousand to the king. Manso's refusal to retain any part of this sum for himself helped to enhance the reputation he had already acquired for honest and disinterested conduct in public affairs.

On the 24th of December, 1744, the king appointed Governor Manso to be the viceroy of Peru, and authorized him to designate an *interim governor* of Chile. Francisco José de Obando, the Marquis of Obando, received this appointment, and occupied the office until the arrival of the king's appointee, in March, 1746.

At the time of his appointment Obando was at the head of the little squadron organized by the viceroy of Peru for the defense of the coast against the aggressions of the English. In carrying out the plans of Governor Manso and in initiating new undertakings for the advancement of the colony, he displayed an interest and an energy not ordinarily expected of one holding a provisional appointment. On the arrival of Ortiz de Rozas, he returned to Peru, and resumed his duties as commander of the Pacific squadron.

VI

Ortiz de Rozas made his formal entry into Santiago on the 25th of March, 1746. He had been a soldier; he had served in the war of the succession and in campaigns in Italy and Africa; and after 1741 he had been governor of the province of Buenos Aires. Among the public works of his administration as governor and captain-general of Chile, the organization of the University of San Felipe was the most noteworthy. This institution had long been the subject of correspondence with the king. In the beginning of the eighteenth century, it was observed that neither the Jesuits nor the Dominicans gave the instruction required in law and medicine, so that those who went to the schools of Lima had a distinct advantage over the Chileans who could not conveniently meet the expenses of the journey and residence in that city. Moreover, during the one hundred years following the first suggestion of a royal university by the bishops of Imperial and Santiago, the population of Chile had increased; the colony had made a certain degree of progress; its attention was no longer wholly taken up by wars with the Araucanians; and many persons saw the need of offering the youth of the colony opportunities comparable with those furnished by the schools of Lima. The project to found an University was, therefore, brought before the cabildo of Santiago in December, 1713. One of

the alcaldes, Francisco Ruiz de Berecedo,¹⁰ presented the subject in an extensive address, and urged the establishment of an university under the royal patronage. He advocated that for this purpose there should be annually set aside in perpetuity from the funds of the royal treasury the sum of five thousand two hundred dollars to erect and maintain a royal university, which should bear the name of Saint Philip, the apostle, and be an eternal memorial to Philip V. The cabildo, having heard this address, agreed unanimously that a letter should be sent to the king, urging him to issue a decree creating the proposed university and setting aside from the royal treasury the sum named for its support.

During the next twenty years the authorities of Chile and the king were in correspondence with reference to the establishment of a royal university. Important among the representations to the king and the Council of the Indies was that made by the authorized agent of the cabildo of Santiago, who had been sent to Madrid. This was Tomas de Azúa.¹¹ The communication of Tomas de Azúa was directed to the Council of the Indies. This body had already in its possession a large number of documents from Chile dealing with the foundation of the proposed uni-

¹⁰ For documents relating to Francisco Ruiz de Berecedo, see Medina, José Toribio, *La instrucción pública en Chile desde sus orígenes hasta la fundación de la universidad de San Felipe*, Santiago de Chile, CCCLXXXVI-CCCCI.

¹¹ See Medina, *Instrucción pública*, CCCCXXVIII-CCCCXXXI.

versity; and on the basis furnished by these communications, and on the report of its attorney, the Council formed its final opinion, which was delivered to the king under date of April 12, 1736. A little more than two years later the decree establishing a royal university was issued, July 28, 1738. One hundred and thirty-six years had passed since the first communication from Chile on this subject was sent to the king. The action was not rapid on the Spanish colonial stage.

The royal decree of 1738 was the charter of the university. In two long paragraphs it set forth the need of an university in Chile and the conditions under which it should be established; and in a final paragraph the king made the formal grant: "I concede and give a license for the foundation, erection, and establishment of the proposed university in the before-mentioned city of Santiago of the kingdom of Chile, and I command my governor and captain-general, royal audiencia, secular and ecclesiastical cabildos, and royal officials of the already mentioned city of Santiago, and other ministers and persons of the said kingdom, that knowing this my royal resolution they render their assistance for its most exact execution without permitting any alteration whatsoever in the plan and rule with which it is my will the foundation of the university should be carried out in the said city of Santiago; and this despatch shall be observed by the keepers of the accounts of my Council of the Indies, and by the

royal officials of the already mentioned city of Santiago de Chile."¹² This decree arrived at Santiago in 1740, but, owing to the lack of funds, the formal inauguration of the university was delayed until the 11th of March, 1747. The first courses of instruction were opened June 10, 1756.¹³

In spite of the long-continued efforts aiming at the establishment of an university, there was no popular interest in any project for general education. There was little disposition in the non-ecclesiastical classes to favor the education of either women or Indians. Many of the women received no literary instruction whatever; only a few learned to read, and ability to write was a very rare accomplishment. The creation of schools for Indians had been ordered by royal decrees, but these decrees had produced only insignificant results. The lower classes of society, whether in the cities or in the country, lived in ignorance, on account of the lack of schools.¹⁴

VII

During the years here especially considered the northwestern part of the continent was the scene of important changes in the government.

¹² Medina, *Instrucción pública*, Documentos, No. XX. The report of the attorney of the Council of the Indies and the opinions of that body concerning the foundation of a royal university in Chile are printed in this volume by Medina, nos. XVII-XIX.

¹³ Vicuna Mackenna, Benjamin, *Historia crítica y social de la ciudad de Santiago*, Valparaiso, 1869, II, 121.

¹⁴ Barros Arana, *Hist. de Chile*, V, 364.

The viceroyalty of New Granada was created in 1717, and the royal audiencias of Panama and Quito were abolished. The towns that had been subject to the audiencia of Panama were continued under the jurisdiction of the viceroy of Peru, while the territory of Quito, or Ecuador, became a part of the new viceroyalty. After Vilalalonga's brief term as viceroy, the viceregal office was suspended, in 1722, and Quito resumed its position under the superior authority of Peru. Antonio Manso Maldonado was appointed President of New Granada, and assumed the duties of his office on the 17th of May, 1724. At the same time Santiago Larrain resumed his administration as president of the audiencia of Quito. His official activity had been suspended by the organization of the viceroyalty. The uneventful administration of Antonio Manso Maldonado ended in 1731, when he returned to Spain, leaving the government of New Granada in the hands of the audiencia. This body conducted the general administration until 1733, when Rafael de Eslaba acceded to the presidency. He died four years later, and his successor, Antonio Gonzalez Manrique, assumed the duties of his office on the 21st of October, 1738. After a short reign of thirteen days, his death caused the office to be again vacant. The audiencia then opened the instructions relating to the presidency in the event of an unexpected vacancy, and found that Francisco Gonzalez Manrique was appointed to be the suc-

cessor of his deceased brother. As the last of the presidents of New Granada under the colonial régime, he held the office until the reëstablishment of the viceroyalty in 1740.

Manso, writing of the resources of New Granada, affirmed that emeralds existed there in such abundance, in the province of the Mozos, that they had caused those of the Orient to be forgotten, and that amethysts were so abundant that one might take out as many as he wished. But he referred to the fact that at the same time almost all of the inhabitants were beggars.¹⁵ Bogotá he found "in the utmost desolation; the principal inhabitants and nobles withdrawn from the place; the merchants idle; the offices of the government vacant; and everything ruined and in a state of lamentable poverty."¹⁶ The cause of the poverty of the people of New Granada and of the kingdom, in spite of the abundant natural resources, was the principal theme of Manso's *Relacion*. The most universal cause of this poverty he found in the fact "that the piety of the faithful in these parts is excessive." They enriched monasteries and the various religious orders, and founded chapels in the churches. For the favor of the church they made donations that encroached on their means of support and added to the dead, instead of to the active, wealth.¹⁷

¹⁵ *Relaciones de mando* (*Bibl. de hist. nacional*, Ed. Posada, VIII), Bogotá, 1910, 5-6.

¹⁶ *Relaciones de mando*, 3.

¹⁷ *Relaciones de mando*, 13.

VIII

The province of Quito, like New Granada, suffered extreme poverty and misery. The productive land was unequally distributed. Here, as elsewhere in the Spanish dependencies, the best lands were held in large tracts by the Jesuits. The private holdings, small in comparison, were burdened with tithes. From this charge the possessions of the Jesuits were exempt. The prospects of good harvests for many years were ruined by unfavorable conditions, by a destructive drought followed by an excess of rain, by an unusual degree of cold, and by pests that for fifteen years afflicted the growing crops.

One of the principal causes of the lack of permanent progress in the Spanish dependencies was the withdrawal of funds for expenditure outside of the political division where they were collected, or to be invested, as already indicated, in the dead hands of the church. The annual contribution of 42,375 pesos, for instance, sent by Quito for the support of the garrisons of Cartagena and Santa Marta withdrew the surplus over the necessary local expenditures that might have made for the progress of the province. But this was not always merely such a surplus; for in 1734, in order to be able to make this payment, it was necessary to withhold the salaries of the president and judges of the audiencia and of all the other public functionaries.¹⁸

¹⁸ Suarez, Federico Gonzalez, *Historia general de la República*

There followed a scarcity of money. Many purchasers had to resort to barter. This was due not merely to the shipment of money to the coast cities, but also to the decline in the exportation of textile fabrics, both to Peru and New Granada. The diminution of the demand for the manufactured products of Quito was due in part to the growth of manufacturing in other provinces, and to the increased importation of European wares into the dependencies. The restrictions on the exportation of cacao had, moreover, added to the poverty prevailing throughout the province when Dionisio de Alcedo y Herrera became president in 1728.

The increase of poverty was attended by an increase of crime, and the criminals took advantage of the immunity offered by the churches and other asylums. The ecclesiastics were slow to assist the secular authorities to execute justice. The city of Quito, therefore, fell into scandalous disorder. Robberies were frequent; thieves invaded private houses and even the churches. The civil authorities were, however, aroused to action by the assassination of José Quiroz y Castrilton, a canon of the church. The murderer fled to the convent of St. Augustine, where he was arrested. Three days later he was condemned and hanged.

Alcedo retired from the presidency in 1736. In the presence of poverty and crime, many of the inhabitants were persuaded they ought to have a better government, but their experience encouraged the thought that it was not possible except

through a departure from the Spanish policy. The name of Alcedo is less distinctly remembered for the president's administration than for the writings of his son, Antonio de Alcedo, in the *Diccionario geográfico é histórico de las Indias occidentales ó America*.

It was in the official period of Alcedo's successor, José de Araujo de Rio, that the expedition of the French Academicians appeared on the tableland of Ecuador. Araujo arrived at Quito in 1736. He was born in Lima, and this fact helps to account for Ulloa's attitude of disrespect towards him. It was a case of a Spanish official in the presence of a creole official. Out of the violent controversy that arose between the Spanish lieutenant and the creole governor there appeared a widening breach between the two classes represented by these antagonists. The relations that existed between these men present one of the many indications of the scorn of the Spaniard for the creole, and the creole's fateful resentment. In fact, one of the characteristics of Quito society in this period, besides its extreme poverty, was the lack of union, the discord, the antagonism between the Spaniards and the creoles. This was doubtless in part the result of a too narrow horizon of associations. This and the deadening monotony of existence made the inhabitants eager to seize upon any occasion for a popular celebration. In 1724 the accession of Louis I, on the abdication of Philip V, was marked

by a fiesta of public rejoicing. Even the period of mourning, following his early death, was undoubtedly an agreeable change in the dull uniformity of their common life. Many of the celebrations had an official character; the death of a king, the birth of a prince, the marriage of a member of the royal family, the coronation of a new king, all these events were greeted as grateful interruptions in the oppressive routine of an isolated colonial existence. The events of the fiesta were always the same: bull-fights, illumination, fireworks, and plays on an open stage in the plaza. A universal preliminary was a mass celebrated in the cathedral.

IX

The principal motives for reëstablishing the viceroyalty of New Granada were found in the inability of the viceroy of Peru to exercise efficient supervision over the vast territory subject to his superior authority, and in the frequent collisions between the president of New Granada and the audiencias of Panama and Quito. The first viceroy of the reëstablished viceroyalty was Sebastian de Eslaba. All the provinces of Ecuador were brought into the new viceroyalty, but the audiencias of Quito and Panama were not abolished as they had been in 1717. Their allegiance was transferred from the viceroy of Peru to the viceroy of New Granada. In April, 1740, Eslaba

arrived at Cartagena, where he organized his viceregal administration,¹⁹ and where he remained until the expiration of his term of service, in 1749. It was in this period, in 1746, that the French commission led by La Condamine, completed its work of measuring the length of a degree of the meridian in Ecuador. The two Spanish officers who were attached to the commission, devoted much of their visit in America to travelling and making investigations in astronomy, physics, and geography. They also made extensive inquiries into the political and social conditions of Chile, Peru, and Ecuador. Some of the results of these investigations were published in *A Voyage to South America* and *Noticias secretas de America*.

One of the government's tasks of this time was to relieve the suffering and wretchedness among the poor, caused by the failure of harvests not only in Ecuador but also in New Granada, and intensified in some quarters by the earthquake's destruction of Popayan. In his appeals to the people the archbishop took a strictly ecclesiastical view of the earthquake and the drought, exhorted the people to reform their customs, and thus avert a similar punishment by God in the future.

Viceroy Eslaba, as already indicated, resided at Cartagena throughout the period of his service, and, therefore, remained without much knowledge

¹⁹ Vergara y Velasco, Francisco Javier, *Eslava el defensor de Cartagena*, in *Capitulos*, 70-78.

of the needs of the other parts of the territory subject to his authority. On his retirement to Spain in 1749, he had to his credit, however, the heroic and successful defense of Cartagena against the attack of the English under Vernon.

On July 9, 1746, Philip V died, and the throne of Spain passed to Ferdinand, a son by his first marriage, while Charles, a son by his second marriage, was king of Naples. Under Philip V, Spain had given evidence of a revival from its abject state at the end of the preceding century. There were indications of an increased intellectual activity; the financial affairs of the government were improved; and the reorganization of New Granada promised increased governmental efficiency for that kingdom. Although Philip V was indolent and without the power of effective initiative, he nevertheless showed a reasonable discrimination in accepting measures presented to him by his ministers.

The hostile attitude of the British suggested that the successor of Eslaba should be an experienced military or naval officer, and José Alfonso Pizarro, the Marquis of Villar, was appointed. Pizarro had served in the naval defense of the coast of Rio de la Plata, Chile, and Peru. He was at Cadiz when the notification of his appointment reached him. He left that port September 23, 1749, taking with him seven Jesuits for the purposes of extending the missionary enterprises of the viceroyalty. His first noteworthy act on

reaching Bogotá was to support the bishop of Panama, Luna Victoria, in creating a public university in that city, which was to be established in the house of the Jesuits. Here, as throughout Spanish South America at the period in question, whatever public opinion existed with respect to education regarded with special favor the work of the Jesuits. For a number of years the true position and jurisdiction of the governments of Panama and Veraguas had been under discussion. This discussion was, however, finally terminated by a royal decree, August 20, 1739, embodying these two captaincies-general in the viceroyalty of Santa Fé, or New Granada; and a few years later, June 20, 1751, the king of Spain caused the audiencia of Panama to be abolished, leaving the government of the region in essentially the same position as the government of Cartagena.

Philip V, in 1718, urged by his financial needs, sold the right to coin money in New Granada to José Prieto Salazar, whose title as the possessor of this right was *Tesorero blanquecedor*. But after the death of Philip the crown resumed this right, making compensation to the person or persons deprived of it. Prieto was permitted to enjoy his acquired monopoly until his death, when it passed to his widow, María Ana de Ricuarte, who was granted a pension for surrendering it. A similar method for providing coin had been followed in other provinces. In Chile the monopoly of the mint was held for twenty-two years by

Francisco García Huidoboro, but in 1770 Charles III revoked it in favor of the crown. The mint of Popayan was incorporated in the crown the same year, when the holder of the monopoly was granted a pension and the title of Count of Casa-Valencia. The pension accorded to his legitimate heirs was enjoyed by the family until 1859.

The sale of alcoholic liquors was an exceedingly profitable branch of trade as carried on during the first half of the eighteenth century. Some of the parish priests did not hesitate to purchase the right to sell such liquors in specified districts, and, in the exercise of this right, they helped to transform the public celebrations of the churches into scenes of drunkenness and debauchery. The evils resulting from this traffic were recognized by Archbishop Azúa, and on the 25th of October, 1749, he issued an edict prohibiting the clergy from engaging in this traffic under penalty of excommunication; but the practices at some of the church festivities in later times indicate that Azúa's edict was not permanently effective.

The viceroy Pizarro had spent much of his life in a different field of official activity, and consequently found the duties involved in the civil administration of an extended territory disagreeably burdensome. He, therefore, sought to be relieved of his office, and his repeated requests were finally granted in 1753, when he returned to Spain. His successor was José de Solis Folch

de Cardona, of a family that had gained an influential position at the court of Spain during the war of the succession. Although frequently referred to as very young at the time of his appointment, he was in fact then not less than thirty-five years old. His childhood acquaintance with Ferdinand VI suggests that he must have been of nearly the same age as the king, who was forty years old in 1753. Various rumors were current concerning his scandalous life in Madrid at the time of his appointment, and during his early years in Bogotá; but no very solid foundation for these tales has been revealed. The record of his public activity in the construction of roads and in the management of the finances indicate an intelligent and effective administrator. His plans for public works, however, exceeded the financial resources of the government, and under these circumstances he tried to induce the inhabitants of certain towns to undertake work in their respective districts. But the protective government had not developed in the people the power to initiate public work or the will to make voluntary contributions for the public good. The attitude of the inhabitants of New Granada with respect to public improvements is described by Viceroy Solis in the remark that "they wished the utilities without expense or labor."²⁰ Solis not only gave attention to the kingdom's material betterment, but also undertook to gather its sta-

²⁰ *Relaciones de mando*, 84.

tistics into systematic form. For this purpose he appointed a commission composed of the regent of the tribunal of accounts, Francisco Vergara, and the chief accountant, Juan Martin de Sarra-tea. However imperfect may have been the accomplishment, the undertaking has the merit of a first attempt to organize a department of statistics in New Granada.

Throughout the period of his office, Solis maintained amicable relations with the church. In December, 1756, he received the information that his brother, the archbishop of Seville, had been promoted to the dignity of a cardinal. This event offered the cabildo of the city an occasion for honoring the viceroy, and in this project the church, through the ecclesiastical cabildo, determined to coöperate; and, by this coöperation with the secular authority, to manifest the high regard of the cabildo and the members of the church generally for the viceroy.

X

The province of Guayana was one of the three provinces subject to the governor who resided at Santa Inez de Cumaná, and who was subordinated to the viceroy of Santa Fé, or New Granada. The other provinces were Cumaná and Barcelona. The town of Santo Thomé was founded in the last decade of the sixteenth century, and became the capital of the province of Guayana. The founder

and first governor was Antonio de Berrio. Reinforcements brought from Spain by Domingo de Vera and other additions raised the number of the inhabitants to about four hundred, including men, women, and children. The early expedition for Minoa withdrew about three hundred of the inhabitants, but later recruits were received from Trinidad. This settlement near the mouth of the Caroni is referred to as being in 1598, a Spanish "rancerie of some twentie or thirtie houses."²¹

In 1598 there appears to have been at the "rancerie" a force of sixty cavalrymen and a hundred musketeers. After the withdrawal of Raleigh, near the end of January, 1618, the inhabitants began to reconstruct the town, building churches and a Dominican as well as a Franciscan monastery. The Dutch West India Company sent a force to attack Santo Thomé under Admiral Adriaen Janszoon Pater, who sacked and burned the town, which had at this time one hundred and thirty or a hundred and forty houses. In 1653 it had very few inhabitants; in fact, between 1591 and 1648 it maintained a precarious existence, and was not in a position to serve as a colonizing settlement for the neighboring country. It was the only Spanish settlement on the Orinoco before the beginning of the eighteenth century. But in the first half of that century Spanish missionaries crossed the divide and established themselves on

²¹ Keymis, *A Relation of the Second Voyage to Guiana*, London, 1596, 15.

the northern tributaries of the Cuyuni. The earliest of these establishments was the mission of Cupapuy, founded in 1733. In 1737 they established the mission and cattle ranch of Divina Pastora, on the Cumuri. Other posts in this region were the Indian village of Cumuri, the mission of Tupuquen, the mission of Palmar, founded in 1746, the mission of Miamo, of 1748, and the missions of Curumo and Mutanambo. Through these missions the Spaniards came into conflict with the Dutch, who regarded them as encroaching on their possessions. The Dutch considered Santo Thomé as a Spanish outpost designed to facilitate hostile attacks. The unfriendly relations between the two colonies were aggravated by the fact that slaves who had run away from Essequibo were harbored by the Spaniards, and that the Spaniards even took by force and retained slaves who belonged to the Dutch.

The first site of the town of Santo Thomé, or the first town in the province of Guayana to bear that name, was situated near the confluence of the Caroni and the Orinoco, opposite the island of Faxardo. The second site was about twelve leagues east of the mouth of the Caroni. The third was at the narrows of the Orinoco. The removal to Angostura, or the third site, was effected in 1764, by Governor Joaquin Moreno de Mendoza, under a royal order of 1762; and the town established at Angostura was known as Santo Thomé de la Nueva Guayana, thus distin-

guishing it from Vieja Guayana. At the time of the removal of the town to Angostura, the Capuchin missions of the Orinoco below the Caroni were transferred to positions above that river. The material local basis of the town's support was about twenty haciendas, or estates, and small herds of cattle, aggregating about eighteen hundred animals. To the product of these estates, the missions of the province made important contributions. The three groups of missions occupied different parts of this vast interior region; and this partition of the territory was authorized by the governors and confirmed by the king. The territory assigned to the Capuchins extended from the mouths of the Orinoco to the narrows; that assigned to the Observantists, from the narrows to the river Caura; and that assigned to the Jesuits, from the river Caura indefinitely towards the west.²² The Capuchins began to establish their missions in 1687, but owing to the difficulties of obtaining the proper support and protection their work suffered long interruptions. In 1724, however, the mission of Concepcion de Suay was founded about two leagues from the presidio of Guayana.²³ The Jesuit missions were established on the rivers Meta and Casanare, and were sub-

²² Cuervo, Antonio B., *Colección de documentos sobre geografía y historia de Colombia*, Bogotá, 1891, III, 23.

²³ A list of the Capuchin missions of Guayana, together with the dates of their foundation and abandonment, is given in *Report of U. S. Commission on the true divisional line between Venezuela and British Guiana*, Washington, 1898, III, 215-217.

ject to the authorities of Bogotá. Only four of them were south of the Orinoco, and belonged to the province of Guayana. These were less favorably situated than the others, by reason of the difficulties of communication and the unhealthfulness of their environment. The conversion of the Indians of the plains was only a part of the undertaking of these missions. They led a serious campaign against the barbarism of the various tribes that inhabited this region. They sought, moreover, to gain and communicate to the civilized world systematic knowledge of the Indians, their country, and their language.

Prior to 1726, the missionaries in the province of Guayana found it difficult to obtain the food requisite for their support; and even in 1742, on information received concerning the poverty of the missionaries of the plains, the king ordered that support should be extended to them from the royal treasury.²⁴ The first steps towards making the missions self-supporting was the introduction of cattle of various kinds. These multiplied rapidly on the grassy plains, but a diet consisting exclusively of flesh was not satisfactory, and in the progress of years the several missions were able to harvest yucca, rice, plantains, and sugar-cane. When the herds had grown to be very numerous, each mission formed an organization for their care. There was a principal superin-

²⁴ See Cuervo, IV, 209, for decree by the king addressed to the governor and captain-general of New Granada.

tendent, with such subordinates as were needed. It became evident very early that horses would be needed, especially for the vaqueros, to assist them in watching and controlling the extensive and increasing herds; and in the course of time the mission became abundantly supplied with both horses and mules.

There is no doubt that much of the hostility shown towards the Jesuits, in the region of the Orinoco as well as elsewhere, was due to their successful conduct of strictly worldly affairs. The charges that were brought against them prior to their expulsion were provoked by the jealousy of secular traders. But it became very clear to the civil authorities that no missionary undertaking on the plains of the Orinoco and the Casanare could be successful except as the missions themselves developed a material basis, and an independent source of supplies, for their support.

Moreover, after the development of the missions, the products resulting from the labor of the Indians was especially important for the support of the military establishment. The surplus not required for the maintenance of the mission was transferred to the presidio, and according to Governor Diguja, "it can be safely said that without this assistance it would have been impossible for the presidio to support the persons who live in it. Nor would it have been possible for the persons who were engaged in commercial affairs in the region of the Orinoco to carry on their

business with as much facility as they can do at present, had it not been for the fact that at the presidio they can find abundant provision of casabe and other supplies sent there by the missionaries. Should the missions fail at any time to furnish this assistance, the inhabitants of the presidio would certainly starve. Supplies from other sources would be very costly, and only be obtained at very distance places.”²⁵

A list of the missions or Indian villages of the plains of the Orinoco, giving the dates of their foundation and abandonment, shows a striking lack of stability; and this was due in part to the fact that there were not missionaries enough to provide one for each settlement, but only one for three or four missions widely separated from one another. Thus, in the absence of the missionary, there was wanting the restraining and disciplinary force to curb the natural propensities of the natives, and to keep them from obeying the call of the wild.

In the province of Caracas, another region that was later to be embodied in the territory of Venezuela, the Dutch contraband trade, the operations of the Guipuzcoa Company, and the rebellion of Francisco de Leon occupied fully the attention of the inhabitants.²⁶

²⁵ Report submitted by José Diguja, Governor of Cumaná, chap. VIII, sec. 6.

²⁶ See *The Spanish Dependencies in South America*, II, chap. XVII.

XI

Still farther towards the east the island of Trinidad presented a miniature revolution. By a royal decree of 1731, the provinces of Guayana, Caracas, Cumaná, Barcelona, Carabobo, Barquisimeto, and Coro were united under a captain-general. In consequence of this act, the government of New Andalucia ceased to exist. Trinidad was subject to this new government only with respect to financial affairs; for all other branches of its administration, it was dependent on the audiencia of Bogotá.²⁷

Four years earlier Trinidad suffered an economic disaster in the failure of the cacao to mature. This failure was evidently due to some change in the temperature or other conditions of cultivation; but the assignment of a natural cause for the calamity did not meet the approval of Padre Gumilla, who held it to be a divine punishment laid upon the cultivators for their neglect to pay the tithes regularly.²⁸ Although the cause of the failure was obscure, the effect was clear: the loss of private incomes; the cessation of commerce with the colony; the emigration of a large part of the inhabitants, reducing the colony to fifty whites and a hundred and fifty negroes,

²⁷ Blanco, José Félix, *Documentos para la historia de la vida pública del Libertador de Colombia, Perú y Bolivia*, Caracas, 1875-1878, I, no. 74, sec. 5; Borde, Pierre Gustave Louis, *Histoire de l'île de Trinidad sous le gouvernement espagnol*, Paris, 1876-82, II, 91.

²⁸ *Orinoco ilustrado*, I, chap. I, sec. II.

mulattos, and mestizos; and the decline of the public revenues to two hundred and thirty-one dollars. The luxuriant vegetation of the tropics invaded the fields that had been cultivated. The village of San José de Oruña, its houses deserted and fallen into ruins, presented the appearance of an abandoned town. The colony was unable to meet the expenses of its administration, and, when the cabildo imposed a slight tax for the purpose of renewing the palm-leaf roof of the municipal building, the inhabitants petitioned the sovereign, requesting that they might be exempt from violence in case it should not be possible for them to pay the impost. A few years later there was observed to be an increase in the population of Trinidad, manifesting itself by a rise in the public revenues from two hundred and thirty-one dollars in 1733 to twelve hundred and seventeen dollars in 1735. But this returning tide of prosperity was checked in 1739 by an epidemic of smallpox that carried off a large part of the population. The disease raged especially among the Indians, who, terrified by its appearance, fled from those who were attacked by it. Even the monkeys did not escape its virulence. To these and other ills were added the terrors of an English invasion in 1740, when ships of the enemy entered the Gulf of Paria and ascended the Orinoco. This new danger moved the colonists to petition Philip V for fifty soldiers to be added to the twenty who then constituted the garrison of the island.

The political affairs of the colony were not less embarrassing than its economic affairs. Governor Esteban Simon de Liñan y Vera transferred the government temporarily to Major Espinosa, the military commandant, and went to Comuná without giving the cabildo notice of his proposed absence. The two powers had evidently been in conflict; for when on the 9th of July, 1743, the cabildo learned that the governor had departed several days earlier, it immediately held an excited meeting, and declared that the appointment of Espinosa was illegal. It decided that the two alcaldes were the only persons who, in the absence of the governor, had the right to conduct the civil and military government of the island. Espinosa was, therefore, deprived of his official power. The spirit of revolt spread from the cabildo to the people, and when Governor Esteban Simon de Liñan y Vera returned, in 1745, there was a general uprising against him. He was seized and imprisoned, and his property was confiscated. Stimulated by the popular revolt, the cabildo aroused itself, and declared the governor deprived of his office for having been absent from the colony without permission. This revolutionary activity of the people and the cabildo was followed by a reaction. Major Espinosa fled to the governor of Cumaná, who caused the details of the insurrection to be passed to the viceroy of New Granada through the captain-general of Caracas. The viceroy, as the governmental superior in all

the lands constituting the viceroyalty, authorized the lieutenant governor of Cumaná to proceed to Trinidad, to liberate the governor from the prison where he was detained, and to replace him in possession of the office and employments of which he had been violently dispossessed.

At the head of an effective force, the lieutenant governor of Cumaná reached Trinidad without opposition in December, 1745, where he liberated the governor, who had been eight months in prison, and put him in possession of his property. Then, proceeding in his judicial capacity, he condemned the two alcaldes to imprisonment in irons and their accomplices to banishment for ten years. The property of the alcaldes was confiscated, and used as a contribution towards the expenses of the expedition against the insurgents.

Having subdued the revolt, Felix Espinosa de los Monteros remained as provisional governor of Trinidad. His administration lasted six months, and on June 3, 1746, he was superseded by Juan José Salcedo, a lieutenant colonel of cavalry, who immediately encountered opposition on the part of the cabildo. This body refused to act on his suggestion, and lapsed into hopeless inactivity. It held not more than one meeting a year between 1746 and 1750. The island's political state had fallen to the level of its economic condition. If the cabildo aroused itself in 1750, it was to petition the king to cause the exiles to be recalled. This action was advocated on the ground that

without them there were too few persons of intelligence in the island to perform the functions of public officials. The return of the exiles was demanded, moreover, to relieve their families of the poverty and misery into which they had fallen. By a proclamation of the governor, dated April 11, 1751, the decree of banishment was revoked, and those persons who had been affected by it were permitted to return to Trinidad; and with their reappearance intrigues and plots were revived.

A critical event in the affairs of Trinidad was the transfer of the capital from San José de Oruña to Port of Spain. The former capital was abandoned by all but a few of its inhabitants; its buildings were dilapidated; its streets were choked with tropical vegetation, and torrential rains had washed deep ditches through them; and the cabildo was composed of ignorant persons who neglected their duties and stood in opposition to the governor. The new capital presented conditions more favorable for advancement. It was on the coast; the inhabitants of the town and those of the neighboring country were industrious and thrifty, and through their efforts the island entered upon a period of more hopeful prospects.

This petty insurrection is without special significance, except as one of many practical indications of the ambition which moved even small Spanish colonies in America in the eighteenth century, to enlarge their governmental prerogatives, and thereby limit the power exercised by the royal government.

CHAPTER III

THE SPANISH-PORTUGUESE BOUNDARY TREATY OF 1750 AND THE WAR OF THE SEVEN REDUCTIONS

- I. Terms of the treaty of 1750.
- II. Protests of the Indians against removal.
- III. The boundary commissioners and the disposition of the Indians.
- IV. Active hostilities of the Spanish and Portuguese against the Indians of the seven reductions.
- V. "Emperor" Nicolas Nanguirú, further hostilities, and preparations for exile.
- VI. Failure of the campaign and the abrogation of the treaty.

I

THE armistice of 1737 did not end the rivalry of the Spanish and the Portuguese in South America. The Portuguese continued to strengthen the fortifications of Colonia, and to extend their control over the coast of Rio de la Plata. They drove away the Spanish settlers, and took possession of their lands. Complaints made to the king of Spain concerning the acts of the Portuguese finally persuaded him to order the governor to attack and take the town of Colonia. The first attempt having failed, the Spanish government proposed to employ a force that would be success-

ful. But at this point the king of Spain was induced to take a new view of the situation. England and Holland determined to continue their support of Portugal. The Spanish king's efforts were, moreover, paralyzed by the thought that the influence of his enemies might cause him to lose his hold on the Two Sicilies. In the meantime the Portuguese went on adding new strength to the fortress of Colonia, and the English made use of it in carrying on the slave trade.

Finally, in 1750, by the treaty of Madrid, an attempt was made to settle the controversy about Colonia, and to fix the boundary, or line of demarcation, between the Spanish and Portuguese possessions. This treaty declared that for the future it itself should be the only basis and rule for determining the limits of the Portuguese and Spanish dominions in America and Asia; that it should set aside and abolish whatever rights had been asserted on the basis of the bull of Alexander VI and the treaties of Tordesillas, Lisbon, and Madrid, or of any other treaties, conventions, or promises; and that all future transactions with reference to the boundaries of these dominions should not make use of other treaties or agreements, but should refer to the prescriptions of this treaty as the invariable rule to be adopted without controversy.

By the thirteenth article of this treaty Portugal ceded Colonia to the crown of Spain; and, in the following article, Spain formally ceded to

Portugal any and all lands that had been occupied by Spain or to which Spain held a title, and which by this treaty were declared to belong to Portugal. The territory involved in this cession embraced seven of the Indian villages, or reductions, established by the Jesuits in Paraguay on the east of the Uruguay River. The missionaries of these reductions were required to withdraw, to take with them their furniture and effects, and also the Indian inhabitants of the reductions. These seven reductions with their houses and lands, their churches and other buildings, were transferred to the crown of Portugal.

Provision having been made for the determination of the boundary line, elaborate and strict regulations were established with respect to trade and travel across the border, providing for a policy of non-intercourse. The treaty also provided for a board of commissioners to fix practically the line of demarcation, as specified by the treaty.¹

II

Neither the Spaniards nor the Portuguese were especially interested in the provisions of the treaty relating to the boundary in the interior, uninhabited part of the continent; but the cession

¹ Calvo, Carlos, *Colección completa de los tratados de la América Latina*, Paris, 1862, II, 241-260; the treaty to determine the instructions for the board of commissioners is printed in Calvo's collection, II, 261-277.

of the seven Jesuit reductions to the Portuguese attracted the interested attention of everybody concerned. The Indians objected emphatically to the transfer of their lands and houses to their enemies, and raised the question of the possibility of resisting the execution of the treaty. They even found it difficult to believe that the king had ordered their removal. This is seen in their appeal to Governor Andonaegui, as presented by Dobrizhoffer. The form of the appeal may have been given by a Jesuit, but the later attitude of the Indians indicates that the document presented their sentiments: "Neither we nor our fathers have ever offended the king or ever attacked the Spanish settlements. How, then, innocent as we are, can we believe that the best of princes would condemn us to banishment? Our fathers, our forefathers, our brethren, have fought under the king's banner, often against the Portuguese, often against the savages: who can tell how many of them have fallen in battle, or before the walls of Nova Colonia, so often besieged! We ourselves can show in our scars the proofs of our fidelity and our courage. We have ever had it at heart to extend the limits of the Spanish empire, and to defend it against all enemies; nor have we ever been sparing of our blood, or of our lives. Will then the Catholic king requite these services by the bitter punishment of expelling us from our native land, our churches, our homes and fields and fair inheritance? This is beyond all belief.

By the royal letters of Philip V, which, according to his own injunctions, were read to us from the pulpits, we were exhorted never to suffer the Portuguese to approach our borders, because they were his enemies and ours. Now, we are told that the king will have us yield up to these very Portuguese, this wide and fertile territory, which the kings of Spain, and God and Nature have given us, and which for a whole century we have tilled with the sweat of our brows. Can any one be persuaded that Ferdinand the son should enjoin us to do that which was so frequently forbidden by his father Philip? But if time and change have indeed brought about such friendship between old enemies that the Spaniards are desirous to gratify the Portuguese, there are ample tracts of country to spare, and let those be given them. What! Shall we resign our towns to the Portuguese—the Portuguese—by whose ancestors so many hundred thousands of ours have been slaughtered, or carried away into cruel slavery in Brazil? This is as intolerable to us as it is incredible that it should be required. When, with the Holy Gospel in our hand, we promised and vowed fidelity to God and the king of Spain, his priests and governors promised to us on his part, friendship and perpetual protection; and now we are commanded to give up our country! Is it to be believed that the promises, and faith, and friendship of the Spaniards, can be of so little stability?"²

² Dobrizhoffer, Martin, *Account of the Abipones*, London, 1822, I, 17-29; Bauzá, II, 144-148.

It is not to be doubted that the Jesuits opposed the treaty of 1750 from the beginning. They could not reasonably be expected to assume any other attitude toward it, since it proposed to destroy in a considerable territory the results of their labors which had been continued for more than a hundred years. But they repudiated the charge that they had instigated or provoked the uprising, a charge that later inquiries have found to be without foundation.

In the interval of two years between the signing of the treaty and the arrival of the commissioners appointed to mark the boundary, the Jesuits of Paraguay addressed a memorial to the audiencia of Charcas, protesting particularly against the transfer of the seven reductions to Portugal and the removal of the inhabitants. A similar protest was presented to the audiencia of Lima. A copy of this memorial was forwarded by the viceroy to the king of Spain, and a second copy was transmitted to the governor of Buenos Aires, with instructions that it should be delivered to the commissioners. Subsequent events do not indicate that these protests exercised any important influence on the conduct of the allies. They were based, however, on the almost unanimous belief of the priests in charge of the reductions that it would be impossible to carry out those provisions of the treaty which required the Indians to abandon their homes and fields for uncultivated and unoccupied lands that might be

assigned to them. In spite of the prevalence of this belief, the Provincial instructed the Jesuits of the reductions in question to urge their followers to obedience; at the same time, in writing to the king, he pointed out the obstacles to the removal of the people.

III

These seven reductions were inhabited by about thirty thousand Guaranis. They were "not fresh from the woods, or half reclaimed, and therefore willing to revert to a savage state, and capable of enduring its exposure, hardships, and privations; but born, as their fathers and grandfathers had been, in easy servitude, and bred up in the comforts of regular domestic life. These persons with their wives and their children, their sick and their aged, their horses and their sheep and their oxen, were to turn out, like the children of Israel from Egypt into the wilderness, not to escape from bondage, but in obedience to one of the most tyrannical commands that were ever issued in the recklessness of unfeeling power."³

The chief Spanish commissioner for establishing the line of separation between Brazil and the Spanish possessions was José de Carvajal, the Marquis of Valdelerios. Señor Carvajal appointed José de Yturriaga as chief for fixing the northern part of the line. The other members were Eugenio de Alvarado, Antonio de

³ Southey, *History of Brazil*, London, 1810-1819, III, 448.

Urrutia, and José Solano. The commissioners appointed by Portugal were Gomes Freyre de Andrade and Antonio Robin de Maura. They were accompanied by a number of engineers and geographers. Valdelirios and his assistants arrived at Montevideo in January, 1752, accompanied by Luis Altamirano, delegate of the general of the Jesuits, and his companion, Padre Rafael de Cordova. Padre José Barreda was especially conspicuous among the persons whose opinions had to be considered by the commissioners. He was the Provincial of Paraguay, having previously held a similar position in Peru. He suggested that since the treaty of limits had been formed without knowledge of the difficulties to be encountered in its execution, it ought not to be considered a crime in the eyes of the king to solicit delay; and that the only way to bring about the emigration of the Indians of the seven reductions was not to make undue haste, or to substitute violence for gentleness and persuasion. He affirmed, moreover, that as the Indians had the advantage of numbers and a knowledge of the country, it was possible they might defeat the united forces of the Spaniards and the Portuguese, thus making it more difficult to subdue them, especially since there was good ground for believing that neither the force of reason nor of arms would lead the Indians to abandon their towns.

Places were selected to which it was proposed to remove the Indians from the seven reductions,

but at this point an obstacle appeared in the unwillingness of the Indians to move to the sites selected for them. They had been aroused by learning of their proposed expatriation, and agents were sent to persuade and pacify them. The agents found in most of the towns complete unanimity on the part of the Indians in opposition to removal; and Pedro Fernandez, especially charged with duties in this connection, wrote to the governor of Buenos Aires that the difficulties which had presented themselves could be overcome only by the sword.

Both Spain and Portugal were interested in the execution of the treaty, and representatives of the two nations met on the island of Martin García to make arrangements for uniting their forces for this purpose. In March, 1754, a second conference was held at the same place to adopt final resolutions for proceeding with force against the inhabitants of the reductions who had assumed an attitude of rebellion. These resolutions provided that Gomes Freyre should join his troops and attack the pueblo of San Angel, while Andonaegui with another force should move against the pueblo of San Nicolas. Some of the Indians had at first been disposed to migrate peaceably, but the known unwillingness of others to leave their towns incited nearly the whole Indian population to resistance. In view of this state of things, the Jesuits sought to have the removal of the Indians postponed for three years, hoping

within that period to bring the controversy to a peaceful conclusion. The immediate removal demanded by the Spaniards gave the Indians no opportunity to provide for their convenience and support at the places where they were requested to settle. Moreover, the sites selected for their new towns were in some cases swamps or other unhealthful districts, and entirely unfit for dwellings, while others were exposed to invasion by hostile Indians. The Guaranis naturally objected to leaving the places where they and their families had spent decades, and where their houses were already built and their fields cultivated; and the attitude which they assumed toward those who would compel them to withdraw, clearly indicated that a peaceful execution of the treaty was impossible.

IV

On the 21st of May, 1754, Governor Andonae-gui began to move his troops toward the missions. The unfavorable season and the lack of proper supplies caused many of his soldiers to desert. On the 3rd of October, he encountered a force of three hundred Indians from Yapeyu and La Cruz. When asked why they had come out under arms, they replied that they had come to defend the lands of the missions. Then, for the third time, they were summoned to obey the king, and were informed that in case of refusal they would be treated as declared enemies. This information

did not terrify them, for they appeared in front of the enemy's camp, waved their banners and standards, and hurled insults at the Spaniards. It was clear that they were prepared for active hostilities and Andonaegui had to accept the challenge.

The clash which followed this first encounter brought disaster to the Indians. They are reported to have lost two hundred and thirty killed, while nearly all of the survivors were made prisoners. The reported loss of the Spaniards was one captain killed, and three sergeants and twenty-four men wounded. During these events, Gomes Freyre was moving his troops from Rio Pardo toward the scene of disturbance. His force consisted of between sixteen hundred and seventeen hundred men, including soldiers and peons, with ten pieces of artillery. On the 12th of November, he received a message from Andonaegui, informing him of the withdrawal of the Spanish troops, and indicating the necessity of Freyre's return to his encampment at Rio Pardo. The retirement of the Spaniards encouraged the Indians to make more effective preparations for defense; and in the meantime other tribes, particularly the Charruas, were beginning to make a common cause with the Guaranis.

After the withdrawal of the Portuguese, the Indians assumed the offensive, and invaded and laid waste the territory almost to the camp of the enemy. The indecisive campaign was followed by

a truce, November 18, 1754, during the continuance of which each party was required to keep within its own borders. The Jesuits made use of the occasion to extend their influence. The withdrawal of the European forces made current an exaggerated idea of the strength of the reductions; for the misfortunes of Andonaegui and his troops were due rather to the rigors of the season and the lack of supplies than to any effective opposition offered by the Indians. Nevertheless, the refusal of the Indians to hand over their villages and their lands to the Portuguese, and the reports of the hostilities, stimulated the imaginations and credulity of the inhabitants of Europe; and the enemies of the Jesuits embraced the occasion to construct a remarkable web of stories. They affirmed that the Jesuits had built up a powerful state, whose soldiers had overthrown in battle the combined forces of Spain and Portugal; they had plunged into this conflict with the desire to make themselves independent; they had crowned one Nicholas Nanguirú as their king; and had taken other steps to make manifest their sovereignty. These tales were widely believed; Ferdinand VI was influenced by them to such an extent that he came to regard the Jesuits not only with lack of confidence, but even with repulsion; he dismissed his confessor, who was a Jesuit, and affirmed his belief that the Jesuits were the authors of the revolt of the Indians.⁴

⁴ Bauzá, *Historia de la Dominación Española en el Uruguay*, II, 114.

For the next campaign Governor Viana, of Montevideo, was made second in command, and he was commissioned personally to visit Gomes Freyre, in order to inform him of the preparations that had been made on the part of the Spaniards. The Spanish troops entered upon this campaign on the 4th of December, 1755, with the design of uniting with the Portuguese troops at Acequa; but on the 6th of January, 1756, Viana received a message informing him that the Portuguese general would meet him near the Rio Negro, and on the 16th of January the two forces were brought together at the appointed place. Five days later the two armies began their march toward the missions.

Extravagant rumors reached the Spanish and Portuguese leaders concerning the number of men the reductions were ready to put into the field. These rumors affirmed that there was an army of five thousand men equipped for the campaign, while, in fact, all the troops ready for action did not exceed three hundred. But when the threatened towns learned that the united forces were advancing, they were greatly alarmed, and sent messengers in all directions to arouse the inhabitants. Thirteen hundred and fifty men were gathered in a few days, but they were poorly equipped and inefficiently armed. Of these, San Miguel sent four hundred; San Angel, two hundred; San Lorenzo, fifty; San Luis, one hundred and fifty; San Nicholas, two hundred; San Juan,

one hundred and fifty; and La Concepcion, two hundred. These were the seven reductions that had determined to resist the allied powers of Spain and Portugal. Their ignorant and untrained leaders gave little promise of success. Knowing of the approach of the troops, the Indians sent messengers to inquire with what authority the European soldiers were invading their territory. Viana replied that they needed no license, only the permission of the king, in whose name the captain-general of this province appeared; and this intelligence should immediately lead them to come and acknowledge obedience; but if they did not wish to do this, they would expose themselves to all the rigors of war. In reply, the Indians affirmed that they recognized only their liberty, which they had received from God, and also the lands dependent on the town of San Miguel, which only God and no other could take from them; and in view of this state of things, they insisted that the Spaniards should not advance farther. They were, however, informed that the allies would continue their march; whereupon the Indians took leave with the remark that they would meet on the road.

Not long afterward there was a clash between a body of Indians and a detachment of the Spanish-Portuguese forces, in which eight Indians were killed, while Viana lost two killed and two wounded. Among the Indians killed was the cacique Sepee. One of the papers found on

Sepee's body was a proclamation, or message, containing a protest against the action of the allies. "We do not wish the coming of Gomes Freyre," it affirmed, "for he and his followers are those who, through the work of the devil, hold us in such abhorrence: this Gomes Freyre is the author of many disturbances, and it is he who operates so wickedly, deceiving the king; and for this reason we do not wish to receive him. We have failed in nothing in the service of our good king; whenever it has occupied us, we have complied with his commands with our whole will, and in proof of this we have repeatedly risked our lives and poured out our blood in obedience to his orders. Why does he not give Buenos Aires, Santa Fé, Corrientes, or Paraguay to the Portuguese, instead of the towns of the poor Indians, who are commanded to leave their houses, churches, and finally whatever they have and God has given them?" This simple protest came like a plea of the dead chief in behalf of his people, but it had no power to stay the ruthless advance of the allies.

V

On the death of Sepee, Nicholas Nanguirú was put in his place. This was the person referred to in Europe as *Nicholas I, King of Paraguay and Emperor of the Mamelucos*. He was in reality a

person of very limited ability; his single accomplishment was a little skill in playing the violin.⁵

In his *Account of the Abipones*, Martin Dobrizhoffer, who was a Jesuit missionary in Paraguay, and a contemporary of Nicholas Nanguirú, refers to the stories about the "King of Paraguay." "About the beginning of the disturbances," he says, "one Joseph, corregidor of San Miguel, was elected general of their forces against the Portuguese. This Joseph, an active and courageous man, behaved like a good soldier but an execrable general, for he was as ignorant of military tactics as I am of the black art. On his falling in a chance skirmish, Nicholas Nanguirú, many years corregidor of the town of Concepcion, succeeded. Under his conduct the war was poorly carried on; and the affairs of the Uruguayans gradually declining, the seven towns were delivered up to the royal forces." . . . "This is that celebrated Nicholas Nanguirú," Dobrizhoffer continues, "whom the Europeans called the king of Paraguay, whilst Paraguay itself had not an inkling of the matter. At the very time when the feigned majesty of

⁵ Bougainville quotes a letter from a captain of grenadiers in which mention is made of Nicholas: "Yesterday we likewise saw the famous Nicolas, the same whom people were so desirous to confine. He was in a deplorable situation, and almost naked. He is seventy years of age, and seems to be a very sensible man. His Excellency (Bucarelli) spoke with him a long time, and seemed very much pleased with his conversation." *Voyage round the World*, 116. The following is the title of one of the books about Nicolas, written apparently without any knowledge of the subject, except vague rumors: *Historie de Nicolas (Nenguirú) Roy de Paragruai et Empereur des Mamelus*, A Saint Paul, 1756.

the king of Paraguay employed every mouth and press in Europe, I saw this Nicholas Nanguirú, with naked feet, and garments after the Indian fashion, sometimes driving cattle before the shambles, sometimes chopping wood in the market-place; and when I considered him and his occupation, could hardly refrain from laughter.”⁶

Continuing their march, the allied forces encountered a considerable body of Indians on the morning of the 10th of February. After the officers had held a council, the troops were ordered to prepare for battle. The Spanish troops were placed on the right, and the Portuguese on the left. In the rear, arranged in four columns, were the two hundred carts containing the baggage and the equipment. The line was finally extended along the base of the hill, Kaibate, the enemy being within clear range. The forces brought into this action by the Spanish and Portuguese have been estimated at two thousand five hundred men. In the battle which ensued the Spaniards lost three killed and ten wounded. Among the latter was Andonaegui. The Portuguese lost one killed and thirty wounded. By reason of their ineffective weapons and lack of military skill, the Indians were seriously handicapped, and suffered an overwhelming defeat. The number of killed on their side has been variously estimated, the estimates ranging from six hundred to fifteen hundred and eleven. Bauzá adopts the highest number, with one hundred and fifty-four prisoners.

⁶ Dobrizhoffer, *Account of the Abipones*, I, 27, 28.

The effect of this encounter was to break the resistance of the Indians. They had lost their principal chiefs, Sepee and Nanguirú, and after this crushing blow they had no competent leaders, even if they had had the spirit to continue the conquest. Their depressed state is indicated by the fact that the allied forces met no opposition in their forward movement after the battle. Yet their way led through a forest and an unknown mountainous region, where a comparatively small troop of Indians familiar with the country could have set an effective obstacle to their further progress. Having entered the territory of the reductions, they had several skirmishes with the Indians, and on the 17th of May, 1756, they entered the town of San Miguel.

On entering the town, Viana, the Spanish commander, is said to have been surprised at its excellent appearance, and to have exclaimed: "And is this one of the towns which we are commanded to turn over to the Portuguese? The authorities at Madrid must be crazy to destroy a town which has no rival among all those of Paraguay." On the arrival of the invaders, the inhabitants of San Miguel took flight, abandoned their property, and spread the panic to other towns through which they passed.

That some of the inhabitants of the reductions considered their cause hopeless is indicated by the fact that the authorities of the town of San Juan presented themselves at the camp of the

allies, and acknowledged to Andonaegui their complete submission.⁷ Andonaegui pointed out to them the serious consequences that would result from any indication of further insubordination. It was expected that San Lorenzo would follow the example of San Juan, but as no message of submission was received, Andonaegui detailed Viana and eight hundred men to take possession of the town. Setting out on the 19th of May, Viana entered the town at dawn the following morning; he surprised the inhabitants, and made a number of them prisoners, among whom were the priests Limp, Unger, and Henis. Padre Henis, examined before Viana, made a vigorous reply to the charges that were brought against him. "These pueblos," he said, "have cost the king nothing; we have conquered them ourselves with the crucifix in the hand. His Majesty cannot hand them over to the Portuguese; and if I had been in Madrid, I could have given him such information that this surrender would not have been undertaken."⁸ The positive attitude assumed by Padre Henis called forth only a reprimand from Viana. The priests were, however, set at liberty, and measures were taken to preserve public order, and to cause the Spanish commander's authority to be recognized.

At this point Andonaegui wrote to the priests and cabildos of the towns that had not submitted,

⁷ Bauzá, II, 135.

⁸ *Relación de los servicios de Viana*, MS, quoted by Bauzá, II, 136.

called their attention to the example of San Juan, and suggested that they should bind themselves to maintain obedience. This communication had the desired effect. All the cabildos and corregidores presented themselves, took the oath of fidelity, and were then despatched to their several reductions. They understood then that their cause was lost, and that it only remained for them to gather themselves together and prepare for emigration. The priests, Balda and Henis, were ordered to direct the march of the Indians. But not all of the Indians were disposed to accept the fate of exiles with resignation. Some fled to the forests to resume the lawless life of savages. Progress toward a final settlement of the affairs of the reductions was, moreover, interrupted by doubts as to the outcome of negotiations in Madrid. Valdelirios expected another general would be sent to replace Andonaegui, and that new instructions would be issued with reference to the transfer of the reductions. Events half accomplished awaited the conclusion of diplomatic maneuvers.

VI

In November, 1756, the expected general, Don Pedro Ceballos, arrived. He came with a body of one thousand men, who were for the greater part foreigners and vagabonds. The tales that had been circulated in Europe concerning Emperor Nicholas and the possibility of the defeat of the

Spanish and Portuguese forces had made a profound impression on Ceballos, but he was soon undeceived by his newly acquired knowledge of the actual state of affairs. In January, 1757, he arrived at the missions, and the superior of the Jesuits went out to receive him. "At San Borja a platform was erected in front of the church, and Ceballos, surrounded by the Marquis of Valdelirios and the principal Spanish leaders, received the declarations of the multitude that no one was opposed to the Jesuits."⁹ This somewhat theatrical ceremony had no great significance, except as a formal presentation of the new commander of the forces. After this event Andonae-gui and Viana departed for Buenos Aires, the former en route to Spain, and the latter proceeding to resume the duties of his office as governor of Montevideo.

Neither the government of Spain nor that of Portugal was now disposed to carry the boundary question to a practical settlement. Portugal had already spent fifteen million dollars on the undertaking, and the destruction of Lisbon by the earthquake of 1755 had discouraged all foreign enterprises; while in Spain the death of Queen Barbara and the illness of the king had paralyzed all the agencies of the government. The commissioners who had been charged to effect the transfer and establish the new boundary were no longer zealous in the execution of their task; and the Jesuits,

⁹ Banzá, II, 141.

after all their wretched experiences, were recalled to take charge of the reductions.¹⁰

Other evidence that the Spaniards no longer regarded themselves as hostile to the Indians of the missions may be discovered in the fact that in order to be prepared to resist any possible future attacks by the Indians of the Chaco, Ceballos placed the inhabitants of the reductions on a war footing, requiring military service from all able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and sixty.

"Thus ended," to quote Francisco Bauzá, "this famous campaign of the missions, in which the Spaniards fought bravely to promote the interests of the Portuguese, encountering hardships and dangers for the purpose of carrying out a boundary treaty, that dismembered their territory and undermined their military and political power on American soil. In few undertakings have the officers and ministers of the king shown a more vigorous tenacity; and would they had employed it for our good rather than, as it was, for the limitation of our territorial extension and of our natural advantage. Money, soldiers, diplomatic intrigues, insults and threats against every opponent, entreaties, cruelties, promises, were alternative means brought to bear to execute the boundary treaty, without attaining anything else, after seven years of aggression and turmoil, than their withdrawal from the negotiations, disgusted

¹⁰ Bauzá, II, 141, 142.

among themselves and returning affairs to their previous condition.”¹¹

In the last years of the decade there was no prospect of reviving the interest of the contracting parties in the treaty of 1750. The treaty itself represented a laudable attempt on the part of Spain and Portugal to establish a line of demarcation between the lands of their American colonies, but it was formed in ignorance of the conditions that were to be affected by it, and the attempt to execute it brought satisfaction to nobody.

In 1759 Charles III brought a large measure of force and intelligence to the Spanish government. He found that the treaty had few or no supporters in either nation. Portugal was convinced that Colonia was more valuable than the seven reductions; and the court of Spain had already anticipations of a time when both Colonia and the missions would be counted among its possessions. Ten years had brought about a marked change in the attitude of the two nations toward one another. Neither government wished the treaty to stand. On October 3, 1760, the king of Spain declared it “nulo, de nungun valor para lo sucesivo;” and in 1761 an agreement was reached, in accordance with which the treaty and all the stipulations based on it were annulled. This agreement was the treaty of 1761. It declared that all the treaties, pacts, and agreements made between the two governments before 1750 should

¹¹ *Hist. de la Dominación Española en el Uruguay*, II, 142, 143.

remain in full force and vigor from the date of this last document forward. Both parties were expected to withdraw all persons who had been sent to America to assist in the practical execution of the treaty.¹²

¹² The principal article of the treaty of February 12, 1761, is as follows: "Artículo I. El sobredicho tratado de límites de Asia y América entre las dos coronas, firmado en Madrid en 13 de enero de 1750, con todos los otros tratados ó convenciones que en consecuencia de él se fueron celebrado para arreglar las instrucciones de los respectivos comisarios que hasta ahora se han empleado en las demarcaciones de los referidos límites, y todo lo acordado en virtud de ellas, se dan y quedan en fuerza del presente por cancelados, casados y anulados como si nunca hubiesen existido ni hubiesen sido ejecutados; y todas las cosas pertenecientes a los límites de América y Asia se restituyen á los términos de los tratados, pactos y convenciones que habian sido celebrados entre las dos coronas contratantes ántes del referido año de 1750; de forma que solo estos tratado, pactos y convenciones celebrados ántes del año de 1750 quedan de aquí adelante en su fuerza y vigor." Calvo, II, 350.

CHAPTER IV

THE EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS

- I. Viceroy Amat and the monopoly of alcohol.
- II. Juan Diaz Herrera and the revolt in Quito.
- III. The controversy respecting the Jesuits.
- IV. The decree of expulsion.
- V. The removal of the Jesuits from the towns of Rio de la Plata.
- VI. The missionaries of the Chaco and the region about Sierra de la Cruz.
- VII. The expulsion of the Jesuits from the reductions of Paraguay.
- VIII. The Jesuits of Peru.
- IX. The Jesuits of Chile.
- X. Their removal.
- XI. The expulsion from Ecuador.
- XII. The Jesuits removed from Bogotá and the other towns of New Granada.
- XIII. Jesuits of the Llanos.
- XIV. The Jesuits in exile.

I

WHILE the Spanish and Portuguese troops were entering upon their campaign against the Jesuit reductions, Manuel de Amat y Junient landed at Buenos Aires, proceeding to Chile to take up his duties as governor and captain-general of that dependency. Six years later, after the failure of the campaign and the abrogation of the treaty of 1750, he entered Lima (October 12, 1761) as the viceroy of Peru, then the supreme authority in

America for the whole of Spanish South America, except the new viceroyalty of New Granada.

Having served in the army in some capacity from his boyhood, from the age of eleven, Amat had naturally acquired much of the traditional ambition of the old soldier. In order to strengthen the means of colonial defense, it became his dominant purpose to organize and discipline military forces. Under his influence a body of militia was formed in nearly every province of Peru. At the same time a number of private persons of wealth and standing in their communities created troops and maintained them at their own expense.

In keeping with his other military preparations, the viceroy continued energetically the work of construction on the incomplete fortress of Callao. He repaired certain warships and made them fit for service, and sent arms and munitions to Chiloé, Valdivia, Valparaiso, Guayaquil, Panama, and Cartagena. He caused bronze cannon to be cast at Lima, various kinds of small arms to be made, and transformed the appearance of the capital into that of a military camp.

In these military preparations, the viceroy appears to have anticipated an approaching need. The monopolies and their incidental oppression had already begun to produce disorder and rebellion. An uprising in Quito, in 1765, indicates that a part of the inhabitants at least had become sufficiently self-conscious to react under oppression, or what they thought to be oppression. The pro-

voking cause in this case was an act of prohibition. It was decreed that alcohol should not be distilled either in Quito or in any of the provinces subject to the audiencia of Quito, except for the account of the royal treasury. To increase the funds of the royal treasury or to check the evils of drunkenness were the two possible motives for the action. But the king's frequently expressed wish to have the revenues increased, and the vast sums he had drawn from America in two hundred years suggest that the former motive was the more powerful. The monopoly right to distill and to sell alcohol was at first granted to a private person, in consideration of a certain annual payment, but when the government observed what enormous gains the monopolist was making, the privilege was annulled, and the right reverted to the crown.

II

In 1765, after the monopoly had existed for ten years, Juan Diaz Herrera arrived at Quito as the agent of the royal treasury and administrator of the monopoly now in the hands of the government. He was sent by the viceroy of New Granada, who then exercised jurisdiction over the province of Ecuador. The details of the popular revolt that followed his advent need hardly be narrated. They were such as might be expected to attend the uprising of an angry populace temporarily in control of a city. Placards attached to

the walls at the street corners announced the proposed attack on the hated monopoly. The offices of the agent were stormed. The mob smashed in the windows with stones, broke down the doors, and rushing in destroyed everything it encountered. The receptacles of alcohol were thrown into the street and broken open, and the intoxicated crowd set fire to the house to complete its destruction. The flames against the night sky and the half-lighted buildings made a weird background for the scenes enacted in the streets. The cries of terrified women and children were added to the shouts of drunken rioters. Near midnight the priest of the church of Santa Barbara thought to allay the popular fury by displaying in the streets the holy sacrament, but the crowd was not tamed, and turned with scorn upon the sacred objects. In order to avoid a sacreligious attack, the procession retired to the church of Carmen. Herrera, the agent of the monopoly, fled, half-naked, to the judges of the audiencia, and implored their aid. Then, finding his request disregarded, he ran to the monastery of San Francisco and hid himself.¹

Terrified by the increasing disorder, the members of the audiencia appealed to the Jesuits to treat with the rioters. The Jesuits, seeking to abate the disturbance, promised that the monopoly and other objectionable duties would

¹ Suarez, *Hist. del Ecuador*, V, 213-215; Cevallos, Pedro Fermin, *Resumen de la historia del Ecuador desde su origen hasta 1845*, Lima, 1870, II, 94.

be abolished and a general pardon granted; but the crowd demanded a confirmation of this promise by the audiencia. The first phase of the insurrection closed with the granting of this request, but the series of events attending the uprising exposed the weakness of the government. Only a general belief in this weakness was required to cause a new outbreak of hostilities. This time the rage of the majority of the people was directed against the Spaniards. The line here between the Europeans and the Americans was sharply drawn, and both the creoles and the mestizos demanded that the *chapetones* should be expelled from the city.

From May until September the insurgents dominated the city. On the 17th of the latter month a communication was received from the viceroy of New Granada ratifying a decree of general amnesty issued by the audiencia of Quito. This proclamation was published in all the wards of the city; and, in celebration of this formal ending of the revolt, the buildings were decorated with brilliant hangings, and the streets were adorned with temporary triumphal arches. The insurgents assumed the airs of a victorious party, and were disposed to direct the action of the audiencia. In view of this state of things the viceroy of Peru and the viceroy of New Granada formed an agreement to place a strong garrison in Quito, commanded by Juan Antonio Zelaya, a Spanish officer of recognized ability and valor,

then at Guayaquil, holding the office of governor of the coast district. Zelaya was not merely appointed to the command of the garrison, but became also the president of the audiencia and captain-general of the province. He took up the work of his new office in September, 1766, about a year after the formal end of the insurrection; and under his protection the Spaniards, who had been banished, returned to Quito. Zelaya established the authority of the government in the city, and, after an administration of ten months, resumed his post at Guayaquil, leaving Colonel José Diguja as his successor.²

The revolt in Quito produced a shock that was felt over only a limited area, but it shows that, in addition to their vast wealth, the Jesuits had here acquired such a degree of power that the officers of the civil government, in facing a popular rebellion, felt constrained to appeal to them. This revolt was, moreover, an indication of the attitude the creole-mestizo party was destined to assume towards the supreme government in Spain and the legitimate authorities in America. The new society undertook here, within an isolated and limited field, to assert its capacity to dominate and direct public affairs. The expulsion of the Jesuits in the following year did not restore, as it may have been expected to do, the power and prestige of Spanish rule in America. The confiscated property fell ultimately largely into the

² Suarez, *Hist. del Ecuador*, V, 227.

hands of creoles and mestizos, and gave them an enlarged basis of wealth for their later enterprises in the cause of emancipation. It loosened the hitherto firm hold of Europeans on both the material and spiritual interests of the colonies.

III

The revolution in Paraguay had made especially prominent the contrast between the purposes of the Jesuits and the encomenderos in that province, or between the purposes of the ecclesiastical and the secular elements of society, with reference to the Indians. The labor and the tribute of the Indians constituted the basis of the encomendero's prosperity; but in the reductions the Indians paid no tribute, and their labor was expended for their own advantage or to increase the common stock of the reductions. The extension of the Jesuits' system seemed to those not involved in it to tend to curtail secular opportunities, and the secular proprietors did not fail to present this view to the crown. The Spanish employers of Indians saw their supply of laborers diminished to their disadvantage as the Indians of the reductions increased; and the next logical step for them was to attempt to break down the reductions.

Charles III succeeded his brother, Ferdinand VI, in August, 1759, and with the crown he inherited the controversy between the Portuguese and Spanish colonies in America. He also inherited

the war of the seven reductions, in which the followers of the Jesuits offered a vigorous resistance to the efforts of Spain and Portugal. The revolution in Paraguay was fresh in the memory of everybody, and the communications concerning it that reached the king, proceeding from the revolutionists, naturally presented the Jesuits in a most unfavorable light: they were hostile to the established policy of Spain; they were a growing power that threatened the interests of Spaniards in America, and even the general welfare of the state. In the spirit of these communications, it was demanded that the activities of the Jesuits should be restricted or their power destroyed; and in these demands the king and his ministers found additional reasons for their radical project.

IV

In 1766, Charles III appointed Francisco Paula Bucareli y Ursúa governor of Rio de la Plata, the provinces which ten years later were to be organized as a viceroyalty. The next year he issued a decree expelling the Jesuits from Spain and the Spanish possessions in America. The decree, the *Real Decreto de Ejecución*, was in the following terms: "Having accepted the opinion of the members of my Royal Council in Extraordinary, which met on the 29th of last January for consultation concerning past occurrences and concerning matters which persons of the highest

character have reported to me; moved by very grave causes relative to the obligation under which I find myself placed of maintaining my people in subordination, tranquility, and justice, and other urgent, just, and necessary reasons, which I reserve in my royal mind; making use of the supreme economical authority, which the Almighty has placed in my hands for the protection of my vassals, and the respect of my crown; I have ordered that the Jesuits be expelled from all my dominions of Spain, the Indies, the Philippine Islands, and other adjacent regions, priests as well as coadjutors or lay-brothers, who may have made the first profession, and the novices, who may wish to follow them; and that all the properties of the Society in my dominions be taken; and for the uniform execution of this decree throughout these dominions I give you full and exclusive authority; and that you may form the necessary instructions and orders, according to your best judgment, and what you may think the most effective, expeditious, and peaceful method for carrying out these instructions and orders. And I wish that not only the magistrates and superior tribunals of these kingdoms may execute your mandates punctually, but that the same understanding may be entertained concerning those which you may direct to the viceroys, presidents, audiencias, governors, corregidores, alcaldes, mayores, and any other magistrates of those kingdoms and provinces; and that in re-

sponse to their respective requests, all troops, militia or civilian, shall render the necessary assistance, without any delay or evasion, under pain of the delinquent's falling under my royal indignation; and I charge the provincials, presidents, rectors, and other superiors of the Society of Jesus to accept these provisions punctually, and in carrying them out the Jesuits shall be treated with the greatest regard, attention, honesty, and assistance, so that in every respect the action taken may be in conformity with my sovereign intentions. You will keep this in mind for its exact fulfillment, as I very confidently expect from your zeal, activity, and love of my royal service; and to this end you will give the necessary orders and instructions, accompanying them with copies of my royal decree, which being signed by you shall be given the same faith and credit as the original.'"³³

This decree, bearing the king's rubric, and dated February 27, 1767, was sent to the Count of Aranda, then president of the Council.

With authority conferred by this decree Aranda issued instructions for the removal of the Jesuits from the dominions of the Indies and the Philippine Islands. These instructions were dated March 1, 1767, and conveyed to the viceroys, presidents, and governors the same power that

³³ Colección General de las providencias hasta aquí tomadas por el gobierno sobre el extrañamiento y ocupación de temporalidades de los regulares de la Compañía, que existian en los dominios de S. M. de España, Indios, e Islas Filipinas. Madrid, 1767, 1, 2.

had been bestowed upon Aranda by the royal decree. They made the officials concerned responsible for the execution of the decree, and provided means for conducting the affairs of the missions after the departure of the Jesuits. By these instructions, moreover, the specific directions contained in the instructions of the same date, issued for removing the Jesuits from Spain, were made applicable in the Indies and the Philippine Islands in so far as the circumstances of those countries permitted.

No one has hitherto made an entirely satisfactory exposition of the influences which moved the king to take this action, but it was naturally suggested to him that his royal prestige might be lessened by the increasing wealth, power, and presumption of the Society. Clement XIII wished to know the reason for the expulsion, but to his inquiry the king replied: "In order to keep from the world a great scandal, I shall conceal in my breast the abominable machination which has been the motive of this severity. Your Holiness must believe me on my word: the security and repose of my existence require of me the most absolute silence on this subject."⁴

On the 20th of March, 1767, Aranda issued a circular letter, enclosing the royal decree of expulsion and detailed instructions for carrying out this decree. These documents were addressed to the magistrates in all the places where the Jesuits

⁴ See Bauzá, *Historia de la dominación española en el Uruguay*, II, 191.

had houses. The recipients were required not to open them until a certain fixed day in the future, and in the meantime to communicate to no one the fact that they had been received. It was required that the officers charged with the execution of the royal decree should be assisted by the army, and that care should be exercised to take possession of the houses and colleges of the Jesuits in the early morning and under such conditions as would leave no opportunity for any member of the order to escape. The archives, the libraries, and all kinds of property, except the very few personal effects which the members of the order might retain, should be seized and turned over to the state. To Bucareli, governor of Rio de la Plata, came not only his commission, but also orders to be transmitted to the governor of Chile, the president of the audiencia of Charcas, and the viceroy of Peru.

V

The night that had been set apart for arresting the Jesuits of Buenos Aires was made almost insupportable by a storm of hail and wind and rain, so that Governor Bucareli, the troops, and all persons who were expected to assist in the undertaking were obliged to remain in the fort from midnight until half past two in the morning. At this hour a company of soldiers was sent to the college of St. Ignatius, commonly known as

Colegio Grande. The soldiers were accompanied by the governor's secretary, Juan de Berlanga, who was the head of this expedition, and by three assistants. Having entered, they gathered together the thirty-six Jesuits found at the college, and read to them the king's order for their expulsion. The prisoners were kept for eight hours in the apartment of the rector, and were then conducted through the streets, guarded by the troops, to the suburbs near the college of St. Elmo. While the Jesuits were being taken from the *Colegio Grande*, another commission, supported by a company of soldiers, appeared at the college of St. Elmo, and took the eight inmates who were subject to expulsion, and held them imprisoned with those who had been brought from the other institution.

Early in the morning of July 13, Bucareli published an edict at Buenos Aires, in which he gave notice of the action that had been taken under the royal decree, and ordered that no one, under pain of death, should communicate with the Jesuits in any manner whatsoever, or censure the decree or the measures taken in carrying it out. By the same decree it was also ordered that all persons owing the *padres* anything, or holding anything that belonged to them, should present themselves before the governor within three days and declare their indebtedness and the article which they held.

This unexpected act on the part of the governor and his agents startled the inhabitants of

the city; and the closing of the Jesuit church disturbed especially those who had been accustomed to resort to it for worship or confession. The order prohibiting communication between the people and the prisoners was not strictly obeyed, and the governor wrote to the chief of the guard, charging him under no pretext to permit this order to be violated, and requesting him to examine the *padres* one by one and take away from them any paper, ink, pens, or other means of communicating with their friends or adherents in the city.

Montevideo was the first city to learn of the arrest and imprisonment of the Jesuits in Buenos Aires. Travelers arriving from the capital brought information of the execution of the royal decree in that city; and on the 5th of July, an attempt was made in Montevideo to transport the books of the Jesuit library to some other place, apparently to avoid the necessity of turning them over to the government. This plan was, however, defeated, and the next morning the four Jesuits in the city were arrested. Three of them were sent immediately to Buenos Aires, but the superior was held to assist in making out an inventory of the property that was to be confiscated.

A week later, at four o'clock in the morning of July 13, the troops surrounded the Jesuit college at Santa Fé. The officers charged with the execution of the decree of expulsion then rang the bell and called for the rector, and on his appearance they arrested him, together with the

porter. The invading party at once distributed themselves throughout the edifice, and gradually gathered all the occupants together and locked them in the refectory. Jesuit writers are naturally disposed to emphasize the commotion made by the inhabitants of the towns when they learned of the action of the officers in carrying out the king's orders. In this case it is reported that "all the people were excited when they learned what had happened in the college. A large number of persons assembled in the plaza; some hooted, others wept, and gave themselves over to grief in a manner to excite compassion; while others, having retired to their houses on account of the horror caused by this outrage, bewailed the fate of the Jesuits in secret."⁵

In the afternoon the Jesuits were taken from the college, and, on the same day, after an examination of their effects, they were driven in carriages out of the city. They were held in an open field within sight of the city for a whole day while preparations were made for their transportation to Buenos Aires. On this journey the soldiers were charged to prevent any communication between them and either the inhabitants of the city or of the country through which they passed. Santa Fé contributed to the contingent already at Buenos Aires five priests, one student, and five coadjutors. The rector and the procurador re-

⁵ Colección de libros y documentos referentes a la historia de América, Madrid, 1904, VII, 76.

mained for the time being to assist in closing up the affairs of the college.

In contemplating the removal of the Jesuits from Cordova, Bucareli feared that, on account of their number and importance, certain difficulties might arise if the undertaking were left to the officials of the province or of the city. He, therefore, entrusted the task to Major Fernando Fabro, appointed by him and sent from Buenos Aires, accompanied by a detachment of eighty soldiers. It was between three and four o'clock on the morning of the 12th of July when Fabro called at the door of the *Colegio Maximo*, and asked for the rector. Here, as a kind of pretext, the porter was told that the rector was wanted to attend a dying man. When the rector, accompanied by another priest, reached the door, they saw that the college was surrounded by soldiers. All the priests were then required to get up, in order that they might hear a communication from the king. They were conducted to the refectory, which they found already occupied by a large number of soldiers, and here a notary read the decree of expulsion and confiscation. The priests of the seminary of Monserrat were at the same time aroused and brought to the refectory of the college, where the whole assembly was locked in. Mattresses were brought in for the night, and were placed on the floor, on the tables, under the tables, on chairs, wherever space could be found, yet there were not enough to accommodate the one

hundred and thirty Jesuits who were crowded together in this single room. For the day the mattresses were piled up in order to afford standing room and to give the prisoners an opportunity to move about.

For ten days the Jesuits of Cordova were kept in these narrow quarters. On the 22d of July it was announced to them that the time had come for them to depart. Fabro took leave of them and turned them over to Captain Antonio Bobadilla. At nine o'clock in the evening they were conducted from the refectory to the vehicles gathered for their transportation. They took with them only their clothing and their breviaries, and at midnight began their long journey to the port of Ensenada. When they halted for the first night nine miles from the city, they found themselves surrounded by a considerable number of the residents of Cordova, who had come out of the city to take leave of them. Some of these followed the train four or five days.

The thirty-four carts laden with deposed priests, escorted by forty soldiers, and attended by drivers and camp-followers, constituted a considerable caravan, that moved over the monotonous plain day after day for nearly a month towards the capital and its adjacent port. The caravan did not enter Buenos Aires, but passed on to Ensenada, leaving the city on the left, four or five miles from the line of march. Two days after their arrival at the port, the Jesuits were embarked, August 20, on the ship *La Venus*.

After Cordova, other cities farther away from Buenos Aires sent their quotas of deposed priests to be added to those already at the capital awaiting transportation to Europe. Fifteen were taken from Corrientes. The distance of Asuncion and the known inclination of the governor of Paraguay to favor the Jesuits left uncertain the result in case he had to be trusted with the execution of the royal decree. The king, therefore, appointed two persons to assist the governor, who were known to be hostile to the designs of the Jesuits; their hostility, however, did not prevent them from upholding Governor Morphy in his considerate and humane treatment of the sixteen persons found in the college at Asuncion, who were liable to expulsion under the royal decree. The prisoners were held for three weeks before preparations were complete for their voyage down the river, which was finally begun on the 19th of August.

The college at Tarija was still farther away from the port. It was in a district dependent on the audiencia of Charcas, but belonged to the Jesuit province of Paraguay. The execution of the royal decree there was under the direction of Victorino Martinez de Tineo, the interim president of the audiencia. The persons marked for exile, twelve or fourteen in number, were started on their long journey of twelve hundred miles within twenty-four hours after their arrest, but they were detained a few miles from Tarija from the 24th of August until the 1st of September.

Padre Asúa died on the way; the rest of the company reached Buenos Aires on the 27th of December, after an overland journey that lasted nearly four months. Gradually, in the course of the last half of the year, the Jesuits were brought to Buenos Aires from their outlying posts, from Salta, Tucuman, Santiago del Estero, Catamarca, and Rioja. They were brought also from the towns of Cuyo.

Only a month before the publication of the decree of expulsion, a license was granted in Spain which authorized the taking of eighty Jesuit missionaries to America. It is not to be supposed that the plan of banishing the Jesuits was conceived and matured after the granting of this license; it is probable, on the contrary, that wishing to keep the project of expulsion secret, the king was willing to let events take their normal or undisturbed course until the arrival of the day for executing the decree. Jesuit missionaries were allowed to embark for America when it was known that they would be arrested and sent back to Europe as soon as they landed. Those who embarked in the *San Fernando* in January were buffeted by the winds and waves for seven months, and arrived at Montevideo on the 26th of July, 1767. Six of them had died after they left Spain, and the remaining thirty-six, exhausted by the want of food and the other hardships of the voyage, came into port signaling for assistance. Their requests were, however, disregarded; and the next

day La Rosa, the governor of the province, accompanied by a troop of soldiers, appeared on the vessel, and, having assembled all of the Jesuits on deck, informed them of the decree of expulsion. At the time of this visit, a letter from Bucareli to La Rosa was on its way from Buenos Aires to Montevideo, ordering that in case the Jesuits arrived from Europe they should not under any conditions be allowed to land; but they should be conducted at once to Ensenada, transferred to the frigate, *La Venus*, and returned to Spain. This message did not arrive until the Jesuits had been taken from the ship and shut up in the narrow quarters formerly occupied by the priests who had been sent to Buenos Aires. It is somewhat difficult to determine whether this was a more or less fortunate turn in the affairs of the prisoners than would have been that which Bucareli's order proposed. Towards the end of August, twenty of those who had arrived in July were sent to Ensenada; seven others who were ill were retained some weeks longer in Montevideo, and were dispatched for Buenos Aires on the 17th of November; but they were overtaken by a violent storm and all were drowned.

Before the end of September a large number of the deposed Jesuits had been brought together in Buenos Aires. Some of them had been waiting nearly three months for the completion of preparations for their transportation. Counting those who had recently arrived on the *San Fernando*

and those who had been taken from posts in the interior of the country, the whole number amounted to two hundred and twenty-four. Of these *La Venus* carried one hundred and fifty, while the rest were distributed among the *San Esteban*, *El Pájaro*, *La Catalana*, and *El Príncipe*. This little fleet sailed from the port of Ensenada on the 29th of September. Its destination was the port of Santa Maria in the bay of Cadiz. *La Venus* arrived January 7, 1768; *El Pájaro*, January 9; *La Catalana*, January 17; *San Esteban*, February 17; and *El Príncipe*, March 9. At Santa Maria the exiles were lodged in the *Hospicio de Misiones*, a house that had belonged to the Jesuits, and that had been occupied by missionaries awaiting opportunity to sail to America. But Santa Maria was only a halting place, and the prisoners were destined to be passed on to Italian territory. Finding themselves here in the home-country after their experiences in the New World, some of them sought permission to remain by making known their desire to leave the service of the Society. But this was not an acceptable excuse, and they were informed by the minister in charge of the expulsion that it would be necessary for them to go to Italy to obtain secularization from the pope.

On the 15th of June the exiles sailed for the island of Corsica, where were already assembled Jesuits banished from the Peninsula; but they were permitted to remain here only from the first

to the thirty-first of August, when by order of the French they were obliged to abandon the island. After an unsuccessful attempt to settle in the republic of Genoa, they were finally conducted to the States of the Church, where they found a permanent abiding place.

VI

The Jesuits constituting the first contingent sent to Europe from the port of Buenos Aires were taken from the colleges in the towns and cities of Rio de la Plata. There remained the missionaries of the Chaco and Chiquitos, and those who had established themselves among the Guarani Indians in Paraguay. In the Chaco there were fifteen missions, or reductions. The action of the officers of the government in arresting the Jesuits of the colleges was known in the reductions before any official communication had reached them. The first effect of this information on the Indians was to inspire them with a desire to abandon the missions and return to their life in the forests. At first some of the missionaries hoped that the decree of expulsion would not be applied to them, but that they would be allowed to remain on account of their influence over the Indians. But this hope did not last long; for Sergeant Major Francisco de Andino soon brought the news that the missionaries were to be taken from the reductions and transported to Buenos

Aires. When the Indians received this information, they were greatly disturbed, and renewed their determination to abandon their settlements. They were persuaded with great difficulty to return, and were so thoroughly enraged, as Padre Pauke observed, that "if I with the help of God and the reasons which He put into my mouth had not succeeded in appeasing my Indians and persuading them to bear their grief, in a short time the city of Santa Fé would have been razed to the ground."⁶

In removing the Jesuits, the commissioner and his assistants turned the missions over to persons who did not belong to the Society. They made a careful inventory of the property, the bulk of which consisted of various classes of animals that had been able to support themselves by grazing on the lands about the reductions. In making the inventory, they found very little money, for in the isolation of the reductions most of the economic transactions had been effected by barter. The six missionaries from San Xavier, San Pedro, and Concepcion were conducted first to Santa Fé, but they were held outside of the city while arrangements were made for transporting them to Buenos Aires. This last stage of the journey lasted from the 6th of September to the 4th of October, and on their arrival they were confined in the quarters formerly occupied by the Jesuits who had been sent to Europe. The procedure that was observed

⁶ *Colección de libros y documentos*, VII, 39.

in the first reductions, from which the Jesuits were removed, was followed in the others, until each was deprived of its leaders. In all cases the Indians saw the departure of their priests with regret, which often found expression in signs of profound grief.

At Buenos Aires the Jesuits remained imprisoned for several months, suffering not only serious physical hardships but also the grief less easily endured of humiliation and disappointed hopes. Towards the end of March, 1768, the frigate *Esmeralda* arrived from Spain, and on the 6th of May she set sail for the return voyage, having on board one hundred and fifty-one Jesuits. This was the second expedition from this port, and what the exiles suffered can be only imperfectly imagined, even when we think of the crowded condition of the ship and the very inadequate preparations that had been made for the long journey, lasting from the 6th of May to the 22d of August, when they arrived at the port of Santa María. From this port the Germans among the deposed priests were sent to their native country, while the rest were transported directly to Italy, without being subjected to the disagreeable vicissitudes experienced by the members of the first expedition.

There were ten reductions in the territory of the Chiquitos, a region which now forms the southeastern part of Bolivia. The execution of the decree of expulsion was not entrusted to Gov-

ernor Bucareli, but to the president of the royal audiencia of Charcas. The troops appointed to assist in this undertaking were placed under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Martinez, who at that time had his headquarters in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, and his special mission here was to resist the encroachments of the Portuguese. But in arresting the priests it was not found necessary to use the troops, for the Jesuits were willing to promise obedience to the order of the king. They proposed to make no resistance, and even suggested that the soldiers should be kept away from the reductions, lest their presence should make an unfavorable impression on the neophytes.

A party of thirteen priests was despatched on the 2d of November; another party of six on the 28th of December; and on the 2d of April, 1768, the rest of the missionaries of the Chiquitos followed their companions to Buenos Aires, or to Spain by some other route. Among the priests of these reductions there were several whose age and infirmities seemed to render it impossible for them to make the long journey without fatal consequences. The commissioner, therefore, wrote to the president of the audiencia for authority to allow them to remain in the country of the Chiquitos until the end of their lives, which was apparently not far off. This request was denied on the ground that the proposed action would be contrary to the royal instructions which prohibited any member of the Society from remain-

ing in the reductions, even on account of age or infirmity. One of those for whom this privilege was sought was Padre Chomé. When the request made by the commissioner had been denied, Chomé was taken from his bed, placed in a hammock, and carried by two strong Indians from San Xavier sixty leagues to Santa Cruz de la Sierra; then for a distance of a hundred leagues to Cochabamba; and finally over the desert and the rough and dangerous paths of the cordillera to Oruro, where his power of endurance failed completely, and he died on the 7th of September, 1768.

Another who was thought unable to endure the hardships of the journey to Spain was Padre Messner. The first stage of his journey was from his post to Santa Cruz de la Sierra, one hundred and twelve leagues. Messner reached Santa Cruz de la Sierra rather dead than alive, and had to wait here five months for the snow to disappear from the mountains. The continuance of the journey from this point, over the mountains and across the bleak and barren plateau, was exhausting even to a person in robust health, and was almost more than one could stand who was burdened with illness and old age. It was, moreover, rendered more fatiguing by the determination of the conductor of the expedition to push on as rapidly as possible, whatever might be the state of the way. On the mountains between Oruro and Tacna, the aged priest asked that he might be

allowed to halt and rest. His petition was not granted, but a man was detailed to walk by the side of his horse and hold him, in order that he might not fall from his saddle. They had, however, advanced only a short distance in this way when the aide found that the priest was dead. Another priest whose course was almost run was Padre Pallozzi. He was taken over nearly the same route as the others to Arica; then from Arica to Callao and Panama; and on arriving at Porto Bello he found himself exhausted, and died there December 21, 1768. And yet, the commissioner who ordered these things was frequently accused of being a partisan of the Jesuits, and too lenient to perform properly the duties of his post.

VII

By the middle of May, 1768, the Jesuits had been despatched from all the stations in the provinces of Rio de la Plata, except from the celebrated Misiones of the Guaranis in Paraguay. The reports that had been circulated, representing these reductions as usurpers of powers that belonged properly to the king, and as in rebellion against the authority of the sovereign, led the governor to proceed with great caution. He summoned the Provincial to Buenos Aires, but later countermanded the order, and requested him to return to Yapeyu from Bojada, the present city

of Paraná. He also requested that the Indian corregidor of each of the thirty reductions should be sent to the capital, accompanied by thirty of the principal caciques. These sixty influential Indians were detained about a year in Buenos Aires, and it was apparently desired that they should hold and express views that would justify the contemplated action with respect to the reductions. When it was supposed that they had been sufficiently turned against the Jesuits, they were induced to write a joint letter to the king, showing their enthusiasm for the governor, and expressing their thanks for their prospective relief from slavery. It has been suggested that they would probably not have manifested such satisfaction with the governor if they had known that they were held as hostages for the peaceful conduct of the Indians they represented.

The governor delayed the execution of the decree of expulsion for about a year, and during this time the corregidores were induced to write other letters to the Indians of their reductions, with a view of creating a prejudice among them against the priests. The position of the Jesuits during this period was sufficiently difficult even without the intrigues of the authorities at Buenos Aires; for it was known that they were to be removed, and this knowledge tended to destroy their prestige with the Indians. They felt compelled, however, to counsel the Indians to submit to the proposed action of the government, which

everybody knew was hostile to the system of the missions.

Besides the time required for carefully preparing for the change, the difficulty of obtaining secular priests as substitutes for the Jesuits, was another reason for the delay. Finally, on the 24th of May, Governor Bucareli left Buenos Aires, proceeding to Misiones to provide for the removal of the Jesuits. He made extensive military preparations for overcoming any resistance that might appear on the part of the Indians; but these preparations were proved by the events to have been unnecessary. On the 15th of July he arrived within a league of Yapeyu, and sent a commissioner to the reduction to bring the decree of expulsion officially to the attention of the provincial and any other Jesuits who might be there. The commissioner in this instance was Dr. Antonio Aldao, who had acted in the same capacity in expelling the Jesuits from Cordova. The ordinary procedure was observed here, including a notification in the prescribed form, the taking of an inventory of all the property belonging to the reduction, or pueblo, the church as well as the workshops and the warehouses. The objects contained in the church were turned over to the new priest, and the other items of property were put in charge of an administrator, one being appointed for each of the pueblos from which the Jesuits were removed. During these events Bucareli remained a short distance from the pueblo, wish-

ing to enter only after the departure of the Jesuits. "Finally, he entered the pueblo with all the ostentation possible, and remained there ten days, seeking to please the Indians and gain their confidence."⁷

From Yapeyu, the first of the reductions, or pueblos, in which the decree of expulsion was executed, the process was carried to each of the other pueblos, and by the 22d of August they had all been occupied and the new masters installed. The number of Jesuits deposed in these thirty pueblos and sent down to Buenos Aires was seventy-eight. After their arrival in the capital, they were held imprisoned until they were despatched for Spain, on the 8th of December. The voyage lasted four months, and on the 7th of April, 1769, they reached Cadiz, and a little later were transferred to the port of Santa Maria. In Santa Maria they were confined in the house of the Augustinians and the hospital of San Juan, and they remained there somewhat more than a year. During this period the provincial, Padre Manuel Vergara, was added to the long list of those who died going into exile. In all the province of Paraguay only one Jesuit remained. He was Padre Segismundo Aperger, who was left there because he could not be removed, since he was confined to his bed, burdened with the weight of nearly ninety years, paralyzed and moribund.

⁷ Colección de libros y documentos, VII, 212.

VIII

The beginning of the Jesuit establishment in Peru was made by a mission authorized by San Francisco de Borja, the third general of the order, on the suggestion of Philip II. The chief of this mission was Padre Gerónimo Ruiz del Portillo. The eight other members were drawn from the four Jesuit provinces of Spain. They embarked at San Lucar on the 2d of November, 1567; one of them died at Panama; and the survivors entered Lima on the 1st of April, 1568, bearing the royal decree providing for the settlement of the order in Peru. The Jesuit province of Peru at that time, with Portillo as the first provincial, comprehended the whole of South America. The members of the mission were received by the Dominicans and lodged in their monastery. With assistance rendered by the government and private donations, they proceeded at once to the construction of buildings immediately needed, and planned for the foundation of their permanent church. The corner stone of this edifice was laid by Archbishop Loayza. Other Jesuits arrived a few months after Portillo's mission, and, a college having been organized, the people, in enthusiasm over the new institution, gave abundantly of their wealth for its support. The enthusiasm manifested itself not only in prompting extensive gifts but also in moving persons to adopt the sotana. The first of these was Pedro Mejía, a member of

the audiencia. In the course of a few years, all of the principal cities became the seats of institutions founded by the Jesuits. In 1576 the historian José Acosta became provincial, succeeding Portillo, whom he sent to Potosí, to found a college in that city, and make it the center of missionary efforts.

Among the early colleges were those founded in Huancavelica, Guamanga, and Cuzco. Besides the college of Cuzco founded for the instruction of sons of Indian chiefs, there was another, that of San Bernardo, designed for the sons of the conquistadores, devoted to the teaching of theology, philosophy, Latin, rhetoric, and morals. The university that was later developed from this institution petitioned the king for the privilege of granting degrees to persons who had studied elsewhere, but this was denied, and authority conferred to grant degrees only to persons who had studied in a Jesuit college.

In Peru as well as elsewhere the Jesuits pursued the worldly path in accumulating riches. They sought gifts and inheritances; associated themselves with persons of fortune; used means of persuasion that only religious guides are in a position to apply; acquired vast estates, and made their products the material of mercantile operations; transferred large sums to Europe to assist members of the order in their designs to dominate governments; imposed their influence on persons of authority in both church and state;

and introduced into public affairs the power o accumulated wealth. The other side of the shield bears a record of their devotion to the welfare of the Indian, their opposition to the merciless greed-prompted cruelty of the encomenderos, and their varied productive industry that might have been a beneficent example to a people disposed to put wealth-seeking adventure and homely indolence above persistent and systematic labor.

On the 20th of August, 1767, the viceroy o Peru received from the governor of Rio de la Plata a letter enclosing documents relating to the expulsion of the Jesuits. Among these was an autograph letter from the king, commanding the viceroy to obey and carry out orders that the Count of Aranda might communicate to him in the king's name. The viceroy was, moreover authorized to use the military force if found to be necessary, as it might be employed in case o a rebellion.. The 8th of September was fixed a the date for the execution of the decree. In taking possession of the various houses or institutions of the Jesuits, essentially the same procedure was observed as in the execution of th decree in other parts of South America. Th members of the order were arrested in thei institutions, and provisional administrators wer put in possession of the confiscated property Mounted police patrolled the streets to prevent curious or malicious groups of persons from caus ing disturbance. The prisoners were conducte

in carriages under escort from their several houses, and assembled in the monastery of St. Paul; from Pisco, Ica, Huancavelica, and Guamanga, they were taken to Lima; but from Cuzco, Arequipa, and Puno they were embarked at a port farther towards the south.

One of the items in the inventory of the confiscated property of the Jesuits in Lima was a body of 5200 slaves. The value of haciendas, or estates, was approximately a million pesos, but by far the largest item appears to have been the credits and the gold and silver. In November, 1768, a bureau was created to take charge of this property, at least such of it as had not been consumed in maintaining and transporting the prisoners, or had not been sent to the king. The first of these items has been set down at 500,000 pesos, and the second at 800,000. Much of what remained passed to other organizations; the libraries went to the university; the numerous churches in Lima and other towns became hospitals, prisons, schools, or places of retirement for pious persons. Many of the sacred vases, ornaments, reliques, and jewels had a destination that has not been recorded.⁸

⁸ On the Jesuits in Peru, see Mendiburu, I, 230-237, 257-267, 293-300; VI, 278, 525-536, 614-618, giving a list of the Jesuits expelled.

IX

During the one hundred and seventy-four years of their residence in Chile, the Jesuits had attained preëminence among the religious orders not only for their intellectual qualities, but also for their worldly acquisitions. They had acquired prestige as teachers of youth; they were the most noted preachers; and they possessed more extensive libraries than the other orders. They had gained great wealth by donations from the government and from private persons.

The desire to be recognized as a founder of a Jesuit house or college or church furnished one of the motives for making donations to the order. Domingo Madureira Monterroco, in 1651, offered to give the Jesuits the sum of seventeen thousand dollars within a period of twelve years, but he determined to pay a much larger sum within a shorter period. The property conveyed, including slaves, amounted to forty thousand dollars. This donation secured for him the distinguished honor of being buried under the principal altar of the church, and of obtaining the title of founder, although the church was built fifty years earlier.⁹

In 1767, besides their urban property in the various cities, the Jesuits owned more than fifty haciendas, or estates, and almost all of them were the richest and most productive lands in the king-

⁹ Barros Arana, *Obras completas*, Santiago de Chile, 1908-1911, X, 60.

dom. These were abundantly equipped with implements, provided with live stock, and amply supplied with laborers, including twelve hundred slaves.

Although the beginnings of the great wealth of the Jesuits were derived from donations, yet their wealth was greatly increased by industries under an especially wise and skilful management. By raising cattle on their estates, and establishing slaughter-houses, and supplying retail shops controlled by themselves, they exercised a practical monopoly over an important element of food. The vast quantities of grain grown on the estates of the Jesuits was in part exported to Peru, and in part sent to their mills and converted into flour for the Chilean market. Producing in many departments of industry on a large scale and with a large number of slaves as laborers, they were able to control the market in many instances, and fix the prices independently, prices, too, that might eliminate competition. They manufactured lime, and supplied it to the government for use in constructing fortresses. The most important bakeries in the capital were in their hands. They controlled the trade in drugs and medicines. They had shipyards, where they built small vessels; and extensive potteries where they manufactured large quantities of the ware used by the common people. These industries were usually directed by the lay brothers, among whom there were sometimes men of special technical skill, notably

architects, who found ample employment in the construction of churches and other buildings needed for the various purposes of the order.¹⁰

The Jesuits, like the other orders, were ambitious to have a large number of houses. Barros Arana remarked that one might suppose that they would have been satisfied in possessing in Santiago alone three *colegios*, or houses of residence, besides villas, farms, and estates in the suburbs, where they had established different industries; but instead of being satisfied with these, they wished to have a monastery (*convento*) in each ward of the town.¹¹ They had also the worldly habit of trying to evade the customs laws. Under the freedom which they enjoyed as ecclesiastics, they caused many articles to pass in or out of the colony freely, on which a legitimate customs charge was due.¹²

The Jesuit establishments of Chile constituted a single province, but prior to 1619 they formed a vice-province dependent on the superior house at Cordova del Tucuman. At the head of the province stood the provincial. Within the province there were eleven *colegios* and about twenty houses of residence. Each of these institutions

¹⁰ Barros Arana, *Obras completas*, X, 120-126; *Hist. de Chile*, VI, cap. XI; Barros Arana, in his essay on the *Riquezas de los antiguos Jesuitas*, has given the names of many of the larger estates, but these names signify nothing in the local geography of Chile, since these estates have been divided and their parts appear under new names. *Obras completas*, X, 118.

¹¹ *Obras completas*, X, 73.

¹² *Obras completas*, X, 127.

had its independent administration, with its peculiar estates and other property; and each had a superior charged with providing for its needs, and with caring for, and developing, its material interests.

The policy carried out by the Jesuits required payment for their services. Their missions were supported by the bishops or by subventions from the crown. Instruction in their colleges was paid for by private persons, and the seminary established at Chillan for teaching Indians received annually one hundred and twenty pesos for each of the sixteen Indian pupils. From whatever source derived, the funds collected went into the coffers of the society, and the individual members seldom if ever engaged in affairs on their own account. The accumulated wealth of the society enabled it to carry on important branches of industry, and thereby to augment their riches and to increase their prestige in worldly affairs. By thus producing on a large scale, they made the small producers feel the inconvenience of the dominating influence of a great corporation; and by this they provoked an opposition that wished their downfall. Their standing was, moreover, affected by the independent spirit of the second half of the eighteenth century. This spirit antagonized the doctrine of absolute obedience that entered into the basis of the Jesuit discipline.

In the early years of their work in South America, the Jesuits were moved by a desire to

correct the abuses of the governor, the corregidores, the encomenderos, and all other persons having power over the Indians. By their protests and their petitions to the higher authorities, they necessarily brought themselves into open conflict with the secular authorities in the kingdom, on whom the Indians were immediately dependent. When the Jesuit preached against the abuses of the encomendero, the encomendero in turn withheld his contribution to the order. The corregidor resented any interference with his plan of spoiling the Indians in his district; and thus very early a breach was made between the Jesuits and the secular proprietors. This had only to be developed in order to bring it to the attention of the government.

X

Before executing Aranda's order for the expulsion of the Jesuits from Rio de la Plata, Governor Bucareli sent the papers designed for Chile to Governor Guill y Gonzaga. These documents reached Santiago on the 7th of August, 1767. Guill y Gonzaga was greatly embarrassed by these orders and the unusual manner of their communication. "Weak in character, ill, fanatically devoted to the church, a decided partisan of the Jesuits, among whom he had sought his confessor and spiritual counsellor, he was nevertheless obliged to carry out against them a rigid and

severe order which antagonized his beliefs and his most firmly grounded sentiments."¹³ The governor was authorized, in case the Jesuits should offer resistance, to use such force as might be necessary to procure an immediate execution of the decree. Although knowledge of the orders of the king and of the instructions of Aranda was kept from the people, yet when it was seen that the troops were preparing for action a rumor became current that they were to be used against the Jesuits. Precautions were also taken to prevent the Jesuits from escaping from the country. Sentinels were placed in the passes of the Andes, and the two ships in the harbor of Valparaiso were ordered not to leave port without the governor's permission; and the governor sent sealed instructions to his subordinates throughout the colony. These instructions were not to be opened before a prescribed date. The 26th of August, a few hours before dawn, was the time fixed for carrying out the decree of expulsion in all parts of Chile. The first house of the Jesuits visited in Santiago by Juan de Balmaseda, acting as commissioner for the government, was the *Colegio Maximo de San Miguel*, which occupied the present site of the palace of Congress. Sentinels were placed at all of the doors, and the commissioner then presented himself at the principal entrance, gave three heavy strokes on the door, and ordered in the name of the king that the door should be

¹³ Barros Arana, *Hist. de Chile*, VI, 268.

opened without delay. The rector of the college, Francisco de Madariaga, received the commissioner respectfully, offered no opposition to the execution of the royal order, and immediately called all the other officers of the college to assemble in the chapel. There were eighty-two of them. The decree of expulsion having been read, the rector handed to Balmaseda the keys of the house, which gave him access to all the property, books and papers of the college. In the course of the forenoon the Jesuits from the other establishments in the city and from neighboring estates arrived and were added to those who at the college had already been placed under arrest. Soldiers were stationed not only in the streets about the building, but they guarded also the several entrances, and in the building itself kept watch at the doors of the apartments occupied by the rector and the other members of the order.

At other points in Chile where there were Jesuits, the royal decree was carried out with the same severity and at practically the same hour. From the northern and the southern districts, during the next few weeks, the Jesuits were taken to Valparaiso, and held there under guard awaiting transportation to Europe. The fourteen members of the order and three coadjutors in the province of Cuyo, as already indicated, were sent to Buenos Aires to be added to those gathered there from the provinces of Rio de la Plata. Although the removal of the Jesuits from their

places in Chile caused serious regrets and lamentations among a very large part of the inhabitants, yet no resistance was made to the authorities commissioned to execute the king's decree.

The first step in this remarkable undertaking was to arrest the Jesuits of Chile and to bring them into the hands of the governmental authorities. It then devolved upon the governor to find some means of transporting them to Europe. The governor's first project was to make use of a vessel, *El Rosario*, then lying in the harbor of Valparaiso; but on account of difficulties raised by the owner, this plan had to be abandoned. Finally, by a letter from the viceroy of Peru, the governor was informed that a warship, *El Peruano*, would arrive at Valparaiso at the end of October, and that Jesuits might be embarked on this vessel and taken around Cape Horn to their destination. In the meantime the task of assembling the exiles at the port remained to be completed. In Santiago there were one hundred marked for deportation. At two o'clock on the morning of the 23d of October, these, under the direction of the corregidor, Luis Manuel de Zañartu, were marched through the dark and silent streets of the city to the suburbs, where horses had been brought together for their use on the journey to the coast. They arrived in Valparaiso after a ride of eight days. Here they found themselves united with other members of the order, who had been brought in from other

parts of Chile, making in all a company of about three hundred persons. A few of the Jesuits of Santiago had been left in the city on account of age and sickness, and seven had escaped on the journey to Valparaiso.

The ship, *El Peruano*, expected at the end of October, did not arrive in Valparaiso until the 30th of November. There were on board five hundred persons, of whom one hundred and eighty-one were Jesuits expelled from Peru.¹⁴ The order of the viceroy provided that the ship should not remain at Valparaiso more than three days for embarking the Jesuits of Chile. But it was found to be necessary to remain in port for a much longer period. The vessel needed repairs; about one hundred of the Jesuits brought from Peru had not suitable clothing, and a new supply had to be obtained in Chile; and the food provided for the voyage was inadequate and unfit for use. It was found, moreover, that the ship could receive only a few persons in addition to those who had embarked on it at Callao. Five of those who had arrived from the north had to be left at Valparaiso on account of serious illness, and place was found for only twenty-four of the three hundred Jesuits in Chile. The rest were left in Valparaiso; and early in January, 1768, *El Peruano* set sail on her long voyage to Europe. One of those left behind wrote: "We flattered ourselves always

¹⁴ A list of the Jesuits expelled from Peru in 1767 is given in Mendiburn, VI, 614-618.

with the hope that the king would again regard us with favor, and permit us to remain in our former state; we prayed without ceasing; we directed ourselves now to the Holy Virgin, now to our blessed founder and to other saints. But our prayers were not heard. As there was no other Spanish ship in the port, we were embarked at the beginning of Lent in three Chilean vessels and taken to Lima.¹⁵ Those who had been left at different points in Chile for various reasons, were in the course of the following months deported, so that in 1772 the governor was able to report to Aranda that no Jesuit remained within the limits of the territory under his jurisdiction. Of those who were sent from Chile to Lima, one hundred and twenty were shipped to Italy by way of Cape Horn, and the rest went by way of Panama.

The historians Olivares and Molina were among the Jesuits sent from Chile to Peru to be embarked for Europe. After some months spent in Lima, they sailed from Callao on the 7th of May, and arrived in Cadiz on the 7th of December, 1768, whence they were taken to Italy. Olivares, who was more than ninety years of age, resided in Imola, while Bologna became the residence of Molina.¹⁶

The exiles from Chile, as well as those from Rio de la Plata, received from the Spanish crown

¹⁵ Quoted By Barros Arana, VI, 285.

¹⁶ See *Colección de historiadores de Chile*, VII, Introduction to Olivares' *Historia*, XIII; Amunátegui, Miguel Luis, *Los Precursores de la independencia de Chile*, Santiago, 1870-1872, I, cap. VI, Sec. XVII.

an annual pension of one hundred dollars, under conditions similar to those that had been imposed upon Jesuits expelled from other parts of Spanish territory.

XI

The order requiring the expulsion of the Jesuits from Ecuador reached the hands of President José Diguja as a sealed document to be opened eight days after its reception. Suspecting the nature of the document, Diguja had prepared for its execution without exciting a tumult on the part of the people, and for its execution in all parts of the presidency at the same time. There were then Jesuits in Quito, Latacunga, Ambato, Riobamba, Guayaquil, Cuenca, Loja, and Ibarra. To the province of Quito belonged the *colegios* of Buga, Pasto, Popayan, and Panama; and, moreover, the missions of Maynas and those of the territory of the Isthmus of Darien.

At four o'clock on the morning of the 20th of August, the president caused the Jesuits of the *colegio* of Quito to be assembled and the royal order to be read to them. At the same time he declared them prisoners, and forbade them to communicate with the inhabitants of the town. It was determined that all of the Jesuits of the province should be assembled at Guayaquil. The president treated them with great consideration; caused clothing to be prepared for them; and organized accommodations for them along the

route to the port. Deguja ordered seven hundred beasts of burden to be gathered at Quito to transport the Jesuits and their effects to the coast. The gathering of the mules, the leave-taking of the faithful, and the long procession over the tableland formed a striking scene.

The Jesuits entered upon the march in three divisions. The third division was composed of the officials who had remained to transfer the property to the state. The three divisions embarked for Panama respectively on the 17th and 25th of September and the 3d of October. A few who were ill and the procuradores sailed in November. Aranda disapproved of the action of the president in leaving six Jesuits in Quito, and they were removed from the city on the 9th of September, 1772. These were very old or blind or ill, and the president caused them to be carried on stretchers. With their removal the expulsion was complete. The whole number expelled from Ecuador was one hundred and eighty-two.¹⁷

XII

Shortly before the expulsion of the Jesuits, the viceroy of New Granada, José Solis Folch de Cardona, laid aside his worldly interests, and devoted his attention to acts of charity. On one occasion he sent the materials for an elaborate dinner to a hospital for the insane that was in

¹⁷ A nearly complete list of the Jesuits expelled from Ecuador is given in Suarez, *Historia del Ecuador*, V, 233-239.

charge of friars; and later, visiting the institution, he asked one of the inmates if he had dined well, and received this reply: "Senor Viceroy, what I can say is that the friars have dined like *locos*, and the *locos* like friars." He gave his property for the benefit of the poor, and on the 24th of February, 1761, he applied for admission to the Franciscan monastery in Bogotá. In "abandoning the world," he took the name of José de Jesus Maria. He continued here his acetic régime until his death, April 27, 1770.¹⁸

The successor of Solis as viceroy of New Granada was Pedro Mesía de la Zerda, who assumed the duties of his office in January, 1761. The expulsion of the Jesuits occurred during his administration. The viceroy received a note from the king, on the 7th of July, 1767, ordering the other documents to be opened on the eve of the day fixed for the expulsion. This day was the 1st of August. On the 31st of July, the Society celebrated the *fiesta* of Ignacio de Loyola, with all the pomp which the wealth of the Jesuits made possible. The benediction of the preacher concluded the activity of the order in Bogotá. In the following night, the viceroy caused the establishments of the Jesuits in Bogotá to be surrounded by guards. These establishments were the *Colegio Maximo*, the *Seminario de San Bartolomé*, and the *Noviciado*. The commissioners appeared at the *Colegio Maximo*, and were immediately ad-

¹⁸ Vergara y Velasco, F. J., *Capítulos de una historia civil y militar de Colombia*, Bogota, 1905, 78-85.

mitted. Then, carrying out the usual programme, they summoned all the members of the college to assemble, and in the presence of witnesses caused the royal decree to be read to them. Then the provincial took it, kissed it, and affirmed that they would obey it like faithful and loyal vassals of the king. After the provincial had surrendered the keys of the college, the members of the Society were arrested and cut off completely, as in the other cases, from all communication with members of the secular community. The commissioner then made a careful examination and inventory of all the property discovered in the college. When the faithful appeared in the morning, they found the doors of the church closed, and the same fact was observed at the *Seminario* and the *Noviciado*, where a similar procedure had been followed. To set aside the possibility of a public commotion, the royal decree imposing absolute silence respecting the events concerning the expulsion, was published. It was, moreover, announced that the college would be opened in a few days with new instructors. The Jesuits from the *Seminario* and the *Noviciado* were transferred to the *Colegio Maximo*.

Commissioners were appointed and sent to other places where Jesuits resided; to Tunja, Honda, Pamplona, the Llanos de Casanare, Popayan, Antioquia, Cartagena, and Mompox. The Jesuits taken from most of the interior towns were sent to Honda, consigned to an officer of the

port, José Palacio, to be embarked for Mompos, as the next stage of their journey to Europe. Those from Pamplona were sent out of the country by way of Maracaibo; while those from the missions of Casanare, fourteen in number, proceeded through Venezuela. In every instance when the commissioners appeared at a college or other Jesuit institution, the door was opened for them immediately; and this fact has been cited as evidence that the event was expected. Whether this was the case or not, the priests made no effort to provoke a popular movement in their favor. However unjust they may have considered their expulsion, they obeyed the order without delay, and the royal permission to use force in making the arrests was superfluous.

XIII

The same prompt obedience was rendered by the Jesuits of the Llanos, or the plains of the Orinoco or of the Casanare. In 1659 the Jesuits were permitted to return to the Llanos, from which they had previously been recalled. Two priests, Francisco Jimeno and Francisco Alvarez, were appointed to explore the region, and to report such information as the provincial might need to enable him to direct the proposed missionary undertaking. On the basis of the report presented by these envoys on their return, headquarters of missionary work were established at Pauto.

A feature of these missions not conspicuous elsewhere was a military escort provided for the protection of the missionaries. The small squads of soldiers detailed for service at the several reductions were paid from the royal treasury. In the reductions of the Orinoco, a troop of six soldiers appears as early as 1681, and six other soldiers were added to the force after the destruction of the pueblos and the missionaries by the savages in 1684. The king ordered another addition, in 1693, consisting of twenty-five soldiers, a number that was increased a little later to thirty-five. Thus from time to time the number of soldiers sent to the missions was increased until each of a majority of the reductions had a small escort.

More than forty missions, or reductions, were founded in the district of Casanare, Meta, and Orinoco between 1604 and 1755, but many of these were afterwards abandoned, some were united, and others continued to exist under changed names. Shortly before the expulsion, there were the following reductions in existence, each with the number of Indians indicated :

CASANARE	
Name of Mission	Indians
1. Pauto	600
2. San Salvador del Puerto de Casanare	350
3. Na. Sa. de la Asunción	1,800
4. El Pilar de Patute	70
5. San Javier de Macaguanes	1,000
6. San Ignacio de Betoyes	1,600

META

Name of Mission	Indians
1. Surimena	400
2. San Miguel de Macuco	800
3. Casimena	700
4. La Quebradita de Jiramena	300

ORINOCO

1. Carichana	400
2. San Borja	330
3. Cabruta	400
4. Uriana	600
5. El Raudal	300
6. La Encaramada	290

Total 9,940

The policy of isolation was more or less strictly carried out in the reductions of the plains as well as in those of Paraguay. The Jesuits sought to prevent Europeans from knowing the internal affairs of the missions. The neophites were not expected to go out, and strangers were not expected to enter, without the permission of the priests. This exclusion provoked hostility, but the Jesuits relied on their brethren to allay it. The confessor of the king and the queen were expected to support them in times of difficulty. The communism of the Jesuits of the llanos, another conspicuous feature of their policy, appears to have been adapted to the disposition of the Indians. The reluctance of the Indians to work made them look with favor on membership in a community where there was a stock, from

which one might draw even when old and no longer able to contribute to it.

When the Jesuits of the Orinoco plains were informed of the royal decree of expulsion, the superiors of the missions presented their books of accounts, containing the record of the reductions from their foundation, to the accredited authorities. Their property, whether in money or in any other form, was turned over to the governor of the province. The priests left their pueblos quietly at night, in order that there might be no disturbance or insurrection among the Indians who had adopted the settled life of the missions. "The rich haciendas of Casanare and other articles of great value, which were the common property of the Indians of this and other districts, were confiscated in favor of the royal treasury, leaving the legitimate owners in extreme want. The churches were dispoiled of their most costly jewels; the haciendas were sold at an insignificant price; and the régime of rigor and rapacity reappeared in greater severity. The Indians abandoned these fields, the former theater of their prosperity; the reductions were depopulated; the temples were ruined; and the land was turned back to its primitive state of savage and solitary nature."¹⁹

¹⁹ Plaza, José Antonio de, *Memorias para la historia de la Nueva Granada desde su descubrimiento hasta el 20 de julio de 1810*, Bogotá, 1850, 314.

XIV

The expulsion of the Jesuits stands out as a prominent event in the history of Spanish South America, yet at the time it attracted comparatively little popular attention. It was an act of the sovereign, and was later ratified by the pope. In opposition to such an act there was then no organized public opinion. Moreover, the measures taken to execute the decree of expulsion were carried out without previous announcement; and before the public had become aware of what was contemplated, the houses, the schools, and the churches of the Jesuits had been closed, and the unfortunate missionaries were well on their way into exile.

One of the problems of the expulsion of the Jesuits was to find where they would be received and permitted to remain. The attempts to establish them in Corsica and Genoa were unsuccessful, and it was finally decided that they should be taken to the papal states. In making this decision Charles III, it is said, pretended to rule the states of the supreme pontiff with the same authority as that which he exercised in his own dominions. Thus, without soliciting beforehand the consent of the pope, or giving notice of his intention, he sent to the papal states the six thousand Spanish subjects whom he had expelled from Spain and the American colonies, ordering his captains to disembark them at ports of these states. By the

royal ordinance of April 2, 1767, he, moreover, declared that if any Jesuit should leave the states of the church, the pension that had been assigned to him would be discontinued.²⁰ The papal states were thus their prison, but the authorities of the church were not pleased to be made their keepers. Their view was that if the Jesuits were innocent of any offense, there existed no ground for expelling them as pernicious; if they were bad, one might not assume that the pope should punish them, but that they ought to have been punished in the dominions of the king.²¹

On the arrival of the Jesuits, it was not thought advisable to incorporate them in the established organization, but to assign them to the provinces of Emilia and Romagna, where they might be maintained without great inconvenience. Those from Paraguay were sent to the cities of Faenza, Ravenna, and Brisighella. At Faenza they received special attention from the priests of the Jesuit college in that city; and some of them accepted an invitation from Count Cantoni to occupy a house owned by him in the country.

Before the end of 1769, almost all of the banished Spanish Jesuits found themselves in the northern part of the papal states, and here some of them attempted to reorganize the instruction that had been interrupted in America by their

²⁰ *Colección de libros y documentos*, VII, 242.

²¹ *Colección de libros y documentos*, VII, 243.

expulsion. The source of their support, aside from the donations received, was a small pension of about a hundred dollars a year, paid by the Spanish government from the property of the Jesuits that had been confiscated. But all their resources were inadequate for their proper maintenance, so that, as it was said, if they clothed themselves, there was nothing left for food, and if they ate, there was nothing left for clothing.

Those persons among the exiles who turned their attention to instruction found pupils without going outside their own ranks; for a considerable number of novices had followed their superiors. They had refused to accept the conditions under which they might have remained in America. These conditions were embraced in the instructions of Aranda to the commissioners charged with carrying out the decree of expulsion. The tenth section of these instructions provided that if any novices were found in the novitiates, or houses, who had not already taken their religious vows, they should be immediately removed in order that they might have no communication with the rest, and should be taken to a private house, where they might enjoy full liberty, have knowledge of the perpetual expatriation that had been imposed upon the members of the Society, and decide freely according to their inclinations, without being influenced by the commissioner, whether to return to secular life or accept the fate of the exiles. But they were made to under-

stand that in going with those who were expelled they would receive no pension, and their expatriation would be perpetual. The government was evidently desirous of having the novices abandon their plan to enter the order of the Jesuits; but the youths, with the zeal of new converts, were not easily moved, and, for the larger part, went with their teachers to Italy, and here under the newly organized instruction had an opportunity to continue their studies.

The expulsion of the Jesuits not only checked the economic development of the dependencies, but also clouded their literary and scholarly prospects. The most efficient schools throughout the colonies were closed, and the inhabitants lapsed into an ignorance even more profound than that which had marked them in the earlier decades.

CHAPTER V

THE CREATION OF THE VICEROYALTY OF RIO DE LA PLATA

- I. The need of a new viceroyalty and the functions of the viceroy.
- II. The audiencia of Charcas and the creation of the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata.
- III. Viceroy Ceballos and his army.
- IV. The Spanish-Portuguese treaty of 1777.
- V. The commercial code of 1778.
- VI. Viceroy Vertiz.
- VII. Fernandez general intendant of the army and the royal treasury.

I

AFTER the expulsion of the Jesuits, and before the conclusion of the second boundary treaty with Portugal, Charles III undertook another measure of internal reform in the South American dependencies. The revolution in Paraguay and the continuance of the controversy with the Portuguese emphasized the need of giving a greater degree of independence to the government of the southeastern provinces. The viceroyalty of Peru had, for many years, shown signs of political disintegration. Evidence of this was presented in demands for an increase in the number of audiencias; in the establishment of the viceroyalty of

New Granada, or Santa Fé; and in the pretension of the captaincies-general to be independent of the viceroys. The growth of the population in the different quarters of the continent, and the development of local interests and local ambitions, made necessary a more effective administration than could be furnished from any single center. This difficulty found its normal solution in the division of the original South American vice-royalty. This division was first carried into effect, as already suggested, by establishing a separate viceregal government for the territory now embraced in the republics of Colombia and Ecuador.

In the southern part of the continent the need of a new administrative organization had become imperative. There was wanted a more effective agency not only for the better management of internal affairs, but also for repelling foreign encroachments, particularly those of the Portuguese from the side of Brazil. As a capital for the new government, Buenos Aires had the great advantage of its geographical position. It was near the southern coast, where the Spaniards were attempting to plant colonies, and it was the gateway to the interior of the continent, reached by the great rivers of Paraguay, Paraná, and Uruguay. The Cordillera, impassable during a large part of the year, made it necessary that the eastern and western coasts should have different centers of governmental authority. The province

of Cuyo, east of the Andes, formerly attached to Chile, had more intimate geographical relations with the provinces of Rio de la Plata than with the territory of the Pacific coast, and, therefore, needed to be politically united with the provinces of the southeast.

The viceroyalty of Buenos Aires, when created, was in all its legal features like those that had been previously established in Mexico, Peru, and the present territory of Colombia and Ecuador. In Mexico and Peru, at the beginning of the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the succession of viceroys already extended over more than two hundred years. A complex social organization had grown up in their capitals; elaborate forms and ceremonies were observed both in the government and in private life; and the class distinctions that were recognized gave the society an appearance of maturity. But in Buenos Aires, a frontier town, there was comparatively little wealth, less recognition of forms and ceremonies, and, in every respect, a simpler mode of existence. While the viceroy of Buenos Aires stood under the same law as the viceroy of Mexico or Lima, his real position was widely different from that of the viceroy in either of the older capitals.

The powers and duties of a viceroy were in general such as devolved upon him as the immediate representative of the king. He considered petitions of all sorts addressed to him, and in this he was assisted by a legal adviser, called *asesor*

general. The *asesor* prepared the decisions, or replies to the petitions, and submitted them to the viceroy for his signature. From these decisions there was an appeal to the audiencia. The viceroy stood at the head of both civil and military affairs. He was the commander-in-chief of the colonial military and naval forces, but in emergencies he was assisted by a council of war. He called courts-martial, and reviewed for confirmation the sentences imposed by the courts before they were carried out. As president of the audiencia he might attend its sessions, and he had the power of veto over all its decisions.¹ In this capacity he made an annual report to the king through the Council of the Indies, and took this occasion to give the king all necessary information concerning the public and private characters of the members of this court. His conduct was, however, subjected to restriction. He was forbidden to marry within the limits of the vice-royalty without the express permission of the sovereign. He might not engage in commercial

¹ Sometimes the viceroy attended the meetings of the audiencia in state. The ceremony of these occasions in Lima has been described by a contemporary observer. When it had been announced that the viceroy would thus be present, a deputation of the judges "attended him from his palace to the hall; on his arrival at the door, the porter called aloud 'the president!' when all the attorneys, advocates, and others met him and conducted him to his chair; the judges continued standing until he was seated and nodded permission for them to resume their seats." At the end of the session all the members of the audiencia "accompanied him to the door of his apartment in the palace, the regent walking on his left, and the other members preceding him two and two." Stevenson, *Twenty Years' Residence*, I, 175.

affairs, acquire property, become a god-father to an infant, or visit a private family. He was the royal vice-patron. All appointments to benefices in the church required his confirmation. In exercising his power with reference to these appointments, he selected one of three persons proposed by the archbishop. The viceroy of Peru was governor-general of Callao, and twice every year he visited the fortifications, receiving for each visit an addition to his salary of five hundred dollars.

II

For two centuries the audiencia of Charcas had exercised extensive powers over the greater part of the territory that now fell under the rule of the viceroy of Rio de la Plata. Within the limits of its wide jurisdiction this body had taken to itself practically sovereign power. It dared even to set itself in opposition to the will of the viceroy of Peru, its legitimate superior. It manifested this opposition in supporting the rebellion of Antequera, while the viceroy was using his power to suppress it.² In the interior of the continent the audiencia of Charcas remained serene and unmoved by the agitations that disturbed Lima, Asuncion, Buenos Aires, and other more accessible cities. It was in some sense the training

² René-Moreno, G., *Bolivia y Perú: Notas históricas y bibliográficas*, Santiago de Chile, 1905, 202. The essay on "La Audiencia de Charcas, 1559–1809" occupies pages 201 to 325.

place, the apprentice station for oidores destined for promotion to the audiencia of Lima.³

The creation of the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata was the most important act of Spanish colonial legislation in the later decades of the century. A step towards this event is seen in the king's declaration of 1766, that the governor of Buenos Aires should have supervision over the eastern shore, including the Straits and Cape Horn.⁴ Another step was taken by the fiscal of the royal audiencia of Charcas, Tomas Alvarez de Acevedo. He foresaw the necessity of a change, and urged that the government of a province as far away as Buenos Aires was from the center of power would inevitably be inefficient and expensive. In spite of the great difficulties of communication, the supreme tribunal for the province of Buenos Aires had its seat nearly two thousand miles away, in the city of Charcas. In order to remedy the evils and promote the public welfare, it appeared to Acevedo imperatively necessary to create a viceroyalty and audiencia at Buenos Aires. The audiencia of Charcas adopted this view, and on the 12th of January, 1771, made a report, and sent it to the king, advising the creation of a new viceroyalty, urging that the province of Cuyo should be separated from Chile, and united with the provinces of Tucuman, Buenos

³ *Memorias de los vireyes del Perú*, II, 93; René-Moreno, *Bolivia y Perú*, 208.

⁴ Quesada, Vicente Gaspar, *Vireinato del Rio de la Plata*, Buenos Aires, 1881, 38.

Aires, and Paraguay, and the whole be made to constitute the territory of the new viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata.⁵ The prompt action that was taken in this case was in a large measure due to the hostility that had broken out between the Spaniards and the Portuguese. The king of Spain determined not only to meet the hostile Portuguese with an effective force, but also to create a new center of viceregal power. Both the viceroy of Peru and the governor of Buenos Aires favored the project; and in July, 1776, Pedro Ceballos was informed that he would be placed in command of the military expedition against the Portuguese in the Rio de la Plata, and that he would be entrusted with the superior authority over this district and all the territories under the jurisdiction of the audiencia of Charcas, as well as those of the cities of Mendoza and San Juan del Pico; and that there would be conceded to him the status of viceroy, governor, captain-general, and president of the audiencia, with all the powers and duties pertaining to this status. Ceballos was then governor of Madrid, and the king provided that this office should be held for him, in order that he might return to it when the object of the expedition should have been attained.

Under the date of August 1, 1776, the king issued to Ceballos his commission in the following form:

“Whereas, being well satisfied with the repeated proofs which you have given me of your love and zeal

⁵ *Obesada. Virreinato.* 40.

for my royal service, and having appointed you to command the expedition that is made ready at Cadiz for South America, instructed to obtain satisfaction for the insults offered by the Portuguese, in my provinces of Rio de la Plata, I have appointed you my viceroy, governor, and captain-general of the provinces of Buenos Aires, Paraguay, Tucuman, Potosi, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Charcas, and of all the districts, towns, and territories, to which is extended the jurisdiction of that audiencia, over which you will preside when present, with the appropriate powers and privileges which the other viceroys of my dominions in India enjoy, according to the laws of the Indies, thus embracing under your command and jurisdiction the territories of the cities of Mendoza, and San Juan del Pico, which at present are dependent on the government of Chile, with absolute independence of my viceroy of the kingdom of Peru, while thus you remain in those countries, with respect to the military as well as to the civil government, and the general superintendency of the royal treasury, in all its branches and products; wherefore I command the said viceroy of Peru, the presidents of Chile and Charcas, the ministers of their audiencias, the governors, corregidores, alcaldes, ministers of my royal treasury, officers of my royal army and navy, and other persons whom it may concern, that they may have, recognize, and obey you as such viceroy, governor, and captain-general of the provinces mentioned, in virtue of this my order and testimonial of that which you will be obliged to direct on your arrival, to the chiefs, tribunals, and others who may be concerned, so that without the least reply or contradiction they may comply with your orders and that they may comply with them punctually in their respective jurisdictions, which is thus my will, and that as soon as you are prepared to leave Cadiz you make yourself known as viceroy and captain-general to all persons on all the warships and transports, in order that

they may act in accordance with this knowledge and may be under your orders when they embark, and to the effect that you may not be placed in embarrassment in the absolute service and authority, and with regard to the high character of my viceroy, governor, and captain-general, in virtue of this my royal decree, I excuse you from all the rest of the formalities of other expeditions, oath, payment of half-year annats, assuming possession, judgment of *residencia*, and of whatever other requisites are customary and prescribed by the laws of the Indies, in case of the appointment of viceroys to those dominions, for thus entering my royal service; and I command equally the officers of the royal treasury of Buenos Aires and the rest of the districts of your government, that they may pay you punctually from the funds of my royal treasury to the amount of forty thousand pesos current in America, which I assign to you in Cadiz, in virtue of your receipts, or letters of payment which will serve for them, of proper date without any other security whatsoever.

"Given in San Ildefonso, August 1, 1776."

III

The king's instructions concerning the government to be established were issued under date of August 15, 1776. The new viceroyalty was independent of that of Peru, and the power conferred upon Ceballos was the absolute power of the king. At this time the governor of Rio de la Plata was Juan José de Vértiz, who, having handed over to the new viceroy the command of the troops and the superior authority over all the cities and territory under his control, was ordered

to remain as governor of this province, subordinated to the viceroy as the viceroy was subject to the king. The sixteenth article of the instructions commands the viceroy to raise all the militia possible within the limits of the new viceroyalty, to commission officers, and to make effective regulations for clothing, arming, and disciplining the troops to be maintained; and at the conclusion of the expedition to make arrangements under which the established armed force may be continued. It was not difficult to foresee that the irritation caused by Spain's commercial policy was destined, sooner or later, to make a considerable military force needed to ward off foreign encroachments.

The fleet appointed to carry the nine thousand soldiers placed under the command of Ceballos left Cadiz on the 12th of October, 1776. Ceballos did not go to the colony as to a strange country. He had been governor of the province of Rio de la Plata for a period of ten years, from 1756 to 1766; and in his military expeditions to Misiones and against Colonia he had become familiar with the region over which he was to rule as viceroy. He knew, moreover, the territory in dispute between the Spaniards and the Portuguese, as well as the merits of the pretensions of the two parties. He landed with his forces at Montevideo on the 21st of April, 1777, and led them along the shore to Colonia. At the same time he sent warships to command that town and fort from the river.

Attacked by both the land and naval forces, Colonia surrendered on the 4th of June, 1777. One hundred and forty pieces of ordnance and a large quantity of arms and munitions fell into the hands of the Spaniards. The officers were sent to Rio Janeiro, while the common soldiers and the colonists were transported to Mendoza. The colonists and common soldiers had been brought to America from the Azores, the Portuguese government expecting that their experience in the vineyards of their native islands would be utilized in developing the culture of the vine in the region about the mouth of the great river. But the climatic conditions there had been found unfavorable to this undertaking. In the interior of the country at the foot of the Andes there was a better prospect, and the later important development in the cultivation of the grape in that region was furthered by the prisoners of war from Colonia.

The continuance of the war against the Portuguese was prevented by despatches from Madrid, announcing that, by an agreement with Portugal, hostilities had been suspended. Portuguese diplomacy had put an end to the military undertaking. These despatches also brought to Ceballos the information that he had received military promotion. Under these circumstances, the only course open to him was to return with his army to Montevideo. Here he placed General Vertiz in immediate command of the forces, and went to Buenos Aires.

IV

The cessation of hostilities was followed by the treaty of San Ildefonso, October 1, 1777. By the nullification of the treaty of 1750, there remained as the line of demarcation between the possessions of the two powers only the vague and indefinite boundary approved by previous documents and actual possession. Portugal found this favorable to her policy of persistent encroachment, and, therefore, had met with indifference all projects for a more definite agreement. Finally, however, it was mutually determined to form a new treaty which would fix more accurately the intercolonial boundary. The ministers appointed to conduct the negotiations and form the treaty were José Moñino, Count of Florida Blanca, on the part of Spain, and Francisco Inocencio de Souza Coutinho, on the part of Portugal. The treaty provided for the mutual release of prisoners taken from the opposing nations; the cession of Colonia and its territory and the island of San Gabriel to Spain. The inhabitants of the ceded establishments and territory might withdraw or remain with all their effects; and the Spaniards in any territory or establishment ceded to Portugal might enjoy the same privilege. In this treaty, as in that of 1750, the line of separation to be drawn was described in detail. The navigation of the rivers should be in common to the point where both banks were held by one nation.

Islands in rivers where one bank was held by each nation should go with the land of the bank that was nearer in the season of low water, except in case of large islands, when they should be divided. This treaty, like its predecessor, provided for a commission to fix practically the boundary line, and to interpret the rules established in the treaty to be followed in its execution. Contraband trade across the border was prohibited. "In proof of the union and friendship so greatly desired by the two august contending parties," the Spanish crown offered to restore and evacuate, within four months after the ratification of the treaty, the island of Santa Catalina and the part of the adjacent continent which had been occupied by Spanish forces; and Portugal agreed not to permit any foreign ships of war or of commerce to enter the port of Santa Catalina or the ports of the adjacent coast, particularly ships belonging to a power with which Spain might be at war, or that might be suspected of carrying on contraband trade. The troops and vessels of war should be mutually withdrawn to posts destined for them in time of peace.⁶ Moreover, inasmuch as the wealth of the country depended largely upon the slaves who cultivated the lands, the governors were required to agree on a method of returning them in case they ran away from their owners, so that the fact of passing under foreign dominion might not give them their liberty.

⁶ Calvo, *Colección completa de los tratados*, Paris, 1862, III,

V

The enemy against whom the king had made war was, after all, a beneficent factor in the life of the colony of Rio de la Plata; for smuggling by the Portuguese had relieved the inhabitants, in a large measure, from the consequences of Spain's commercial restrictions. Not only Portuguese wares, but also wares from other countries were smuggled over the border to Buenos Aires. English goods, received at Colonia under relatively low duties, were smuggled across the river and brought to the Spanish settlers. The low prices at which they could be obtained naturally diminished the importations by the overland route from Peru. When Charles III became aware of the deplorable state of things that had prevailed in this southern colony, he was convinced that the fundamental error lay in the economic legislation to which the colonists had been subjected. Under this conviction he issued the commercial code of 1778.⁷ This applied alike to all the Spanish colonies in America. It had been preceded by a decree issued by Ceballos, in 1777, making free the trade of Rio de la Plata with Spain and the rest of the colonies. This act was approved by the king and prepared the way for the more general law of the following year, the commercial code of 1778.

⁷ *Reglamento para el comercio libre de España á Indias de 12 de Octubre de 1778.*

Hitherto Seville and Cadiz had held the monopoly of Spain's commerce with America. The advantages of this trade were now extended to the principal ports of Spain and of the Canary Islands. In Spanish America practically all of the important ports, including Buenos Aires and Montevideo, were admitted to the privileges previously enjoyed exclusively by Vera Cruz and Porto Bello.

It was not the design of the crown in making the concession of 1778 to relinquish its hold on the colonies or on any part of the revenues derived from them, but the result of the enlarged commercial freedom was inevitably to stimulate a desire for liberty of a larger scope. This change was followed by an unprecedented growth in the population of the province of Buenos Aires. The necessary adjustment of this increasing population to the material conditions of the colony, in view of the inefficiency or indifference of the supreme government, called for the exercise of local authority, and thus fostered the sense of self-control and suggested the idea of independence.

The war between England and Spain, which broke out in 1779, prevented the full realization of the expected results of the enlarged commercial freedom. This commercial emancipation, moreover, came too late to revive the loyalty of the colonists of Buenos Aires. They were well aware that they had been neglected for decades, and that

this neglect had been permitted in the interests of the residents of other ports. They were now free from the commercial as well as the political domination of Lima. Seville's monopoly was broken, and the rich products of Upper Peru, Chile, Paraguay, and the provinces of the interior were brought to Buenos Aires and shipped thence to Cadiz, Barcelona, Malaga, Santander, Vigo, Gijon, San Lucar, Havana, Lima, Guayaquil, and Guiana; and these ports sent back to Buenos Aires whatever wares were demanded to further the advancement and well-being of that colony.

VI

From San Lorenzo, October 27, 1777, the king issued an order declaring the viceroyalty permanent. By this order General Vertiz was appointed to succeed Ceballos, but it was left to Ceballos to determine when this appointment should become effective. This order, moreover, introduced an important reform, by creating the office of General Superintendent of the Army and the Treasury, the occupant of which was to have general direction and management of all the departments of the treasury. The creation of this office fixed a limitation on the power of the viceroy which had not existed during the administration of Ceballos; for he had performed the functions of general superintendent of the royal treasury, and "to him was subordinated the intendant appointed for the military expedition and all his

subordinates of the auditor's office and the treasury.⁸ The intendancies were made to embrace all the inhabited districts of the viceroyalty and all those that might be inhabited in the future, and the power to be exercised by the intendant under the new viceroy and his successors was in some sense a counterpoise to the authority of the viceroy; for in the order appointing Vertiz the king informed him that while he had made him viceroy, governor, and captain-general, he had left the supervision and regulation of the royal treasury in all its branches and proceeds to the care, direction, and management of the intendant of the army whom he had appointed.

During the administration of Vertiz settlements were made on the southeastern coast, in the region formerly known as Patagonia, and these were recognized as part of the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata, and thus under the jurisdiction of the viceroy. But these establishments were found to cost the government large sums, and, with the exception of that of Rio Negro, were later abandoned by the authority of the king. At the same time the king directed that a column should be left there, on which should be fixed the royal arms and an inscription affirming the Spanish sovereignty over the region; and that this territory should be visited or otherwise recognized every year.⁹

⁸ Quesada, *Vireinato*, 134.

⁹ *Informe del Virey Vertiz, para que se abandonen los establecimientos de las Costa Patagónica*, Angelis, V, 122-127.

At the head of the political hierarchy stood the viceroy, governor, and captain-general; under him the secretary of the viceroyalty; and there were the following provinces with civil or military governors: Montevideo, Tucuman, Paraguay, Charcas, Potosi, Paz, Chucuito, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Mojos, Chiquitos, Misiones de Indios Guaranis. The Malouine, or Falkland, Islands, and the new settlements on the coast of Patagonia were dependencies of the government of the vice-royalty. The officials of these regions were subordinated to that government, "and they formed an integral part of the administration of the governmental district of the viceroy."¹⁰

VII

The viceroy, on retiring from office, made, for the benefit of his successors, a somewhat detailed account of his administration, and of the questions, solved and unsolved, that had engaged his official attention. This practice was continued in the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata. Ceballos, in his memorial for his successor, referred to his efforts to fortify the frontier against the Indians, and, in order that Vertiz might be in a position to maintain this defense, he gave him an account of the arms and munitions available for this purpose.

¹⁰ Quesada, V. G., *Vireinato*, 130; on the political geography of this part of the world at the end of the eighteenth century, see *Revista del archivo general de Buenos Aires*, by Trelles, IV, 99-278.

At the same time he gave him the necessary information concerning the soldiers who were in the service or who might be drawn into it. In this document Ceballos also provided for the repatriation of the Portuguese soldiers who had been sent to the region about Mendoza, as well as of the Portuguese inhabitants of Colonia, in case they did not wish to remain under Spanish rule. They should be assisted with transportation, but only in case they had paid their debts, or otherwise satisfied their creditors. He, moreover, emphasized the need of supporting the missions of the Gran Chaco, not merely because of the desirability of bringing to the Indians a knowledge of Christianity, but also in order to forestall the encroachments of the Portuguese in that region.¹¹ The ill success of the administration of the Paraguayan missions after the expulsion of the Jesuits induced Ceballos to commend the problem of their reform to the consideration of Vertiz.¹²

There was abundant evidence early in the eighteenth century that the Spanish colonial system had failed to reach the ends for which it was designed by the king and his council. The Indians, in spite of the benevolent intentions of the supreme government, suffered a barbarous and destructive oppression at the hands of practically irresponsible officials. Yet before the middle of the century the Spanish king had in his

¹¹ Trelles, *Revista del archivo general de Buenos Aires*, Buenos Aires, 1870, II, 427.

¹² Trelles, *Revista del archivo general*, II, 434.

possession the *Noticias secretas de America*, which left no ground for doubting the necessity of reform. The establishment of the liberal commercial code of 1778 magnified the difficulties of administering the colonies under the old organization; and, in the presence of the complicated and difficult problem, the kings before Charles III had been helpless, and their helplessness had made more evident the need of a modification of the existing system.

The appointment of Ceballos introduced a governmental reform in these southwestern provinces. The viceroy became the single dominant authority for the entire viceroyalty. The governors in the several provinces were subordinated to him. The viceroy was, however, always under the laws of the Indies and such other orders as might be issued by the king and the Council of the Indies. These constituted the supreme law under which the viceregal government existed. The viceroy was not assisted by ministers, but there was a secretary of the viceroyalty.

The several provinces, Cuyo and those of Upper Peru and the rest, after the organization of this viceroyalty sent their accounts to the auditor's office and the tribunal of accounts at the capital. The viceroy was the single superior, in the beginning, in whom all the authority of the viceroyalty was centered; but when it was determined to make the viceregal organization in this part of the continent permanent, it was thought

to be advisable to create a general superintendent of the treasury with important powers, and representing the supreme authority of Spain in matters relating to the treasury. This arrangement became effective with the appointment of Vertiz to succeed Ceballos. At this time Manuel Ignacio Fernandez was made general intendant of the army and the royal treasury in the provinces of Rio de la Plata and all the other provinces subject to the viceregal government. There was thus introduced a dual government, the inconveniences of which showed themselves very early. Under this system the viceroy's government was without a revenue which it could control; and the intendant lacked the power necessary to give his orders effective force. But all doubts or confusion with respect to the jurisdiction of these two functionaries were set aside by the publication of the *Ordenanza de Intendentes.*¹³

Two years after the creation of the intendencies, the king amended the commercial code of 1778. This he did by freeing entirely from duties all Spanish wines, spirits, agricultural products, and manufactured articles, and by reducing from four to two per cent the duties on foreign goods carried from Spanish ports that were permitted to trade with America. This decree was dated at San Ildefonso August 5, 1784.

¹³ The complete title of this law was, *Real ordenanza para el establecimiento é instrucción de intendentes de exército y provincia en el virreinato de Buenos Aires, Año de 1782.*

CHAPTER VI

THE REVOLT OF TUPAC AMARU

- I. Abuse of the Indians by the corregidores.
- II. Areche as visitador-general.
- III. Tupac Amaru.
- IV. The beginning of hostilities.
- V. The events of Oruro and Sangarara.
- VI. Hopes and aims of Tupac Amaru.
- VII. The overthrow and execution of the Inca.
- VIII. The sieges of Sorata and La Paz.
- IX. Results of the war.

I

TWENTY years after Juan and Ulloa had prepared their extended comment on the excesses of the corregidores and the parish priests, the city of Cuzco treated of the same subject in an elaborate report to the king, dated August 27, 1768. The original purpose in creating the office of corregidor, as represented in this reoprt, was to place in each district a person who should hold a paternal relation to the Indians within his jurisdiction; who should be their judge, their superior, and should treat them with pious consideration. At first by reason of the abundance prevailing in the districts, the corregidores had opportunities for legitimate gains, but with the diminution of this abundance they resorted to illegitimate means to

increase their fortunes; they forced the Indians to buy articles they did not need at prices fixed by the corregidor, who after a while carried on this traffic as if no legal prohibition existed.¹

In 1749, the viceroy had already made a vigorous protest against the corregidor's practice of throwing upon the Indians by a forced sale articles entirely useless to them: silk stockings to persons who wore no shoes; spectacles to persons who had no defect of vision; hats of a normal value of sixty cents, at nine dollars; silks, brocades, velvets, together with numberless articles equally useless. In order to pay for these things the Indian was often obliged to surrender his domestic animal or animals, his principal means of support. Obedience to superior regulations respecting the distribution of wares in the several districts might have brought relief to the Indians and immunity to the corregidores from later vengeance; but the avarice of these officials would brook no check, and more and more wares useless to the Indians were forced upon them. By this process the natives were placed, almost without exception, under an obligation to pay that could be met only by the most strenuous effort and ruinous sacrifices. Inability to meet these burdensome obligations was followed by the forced sale of all of the Indian's property, even to the total destruction of his poor and wretched habitation.

One instance from an almost endless list is that of a corregidor near Cuzco, who assigned to an

¹ *Relaciones de los vireyes y adiencias*, Madrid, 1872, III, 211.

Indian wares for which the Indian was obliged to pay three hundred and forty pesos. As he could not use them, he sold them in the city, and was able to get only twenty-five pesos for them. This sum he paid to the corregidor, who for the balance took from the Indian his little piece of land, or farm, and all the rest of his property. After this the Indian expressed his satisfaction, that, having no more property, he was free from further repartimientos.²

It is significant that the exposition of the excesses of the corregidores and the parish priest made by the city of Cuzco, in 1768, shows a survival of all the abuses that provoked condemnation by Juan and Ulloa two decades earlier.³ The tragedies that resulted from the corregidor's exactions, depriving the Indians of means of support, are repeated and multiplied, indicating that, in spite of all opposing influences, the cupidity and arrogance of the corregidores and the sufferings of the Indians persisted. The viceroy had apparently exhausted the resources of his influence for reform, and the Indians had to face the alternatives of either fleeing for refuge to the mountains and the forests or rising in rebellion against their oppressors. Still, for more than a decade of this time of slow movements the Indians continued to bear their burdens and suffer the outrages imposed upon them by the corregidores.

² *Relaciones de los vireyes y audiencias*, III, 219.

³ The title of Cuzco's protest was: "Representación de la ciudad del Cuzco, en el año de 1768, sobre excesos de corregidores y enras" in *Relaciones de los vireyes y audiencias*, III, 207-306.

II

It was not only the greed of subordinates, but also the demands of the crown that piled the burden on the unfortunate Indian. In the reign of Viceroy Manuel de Guirior (1776–1781), Amat's successor, the king sent José Antonio de Areche to Peru as visitador-general, with powers superior in important particulars to those of the viceroy. Areche arrived in Lima on the 14th of June, 1777. Although a member of the Council of the Indies, he lacked intimate knowledge of the affairs of the inhabitants of the dependencies. Guirior, on the other hand, as viceroy of New Granada, had derived from experience among the people a practical knowledge not possessed by any official who had viewed America only from Madrid.

In 1777 and 1778, numerous social movements at various points in the viceroyalty, promoted by other classes than the Indians, claimed much of the attention of the government. Without inquiring into the causes of these disturbances, Areche proceeded to form plans for increasing the royal revenues. But Guirior had also contributed to the public discontent by imposing a tax of twelve and one-half per cent on alcoholic liquors. The abuses of the corregidor's administration still called loudly for reform, and provoked an inquiry into the desirability of abolishing the system of repartimientos. Areche proposed, among his changes of taxation, to increase the alcabala from

four to six per cent. As this was a tax on all articles at the time of sale, its wide application caused general dissatisfaction, intensified by the knowledge that this new contribution was not to be expended for the welfare of the viceroyalty, but was to be transported to Spain. Although the Indians by a special law were exempted from paying this tax on the products of their harvest and their industry,⁴ there was here, however, an opportunity for abuse; it was often improved by the unscrupulous corregidor, who by this violation of the law added to the grievances and the hostility of the Indians. Other changes made by Areche, increasing existing taxes and imposing new taxes, called forth protests from the cabildo of Lima and the tribunal of the consulado. In fact, the outcry against taxes in the viceroyalties of Peru and New Granada appears like an echo of the opposition that had already found voice in the British colonies of North America.

The disturbance caused by Areche's rash interference and changes in the affairs of the administration justified Viceroy Montesclaros' comparison of the coming of a visitador to a little whirlwind. Not content with raising the dust about the ears of the officials, Areche conceived of the viceroy as his hostile rival, and presented to the supreme government a list of charges against him. Guirior thus found himself not only personally attacked but the affairs of the kingdom

⁴ *Mendiburu*, I, 321.

turned into confusion. Areche's charges had much weight with the government in Spain, particularly with José de Gálvez, who advocated, and succeeded in effecting, the removal of the viceroy from office. Guirior's successor, Agustín de Jauregui (1780–1784), who arrived in Lima in July, 1780, found the spirit of rebellion rife throughout the viceroyalty. But the local revolts in several of the cities, Cuzco, Arequipa, Huancavelica, were early overshadowed by the great Indian uprising against the corregidores.

III

The officers of the government, both in Spain and America, knew that the movement led by Tupac Amaru had its origin in the abuses perpetrated by the administration, and in the wrongs inflicted on the Indians by the parish priests, the corregidores, and the owners of manufacturing establishments. The various reports that had reached the viceroys, the audiencias, the Council of the Indies, and the king left no doubt as to the sources of the grievances provoking rebellion. Circulars and royal orders had been issued for the purpose of setting aside abuses, but the officials in America had long since ceased to be scrupulously obedient to the commands of their superiors. Royal orders had very little effect when they ran counter to the interests or wishes of an influential class in the colonies. The In-

dian's life continued to be one of uninterrupted privation and suffering, and he had little hope of a better fate for his children. The orders of the supreme government and the decrees of the viceroys brought him no relief. The merciless exactions of the priests, the exhausting labor in the mines, and the deadly oppression of the *obreros* had become a fixed tradition. The only basis of hope, and that very uncertain, lay in revolt; and this fact furnishes an explanation of the frequent uprisings and conspiracies that appeared in the colonies during the later decades of Spanish domination.⁵

The revolt of Tupac Amaru and the insurrection of the comuneros of New Granada belong to the same narrow period. Tupac Amaru raised his standard in November, 1780, and the hostilities of the comuneros began in March, 1781. The Inca was overthrown in May, and the comuneros capitulated in June, 1781. The revolt of Tupac Amaru was not without its forerunners, but it gave the fullest expression to the hatred that had been provoked by a long period of oppression. Tupac Amaru had doubtless long considered his plan; but in 1780, he seized the opportunity for its execution presented by the general dissatisfaction and incipient revolutions. He was born at Tinta in 1742, and was baptized as José Gabriel Condorcanqui. As the son of a chief, more attention was given to his education than to that of most Indian

⁵ For a list of these revolts, see Mendiburu, VIII, 121-126.

boys. His instructors were two clergymen of Upper Peru, Antonio Lopez, the *cura* of Pamamarca, and Carlos Rodriguez, the *cura* of Yanaoca. While still very young he was admitted to the Jesuit college of San Borja at Cuzco, which had been established to furnish instruction to the sons of Indian chiefs. At the age of eighteen, in 1760, he was married to Micaela Bastides, and before he was twenty he succeeded his father as cacique of Tungasuca, in the province of Tinta, and other villages that overlook the valley of Vilcamayu. His pretension as heir of the Incas was admitted by the Indians, and about 1770 the royal audiencia acknowledged his claim to the marquisate of Oropesa. This honor had been conferred upon his family by Philip II, and now, at the age of twenty-eight, Tupac Amaru was officially declared to be the lineal descendant of the Inca Tupac Amaru who was executed by the viceroy Toledo, in 1571.

The recognition of the young cacique as the representative of the ancient Inca family and as the bearer of a Spanish title of nobility naturally awakened his pride and intensified his sense of the wrongs his people had suffered. The enjoyment by an Indian of the wealth and the dignity that attached to the marquisate of Oropesa had been regarded as a source of danger, and it had been recommended that all claimants to the marquisate should be obliged to live in Spain. This recommendation had, however, not been carried

out, and Tupac Amaru remained in his native district and continued to govern the villages of Tungasuca, Surimani, and Pampamarca. His administration within this narrow field showed careful attention to the interests of the Indians, and made him conspicuous among the caciques for his practical sense. He sought to make the Spaniards of his acquaintance appreciate the unfortunate condition of his countrymen; and at the same time he did much to relieve their distress. In some cases he paid the tribute of the poor, and in other cases he supported whole families that had been reduced to want.⁶ For several years he tried every available means to redress the grievances of his people, and when he finally took up arms against the Spanish authorities, he did it because no other course appeared to offer a ray of hope. He had appealed to the ecclesiastics and had petitioned the king; but the opposition of the corregidores, in their immediate control of affairs, was sufficient to defeat all favorable reforms the king had been persuaded to order. The burdens of the Indians increased, and hope of peaceful relief disappeared. The resort to arms was a last resort. But even when hostilities had been determined upon, the end sought was not independence from Spain, "but to obtain some guarantee for the due observance of the laws, and their just administration. His views were certainly confined to these ends when he first

⁶ Funes, *Ensayo de la historia civil de Buenos Aires, Tucuman of Paraguay*, Buenos Aires, 1856, II, 234.

drew his sword, although afterwards, when his moderate demands were only answered by cruel taunts and brutal menaces, he saw that independence or death were the only alternatives.”⁷

IV

The immediate occasion of active hostilities was the conduct of Antonio Aliaga, corregidor of Tinta, in oppressing the Indians within his jurisdiction, which included the villages controlled by the Inca. The unjust acts of the corregidor had already called forth threats of assassination, and he had yielded in individual cases without modifying his general policy. He had also encroached upon the jurisdiction of the Church, and had been excommunicated by the ecclesiastical authorities at Cuzco. Since the Church had condemned him, it might be supposed that the Inca would hesitate less than under other circumstances in proceeding violently against him.

On the 4th of November, 1780, the corregidor and Tupac Amaru dined with Dr. Carlos Rodriguez, the cura of Yanaoca, who by this dinner celebrated his name-day. The Inca found an excuse to withdraw early, and with a few attendants ambushed the corregidor when he appeared a little later, and took him as a prisoner to Tungasuca. By compelling the corregidor to sign an order for the money in the provincial treasury,

⁷ *Markham, Travels in Peru and India*, London, 1862, 139.

Tupac Amaru received twenty-two thousand dollars in money, and, in addition, a certain amount of gold in ingots, seventy-five muskets, and a number of baggage horses and mules. Tupac Amaru determined that the corregidor should suffer death as a punishment for the wrongs done the Indians. He gathered a large force of his followers about him, sent for his old teacher, the cura of Pampamarca, and ordered him to inform the corregidor of his fate. He also instructed him to administer to the corregidor the last religious rites. The ceremonies of the execution, on the 10th of November, were calculated to impress the Indians with the idea that a new power had arisen. The armed retainers of the Inca were drawn up in three lines around the scaffold on the plaza of Tungasuca, and the Inca seized the occasion to explain his conduct and policy to those who had assembled to witness the remarkable scene.

The Inca's declaration moved the assembled Indians to affirm their loyalty and willingness to obey his orders, and the work of bringing them together into a military force under properly appointed officers was carried vigorously forward. The first expedition was directed against the corregidor of the province of Quispicanchi, in the valley of Vilcamayu. It was led by Tupac Amaru, but before he arrived at Quiquijana, the provincial capital, the corregidor had fled to Cuzco, carrying to that city the news of the revolt. Disappointed in not being able to capture the cor-

regidor, the expedition returned to Tungasuca, having plundered several mills, and taken a large amount of clothing for his followers, eighteen thousand yards of woolen and sixty thousand yards of cotton cloth, together with a quantity of firearms and two pieces of artillery. The special reason for hostility to the owners of these manufacturing establishments was their conduct in a rigid and unmerciful enforcement of the mita, and their cruelties to the women and children employed. Tupac Amaru had already under his command 6000 men, 300 of whom had firearms. After this expedition, the revolt spread rapidly over the region now comprising the southern part of Peru, Bolivia, and the northern part of the Argentine Republic. It embraced practically all of the inhabitants except a few Europeans and creoles.

V

The events in Oruro were indicative of the happenings in other places. The Spanish Europeans were the special object of Indian and mestizo hostility. Their riches excited the covetous zeal of the insurgents. Frightened by the sudden uprising and by the destruction and death in the track of the rebellions, they took refuge in the house of Endeiza; and when the house had been set on fire, they fled only to fall, to the number of between thirty and forty, into the hands of their murderers. The seven hundred thousand

pesos deposited here, belonging to Endeiza and other rich merchants, were seized by the rebels as booty. The distribution of these spoils increased the desire for other captures, and facilitated the formation of an insurgent force, said to consist of twenty thousand men. Every commercial house was looted, and the proprietors, with few exceptions, were killed. There was destruction on every side; churches were desecrated, houses were destroyed, women sought refuge in the convents, and bodies were strewn about the plazas.⁸

Reports of the progress of the insurrection induced the viceroy of Peru to send to Cuzco General José Antonio del Valle and José Antonio Areche, the visitador-general. At Cuzco Areche was able to muster a force of 17,000 men. At the same time the viceroy of Buenos Aires sent three detachments under General Flores, designed to subdue the revolt in the southern towns of the disturbed region.

The news of the revolt brought consternation to Cuzco. Two regiments which garrisoned the city turned the Jesuit college into a citadel, and steps were immediately taken to increase the forces for defense. The Spaniards and creoles in the city were enlisted, and messengers were sent to other towns for assistance. On the 13th of November Tiburcio de Landa, the governor of Paucartambo, led a force of about one thousand men up the

⁸ Funes, *Ensayo de la Historia civil de Buenos Aires, Tucuman y Paraguay*, Buenos Aires, 1856, II, 244.

valley of Vilcamayu to meet the enemy. Several hundred of these were friendly Indians. This little army advanced as far as Sangarara, where they found themselves surrounded by a superior force of Indians under the Inca. This fact and the appearance of a severe snowstorm induced Landa to retreat and take refuge in a church. Here negotiations were opened between him and Tupac Amaru. Landa wished to know the Inca's intentions, and to this inquiry Tupac replied with the suggestion that all Americans should pass over to his camp, where they would be treated as patriots, since he was proceeding only against Europeans, corregidores, and employees of the customs.⁹ These terms having been rejected, the Inca wrote to the cura, asking him to take away the women and children, but the Spanish troops prevented this, and in the struggle that ensued the powder on hand was exploded, blowing off the roof and throwing down one of the walls of the church. Immediately after this calamity the Spaniards charged the enemy, but in spite of their heroic onslaught they were nearly all cut down; there remained only twenty-eight, all of whom were wounded. These, however, recovered from their wounds in the course of time, and were set at liberty. Among the killed were Tiburcio de Landa, the chief in command, his lieutenant Escajadillo, Cabrera, the corregidor of Quispicanchi,

⁹ Ferrer del Rio, A., *Historia del reinado de Carlos III en España*, Madrid, 1856, III, 418.

who had fled from his province to Cuzco, and Sahuaraura, the cacique of Oropesa, who had led the Indian contingent of the Spanish forces.

VI

Immediately after the overthrow of the Spanish forces at Sangarara, the way to Cuzco was apparently open to the victor. The city was in great confusion and only imperfectly defended. Tupac Amaru still believed, however, that, on account of the justice of his cause, he could attain his object by negotiation. With a view, therefore, of treating with the enemy, he established his followers in an encampment near Tinta. He then issued a proclamation, setting forth the grievances that led to the revolt, and denounced the tyranny of the Spanish officials as cruel and impious. At the same time he saw the possibility of failing by peaceable means, and called upon the Indians to join his forces.

In the meantime the cabildo of Cuzco prepared to resist the threatened attack. It collected arms, repaired six old field-pieces, and began to make powder. Reinforcements were received from Urubamba, Calca, and other places. Volunteers from the inhabitants were brought into the military force, and the clergy, ordered out by the bishop, were organized into four companies under the command of Dr. Manuel de Mendieta. At the end of November, Cuzco had three thousand men

in arms. Still the authorities felt insecure, and in order to ward off the danger of a general uprising of the Indians, they abolished the repartimientos and the alcabala, and made known by proclamation these and other concessions.

Instead of leading his forces directly against Cuzco, Tupac Amaru visited several towns or villages in the district, where he called the inhabitants together and told them that the object of his campaign was to correct abuses, punish the corregidores, and release the people from their burdens. He was everywhere received by the Indians with enthusiasm and greeted by them as their Inca and Redeemer. Mr. Markham refers to a private letter, dated January, 1781, which describes the Inca's entrance into Azangaro. He rode a white horse, with splendidly embroidered trappings; two fair men, like Englishmen, of commanding aspect, accompanied him, one on the right and the other on the left. "He was armed with a gun, sword, and pistols, and was dressed in blue velvet, richly embroidered with gold, with a three-cornered hat, and an *uncu*, in the shape of a bishop's rochet, over all, with a gold chain round his neck, to which a large golden sun was attached."¹⁰

News of the military preparations of the Spaniards called Tupac Amaru back from the south, and led him to concentrate his army in the neighborhood of Cuzco. A detachment under

¹⁰ Markham, *Travels in Peru and India*, 145.

Antonio Castelo, proceeding directly to the city, was defeated at Saylla, a place about two leagues from Cuzco, but it finally reached the main body of the Inca's army. While encamped on the heights of Picchu, overlooking the town, Tupac Amaru wrote to the cabildo and the bishop. These letters were dated January 3, 1781. In the letter to the cabildo, he affirmed his position as the heir of the Incas, and declared that he was moved to try by all possible means to put an end to abuses, and to have men appointed to govern the Indians who would follow the laws laid down by the Spanish authorities. He declared that the punishment of the corregidor of Tinta was necessary as an example to others; and proclaimed the object of the rebellion to be the entire abolition of repartimientos, the appointment of an alcalde mayor, or judge in every province, and the establishment of an audiencia, or court of appeal, with a viceroy as president, at Cuzco, within reach of the Indians; but he did not aim to overthrow the authority of the king of Spain. In the letter to the bishop, he announced that he appeared, on behalf of the nation, to put an end to the robberies and outrages of the corregidores; and at the same time he promised to respect the priests, all church property, the women, and the inoffensive and unarmed people.

The Spanish forces in Cuzco were unwilling to make terms with the Indians. They had been reinforced by the cacique of Chinchero and his

men, and by two hundred mulatto soldiers from Lima. After a period of ineffective skirmishing, a bloody battle was begun, on the 8th of January, in the suburbs of Cuzco and on the heights. It lasted two days, and was so far unfortunate for the Inca that he was obliged to withdraw his forces to Tinta. The force of six thousand men that had been sent to the provinces of Calca and Paucartambo made a desperate resistance, and after the arrival of reinforcements under Pablo Astete, Diego retired to Tinta, on the 18th of January, 1781. Here the Inca reorganized his army, and, in union with Diego, made another attack on Paucartambo, on the 11th of February. This, like the previous attempt, was unsuccessful, and five days later the Inca's army was back again in Tinta.

The force of 60,000 men that Tupac Amaru gathered at Tinta was more notable for its numbers than for its discipline or its arms. Only a few hundreds had muskets. But the multitude assembled showed how strong was the feeling against the abuses of the Spanish administration. The Indian and mestizo inhabitants of the interior of Central and Upper Peru were practically all in revolt. Only sixteen caciques adhered to the Spaniards. The threatening prospect alarmed the Spanish officials in Peru and Buenos Aires. The viceroy of Peru sent to Cuzco José Antonio Areche, as visitador, supported by a military force commanded by José del Valle; and the vice-

roy of Buenos Aires commissioned General Ignacio Flores to put down the rebellion in the southern provinces; for the inhabitants of the entire region as far south as Oruro were in a state of revolt. Before the arrival of Flores, La Paz, which was under the command of Sebastian de Segurola, had been besieged by the Indians and subjected to almost daily attacks for four months.¹¹

At Cuzco General del Valle collected an army of 15,000 men, and prepared to enter upon the campaign. While this army was still at Cuzco, the Inca wrote to Areche, the visitador, setting forth the fact that the Spanish officials had repeatedly violated the laws and had cruelly oppressed the Indians; at the same time he urged the necessity of certain reforms in the administration. He, moreover, affirmed his willingness to enter into negotiations through which these reforms might be attained without further hostilities. Areche's answer to the Inca's despatch was a refusal to negotiate, accompanied by a brutal declaration of vengeance and an affirmation that if Tupac Amaru would surrender at once the mode of his execution would be less cruel than if further resistance was made.¹²

¹¹ The events of this siege are set down in the diary of the commanding officer of the city. This diary was edited several years ago by Vicente de Ballivian y Roxas and was published in Paris in 1872, by A. Franck (F. Vieweg), in the first volume of *Archivo Boliviano*, under the title *Diario de los sucesos del cerco de la Ciudad de La Paz en 1781, hasta la total Pacificación de la rebelión general del Perú.*

¹² Markham, *Travels in Peru and India*, 148; for the fate of the Inca's letter, see p. 149, note.

The attitude assumed by the brutal visitador Areche convinced Tupac Amaru that complete independence or death were the only alternatives before him. But he had not hitherto indicated that he was seeking independence; only that he aimed at such reforms in the Spanish administration as would release the Indians from oppression. There exists a paper, however, attributed to him in which he is styled "Don José I, by the grace of God, Inca, King of Peru, Quito, Chile, Buenos Aires, and the continents of the South Sea, Lord of the River of the Amazons, with dominion over the Grand Paytiti." This paper, moreover, affirms that

"the king of Castile had usurped the crown and dominions of Peru, imposing innumerable taxes, tributes, duties, excises, monopolies, tithes, fifths; appointing officers who sold justice, and treated the people like beasts of burden. For these causes, and by reason of the cries which have risen up to heaven, in the name of Almighty God, it is ordered that no man shall hence forth pay money to any Spanish officer, excepting the tithes to priests; but that tribute shall be paid to the Inca, and an oath of allegiance to him be taken in every town and village."

This document is without date, and it has been suggested that it was forged by the Spaniards to be used as written evidence against the Inca.¹³

¹³ This letter is given by Mendiburu, VIII, 137.

VII

About the middle of March, 1781, General del Valle moved from Cuzco against the insurgents. His army was composed of 17,116 men. His line of advance led along the mountains west of the Vilcamayu, where his troops suffered from snow-storms, the lack of food and fuel, and the want of all commissariat arrangements. Finding his position here almost unendurable both for himself and for his soldiers, he moved down from the mountains and ascended the valley of Vilcamayu, captured Quiquijana, and near the village of Checacupe encountered the Inca's army drawn up behind a trench and a parapet that stretched across the valley. Flanking the Inca's forces, he made an attack in front and in the rear, and drove them back to another entrenchment at Combapata. The Indians, routed from this position, fell back to Tinta, where they were overthrown by the artillery fire and a bayonet charge of the Spanish troops. Tupac Amaru's plans had failed because of the treachery of Zunuario de Castro, and his final undoing was due to the traitorous action of one of his officers, Ventura Landaeta, who, assisted by the cura of Lanqui, delivered him and his family into the hands of the Spaniards, after he had fled to that place from Tinta. With this the Spaniards began their revolting course of outrage and vengeance. On the day of the Inca's capture General del Valle hanged sixty-seven In-

dian prisoners at Tinta, and stuck their heads on poles by the roadside. The chief prisoners were marched into Cuzco. They were the Inca Tupac Amaru, his wife, his two sons, Hipolito and Fernando, his uncle Francisco, his brother-in-law Antonio Bastides, his maternal uncle Patricio Noguero, his cousin, Cecilia Tupac Amaru, with her husband, Pedro Mandagure, and a number of the officers of the Inca's army, and the negro slave, Antonio Oblitas, who had served as executioner for the punishment of Aliaga. They were taken to separate places of confinement, and informed that their next meeting would be on the day of their execution.

The visitador Areche pronounced the Inca's sentence on May 15, 1781. He wished to show the Indians that even the high rank of the heir of the Incas could not deter the Spaniards from imposing the extreme punishment when they considered it deserved. The charge against this victim of Spanish barbarity was that he had rebelled against Spain, that he had destroyed the mills, that he had abolished the mita, that he had caused his portrait to be painted dressed in the imperial insignia of the *uncu* and *mascapaicha*, and that he had caused his victory at Sangarara to be represented in pictures. He was condemned to witness the execution of his wife, a son, his uncle, his brother-in-law Antonio Bastides, and his captains; to have his tongue cut out; to be torn in pieces by horses attached to his limbs and driven

in different directions; to have his body burnt on the heights of Picchu, and to have his head and arms and legs stuck on poles to be set up in the different towns that had been loyal to him; to have his houses demolished, their sites strewn with salt, his goods confiscated, his relatives declared infamous, and all documents relating to his descent burnt by the hangman. It was also provided that all Inca and cacique dresses should be prohibited, all pictures of the Incas destroyed, the presentation of Quichua dramas forbidden, the musical instruments of the Indians burned; all signs of mourning for the Incas, the use of all national costumes by the Indians, and the use of the Quichua language should be prohibited.¹⁴ This sentence in all its barbarity was carried out on the 18th of May, 1781.

VIII

"With the death of the Inca the insurrection may be considered ended; nevertheless many Indians still remained under arms, whom the bloody drama of Cuzco, far from discouraging, only seemed to have inspired with new fury. Thenceforward it was a war of extermination, so much so that the number of victims of the vengeance of the Spaniards and the Indians may be reckoned at 80,000."¹⁵ The surviving leaders moved south-

¹⁴ *Memoirs of General Miller*, Spanish ed., Lima, 1861, vol. I, Appendix A.

¹⁵ Mendiburu, VIII, 144.

ward, and, enraged by the horrible cruelty of Areche, their line of march became a path of destruction. Diego Cristoval Tupac Amaru, the Inca's cousin, held the chief command. After the siege of Puno, Andres Mandagure and Miguel Bastides overran the eastern shore of Lake Titicaca and joined the forces that were carrying on the war about Sorata and La Paz.¹⁶ They "laid siege to the town of Sorata, where the Spaniards of the neighboring districts had taken refuge with their families and wealth. The unarmed Indians were unequal to the storming of fortifications, which, although constructed only of earth, were lined with artillery. But their leader surmounted this difficulty by the adoption of a measure that would have done credit to any commander. By the construction of a lengthened mound he collected the waters which flow from the neighboring snowy heights of Ancoma, and, turning them against the earthen ramparts, washed them away. The immediate result was the storming of the town, and the massacre of its inhabitants, with circumstances of horror exceeding the death of Tupac Amaru."¹⁷ Practically all of the inhabitants, about twenty thousand in number, were killed. The clergy alone escaped.

The siege of La Paz was continued for six months after the death of the Inca. Like Sorata,

¹⁶ La Paz lies in the upper end of a vast cañon, several hundred feet down in the great gash that has been cut in the inter-andean plateau, the general surface of which is over twelve thousand feet above the level of the sea.

¹⁷ *Memoirs of General Miller*, I, 18.

it was a place of refuge for the Spaniards of the surrounding country. In defending the city the commanding officer had constructed a line of fortifications, but had determined to include only the principal part of the town, leaving outside the suburbs and several Indian villages. During the continuance of the rebellion in the north, the forces supporting the insurrection had been daily increasing in the south, and requests for assistance from the towns near-by were sent to La Paz, with which Segurola complied—as far as possible. He had also used all available funds to gather stores of provisions for the city, which were especially needed to support the increasing number of refugees. The story of the progress of the siege and of the resistance offered by the besieged is given in the diary of the commanding officer, Sebastian de Segurola. The following extracts from this diary show under what disadvantages the Indians fought; and the fact that in the face of these disadvantages and of their great losses they persisted in the conflict for many months indicates to what a degree they had been moved by their intolerable grievances.

"March 27.—This day the Indians attacked with great force all parts of the city, setting fire to the houses that were outside of the trenches, assaulting these and the wall, from which they were repulsed with great vigor. This engagement lasted from 11 o'clock in the morning till 4 in the evening. At this hour the rebels retired with

much loss, which was given at more than one hundred and fifty killed, without any loss on our part.

“March 28.—It was recognized to-day that the number of Indians who approached us was considerably increased. At 8 o’clock in the morning they attacked all parts of the city, aided by some guns which they fired, and at the same time they went on burning the houses outside of the fortifications, and we resisted them with great valor. The attack lasted till 5 o’clock in the afternoon, when the enemy retired with more than three hundred and fifty dead, according to our calculation, and on our side we had only two.

“March 29.—The Indians have been coming down from all sides since daybreak, and at 10 o’clock assaulted the city with desperation, and this attack, repulsed by us, lasted till half-past 5 in the afternoon, at which hour they retired with a loss of more than 150 men, and we had the misfortune, by the bursting of a cannon in one of the forts, to have three killed and several severely wounded, and among the killed was Sergeant-major Joseph de Roxas.”

After 109 days of siege, in which a besieging force of 40,000 Indians, according to Segurola’s statement, took part, the condition of affairs in the city was desperate, but no word of despair appears in the diary of the commander. “By the grace of God,” he wrote, “we have defended ourselves in spite of hunger, pest, and the enemies, even from those within, who have caused not less

care than those without." In want of other food, they had eaten the horses, mules, and asses, not merely the flesh but the skins as well, and the dogs and cats, the cat having a quoted price of six dollars. Of the 2000 mules in the city at the beginning of the siege, scarcely more than forty remained at the end of it. During these months, moreover, disease made rapid strides; and many persons in their incautious search for food fell into the hands of the enemy, to whose treatment of them "we may not refer without the greatest horror, grief, and compassion."

At the end of June, General Flores arrived with the troops from Buenos Aires and brought the desired relief.¹⁸ He scattered the besieging force, and caused food to be introduced into the city. Under the protection of the military force, many of the inhabitants left their houses in the city and established themselves temporarily near the camp of the soldiers. But hostilities were continued at different points in the surrounding country; and on the withdrawal of a part of the

¹⁸ "The reinforcements sent to the royal army from Buenos Aires, Tucuman, and Cochabamba were for the most part regular troops; the Buenos Aireans were armed and equipped as European soldiers; the Tucumanos composed the cavalry, and were armed with butcherknives and lassos; the Cochabambinos used short clubs loaded with lead, and which, by means of a string several yards in length, they could fling from them, and were deadly weapons. The mode of attacking the Indians was first by the fire of musketry, to throw them into confusion, when, if the ground admitted, the Tucuman horsemen rode among them, dragging down whole ranks with their lassos, followed by the Cochabambinos, who despatched them with their clubs."—Temple, *Travels in Various Parts of Peru*, II, 175, 176.

troops to places where they seemed to be imperatively needed, the siege of La Paz was renewed. This time it was continued from the beginning of August until the 17th of October. At noon on this day the troops from Oruro arrived under the command of Lieutenant Josef Reseguin, "and we began to see on the brow of the hill of Puna certain men who it was not doubted were ours, and in a short time the rest appeared, covering in a moment the top of the hill. From this position they saluted the city with their artillery, filling it with the greatest joy and satisfaction imaginable. The commandant, Don Josef Reseguin, sent to me immediately notice of his arrival with 7000 soldiers and a large quantity of provisions which would supply the city.

"Thus ended the second siege of this afflicted and unfortunate city, if it may not be considered the first; since during the period of the other relief the enemies remained always on the heights of the Potopoto, Calvario, and even on the others of the environs, when the troops moved their encampment some distance away. In this it is seen that the rebels to the number of 12,000 fighting men, according to all accounts, not only pursued the siege with fire and blood as before, but also turned the waters against us; and although it had not the same outcome as in the town of Sorata, still it caused considerable destruction in the city. Misery made the same inroads as the last time, and want compelled the use of the same

unfit food; in sustaining life there was no exemption for the horses, the mules, the asses, the cats, the dogs, and the most despicable hides, not only of the animals killed but also those furinshed by the rawhide trunks and the food pouches of the shepherds.”¹⁹

IX

For still two years or more desultory fighting continued in many parts of the country in which the revolt had appeared. Although the Indians were defeated, they were neither crushed nor placated. From their victory the Spaniards derived little profit and less honor. The Indians remained hostile and in a mood to join any enemy of their hated masters that might arise. Outraged by the barbarity of the Spaniards, they espoused the cause of the creoles and became a powerful factor in the struggle for independence.

A recognition of the disastrous results of Spain's treatment of the Indians led the Spaniards at last to make their exactions less burdensome. Under the new order the Indians might be employed in occupations contributing directly to the general well-being of society: in raising grain and cattle; in building roads, bridges, and edifices for public use. They might also be employed in mining; but it was not expected that they would be employed in occupations that contributed

¹⁹ *Archivo Boliviano*, Paris, 1872, I, 127, 128.

merely to the luxurious gratification of the Spanish part of the population. The line of distinction between these occupations was, however, only vaguely drawn, and was only imperfectly observed in practice. Service in the mines was subject to restrictions that were expected to obviate at least some of the evils that had previously existed. Only a certain number of laborers, not to exceed one-seventh of the inhabitants, might be taken from any district, and these were retained for a period of six months. They were paid at the rate of four reals a day. The provision that no Indian might be taken more than thirty miles to work in a mine tended to set aside the practice of taking them from the warm climate of the low country to the cold regions of the mountains. But abuses were continued in spite of the good intentions of the law-makers. The execution of the laws was in the hands of officers far removed from the supervision of their legislative superiors. The great distance and the difficulties of communication still left the Indians practically subject to the discretion of the American end of the administration.²⁰

²⁰ The details of the rebellion of Tupac Amaru are presented in the three hundred and sixty pages of documents contained in the first volume of Odriozola's *Documentos históricos del Perú*; in the *Relación histórica de los sucesos de la rebelión de José Gabriel Tupac Amaru en las provincias del Perú, el año de 1780*; and in *Documentos para la historia de la sublevación de José Gabriel Tupac Amaru, cacique de la provincia de Tinta en el Perú*, in *Colección de Angelis*, Tomo V; Lorente, *Historia del Perú bajo los Borbones*, Lima, 1871, 174-215; for the events in Cuzeo, see "Informe Relacionado," in *Relaciones de los vireyes y audiencias*, III, 307-368.

CHAPTER VII

THE REBELLION OF THE COMUNEROS IN NEW GRANADA

I. Viceroy Flórez and the visitador-regente Piñéres. II. The outbreak in Socorro. III. Organization of the *Comun* under Berbeo, and the battle of Puente Real. IV. The advance on Bogotá, and the flight of the regent. V. The negotiations and the agreement. VI. Galán and the new revolt. VII. The Indians of Nemocon and the conclusion of the conflict.

I

THE rebellion of the comuneros in New Granada, like the revolt led by Tupac Amaru, was a protest against abuses by the government. On the 10th of February, 1776, Manuel Antonio Flórez assumed the duties of viceroy at Cartagena. His financial administration failed to elicit the approval of the king, who sent Juan Francisco Gutierrez de Piñéres to be the visitador-regente of the viceroyalty. The visitador held a commission from the king, ordering him to regulate the affairs of the royal treasury in New Granada, and, if possible, to increase the royal revenues. And

when the viceroy objected to the measures adopted, and appealed to the king, he was informed that Piñéres should be permitted to proceed according to his own ideas, particularly with reference to the affairs of the treasury. The visitador-regente, thus placed beyond the reach of viceregal interference, proceeded to impose burdensome taxes. His sole object appeared to be to augment the funds that were destined to be sent to Spain, without observing the disastrous effect of his measures on the welfare of the colony. The viceroy having been sent to Cartagena to provide for the defense of the coast, Piñéres remained at Bogotá the acting head of the government.

The visitador found the inhabitants burdened with a long list of taxes and monopolies. There were monopolies of salt, tobacco, spirits, playing cards, the post, stamped paper, and a burdensome array of taxes and tributes, both civil and ecclesiastical; yet in the face of a revenue system that removed from the colonists every prospect of individual prosperity, he was expected to increase at least some of these imposts. The instructions under which he acted required him to effect a more exact and systematic management of the royal revenues known as alcabala and armada de barlovento.¹ It was not merely the amount of the taxes, but also the intolerable brutality with which they

¹ The tax called *armada de barlovento* was an impost designed to support the little squadron, or the division of the navy assigned to South America.

were collected that provoked insurrection,² and this source of disturbance was aggravated by the corruption and tyranny of those persons who received and administered the funds collected, and who increased their gains by stealing one-half of the revenues in their passage from the persons taxed to the treasury. But complaints and protests by the people against these abuses were of no avail; the regent who depended solely on the king had more inducements to increase the income of his master than to seek to remove the corruption or lessen the burdens of the people. And the people were aroused to resistance not by a fear that the government might oppress them sometime in the future, but by actual oppression which curtailed very materially their means of living. It was the desire to redress real grievances rather than a prospect of independence that moved them.

II

The province of Socorro, the seat of the principal manufacturing industries of New Granada, felt especially the burden of the new taxation, and therefore, became the center of the revolutionary movement, which spread rapidly from day to day, and appeared in regions as widely separated as

² "El maltratamiento que los ministros y guardas de la Renta de Tabacos daban a los vasallos... ha sido causa para que esta Jurisdicción, la de San Gil, la de Velez, y la de Tunja, según se dice, se hayan alzado." Report by the cabildo of Socorro to the viceroy, March 7, 1781, in A. M. Galán, *Vida de J. A. Galán (Bibl. de hist. nacional, IV)*, 223; see also *ibid.*, 229-231.

Pamplona and the llanos. The insurgents were, moreover, stimulated by reports of the uprising of Tupac Amaru, which was communicated to the Indians of New Granada, and which helped to arouse them to action. In the llanos, Javier Mendoza proclaimed the revolution in the name of the Inca, ordered the churches closed, and prohibited the Catholic worship.

The idea of revolt was early entertained in Bogotá. It found adherents in Jorge Lozano de Peralta, Juan Bautista Moráles, Manuel García Olano, Ciriaco de Archila. The last named person was a lay member of the Dominican monastery. Opposition to the decrees of Piñéres appeared in October, 1780, in the towns of Barichara, Simacota, and Mogotes. A few weeks later a more strenuous resistance was manifest in Charalá, led by Pedro Nieto. Neither the audiencia nor the regent possessed either the physical or the moral force to suppress the revolt in its beginnings. The party of rebellion sought an effective ally in the Indians by communicating to the more intelligent of them the idea that through independence they might find a redress for their long-standing grievances. Manuel García Olano, the general director of the post, and Francisco Vargas, the parish priest of Socorro, were especially influential in this undertaking.

At Socorro, March 16, 1781, a company of persons, led by José Delgadillo, appeared before the house of the alcalde, José de Angulo y Olarte, and shouted their refusal to pay the new imposts.

The alcalde addressed the crowd, and urged the necessity of complying with the regent's orders, since they were the commands of the highest legitimate authority in the kingdom. This appeal only called forth cries of indignation and violent threats from the rioters. In the midst of this uproar, a woman ran to the bulletin-board near the alcalde's house, and tore down the edict of the visitador. This act was greeted with applause and with the cry, "Long live the king and death to bad government." The frightened alcalde fled to a hiding place, while the crowd surged through the streets proclaiming its victory and vociferating its condemnation of the regent.³

This demonstration produced an immediate result. The cabildo of Socorro assembled on the afternoon of the riot, and decided to suspend the collection of the new taxes. The insurgents of Socorro were temporarily pacified, but there was a new outbreak in San Gil. The inhabitants came together in the plaza, destroyed the regent's edict, attacked the guards and the administrator of the monopolies, burned the tobacco in the store-houses, and declared that they would not pay the additional taxes demanded. A similar attack was made at Simacota, where the crowd poured out

³ Briceño, Manuel, *Los Comuneros*, Bogotá, 1880, 13; Manuela Beltran is said to be the name of the first person, in New Granada, who thus dared to tear in pieces a document issued by authority and posted under the royal arms of Spain. *Ibid.*, 99; Plaza, Antonio de, *Memorias para la historia de la Nueva Granada*, Bogotá, 1850, 334; Galán, A. M., *Vida de J. A. Galán* (*Bibl. de hist. nacional*, IV), 223.

the brandy, burned the tobacco and other stores, distributed the money, threw out the furniture, and pulled down the royal arms. The insurgents from many quarters prepared to appear in Socorro on the 15th of April to continue the work of destruction. Their vigorous and unrestrained action had a practical effect in causing the regent to issue a decree relieving the towns of Tunja, Socorro, Sogamoso, and San Gil of some of the objectionable taxes. The success of these early instances of resistance suggested the possibility of acquiring a larger measure of relief.

At the end of March Dionisio Plata received at Socorro a document sent from Bogotá by Ciriaco de Archila. When opened in the presence of a company of the more influential residents of the town, it proved to be an appeal to the people in verse. Later it was read by the crier to four or five thousand persons called together by the sound of the tocsin, and was received with shouts of applause. It moved the people to avenge themselves for the evils they had suffered under exorbitant taxes and the merciless conduct of monopolists. The members of the crowd were transformed into an angry mob. They assaulted the offices of the monopolies, broke open the doors, tore down the royal arms, poured out the alcoholic spirits, destroyed the cards and stamped paper, and burned the tobacco. The guards, the administrator, and the alcaldes escaped to the houses of Francisco Rosillo and Juan Bernardo Plata, and

then took refuge in a church. Destruction of this kind was repeated as the revolt extended its area, yet the seizure of property was not robbery for individual gain, nor was it attended by assassination.

III

In April, 1781, six thousand insurgents from adjacent towns assembled in Socorro for the purpose of organizing themselves with the view of persuading the government to abate the grievances of the people. They elected Juan Francisco Berbeo to be their chief, and José Antonio Estevez, Antonio José Monsalve, and Salvador Plata to be associated with him. These four persons having taken an oath of fidelity to the people, formed a commission called the *Comun*, from which the members and their adherents became known as *Comuneros*. The procurador of the commission was Antonio de Molina, and the secretary was Manuel José Ortiz. Each of the towns in revolt chose a captain, and by popular election three or five persons to constitute a local *comun*. The serious and energetic activity of Berbeo in creating a military force, persuaded the audiencia to move towards the same end. That body sent one of its members, José Osorio, to subdue the rebels, and establish order in the insurgent towns. Informed of this project, Berbeo prepared to offer resistance. The force which he was able to put into the field consisted of about four thousand men. These so far outnumbered the forces of

the oidor that he found it advisable to surrender to the insurgents. After this event Berbeo, Monsalve, Rosillo, and Estevez addressed the viceroy, affirming that they had accepted their positions as captains in order to restrain the disorderly proceedings, and to see whether it might be possible, by prudence, to secure the "tranquility of these republics," without loss of lives and property. At the same time they wished to make it clear that they were not disposed to deny the sovereignty and power of the king.⁴

When the cabildos of the insurgent towns and the leaders of the revolt asked respectfully that the audiencia would moderate the new imposts, this tribunal replied only by an order requiring the pueblos to be subdued by force. For this purpose Oidor Osorio marched out towards the north with a troop of fifty armed men, leaving twenty-five in Bogotá.⁵ Captain Barrera was in immediate command, while Osorio was commissioned to treat with the enemy. At Puente Real, near the town of Vélez, they met the vastly superior force that had been gathered from the towns in revolt. Although the rebels had few fire arms, by the advantage of mere numbers they overwhelmed the troops sent from Bogotá. Osorio had attempted to avoid an actual conflict by offering to make concessions, but in this he was not successful. Barrera and Osorio were captured, and sent to

⁴ *Nota de los capitanes generales del Socorro al virey, Socorro y Mayo 7 de 1781*, printed in Briceño, *Los Comuneros*, 103.

⁵ Vergara y Velasco, *Novísimo texto de historia de Colombia*, Bogotá, 1910, 207.

Chiquinquirá. Osorio died a few months later. Francisco Ponce, Barrera's aide, escaped disguised as a monk, and carried the news of the disaster to Bogotá, where the inhabitants, in view of the lack of troops for defense, were thrown into a panic. At this encounter the insurgents obtained the fifty muskets that had belonged to the soldiers, twenty-two trabucos, and the seven hundred muskets which the authorities at Bogotá had provided for the expected additions to their force. They took also twenty thousand cartridges with balls, and a large amount of powder with separate balls, together with pistols, swords, money, and equippages.⁶

The bloodless victory of the comuneros at Puente Real was followed by important changes in their organization. The captains were organized as a supreme council of war. Berbeo became superintendent and commanding general, and Joaquin Fernandez Alvarez became secretary of state. With their new organization, the insurgents assumed the supreme authority, and adopted democratic principles as the basis of their state. They declared their independence, and wished to govern themselves as a sovereign republic.⁷ Yet, in spite of their proposed democracy, they contemplated offering the crown to Osorio, but an inquiry as to his sentiments revealed the fact that he would reject it if offered.

⁶ Cuervo, *Documentos*, IV, 8.

⁷ Finestrad, J. de, *El vassallo instruido* (*Bibl. de hist. nacional*), Bogotá, 1905, cap. VIII.

IV

The next step in the revolutionary movement was an advance upon Bogotá. Information reached Piñéres that the rebels sought his head, and that to take it would be their first object on entering the city. This prospect induced him to prepare for flight. But before he left Bogotá, he convened the audiencia. He proposed to that body that it should appoint a commission to meet the comuneros; and that it should solicit the intervention of the archbishop; it should organize the militia and publish an edict reducing the alcabala and the armada de barlovento. The audiencia adopted the measures proposed, and adjourned at midnight. Before dawn of the following morning, Piñéres had left Bogotá for Honda. On the same day, the 13th of May, the commissioners went out to meet the advancing insurgents. From Zipaquirá they sent a note to Berbeo and his lieutenants, which reached them at Ráquira. In this note the commissioners announced their willingness to hear them on subjects which they thought might be for the good of the king and the people.⁸

On approaching Zipaquirá, the insurgents were not in a tractable mood. They were not dis-

⁸ This letter is printed as No. VI of the documents forming the Appendix of Briceño, *Los Comuneros*, p. 106. No. VII of these documents is a list of the captains who assembled at Zipaquirá in command of the comuneros. The men under these eighty-seven officers numbered about 20,000, representing sixty-six pueblos embraced in territory now belonging to the states of Boyacá, Cundinamarca, and Santander.

posed to listen either to the commissioners or to the archbishop. They made a riotous attack on the house of the administrator of monopolies, and destroyed everything within reach. This outbreak caused the members of the audiencia to see the helplessness of their position. With no means of resistance at hand, they announced that the tax of armada de barlovento was abolished, and that the alcabala was reduced to two per cent. Catani, one of the members, having been made general-in-chief of the legitimate troops, gathered a force of six hundred and forty men, and sent to Honda for arms that had been deposited there for the viceroy. At Nemocon the insurgents learned of the flight of the regent, and appointed José Antonio Galán to proceed to Honda and prevent him from going to the coast.

Near Facatativa Galán and his twenty-five soldiers encountered the troops sent out from Bogotá against him. Having defeated them, he gathered reinforcements at Facatativa, and continued his march towards Honda. He captured the guards who were conducting arms to the viceroy, and occupied Guáduas. This event and the threatening attitude of the increasing rebel force created a state of confusion in Bogotá. The commissioners and the archbishop were authorized to prevent the insurgents from entering the capital, and to this end they might employ any possible means.⁹

⁹ See the credentials of the commissioners, No. VIII of the documents in Briceño, 110.

Knowing that the greater part of the insurgents were without arms, Berbeo vacilated and was undetermined as to what course to pursue. It was clear that the government would make an effort to defend itself and put down the rebellion, and Berbeo recognized the inability of an untrained and unarmed crowd to resist successfully such a force as the government would ultimately bring against it. After considering suggestions for an agreement with the audiencia, he finally decided to send one of his advisers, Juan Bautista Moráles, to England, commissioned to obtain funds for the purchase of arms and equipment.

The archbishop was alarmed by the growth of the revolutionary spirit, and by the fact that the bulk of the discontented were not affected by his appeals. He succeeded, however, in taming the zeal of Berbeo, the commanding general, and in persuading him to adopt such an attitude of mind as led him later to be accused of treason to the cause of the insurgents. While the popular movement was gaining ground, the town of Giron undertook to oppose the revolution. It created a council of defense, and formed a military company of two hundred lances. The aggressive acts of this body were answered by the revolted towns sending against Giron a force of four thousand men. The inhabitants fled, but later many of them were induced to return and swear allegiance to the supreme council of war of Socorro. The rebels were intolerant of the inactive or indiffer-

ent course pursued by some of the towns, and required them either to declare positively in favor of the insurrection or accept the position of enemies.

V

In the last days of May, 1781, Ambrosio Pisco, with a number of Indians, joined the ranks of the insurgents. Pisco was a descendant of the Zipas. Along the way from Güepsa to Nemocon, and on his arrival, he was greeted with enthusiasm, and the principal Indians from many quarters appeared to pay him homage. In the presence of a large assembly of Indians, he was proclaimed Lord of Chia and Prince of Bogotá. These survivals of ancient ceremonies and the empty honors conferred by them apparently satisfied the Zipa. He placed himself under the command of Berbeo; for after the oppression his race had endured for many generations, he knew only how to obey. If he had possessed the power to take the initiative in action, and the insurgents had had more respect for the Indians, the ancient rule of the Zipas might have been revived, and have become at least a temporary substitute for the rule of the king.

While encamped near Zipaquirá, Berbeo requested the authorities of Bogotá to appoint commissioners to discuss with insurgent commissioners certain terms on which the two parties might agree. The demands of the insurgent were

presented in an extensive document providing for the abolition of monopolies, and the abolition or reduction of a large number of specified taxes.¹⁰

The rebellion of the comuneros aroused the Indians to revolt. At Silos, in the district of Pamplona, the Indians came together in considerable numbers and rejected the authority of the king of Spain. "They solemnly published the proclamation of Tupac Amaru, and swore obedience to him as Emperor of America."¹¹

In the course of the discussion on the proposed terms of agreement, the mass of the insurgents conceived the idea that their officers, by too great concessions, were deceiving them. They spread the alarm, and demanded that the war should be continued. They demanded, moreover, that they should be led to Bogotá. Aroused by the attitude of the crowd, the archbishop urged the immediate approval of the capitulaciones by the commissioners; and when this was accomplished, the document was sent to the audiencia. This body confirmed the commissioners' approval, thus allaying the popular agitation.

¹⁰ This document, *Texto de las capitulaciones redactadas por los comuneros para presentarlas al comandante general*, is printed in Briceño, *Los Comuneros*, 121-137. It is dated June 4, 1781, and is signed by Juan Francisco Berbeo. These capitulaciones were approved by the audiencia June 7, at eleven o'clock in the night; they were confirmed by oath on the plain of Mortiño before 2000 insurgents, the archbishop sanctifying the agreement by a religious service. The multitude dissolved the same day. Sixty copies of the agreement were made for the sixty cabildos that had supported the movement. On the 15th it was published at Bogotá. Vergara y Velasco, *Texto*, 210.

¹¹ Briceño, *Los Comuneros*, 64, 139.

Groot affirms that through the influence of the archbishop the capitulaciones, or the terms of agreement, were approved without modifications, "but at the same meeting the members of the commission signed a secret protest declaring that, having given their approval, it was done under the force of circumstances in order to avoid greater evils, and that consequently they held the agreements void as obtained by force when they had no force with which to sustain the dignity of the government."¹² Yet in the face of this attitude, when the agreement had been received at Zapaquirá, and had been approved and solemnly sworn to, the archbishop celebrated mass with the *Te Deum*. This solemn act of hypocrisy was performed when the commissioners had already secretly declared that they would not for themselves regard the agreement binding. The comunitarios, having faith in the oath of the commissioners, disbanded their forces, and caused them to return to their accustomed places.

The purpose of the audiencia in making the concessions contained in this agreement, as set forth in its report to the king, was to maintain the sovereignty of the crown in these dominions (at whatever cost) which otherwise could not have been accomplished, except by means of a difficult and bloody conquest.¹³

¹² *Historia de Nueva Granada*, II, 191.

¹³ *Informe de la real audiencia de Lima a su Majestad*, Lima, December 22, 1780; *Carta del Arzobispo al Oidor Osorio*, Zipaquirá, June 11, 1781.

The insurgents fancied they had won an important victory. They were, moreover, lured into a fatal sense of security by oaths and the elaborate religious ceremonies by which the agreement was solemnized. The revolutionary forces returned to their several towns, taking with them copies of the document which they regarded as the charter of their liberty. Berbeo went to Bogotá to receive his appointment as corregidor and chief justice of Socorro. This appointment was later interpreted to be the price of his advocacy of the agreement.

VI

The principal insurgent force had been outwitted and traitorously deceived, and had left the field. Galán, however, held his small body of soldiers intact. At Guáduas he learned that the supporters of the rebellion in Honda had been defeated. He, therefore, advanced to that town, where he discovered that the victorious forces, fearing an unfavorable result of the impending conflict, had fled to Nare. Galán's march towards Honda excited the inhabitants of towns north of Bogotá to take up the cause of the revolution. La Mesa, Tocaima, Ibagué, Cayaima, Purificación, and Neiva raised the standard of revolt in June. In Neiva the leaders assembled in the plaza on the 19th of that month, repudiated the authority of the governor, broke down the doors at the office of the monopolies, and in general, carried out the

programme that had been followed elsewhere, including the destruction of the arms of Spain. Hearing the uproar in the plaza, the governor, Policarpo Fernandez, rushed into the presence of the rebels; and when he saw that his commands were not obeyed, he drew his sword in order to enforce obedience. At this point, Toribio Zapata, one of the leaders of the rebellion of Neiva, attacked him and killed him with a spear. The alcalde, who had accompanied Fernandez, entered the fight and killed Zapata; and in the confusion of the conflict the alcalde escaped.¹⁴

The purpose of the capitulaciones having been attained in the disbanding of the insurgent force under Berbeo, the next step was to quell the revolt in the north, and to obtain from the people declarations of fidelity to the king and a repudiation of the capitulaciones. By the participation of the clergy, other-worldly influences lent their persuasive force to accomplish this result. The archbishop decided to make a pastoral visit to the northern towns; and he summoned to his assistance the Capuchin missionaries Joaquin de Finestrad, Felix Goyanes, and Miguel de Villajoyosa. The incentive urged by the missionaries for laying aside hostility to legitimate authority was not the common good of the community but the pains of eternal damnation.

The agreement between Berbeo and the audiencia settled nothing. Both the government and

¹⁴ Briceño, *Los Comuneros*, 70.

the people were dissatisfied. The government had acted on the policy of making concessions in days of trouble, and of withdrawing them in the days of peace. The dissatisfaction of the people manifested itself in frequent outbreaks; and the spirit of the government, now that the great body of the insurgents had been dispersed, was shown in energetic measures of punishment. Large numbers of prisoners were sent to the fortress of Cartagena, and among these there were many persons who were conspicuous and known to be popular in their communities; and because they were popular and conspicuous their influence was feared. Therefore, under this suspicion, they were seized and conducted to prison secretly.

The arrival of five hundred veteran soldiers at Bogotá from Cartagena, on the 15th of August, 1781, gave the government confidence in its ability to carry out its policy; and the desire to retreat from the position taken in the articles of agreement became more pronounced when it was known that viceroy Flórez was disposed to repudiate that document. The viceroy's ground for nullifying it was that the acceptance of its terms was secured by force.

VII

In August the Indians of Nemocon came into conflict with the government about the *salinas*. These salt works formerly belonged to the Indians, but they had been taken by the audiencia and held

as property of the crown. The effort of the Indians to regain them was supported by Ambrosio Pisco. The Indians attacked the house of the administrator, determined to kill him. Information of this event having reached Zipaquirá, troops were sent to Nemocon, where they arrived on the 1st of September. In the clash which ensued the Indians were victorious, but five of their number were killed, and seven of them were wounded.¹⁵

The Indians, persuaded that they could not withstand the trained troops, fled to the mountains. The commander of the legitimate forces ordered the heads of the Indians who had been killed to be cut off and placed on pikes, one in each of the five towns of San Diego, San Victorino, Las Cruces, Egypto, and Boqueron. This act suggested to the comuneros what would probably be their fate, and persuaded them to assemble at Socorro, and prepare for a new insurrection. José Antonio Galán became the commanding general. A number of towns, Málaga, Mogótes, Charalá, La Concepcion, Santana, and others joined in a new revolt; but it was not possible to reawaken the enthusiasm of the people. There was, moreover, no leader who inspired confidence; yet the audiencia, fearing that Galán might possibly prove a successful commander, ordered his arrest and imprisonment.¹⁶

¹⁵ An account of this conflict is given in a letter written by José Bernet to Viceroy Flórez, September 9, 1781, printed as No. XXI of the documents in Briceño, *Los Comuneros*, 151-153.

¹⁶ For this order, see Briceño, *Los Comuneros*, 162-167.

When the insurgents at Mogótes learned that the government had decided to imprison Galán, their revolutionary zeal abated. The majority of them abandoned him. Attended by only a few followers, he fled to a place called Chagonuete, where he was arrested.¹⁷ Galán was born at Charalá, and at the time of his arrest he was thirty-two years of age. On the basis of charges that appear not to have been proved he was sentenced, January 30, 1782, to be hanged; and, after the execution, his body was quartered and burned. Juan Manuel José Ortiz, Lorenzo Alcantuz, and Isidro Molina met a similar fate.¹⁸

In pronouncing sentences at this time the audiencia was apparently moved by a desire for vengeance rather than by a wish to execute justice. Besides those who suffered the death penalty, a large number of other persons received milder forms of punishment. The government rather than the rebels displayed the barbarity of a tribunal of terrorists. Galán's head was sent to Guáduas, where it was placed on a pike at the entrance of the town, while the heads of Ortiz, Alcantuz, and Molina were exposed in a similar manner respectively at Socorro, San Gil, and Bogotá. The houses of these four victims were

¹⁷ For an account of Galán's arrest, see Plata's report in the documents in Briceño, *Los Comuneros*, 165-167.

¹⁸ The sentence of death on Galán, Ortiz, Molina, and Alcantuz is No. XXVI of the documents in Briceño, 175-181; see charges against José Antonio Galán in Galán's *Vida de J. A. Galán*, 240-242. The sentence is printed on pp. 314 and 315.

destroyed, their descendants were declared infamous, and their property was confiscated. By its summary judgments and the severity of the penalties imposed, the audiencia introduced a reign of terror throughout the kingdom. Companions of Galán were sent to the presidios of Africa. Ambrosio Pisco was condemned to death, for setting himself up as Prince of Bogotá in place of Charles III. But his sentence was subsequently modified, and, with his wife and nephew, he was sent for fourteen years to the fortress of Cartagena.

After the execution, imprisonment, or expulsion of the leaders of the revolt, and the return of Piñéres, the regent, to Bogotá, the audiencia publicly annulled, on the 18th of March, 1782, the capitulaciones, or articles of agreement, made with the insurgents through Berbeo; and all acts based on that agreement. A little later, April 1, of the same year, it deprived Berbeo of his title and functions as corregidor.

After a troubled reign of six years filled with misfortune, due chiefly to the unwisdom of the visitador Piñéres, Flórez petitioned the king to be relieved of his viceregal office. His petition was granted, and Juan de Torrezal Diaz Pimienta, the governor of Cartagena, became his successor, and proceeded to Bogotá by way of the Magdalena river. Reports of his proposed policy of conciliation had preceded him, and his arrival was expected with satisfaction; but all hopeful antici-

pations were set aside by his death four days after he reached the capital. In accordance with the sealed orders opened by the audiencia, after the death of Pimienta, Archbishop Caballero y Góngora assumed the duties of the viceregal office, and thus to his ecclesiastical functions, there were added those of the political chief of the vice-royalty. The archbishop was born in Andalucia; was appointed bishop of Chiapa in 1775; and was promoted the same year to be bishop of Yucatan. In March, 1779, he entered upon the office of archbishop of Bogotá.

The promotion of the archbishop to the office of viceroy was in recognition of the service he had rendered in favor of peace. The general amnesty granted by the king and applied by the archbishop-viceroy included Ambrosio Pisco and his family, who returned to Chia. By the barbarous punishment of Galán and his immediate followers, and by the subsequent acts of pardon, the spirit of revolt, it was assumed, had been subdued; yet the revolutionary flame had not been quenched, but only smothered.¹⁹ The revolution of 1810 completed the work, at once destructive and creative, begun by the comuneros thirty years earlier.

Juan Bautista Moráles, as already indicated, had been sent to England to obtain funds for carrying on the revolution. In May, 1784, Luis

¹⁹ *Edicto promulgando el indulto*, No. XXX of the documents in Briceño, 189-205.

Vidalle arrived in London to assist in the undertaking, and on the 12th of May he presented a statement to the British government, in which he set forth the state of affairs in New Granada. The revolt of the comuneros had been suppressed, and his purpose was to obtain assistance in an attempt to emancipate themselves from the crown of Spain; as stated by Vidalle, "the inhabitants of these provinces are looking forward with anxiety to their separation from Spain."²⁰ The papers presented offered numerous inducements designed to persuade the British to furnish the required assistance. It was affirmed that the people would declare themselves British subjects; and it was announced at the same time that an intimate connection existed between the movement of Tupac Amaru and the uprising of the comuneros. In these documents it was, moreover, declared that the purpose of the insurrection of 1781 was to secure the complete independence of the American colonies.

The plans of the commissioners were communicated to the Spanish minister in London, together with copies of the propositions that were to be presented to the British government. Vidalle was arrested in France and imprisoned in Cadiz. Moráles was also imprisoned and with

²⁰ Informe del comisionado don Luis Vidalle al gobierno inglés, No. XXXVI of the documents in Briceño, 235; Robertson, William Spence, *Francisco de Miranda and the revolutionizing of Spanish America*, in *Annual Report of Am. Hist. Assn.*, 1907, I, 208.

these events the comuneros' prospects of European assistance and of independence vanished for the moment, but the hope of emancipation remained.²¹

²¹ Some of the more accessible writings dealing with the rebellion of the Comuneros are the following: Briceño, Manuel, *Los Comuneros*, Bogotá, 1880; Finestrat, Joaquín de, *El rasallo instruido* (*Bibl. de Hist. nacional*, IV), 1-204; Galán, A. M., José Antonio Galán (*Bibl. de hist. nacional*, IV), 205-410; Restrepo, *Hist. de la revolución de la república de Colombia*, Bessanzon, 1858, I, 13-30; *Relación verdadera de los hechos y pasajes ocurridos en la sublevación de los pueblos, ciudades y villas que dió principio en la del Socorro y San Gil, y extensiva a todos los del reyno*, Santa Fé, 1781; Orjuela, Luis, *Minuta histórica Zapaquireña* (*Bibl. de hist. nacional*, IV), 329-362.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CONSPIRACY OF GRAMUSET AND BERNEY.

- I. The revolt under Amat, governor and captain-general of Chile. II. The conspiracy of Gramuset and Berney. III. The arrest and imprisonment of the conspirators.

I

THE breach between the governors and the governed was often widened by the arrogant bearing of some of the higher officials towards the colonists. This was illustrated by the conduct of Amat y Junient, the captain-general of Chile (December 29, 1755—September 26, 1761). Under Amat and his successor, Guill y Gonzaga (1761-1767), the Indians on the southern frontier continued their ancient resistance to Spanish encroachments, and the frequent *parlamentos*, instituted by the Spaniards, generally failed to set aside the hostilities that existed between the settlers and the Indians. Francisco Javier Moráles and his *interim* predecessor (1768-1773) recognized that the ports of the Pacific were almost entirely defenseless. At the same time it was seen that Spain was not in a position to furnish a force

adequate for their defense; nor was the government in Spain able to control the measures undertaken by Chile and Peru in coöperation; and the inability of this government to manage effectively the affairs of the colonies became, with the passage of time, more and more evident; yet in spite of this fact, the king demanded reforms in the revenue systems designed to increase the income of the royal treasury, and deplete the resources of the colonies. The demands made in Chile for the benefit of the royal treasury, were not greatly unlike the contemporary requirements in New Granada, which had provoked the revolt of the comuneros. During the administration of Augustin de Jauregui (1773-1780), the increase of the alcabala and other taxes in Chile moved the colonists to assume an attitude of decided hostility towards the officers of the government.

The reforms of Charles III doubtless aimed at an improvement of the colonial administration, but, in unsettling social conditions, they weakened the influence of preëxisting traditions as an element of control, and thus left the inhabitants freer than they were before to question the advisability of new legislation, and to propose measures inconsistent with Spain's governmental policy. The alcabala had long been felt to be an oppressive tax, but it had been endured, and even modifications of the rate had not greatly disturbed the order of things. The tax on certain shops, particularly those for the sale of groceries and alcoholic beverages, had been reduced, but under

Jauregui it was proposed to reëstablish the old rate, and to increase the alcabala. These changes, the imposition of new taxes, and an increase in the valuation of articles subject to the alcabala, provoked a revolt against the king's subordinates in Chile, by whom the obnoxious changes had been made.

On the sudden death of Silvestre García, President Jauregui appointed Gonzalez Blanco to be García's *interim* successor as administrator of accounts. Blanco was especially moved by the desire to increase the royal revenues, and he undertook to reform the alcabala, as well as the fiscal regulations respecting the *pulperias*, or shops for selling groceries and alcoholic beverages, so that they might contribute to that end. When the people learned of these changes, Blanco became the special object of popular indignation. Numerous pasquinades appeared in Santiago, and under their influence the popular agitation was intensified. The fact that Blanco's predecessor was the author of many of the obnoxious changes was not remembered by the people. In July, 1776, they assembled in riotous disorder in the plaza of Santiago. The governor, apparently unable to restore tranquility, acceded to the demand for a general assembly to consider means for quieting the revolt. This assembly was an open meeting of the cabildo of Santiago, and was limited to one hundred members chosen by the cabildo from the inhabitants of the city. It selected four especially prominent men of the colony as an executive com-

mittee. These were Bacilio de Rojas, Antonio Bascuñan, Antonio Lastra, and Lorenzo Gutierrez. The governor revoked provisionally the changes in taxation that had been introduced. He also gave assurance that justice would be administered. He sent (March 31, 1777) the provisional suspension of the changes in taxation to the king for his consideration and final decision. Gonzalez Blanco, in consideration of his zeal in seeking to procure funds for the king, was appointed royal treasurer at Potosi.

The popular agitation was, however, continued, and to this unrest was added dissatisfaction of the regular clergy. The rules of the orders were relaxed. The monks lived without the monasteries, and disregarded the obligations of their profession. The king and his appointed inspectors appeared to be unable to set aside the scandals. The revolutionary movement in Chile was a local manifestation of the contemporary revolt against the government, that appeared with more or less force in practically all of the colonies. In Peru and New Granada it resulted in Civil War, but in certain other instances, owing to the peculiar circumstances of the communities, it did not advance beyond the status of a conspiracy or a local rebellion. But everywhere it indicated the failure of the government in Spain to grow sufficiently in wisdom and power to enable it to accomplish successfully the increased task imposed upon it by the changing needs of the colonial administration.

II

The full extent of the spirit of revolt was not made manifest by the movements that culminated in active and open hostilities, and became known to all the world. Besides these there were secret conspiracies. Some of these were afterwards brought to light, while there were doubtless others that were never revealed. An instance, or a type, of the secret conspiracy was that formed by two Frenchmen, Antonio Gramuset and Antonio Berney. Gramuset had lived many years in Chile; he had been married there, had tried many projects and had failed in most of them. In 1769, he was included under the royal order for the expulsion of foreigners. The execution of this order was stayed when he joined a company of foreigners to fight against the Araucanians. The king disapproved of this concession; nevertheless, the foreigners remained in the country. After several years of unsuccessful mining and agriculture, Gramuset was occupying, in 1776, a small country house near Santiago, and was chiefly concerned with mechanical inventions.

Berney was a teacher of languages and mathematics. He had come from Buenos Aires to Chile, and had found protection and occupation as an instructor in French in a Chilean family, and in Latin in the *Colegio Carolino*. He was a guileless, visionary, and deluded person. His mind was filled with all sorts of abstract doctrines, but he

had very little knowledge of the real, practical world. Gramuset planned to become rich; Berney, to make law that would shape the fortunes of a state.

Berney visited Gramuset, and their conversation turned to the popular discontent, and to the absurd tyranny of the colonial régime. They reached the conclusion that the country should be independent. By 1780 the noise of the tax revolt had ceased, but dissatisfaction and discontent remained. According to Gramuset, the achievement of independence would be the realization of a general earnest desire. Gramuset examined the project of a revolution calmly and coolly as another speculative undertaking. Berney, having been unjustly dismissed from the *Colegio Carolino*, turned against the existing order with bitter resentment. The success already attained by the English colonies, whose grievance was unjust taxation, supported the thought that the same degree of success might be achieved in Chile, where the grievance was also burdensome taxes.

The confidence of Gramuset was not fully entertained by Berney, who, as a man of books, was in his proper element when solving mathematical problems rather than when dealing with practical political problems. But Berney's doubts and vacillation disappeared after his conversation with José Antonio Rojas, who appeared as an ally in the conspiracy. Rojas was a man of education and standing in the colonial community.

He was born in Santiago and was educated at the Jesuit College and at the University of San Felipe. He had served as an officer in the garrison of a militia post on the frontier; as adjutant of Viceroy Amat, after that officer had been promoted to the position of viceroy of Peru; and as corregidor of Lampa. He had been in Madrid six years, soliciting from the government the adjustment of certain private affairs; and the knowledge which he gained there of the conduct of the public administration, its intrigues, its prejudices, and its ignorance, made him a determined opponent of the colonial relation of Chile to Spain. He returned to America in 1777 with his collection of books. He purchased a seat in the cabildo of Santiago, but he did not attend the meetings; and a little later withdrew to his estate of Polpaico. In his retirement he received Berney, and discussed with him the proposed republican constitution for Chile.

Rojas' opinions, his mental attitude towards the social organization, underwent a very great change during his residence in Europe. In France he acquired an extensive knowledge of the current philosophy of the time. In Amunátegui's words, "he left America a loyal vassal and returned a rebellious subject."¹ In this state of mind he entered into communication with Berney, and announced to him that there were two other allies who were important because of their social

¹ *Los Precursores de la independencia de Chile*, III, 201.

standing. These were Manuel José Orejuela, who had been commissioned to go with an expedition to discover the city of Caesares. The other was Francisco de Borja Araos, a captain of artillery at Valparaiso.

Gramuset then undertook the formation of a programme of events by which the proposed reform should be introduced, and Berney proceeded to frame a constitution. He thought that the proclamation of the reform should embody the constitution of the new state, and he was persuaded that no other means than the reading of the constitution would be required to induce the people to adopt it and approve the change. Clearly much depended then on this document, and while writing it Berney naturally wished to be free from the confusion and distractions of the city. He, therefore, withdrew to Polpaico, Rojas' estate, and there began and completed his task of framing the constitution.

The first part of the document that was expected to convince and move a people, very few of whom were able to read, was an argument in justification of a republic, presenting its advantage over monarchy, and illustrated by facts drawn with much learning from sacred and profane history.

The second part set forth the organization of the state, affirming that it was based on the principles of natural law. It was the development of two fundamental maxims: "Love your neigh-

bor as yourself," and "Do not to another what you do not wish him to do to you." The state should be governed by a body called "The Sovereign Senate of the very noble, very powerful, and very Catholic Chilean Republic." The members of the senate should be elected by the people. The Araucanians, like the rest of the inhabitants, should send deputies to this assembly. The death penalty should not be applied to any criminal; slavery should be abolished; social classes should not exist; and the land should be divided into equal portions. As soon as the revolution should have triumphed, an army would be raised; the cities and the coast would be fortified, not with the design that Chile should be moved by the ambition of conquest, but in order that she might make herself respected, and that her concessions dictated by justice should not be attributed to weakness. Moreover, there should be decreed freedom of trade with all the nations of the world, without exception, including the Chinese and the Negroes, and even with Spain that had pretended to isolate America from the rest of the earth.²

The manifesto ended with a note to the king of Spain, informing him in moderate and courteous terms that the Chileans had determined to separate themselves from his rule, and to constitute themselves an independent republic.³ It affirmed, moreover, that they were disposed to

² Amunátegui, *Los Precursoros*, III, cap. 4, See. 9.

³ Barros Arana, *Hist. de Chile*, VI, 405.

offer to him their friendship and their commerce in case the mother country preferred these relations to an armed breach.

There was little probability that this programme would be accepted. The majority of the inhabitants were too ignorant and too far removed from the intellectual currents of the age to have any thought about government. The educated minority were either ecclesiastics, who were still persuaded of the divine right of kings, or encomenderos or other owners of property who had no wish to see an equal distribution of the land.

The number of persons privy to the plot was gradually and cautiously increased. Among the later enlistments was Mariana Perez de Saravia, a lawyer of indifferent standing from Buenos Aires. After mature consideration of his position, and troubled at finding himself involved in a questionable undertaking, he determined to denounce the revolutionary project to the authorities. The chief of these authorities at this time (1781) was the governor and captain-general Ambrosio de Benavides, whose advanced age rendered him infirm and inefficient. The effective head of the government was Tomas Alvarez de Acevedo, the regent of the audiencia. To him Saravia addressed a letter announcing the existence of a conspiracy to effect a political revolution. Finding Saravia's assertion in accord with reports from other sources, Acevedo resolved to act on it. But at this point he encountered embarrassment.

He was aware that revolution tends to breed revolution, and that to announce publicly the fact that the separation of Chile from Spain had been advocated, would put the thought of emancipation into many minds. He had, therefore, to devise a plan under which the offenders might be arrested, tried, and punished without making partisans for the revolution.

III

Saravia continued his association with Berney, and entered into relations with Gramuset. He pursued the business of a spy with the zeal of a renegade. When Acevedo had derived from Saravia the needed information, he caused the conspirators to be arrested and subjected to a secret trial. The proposed arrest of Rojas and Orejuela produced a new difficulty. On account of their conspicuous positions in the community, they could not be smuggled away and imprisoned without causing their absence to become noted and inquiries to be set on foot regarding it. Such inquiries would inevitably expose the fact that the emancipation of the colony had been advocated, by persons of social importance. The proposed proceedings against them, therefore, were dropped.

The sentence on Berney and Gramuset was pronounced February 5, 1781. It was decided to withhold the punishment legally due, and to

send the prisoners to the viceroy of Peru, with a complete record of the case.⁴

The consideration of the fate of these conspirators occupied the attention of the crown, the Council of the Indies, and the viceroy of Peru for a number of years. In the meantime Berney and Gramuset remained imprisoned in Lima, the authorities hesitating to send them to Spain, lest they should fall into the hands of the British, and thus reveal to the enemy the fact that a conspiracy had existed in Chile to overthrow the government and establish a republic. Finally, in 1784, after peace had been made with Great Britain, Berney and Gramuset were embarked in a man-of-war. Berney was lost in a shipwreck on reaching the coast of Portugal; Gramuset, however, arrived at Cadiz, and was imprisoned in one of the subterranean cells of the castle, where he perished miserably in 1786. The government of Chile, as suggested, wished to keep the people in ignorance of the projected revolution, lest the knowledge of it should breed further discontent, and it was so successful in this undertaking that no popular tradition of the proposed movement survived in Chile; yet when revealed by the researches of Chilean historians, it is seen to be one of the early manifestations of discontent, which were followed by others from time to time until the violent outbreak, thirty years later.⁵

⁴ The sentence is printed in Amunátegui, *Los Precursorés*, III, 230.

⁵ For the details of this conspiracy one may consult *Una conspiración en 1780*, by Miguel Luis Amunátegui and Gregorio Vie-

To these rebellions and conspiracies one might add a number of others that were less far-reaching in their effects, but prompted by essentially the same causes. Among the more noteworthy of these were the revolt in Venezuela, led by Francisco de Leon, and that led by Felipe Velasco in the province of Huarochiri. They were all provoked by burdens, abuses, and hardships imposed by the government, its agents, or by members of a dominant class or corporation.⁶

tor Amunátegui; Barros Arana, *Hist. de Chile*, VI, 404-420; Amunátegui, M. L., *Los Precursores*, III, cap. 4.

The experience of José Antonio de Rojas, who went from Chile to Spain in 1772 and returned in 1777, indicates one of the methods by which liberal or revolutionary ideas entered America. He became interested in the characteristic thought of the last half of the eighteenth century, and purchased and sent to America many of the notable books of the time: The *Encyclopedie* of D'Alembert and Diderot, the works of Rousseau, Montesquieu, Helvetius, Robertson, Holbach, and Raynal. Writing to José Perfecto de Salas in December, 1774, he notes the fact that "a very singular work has appeared, entitled, The Political and Philosophical History of European Establishments and Commerce in the Indies. It is anonymous, and appears to have been printed in Amsterdam. It is prohibited because the author speaks very clearly, and because he utters certain truths." In a later letter to the same person, Rojas says "the author of the work mentioned is Abbé Raynal. This *hombre divino*, this true philosopher, is worthy of the praise of the whole literary world, and particularly of Americans." Quoted by Amunátegui, *La crónica de 1810*, II, 47-49; on Rejas, see *Ibid.*, II, 5-107.

⁶ Schumacher, H. A., *Südamerikanische Studien*, Berlin, 1884, 172; Mendiburu, VIII, 295. Mendiburu prints the barbarous sentence pronounced upon Velasco and his followers, VIII, 295-298.

CHAPTER IX

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE VICEROYALTY OF RIO DE LA PLATA

- I. The *Ordinanza de Intendentes*. II. Status and functions of the intendants. III. The ordinance applied in Peru and Chile. IV. The reformed ordinance of 1802. V. The state of Buenos Aires and the adjacent country.

I

ONE of the effects of the conspiracies and rebellions already referred to was to convince the supreme government that the state was failing in its great undertaking. Conspicuous evidence of this was the relation that existed between the corregidores and the Indians. These officials stood nearer the bulk of the inhabitants than any others, and had thus the most advantageous position for either inspiring loyalty or creating dissatisfaction and hostility. The records of their conduct show how little they did to attract or please the Indian, and how much to repel and enrage him. Neither the Indian's person nor his property was secure from the abusive and unjustifiable acts of the corregidor; and through the reforms that followed these intrigues and revolts the office of the corregidor disappeared.

In spite of the power nominally conferred upon officials in America, the king sought to keep in his own hands or in the hands of the Council of the Indies the essential power in all matters of fundamental importance; but this involved governing at long range, and no adequate means existed for overcoming the difficulties of communication. The old governmental machine had shown itself unfit for the work it had to do. The energy even of Charles III, Spain's ablest king, made itself only imperfectly felt in the remote provinces of the dependencies. The power of Spain was declining in America because the governmental organization was inadequate to carry that power to points where its exercise was needed. The *Ordinanza de intendentes* was issued for the vice-royalty of Rio de la Plata in order to introduce an important administrative reform. With certain modifications it was extended to the other dependencies in South America and to Mexico. It divided the territory of Rio de la Plata into eight intendencies, each taking the name of its principal city. The territory of each, with certain exceptions, was made to coincide with that of the bishopric in which the capital city lay. These exceptions refer to certain districts that were parts of a bishopric but not subject to the corresponding intendant. Mojos and Chiquitos were included in the diocese of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, but were military governments in immediate subordination to the viceroy. Montevideo and

Misiones were other exceptions of a somewhat similar kind.¹ They were in the bishopric of Buenos Aires, but not under the intendant of Buenos Aires or any other intendant. On the other hand the bishopric of Paraguay had the same limits as the intendancy of Paraguay.

The capitals named in the ordinance were Buenos Aires, Asuncion, Tucuman, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, La Paz, Mendoza, La Plata, and Potosi. The powers of the viceroy were not to be curtailed, except that the supervision and control of the royal treasury was to be under the general intendant, who, in this matter was to act with absolute independence of the viceroy.² Under this law the corregidores were suppressed or supplanted by sub-delegates, who, in divisions of the intendancy called partidos, were subordinated to the intendant.

II

The audiencia of Buenos Aires was created in 1783, the year following the publication of the *Ordinanza*. It embraced within its jurisdiction the provinces of Buenos Aires, Tucuman, Paraguay, and Cuyo. The inhabitants were thus subject to the superior authority of the viceroy, which

¹ Quesada, *Vireinato*, 574.

² Lopez, V. F., *Historia argentina*, Buenos Aires, 1883, I, 403; *Ordenanza de intendentes*, Art 2; Quesada, *Vireinato*, 387-519; for the dates of the establishment of the bishoprics and the territory of each, see Zinny, *Gobernadores*, I, XCIVL

reached every part of the kingdom; to the general intendant; to the governors-intendants, limited to their several intendancies; to the audiencia of Buenos Aires, in the provinces of Buenos Aires, Tucuman, Paraguay, and Cuyo; and to the audiencia of Charcas, in the provinces of Upper Peru. To these several secular authorities must be added the ecclesiastical authority of the bishops. The officers of the viceroyalty, under this organization, may be considered as apportioned to two departments under the king, the heads of which were made responsible to him. At the head of the first stood the viceroy. At the head of the second stood the general intendant of the army and the treasury. The chief official of each of the eight intendancies had the double title of governor-intendant; for he was subordinated to the viceroy in affairs relating to the police, instruction, worship, and the judiciary, while he was the agent of the general intendant in his intendancy, with reference to revenues, expenditures, and all other fiscal matters.

This distribution of power did not create local governments, as that term is used with reference to a constitutional state. The divisions of the viceroyalty were merely administrative districts; and the officers who exercised power in them did not derive their authority from local constituents, but from the king. They were not parts of a federation, but agents of an absolute centralized superior, or rather of two superiors that were

expected to work along different but parallel lines; and "what made the application of the ordinance of intendants, of 1782, inconvenient and impossible in practice was the hierarchical administrative subdivision which it introduced. A viceroy of the treasury and a viceroy of political government were two incompatible terms."³ The inconvenience of this bifurcated administration was soon set aside, and the two functions which the ordinance had separated were united in the viceroy. This was done by suppressing the independence of the general intendant and making him subject to the viceroy. The chiefs remained independent of one another only during the administration of Vertiz (1778-1784), and while Manuel Fernandez was the general intendant. On the appointment of Francisco de Paula Sanz, as general intendant, he was subordinated to the viceroy, and became at the same time governor-intendant of the intendancy of Buenos Aires, and in this capacity he exercised the same functions as the governor-intendants of the other intendancies; but in his character as general intendant, he had general jurisdiction in the whole territory of the viceroyalty, and as governor-intendant of Buenos Aires, his jurisdiction was limited to the territory of the bishopric, coextensive with the intendancy.⁴

³ Lopez, *Historia argentina*, I, 408.

⁴ Quesada, *Vireinato*, 449.

III

The ordinance of intendants was applied in Peru by the creation of eight intendancies. These were the intendancies of Trujillo, Lima, Tarma, Huancavelica, Guamanga, Cuzco, Puno, and Arequipa, which were divided into fifty-seven partidos.⁵ The application to Chile was delayed, in order that the question of Chile's relation to Peru might be considered, and this was finally resolved by a royal order of June 1, 1784. This order provided that Chile should remain dependent on the viceroyalty of Peru with respect to the military administration and the affairs of the royal treasury. The territory was divided into two intendancies. The northern part of the country, from the southern boundary of Peru to the river Maule, constituted the intendancy of Santiago; the region between the Maule and the Araucanian frontier formed the intendancy of Concepcion. This division was confirmed January 14, 1786, by the viceroy of Peru. Ambrosio de Benavides became the intendant of Santiago, while Ambrosio O'Higgins was appointed to the same office in Concepcion. In these, as in all other cases under this law, the intendant appointed a legal adviser. Besides these two cities, the only other town of importance in Chile was La Serena; for the majority of the inhabitants were engaged in agriculture, and lived scattered throughout the country. After the two

⁵ Paz Soldan, Mariano Felipe, *Historia del Perú independiente*, Lima, 1868, I, 1.

intendancies had been approved by the king (February 6, 1787), the project to make La Serena the capital of a third intendancy was considered and rejected. The province of Chiloé remained dependent on the viceroy of Peru.

IV

The organization and procedure established by the royal ordinance of 1782 was modified by the general ordinance of 1802^a

The later ordinance superseded the earlier, and the first article of it declared that each province should be in charge of a single person with the title of intendant, reuniting the political and the military governments. It also provided that the intendant should be appointed by the king. The ordinance itself appears as a constitution for the colonial governments in America, and deals with the superior government, the subordinate governments, and the whole hierarchical order of employees, pointing out to each one his powers and duties, in a word, his jurisdiction.^b It provides for the establishment of superior councils in all of the capitals of the viceroyalties and the captaincies-general. One of these superior councils, or courts, with the title of *contensiosa*, took account of private cases, everything that involved

^a The title of this later ordinance was: *Ordinanza general formada de orden de S. M. y mandada imprimir y publicar para el gobierno é instrucción de intendentes, subdelegados y demás empleados de Indias.*

^b Quesada, *Vireinato*, 486.

a point of law that could be settled by trial; the other, the *junta superior de gobierno*, of which the intendant of the capital was an *ex-officio* member, rendered opinions in cases involving governmental matters, everything relative to the revenues, the method, manner, and time of collecting them, as well as to employees and their powers and obligations. In so far as the members of these two courts were in sympathy with the inhabitants of the capital where they resided and shared their aspirations with respect to local affairs, they formed a counterpoise to the centralized power exercised by the viceroy. But all of these functionaries of the capitals were under the superior jurisdiction of the audiencias, whose powers lay above the range of these reforms, and who still were authorized to assume the viceregal functions in case of the death of the viceroy without provision made for an immediate successor. Subject to the viceregal superiority and the jurisdiction of the audiencia, the intendants, as provincial governors by royal appointment, continued to exercise those large powers which naturally devolved upon them as agents of the viceroy and as important members of an administrative hierarchy, where the head was absolute and the other members too isolated to be effectively under practical control.⁸

⁸ For a general statement concerning the condition of affairs in the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata at the end of the eighteenth century, see the *Memoria* of the viceroy Avilés, addressed to his successor, Joaquin del Pino, dated at Buenos Aires, May 21, 1801, and printed in Zinny, *Gobernadores*, I, XLVII-XCVI.

V

At the time of these reforms, early in the last quarter of the century, the town of Buenos Aires was in a neglected state, and the condition of the inhabitants of the neighboring country was even more lamentable. In addition to the lack of the resources of civilized life, they were harrassed by Indian raids. Many of the men were killed, and women and children were carried off into captivity. The region presented no places especially favorable for defense, or passes where the approaching bands might be attacked and destroyed. From any part of the vast plain, they swooped down upon their unfortunate victims. To patrol the pampas and give security to the country population was a task quite beyond the power of any militia then at the disposal of the government.

The city of Buenos Aires at this time showed the results of shameful neglect. Many of the streets were impassable the greater part of the year. The heavy rains carried off the loose material, leaving deep, irregular gullies and stagnant pools. From the west a stream entered the city; it separated into two branches, formed deep water-courses that cut off almost completely different districts from one another. The inhabitants enjoyed few of the facilities ordinarily incident to living in a city as wealthy and populous as Buenos Aires was then. There was no hospital, no public lighting, no police; and the streets were

unpaved. The abundant wealth was largely in the hands of persons whose ignorance or whose meanness prevented the public from deriving any advantage from it. Even the idea of placing lights in front of their houses at night did not occur to the inhabitants as desirable.

Viceroy Juan José Vertiz (1778–1784) undertook to remedy some of these evident defects. In spite of the lack of coöperation of the inhabitants, he began to improve the streets; he founded a hospital, established a home for foundlings, created an orphan asylum, and took steps towards introducing a system of street-lighting. The foundling asylum was supported in part by rents derived from estates confiscated from the Jesuits; in part from the proceeds of bull-fights; in part from the income from the theater; and in part from the gains of the printing office. The municipal lighting was supported by a door tax of two reals on each street door. Recognizing that the life of the city was barren and that there were few social influences except those making for degeneracy, Vertiz determined to establish a theater which might furnish a certain degree of inspiration through the heroic characters it would present, and the cultivated language of the plays. In carrying out this project he naturally encountered the opposition of the clergy. A Franciscan friar, José Acosta, went so far as to censure, from the pulpit, these public amusements patronized by the viceroy. He "declared in the name of

the Holy Spirit that those who attended them would incur eternal damnation.’’⁹ The viceroy, having learned of the attitude assumed by the friar, required him to be expelled from the monastery, and another preacher to repudiate his utterances.

The superiority of Buenos Aires over the other cities of the viceroyalty was rather prospective than actual. It was at this time in no sense a center of wealth or cultivation. It had an old fort, a town organization, and an old market. The suggestion that it would absorb the life of the other towns did not seem to point to a real danger. The cities of Cordova, Tucuman, and Salta appeared then so firmly established as not likely to be affected by the rivalry of the port. These cities were richer and more populous than Buenos Aires. Cordova had a university, while no such institution existed at Buenos Aires in the colonial period. Cordova was, moreover, the residence of a bishop, and it was an important point on the line of trade between the eastern provinces and Chile, Cuyo, and Peru. In some respects Chuquisaca was even more important than Cordova. It was the seat of an audiencia, the residence of the archbishop of La Plata, and the place of residence of many persons of wealth. In fact, the centers of wealth and cultivation were not at the shore or in the valleys of the great river of the eastern part of the continent, but in the mountains

⁹ Lopez, *Historia Argentina*, I, 438.

near the mines of Upper Peru. But Buenos Aires had one point of advantage that was destined to become appreciated when the significance of its agriculture and foreign commerce with respect to progress in civilization should become known. The Spaniards were under the delusion that civilization could be developed in isolation; that it was a matter of precept, not a result of social contact and imitation. In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the society of the river country and that of the mountain country were too different to permit a great degree of sympathy to exist between them; and Paraguay, with the large Indian element in the population and its traditions of theocratic government, had also a character peculiar to itself.

Finding Buenos Aires without facilities for printing and consequently without the desired means for distributing information among the people, Vertiz endeavored to supply this deficiency. He fortunately discovered that the Jesuits, on their expulsion, had left a fully equipped printing office in the college of *Nuestra Senora de Monserrat* in Cordova. This equipment he caused to be transferred to Buenos Aires. Here he encountered a new difficulty: he knew no one competent to set up the press and use it. He sent inquiries to all the provinces for such a person, and was finally informed by the governor of Montevideo that there was in that city a young sergeant who had worked in a printing house in

Cadiz. The viceroy called him to Buenos Aires to assume immediate charge of the undertaking; he offered him for a wife any one of the inmates of the orphan asylum. The young man with marvellous modesty expressed his desire to accept the choice of his patron, who is reported to have made a satisfactory selection. Thus was founded a printing house and at the same time an important family of the viceregal capital. The printing house continued to be known for many years under the designation of *Imprenta de los Niños Expositos.*

Around the colonial city was the colonial country, and the character of this background determined the character of the city's life. Behind Potosi lay the rough and barren summits of the eastern Andes, with their rich mines of silver. Potosi was necessarily a miner's town. La Paz lies in a deep gash cut in the interandean table land, bounded by the inhospitable plain of central Bolivia and a ridge of the mountains. Santiago flourished in the delightful valley of central Chile. Back of Buenos Aires were spread out the vast and fertile plains of Argentina, occupied by a few land-holders and the multitude of a homeless proletariat. In 1744, for 186 proprietors there were 5897 dependents. The latter were without some of the fundamental ideas of civilization. To them the plains and the herds appeared like the gift of God to the race. If they were hungry, there were the animals provided for man's comfort. If

they needed shelter, there was the land on which they might erect their habitations. The new order of things, under which the lands were claimed as private property and the herds had individual owners, had been brought about by decrees of persons, who from the viewpoint of the dwellers of the plains had no right to either the land or the animals. Why should the favoritism of a governor deprive them of their ancient privilege of wandering or settling at will? As the generations passed and the blood of the white man became mixed with that of the tribes of the plains, the views of the half-wild proletariat remained practically unchanged. The savage had not become civilized, but the descendants of the white man had moved towards the savage state. In contrast with the state of things in Chile, the cheapness of slave labor on the great estates drove the free men to the desert, or made them the unpaid dependents of the proprietors. If endowed with energy and daring, some of them moved beyond the limits of the territory that had been granted to private persons, and established themselves on the unappropriated lands, and made there little centers of cultivation. But their peace was not long; for a new grant brought a new proprietor to claim the results of their labor, or they were swept away by the nomadic savages.

The absence of a minute division of the land was in a large measure due to the persistence of the feudal ideal in the colonies. Such a division,

if it had been carried out, might have furnished an independent possession to every man seeking a permanent home and property for himself and his descendants, and filled the country with a self-respecting population, democratic because of the essential equality of wealth, and fitted in good time to lay the foundation of a republic. Instead of this, the feudal notion of inferior and superior survived, making, when carried into practice, the great body of the people in the country either miserable dependents or free men who could find no place for a permanent home. This was the undemocratic state of society, on which it was later proposed to erect a democratic government.

CHAPTER X

AWAKENING INTEREST IN SCIENCE AND POLITICS: MUTIS AND NARIÑO

- I. Beginnings of a new literary cultivation. II. *El Mercurio Peruano; Papel Periódico.* III. Mutis' arrival and early years in New Granada. IV. Mutis turns to botany; correspondence with Linnaeus. V. Work of Caballero y Góngora for progress. VI. The Botanical Expedition. VII. The viceroy ordered to protect the Isthmus against invasion. VIII. The viceroy's commercial views. IX. The Botanical Bureau's headquarters transferred to Bogotá. X. The Spanish Botanical Expedition to Peru. XI. Nariño and the young reformers and their trial. XII. Nariño in Europe; his return to New Granada and imprisonment.

I

THE revolts and conspiracies in various parts of Spain's South American possessions indicated that the inhabitants had become conscious of their individuality and of their unsatisfactory state. This consciousness was intensified by the intellectual awakening that appeared in the last decades of the century. Unions with intellectual aims became inevitably patriotic unions. The

achievements of colonial writers and investigators did not enhance the interest or the pride of the colonists in the mother country, but helped to concentrate popular interest on the welfare of the colonies, and to magnify their aspirations for recognition as independent commonwealths. The intellectual awakening brought into clearer light the unreasonableness of Spain's policy, and strengthened the opposition to Spanish rule.

An illustration of this tendency may be observed in the consequences of the intellectual movement under the later viceroys of New Granada. This movement was characterized by a new interest in literary production, by a new zeal in scientific investigation, and by attention to questions of political reform.

One indication of the changed attitude towards literature was the formation of societies, or "circles," for the promotion of literary cultivation. One of these societies in New Granada was called *Tertulia Eutropélica*. All kinds of subjects were discussed at its meetings. At the head of it stood Manuel de Socorro Rodriguez, who was one of a small group of its more notable figures. Others of this group were Maria Valdes, Francisco Antonio Rodriguez, and José Maria Gruesso. All of these, as well as a great majority of those who participated in the scientific and literary movement of the period, were creoles, men of Spanish blood born in New Granada.

II

Indications of an awakening intellectual activity may be seen also in the literary and scientific revival in the University of San Marcos, in the increasing number of persons who habitually gathered in the newly established cafés of Lima for literary discussions, and in the publication of the periodical called the *Mercurio Peruano*. In Quito the Jesuits had formed an academy for the study of astronomy and physics, but this disappeared with the expulsion of the order. A little later the *Escuela de la Concordia* appeared, designed to further the study of agriculture and industry. This institution undertook the publication of a periodical known as the *Primicias de la Cultura de Quito*, the first to appear in that city. The means for printing had been introduced by the Jesuits, and the *Apéndice al plan de estudios para la real universidad de Quito*, of 1791, indicates a disposition to revive the intellectual life of the institution.

In spite of the dense ignorance that prevailed generally throughout the viceroyalty, the capital had always contained a limited group of cultivated persons, and this group became especially active during the reign of Viceroy Espeleta (1789–1797). One of the noteworthy manifestations of this activity was the establishment and maintenance of the *Papel periódico de la ciudad de Santafé de Bogotá*. It consisted of eight pages, and the first

number was published on the 9th of February, 1791. It deprecated the attention that had been given to insipid, useless, and absurd questions; called for an examination of the marvellous nature of the country; and endeavored to cultivate a taste for literary, scientific, and political studies. Although liberal ideas had been more or less current in the preceding decade, Viceroy Espeleta became "the protector of the press which popularized them."³ The appeal in favor of more liberal thinking was made not merely to New Granada, but also to other countries of Spanish America. The first number of the *Papel Periódico* was sent to a literary society in Lima with the viceroy's commendation, and thus, through his patronage and protection of a publication that encouraged the spread of emancipated thought, he unwittingly contributed to weaken the foundations of Spanish rule in New Granada and in every other dependency to which the journal's influence was extended. The *Mercurio Peruano* for April 28, 1791, devoted its leading article to the *Papel Periódico*, affirming that "the spirit of the century is propitious for instruction, humanity, and philosophy. Different parts of America have, for a long time, found themselves in possession of common ideas, and have unconsciously united in adopting the most opportune means for transmitting them, namely, periodicals. Perhaps before 1800 Buenos Aires and Chile will respec-

³ Groot, II, 270.

tively issue a *Diario*, a *Mercurio*, or a *Gazeta*." The *Papel Periódico* ceased to be published after an existence of five years. But while it continued to be issued, it was used by the new generation of creoles of New Granada in making public their ideas and aspirations.

III

A more noteworthy phase of the intellectual awakening in New Granada was the series of investigations led by José Celestino Mutis, who stimulated a large number of the rising generation of creoles to habits of scientific inquiry. Mutis arrived in New Granada in 1760, as physician to Viceroy Mesia de la Zerda, who landed at Cartagena, then the bulwark of Spanish power in America. Here Eslaba had spent the whole period of his viceregal administration (1740–1749), and his successor, José Alfonso Pizarro (1749–1753), had remained here the greater part of his term of service in New Granada. But Solis (1753–1761) had resided at Bogotá, then, as many years later, difficult of access; and his successor, Mesia de la Zerda (1761–1773), followed his example. Zerda left Cartagena on the 5th of January, 1761. By way of the Magdalena and the Opon rivers and the mountain trail, he reached Bogotá on the 24th of February. The city as a place of residence in the eighteenth century did not offer many attractions to one coming from the higher ranks of

European society. It contained only a few thousand inhabitants. Under Viceroy Guirior (1773-1776), there were 16,233. In 1794, sixteen or eighteen years later, there were only 17,405. Most of the institutions characteristic of a civilized community were wanting.*

The country was without roads. Whatever communication was maintained made use of rivers, mountain trails, and Indian paths. The missions were protected by military garrisons. The finances of the kingdom were in a low state; even the more important centers of population furnished only meager incomes to meet local expenditures or to satisfy the demands of the royal treasury. And at this time the commission for establishing the boundary between the Spanish and the Portuguese dependencies in the north, under the direction of José de Yturriaga, was soliciting funds for the maintenance of its large staff of engineers, draughtsmen, mathematicians, naturalists, and an escort of more than a hundred men. The extreme of embarrassment was, however, avoided by the arrival of the information that the treaty of demarcation had been annulled by the agreement of February 12, 1761.

In 1762 the viceroy, accompanied by Mutis, returned to the coast by way of Honda and the Magdalena river. This journey was undertaken to make sure that the defenses of Cartagena were

* The name of the city at this time was Santa Fé de Bogotá, but it was usually called Santa Fé. A law of December 17, 1819, made Bogotá the official designation.

strong enough to withstand any attack which Great Britain might make. After the conclusion of peace and his return to Bogotá, Mutis devoted some part of his time to instruction in the *Colegio de Nuestra Señora del Rosario*. The subject taught by him was Mathematics, not Medicine or Botany or Natural History. His public presentation of the doctrines of Newton raised against him a storm of opposition on the part of the secular clergy and the monks, but the protection of the viceroy appears to have fixed a point beyond which their opposition might not go.

IV

Zerda recognized the low state into which mining for the precious metals had fallen, and made an effort to increase the production. For this purpose José Antonio de Villegas y Avendaño was called from Lima, and commissioned to examine and report on certain districts north of Bogotá. Mutis accompanied him, and remained for a number of years in the region about Pamplona. These efforts were attended with no especially striking results, and the attention of Mutis was hereafter directed more exclusively to a botanical survey of the country. Linnaeus had urged him to make botany the object of his investigations. Mutis' correspondence with the Swedish botanist suffered serious interruptions, for

Linnaeus' letters were in the beginning directed to Santa Fé in New Mexico instead of to Santa Fé in New Granada. In this correspondence, when finally established, there was much reference to chinchona. Although the quality of the bark as a remedy for fever had been known for more than a hundred years, scientific inquiries concerning it had only recently been undertaken. Condamine, of the geographical commission, had published a report on this subject in the transactions of the Paris Academy of Sciences, and this report had been made the basis of Linnaeus' description.

The intellectual progress of New Granada, stimulated by the activity of Mutis, had been checked by the expulsion of the Jesuits. It was the members of this society that were furnishing the most hopeful instruction in the missions and other remote parts of the kingdom. To repair the temporal damage caused by their removal, the viceroy appointed Francisco Antonio Moreno to be the executor of the Jesuits' heritage. Moreno was born in Mariquita, was educated in Spain, and had been fiscal of the audiencia. In his new office, he conceived a comprehensive system of instruction that, among other things, would provide for a school wherever a Jesuit mission had existed. With the confiscated book collections of the Jesuits he founded a public library, and to these measures Mutis gave his enthusiastic approval. The *Colegio del Rosario*, where Mutis

had taught mathematics, was transformed into a university and removed from clerical domination. In this institution Mutis resumed his instruction, now as professor of mathematics. Referring to the failure of the Spaniards adequately to exploit the products of their territory and to bring them into general use, Moreno cited chinchona as an illustration, and expressed regret that they should be obliged to beg from the French such a product of their own soil.

In 1772, Zerda returned to Spain; Mutis, who had accompanied him to America as his physician, was invited to make the return voyage in the same capacity. He decided, however, to decline the invitation. The distinguished engineer, Francisco Requena, under the persuasion of the viceroy, reached the same decision. Although Requena had gone to New Granada for a brief period of colonial service pre-requisite for promotion in Spain, he remained in America three decades, and became the head of the Spanish Boundary Commission provided for by the Spanish-Portuguese treaty of 1777.

Shortly after the departure of Viceroy Zerda, Mutis entered the priesthood, but in his new character his attention was not distracted from his scientific work. The new viceroy, Manuel de Guirior, was received at Honda, April 16, 1773, by a number of the higher officers of the viceregal government at Bogotá. Mutis was a member of this reception committee, and a little later, in a

letter to Linnaeus, wrote as follows concerning Guirior:

"Our illustrious Viceroy, just arrived in this town from Spain, is a most ardent promoter of science. He has become acquainted with our correspondence in consequence of your present of books, confided to his care; and he is much interested in what passes between us. He generally enters into conversation with me, after dinner, about you; and makes me read passages out of your letters, highly flattering to me in which he takes great delight, though they put me to the blush. This benevolent man, a few days since, took me with him into the hilly country, where he went for the purpose of planting strawberries, now one of our luxuries, in order that they may become naturalized all over these mountains."⁵

V

Guirior showed his sympathy with the liberalizing efforts of his predecessor and the work of Moreno and Mutis by defending their educational reforms against the attacks of the church. He undertook, moreover, to improve the financial condition of the kingdom by extending the system of monopolies, notably those of tobacco and chin-

⁵ Smith, James Edward, *A Selection of the Correspondence of Linnaeus and other Naturalists.* London, 1821, 11, 525. The editor of this correspondence wrote, in Bees' Cyclopedie, XXV, Art. "Mutis," that Mutis was the means of introducing strawberries into the country of New Granada.

chona. Extravagant expectations were at this time entertained concerning trade in chinchona bark. Some persons maintained that it was destined to be as profitable as the Dutch had found their oriental trade in spices.

Before the arrival of the royal confirmation of the proposed changes, in the system of monopolies, Viceroy Guirior was transferred to Peru, and Manuel Antonio Flórez (1776–1782) had become his successor in New Granada. Flórez retired from Bogotá early, and, residing at Cartagena, was eclipsed by the visitador-regente, Peñéres, whose maladministration provoked the rebellion of the comuneros. The accession of Archbishop Caballero y Góngora to the post of viceroy in June, 1782, promised a more enlightened rule than those which had led to the popular revolt. The new archbishop-viceroy became interested in the missions that had been ruined by the expulsion of the Jesuits, particularly those in the region of the Orinoco and the Amazon, and in the work of the boundary commission. He supported the system of schools established by Moreno, and furthered the plans of Mutis for an organization that would promote scientific research; founded a chair for instruction in medical science in the *Colegio del Rosario*; and contemplated the formation of a public clinic and means for caring for the poor.

In spite of his quality as an ecclesiastic Caballero did not disapprove of the plan to bring

German and Swedish miners into the country although they were Protestants; for this project was in keeping with his plan to have the mines of the kingdom worked on a larger scale and in a more systematic manner than heretofore. A somewhat similar project had occupied much of Mutis' attention in the earlier years of his residence in America; and through his efforts to put mining on a better footing, he became interested in José Ruiz, who went to Upsala to study under Johan Gottskalk Wallerius. Later in a letter to Linnaeus, written from the mines of Ibagué, February 8, 1777, Mutis says, "Our friend Ruiz, after a long journey, which has occupied him for three years, is now safely returned to America, and I have passed many delightful days with him in hearing all he could tell me of you and your concerns, as well as of your worthy son.... We came together from Bogotá, a few days since, to these mines of Ibagué, that he may put in practice everything he had further acquired in this science during his stay in the Upper Hartz."⁶

After his return to America, José Ruiz had much practical experience in mining enterprises, yet the proposed mining reform was entrusted to José d'Elhuyar, who had had extensive opportunities to acquire profound knowledge of mining. He was born in Legroño. At Paris he had studied mathematics, physics, chemistry, and natural history. Then, supported by a grant from the king,

⁶ Smith, J. E., *Correspondence of Linnaeus and other Naturalists*. London, 1821, 11, 526.

he turned his attention to metallurgy; studied three years at Freiburg, making himself familiar with the processes of smelting the various metals; visited the mines of Bohemia, and acquired a knowledge of the processes employed there; went later to the mines of Hungary, Sweden, and Norway, always with the object of learning their practical methods and processes. By his studies and his observations he had become eminently fitted for directing the proposed reform in mining.

VI

Another striking evidence of an awakening scientific interest in the natural resources of America was the organization of the Botanical Expedition of 1777. This was to have its principal station at Lima, and to extend its activity into Ecuador and Chile. This enterprise prompted Viceroy Caballero to organize researches in botany in New Granada. Under the name of an expedition he created a bureau or institute for botanical research. According to his *Relación de Mando*, he was moved by the announcement of the coming of German explorers and the humiliation of having the unknown natural treasures of the country pointed out to the inhabitants by strangers. "I provided for the formation of a Botanical Expedition, composed of a director, a vice director, and a draughtsman. For the post of director, I chose the presbyter Don José Celestino Mutis, a subject who

for more than twenty years had traversed a great part of the kingdom, collecting the products of nature, and known by his literary correspondence with the scientific men of Europe."⁷

This action of the viceroy was approved and confirmed by the king, and he ordered that the necessary funds should be immediately placed at the disposal of Mutis. The authorities were spurred to unusual activity in this matter by national pride prompting the wish that whatever foreigners published might not be original discoveries but only such things as should be already known in America. Mutis was appointed royal botanist and astronomer to the expedition for the northern part of South America, and two thousand doubloons were awarded to him to meet the expenses of completing his writings. Besides this he was given an annual salary of two thousand pesos. And under the king's orders, he was to be furnished with all the botanical and astronomical books and instruments that might be needed for the execution of the work entrusted to him. The second officer of the expedition was Elroy de Valenzuela, who was born in Giron, and had accompanied Mutis from that town to Bogotá. Mutis evidently found in him a favorite protégé, for on one occasion he wrote to him: "Every letter which I receive from you is as precious to me as were my letters from the great Linnaeus."⁸

⁷ *Relaciones de Mando (Bibl. de Hist. Nacional, VIII)*, 253.

⁸ Schumacher, Hermann A., *Südamerikanische Studien*, Berlin, 1884, 45.

Mutis was empowered to select the place where the bureau, or the headquarters of the expedition, should be established, and he chose Mariquita, a little town in the upper valley of the Magdalena river near Ibagué. Here he commanded a large staff of assistants. Among them there were artists or draughtsmen. The majority of the artists came and went. Two, however, were especially noteworthy. One was Pablo Antonio García, whose original talent, cultivated at Pamplona, Bogotá, and Ibagué, entitled him to distinction, and who was appointed draughtsman of the expedition. The other was a boy from Guáduas, who appeared at Mariquita, and who developed rapidly a marvellous talent for drawing plants. This was Francisco Javier Matiz. With the opportunities for instruction which he enjoyed in association with Mutis he became also a botanist.

VII

Mutis' retirement to Mariquita and the determination of the viceroy to reside near the coast made subsequent communication between them infrequent. The king was desirous that the Isthmus of Darien should be protected against invasion, and by a decree of August 15, 1783, he made it the special duty of Caballero to see that this was accomplished. The viceroy's first step in responding to this obligation was to appoint Antonio de Arévalo to be the military commander

of that region. Garrisons were established at various points along the coast, and a fleet of vessels was gathered at Cartagena to carry supplies to these posts.

Arévalo occupied Caiman, Mandinga, and Concepción; and later, Calidonia. To Calidonia he gave the name of Carolina del Darien. He proceeded to bring together inhabitants for the district, and to construct forts for defense against the Indians. The British government, through the governor of Jamaica, ordered that no assistance should be furnished the Indians. This appears to have persuaded them of the hopelessness of their attempts to resist the Spaniards, and they sent a representative to Cartagena, who took the oath of fidelity before the archbishop-viceroy in the name of the eight tribes for whom he acted. But this oath was not faithfully observed, and the Indians soon traitorously attacked fort Carolina. The intervention of Henry Hooper, an Englishman, who had lived many years in the region and knew the language of the Indians contributed to the restoration of peace. He persuaded the Indians to send a delegation to Cartagena to agree on terms of peace with the viceroy. Such an agreement was formed July 21, 1787. By the provisions of this treaty the Indians agreed not to trade with the British, to carry no arms but axes and machetes, not to take vengeance for grievances, but to refer all grievances to the proper authorities. In this way the hundred years' con-

flict with the barbarians of Darien was brought to an end by the energy and prudence of the viceroy, and with this ceased the hostilities that had been encouraged by the British and the Dutch.

In dealing with this region, the viceroy had his attention called to the possibility of inter-ocean communication, and he informed the king that through Darien communication between the oceans by water might be effected without great difficulties. This had reference to the route by the Atrato and the San Juan rivers. More than fifty years earlier the possibility that foreigners might use this route appears to have been called to the attention of the Spanish government. A royal decree was issued, January 20, 1720, that imposed the death penalty on anyone who should navigate these rivers.⁹

Absorbed in the affairs of the coast, the viceroy gradually ceased to be interested in the interior of the country. He no longer thought of returning to Bogotá, and fixed his residence in Turbaco, not far from Cartagena. The need of funds to meet the expenses of his military undertakings led him to impose a succession of burdensome taxes; and his interest in the botanical expedition, at first supported for expected scientific results, was now limited to the thought that it might be useful in exploiting the natural resources of the country for the Spanish market.

⁹ Schumacher, *Südamerikanische Studien*, 50; Plaza, *Nueva Granada*, 401.

VIII

In the *Relación* handed to his successor, Caballero affirmed that in two years there had been sent to Spain, under the monopoly 21,271 cases of *quina* weighing nearly four million and a half of pounds. This was expected to produce for the royal treasury more than 600,000 pesos. But in the enthusiastic viceroy's view, "The principal ornament and glory of the botanical expedition was the discovery of the tea of Bogotá, a most precious plant of great use in Asia and Europe, and of not less use in America, and which until now has been believed to be the exclusive product of China. The past year, 1786, the Director, Don José Mutis, gave me the first notice of it, and I sent to the court the samples which he handed to me, in order that they might be examined anew; and in fact, from the careful and repeated chemical examinations that were made, it proved to be not only really tea, but also more aromatic and of superior quality to tea of Asia."¹⁰

The prospect of an advantageous foreign trade in the tea of Bogotá, particularly with the English, loomed above the viceroy's horizon, when he considered the difficulty in getting it from China. "We have it in the valley of Bogotá, near the city in great abundance," he continued, "and its cultivation may be increased to any extent; and with the exception of a short journey by land to Honda,

¹⁰ *Relaciones de Mando* (*Bibl. de Hist. Nacional*, VIII), 254.

it may be carried by the Magdalena river to Cartagena, and from there to Spain, an infinitely shorter and more secure journey than that from the East Indies. The government is able to give it all the protection that may be needed from its planting to its sale in the foreign country; and finally the tea of Bogotá, may be the most important product for exportation from the kingdom.''¹¹

With a similar practical end in view, the viceroy supported the movement to put the mining industry on a better basis. Engineers and miners were brought from Europe and an organization for the administration of the mines was formed. This embraced a director of mines, a fiscal, and a large number of mining officials and practical miners. The general direction of the whole system devolved, as already suggested, upon Juan José d'Elhuyar, who became intimately associated with Mutis; and the region about Mariquita became the seat of initial operations.

IX

The new viceroy, Francisco Gil y Lemus, appeared in New Granada commissioned to hold the residencia of Caballero, and then to proceed to Peru. But during the period of his residence, from January 8, to July 30, 1789, he displayed great activity. He visited Santana, the seat of

¹¹ *Relaciones de Mando* (*Bibl. de Hist. Nacional*, VIII), 255.

D'Elhuyar's mining operations, where he found the German miners suffering from ill effects of the tropical climate, and where they were the object of popular opposition for their Protestant faith. At Mariquita he found that the years of work by Mutis and his staff of assistants had had almost exclusively a scientific purpose, and had contributed little to the practical economic results, which the kingdom's finances, with the indebtedness of two million pesos, seemed to demand.

After the short administration of Viceroy Gil y Lemus, José de Espeleta succeeded him at the end of July, 1789. Espeleta had been captain-general of Cuba for more than three years (December 28, 1785, to April 18, 1789) and was thus not without experience in the affairs of America. Early in his reign, in 1791, the bureau of the Botanical Expedition was transferred to Bogotá, thirty years after Mutis had entered that city. In these years Bogotá had undergone a great change. It was becoming the fashion for men of cultivation to turn to new things. Societies, associations, and clubs were formed for discussions, from which not even political questions were excluded. Many persons had found the plain and simple manner of living unsatisfactory, and articles of luxury had begun to find a way into the country from France. The creoles had experienced an intellectual awakening, and had become conscious of their importance in the community. Manual Socorro Rodriguez, the chief

official of the Library of Bogotá began with this year, the publication of a periodical devoted to literature and philosophy. Much attention began to be given to geographical studies, and studies in the natural sciences were introduced into the *Colegio del Rosario*. This movement derived its origin and principal impulse from men of a generation younger than that of Mutis, some of whom were his pupils and assistants, who had come with him to Bogota from Mariquita, or who were his collaborators on the *Flora Bogotana*.

The edifice prepared for the bureau on its transfer from Mariquita to Bogotá, became known as the Botanical House. It furnished abundant room for Mutis' herbariums and the various collections that had been made in other departments in previous years, as well as working space for the enlarged staff. The number of creoles among the assistants, in relation to the Europeans, was increasing. This was particularly true of the draughtsmen and the painters. In connection with the bureau there was established a school of drawing and painting, conducted by Salvador Rizo, who for three years had been the accountant, or business manager of the expedition. By the work of pupils of this school a new rate of progress was had in the preparation of drawings and paintings for the proposed *Flora Bogotana*.

The intellectual awakening in New Granada that marked the years of Mutis' activity was not due entirely to the progress of studies in the

realm of nature. The events of the French Revolution became gradually known, and provided subjects for discussion among the members of the new generation. But the director of the expedition was of another generation. Science still claimed Mutis' undivided attention. Although his later years were spent in the capital, he had little part in its conspicuous society. In spite of the publications directed against him in Spain by Sebastian José Lopez, the opinion of the Spaniards concerning him remained that to which Linnaeus had given expression.¹²

X

The botanical expedition to Peru was more properly called an expedition than that which

¹² José Celestino Mutis was born in Cadiz in 1732, and died in Bogotá September 2, 1808. Some of the results of his investigations were published in the proceedings of the Swedish Academy of Sciences. A part of his correspondence with Linnaeus is included in Smith's "*Selection of the correspondence of Linnaeus with other Naturalists,*" London, 1821. A collection of papers entitled *El arcano de la Quina* with portrait, was published in Madrid in 1828. The material prepared for the *Flora de Santa Fé de Bogotá*, was deposited in the archives of the Botanical Garden at Madrid. This consisted of a large number of manuscripts, an extensive herbarium, and 6849 drawings of plants. Some of his monographs were *Memoria de las palmas del Nuevo Reino de Granada* (incomplete), *Memoria sobre el Caryocar amygdaliferum*, printed in Cavanilles' *Icones*, and *Observaciones sobre la vigilia y sueño de algunos plantas*, in Botanical Garden of Madrid. An elaborate account of Mutis is found in Gredilla, A. Federico, *Biografía de José Celestino Mutis con la relación de su viaje y estudios practicados en el Nuevo Reino de Granada*, Madrid, 1911.

appeared in New Granada. It was directed by Hipolito Ruiz and José Pavon, who went from Spain and returned to Spain after they had finished their survey and made their collections. This expedition left Cadiz November 4, 1777, and arrived at Callao April 8, 1778. It embraced, besides the directors, Joseph Dombey, "*Galliarum Regis Medico, et Botanico egregio,*" and two draughtsmen, Joseph Brunete and Isidore de Gálvez.

In the preface to their Flora the directors give a general sketch of their survey, noting the regions explored, and giving some account of the material results of their researches. They first examined the country immediately about Lima, and sent to Spain, by the ship *Buen Consejo*, a large number of dried plants and two hundred and forty-two colored drawings. Their second field of investigation was the region about Tarma and Jauja, whence they passed to Huánuco, where they discovered seven species of Cascarillos. After their return to Lima, they went a little later to the province of Chancay, leaving Dombey at Lima.

Chile, as well as Peru, was a part of the field assigned to Ruiz and Pavon, as the directors of the Peruvian expedition. The descriptions of Chile by Feuvillée and Frazier facilitated the exploration of that country. The members of the expedition went to Chile by sea, and landed at Talcahuana. They surveyed the regions near Concepción, Itata, René, and Arauco; and also

the provinces of Puchocay, Maule, San Fernando, Rancagua, Santiago, and Quillota and some part of the region of the Andes. A shipment of fifty-two cases of the collections which they had made in two years was lost in the wreck of the *San Pedro de Alcántara*, that ran on the rocks at Peniche in Portugal, on the 2nd of February, 1786. In order to repair this loss, the investigators returned to Huánuco, and revisited various parts of that province; they advanced as far as the Huancabamba river, which was then the boundary between the lands of the settled inhabitants and the territory of Indians still in their wild state. At the estate of Macora they spent two months, and here two persons, Juan Tafalla and Francisco Pulgar, became attached to the expedition in the capacity of student assistants, the former as a botanist and the latter as a draughtsman.

Before the loss of the shipment on the *San Pedro de Alacántara* the expedition encountered a disaster, on the 6th of August, 1786, in the burning of the descriptions of plants, animals, and minerals made in Chile, and of the topographical accounts of the provinces of that kingdom and of Peru. At the same time there were burned large numbers of plants, birds, quadrupeds, and insects, together with equipment and supplies for three months. The expedition returned once more to Huánuco, and after this undertaking sent from Callao to Spain by the frigates *El Pilar* and *El Brillante*, seventy-three cases of natural products,

eighteen pots of living plants, and five hundred and eighty-six drawings.

The draughtsman Joseph Brunete died in Pasco in 1787, whither he had gone to receive the salaries of the expedition's personnel. The other members having returned to Lima, took leave of their pupils, Tafalla, who later became professor of Botany at Lima, and Pulgar, and embarked in the ship *El Dragon* on the first of April, 1788. They took with them their manuscripts, twenty-nine cases of natural products and one hundred and twenty-four living plants. After a voyage of somewhat more than five months, they landed at Cadiz, on the 12th of September.

In the preface to their work, *Florae Peruvianaæ, et Chilencis Prodromus, XV*, Ruiz and Pavon enumerated the toils they had endured and the dangers they had passed during the eleven years of their sojourn and wanderings in America. They had suffered, to quote their account, "heat, weariness, hunger, thirst, nakedness, wants of every kind, tempests, earthquakes, plagues of mosquitos and other insects, continual risks of being devoured by tigers, bears and other wild beasts, ambush by thieves and savage Indians, treachery of slaves, accidents from precipices, from the falling of the branches of the lofty trees of the forests, and from the passing of rivers and torrents, the burning of Macora, the shipwreck of the *San Pedro de Alcántara*, the separation from M. Dombey, the death of the draughtsman Brunete, and the loss of manuscripts."

These two undertakings present certain points of contrast. The expedition to Peru was organized in Spain; the members were appointed in Spain; and it proceeded to Peru to work with a large measure of independence for the attainment of its specific purpose. The expedition, as it appeared in New Granada, had to a large extent the character of a domestic institution, in the organization of which the viceroy was especially active. The director although born in Spain, had already at the time of his appointment, spent many years in scientific researches in America. The expedition in New Granada had also a much more powerful influence than that of Peru in educating youth and in promoting intellectual activity, particularly among the creoles.

The period of Mutis' effective work closed with the visit of Humboldt in 1801; after this event Francisco Caldas became the leader of scientific inquiry in New Granada.¹³

¹³ The awakening interest in the scientific study of nature in all the Spanish Colonies was observed by Humboldt, and he affirms that "no European government has spent more considerable sums to increase knowledge of plants than the Spanish government." "All the researches made during twenty years in the most fertile regions of the new continent have not only enriched the domain of science with more than four thousand new species, but they have also contributed much to spread the taste for natural history among the inhabitants of the country."—*Essai politique sur le royaume de la Nouvelle Espagne*, Paris, 1811, 1, 120.

On Caldas and his work, see *Memoria histórica sobre la vida, carácter, trabajos científicos y literarios y servicios patrióticos de Francisco José de Caldas*, in *La Siesta*, Bogotá, 1852; also Vergara y Vergara, *Historia de la literatura en Nueva Granada*, Bogotá, 1905, cap. XIV; Groot, cap. XLI; Schumacher, *Südamerikanische Studien*, Berlin, 1884.

XI

Other evidence of the intellectual awakening in Spanish South America is found in the new interest manifested by the creoles in questions of government. The transformation of the British colonies into the United States of America and the social explosion of France in the French Revolution filled the atmosphere of Europe and America with a storm of new political ideas that swept over the barrier of Spain's protective system. Many Spanish traditions were thrown down, and the loyalty of the colonists, particularly the loyalty of the creoles, was everywhere thoroughly shaken. The effects were observed in all of the dependencies, but most distinctly in New Granada, where they were conspicuously illustrated by the career of Antonio Nariño. In the last decade of the century Nariño voiced the protest of an awakening people against Spain's unreasonable rule. He belonged to the same generation as the younger scientists who had grown up under the influence of Mutis' investigations, but his thought was directed chiefly to the realm of social affairs. He was born at Bogotá in 1760.¹⁴ He studied at the *Colegio de San Bartolomé*; and at the time of the reception of Gil y Lemus as viceroy of New Granada he was alcalde of his native city. Among

¹⁴ *El Precursor: Documentos sobre la vida pública y privada del General Antonio Nariño*, Bogotá, 1803 (*Bibl. de hist. nacional*, II). 2.

his contemporaries he passed for a man of learning.¹⁵ The viceroy maintained especially friendly relations with him, and appointed him treasurer of the tithes. The canons of the ecclesiastical cabildo opposed this appointment on the ground that they alone had the right to appoint to this office. They appealed to the king who supported their contention. When their power had thus been recognized, they exercised it in appointing Nariño, who had been appointed by the viceroy.¹⁶

Among his other enterprises, Nariño had acquired a printing press. Having received a copy of a history of the constituent assembly of France from Captain Ramirez, an officer of the viceroy's guard, he copied *Les Droits de l'Homme* from it. He translated this document into Spanish and printed it on his press in the beginning of 1794. He at first held the copies in reserve, but a few of them were distributed among Nariño's friends. One of these was discovered by a Spaniard, Francisco Carrasco, through whom knowledge of it became public, and by whom Nariño was denounced to the viceroy. The viceroy was at Guáduas when he learned of this publication. On his arrival in Bogotá he commissioned Joaquin Mosquera to institute proceedings against Nariño.

¹⁵ One of the most enlightening documents of the collection called *El Precursor* (164-191), is the list of books contained in Nariño's library, and confiscated with the rest of his property by the government.

¹⁶ Documents relating to this controversy are printed in *El Precursor*, 3-15.

At the same time he authorized Juan Fernandez de Alva to prosecute a number of persons charged with conspiracy; and Joaquin Inclan to bring to trial certain persons for issuing pasquinades against the government. By the trials for sedition and issuing the pasquinades a number of the accused were sentenced to imprisonment, and later were sent to Spain. When Nariño was brought to trial, he affirmed that no other person had had any part in the publication of the document in question; and he excused his act by saying that he had not published it to provoke a revolution against the government, but merely as an economic speculation. When asked to deliver the copies, he replied that as soon as he learned that the subject was to be investigated he had burned them. The destruction of them appears to have been complete.

The defense presented by Nariño and his attorney Ricuarte maintained that publishing *The Rights of Man* was not a crime; that it was not pernicious, since the same principles were current, having been already printed in Spanish books, and consequently its further circulation should not be regarded as criminal; and that viewed in the light of reason and giving to the document its proper meaning, it could not be considered as prejudicial to the public interest.¹⁷

¹⁷ The document containing the defense offered by Nariño in the case brought against him for publishing *Los Derechos de Hombre* and for other alleged offenses is found in *El Precursor*, 51-110.

The evidence presented by Nariño was not accepted as exculpating him, and he was sentenced to imprisonment in Africa for a period of ten years. He was sent to Spain with a number of other persons who had been convicted on charges relating to conspiracy and the issuing of pasquinades. On arriving at Cadiz, Nariño took advantage of the confusion at the port, escaped, and went to Madrid. The other persons whose cases were referred to the Council of the Indies, and who were conducted to Madrid, were Louis Rieux, Manuel Froes, José Ayala, Sinforoso Mutis, Francisco Zea, Ignacio Sandino, Pedro Pradilla, Bernardo Cifuentes, José María Cabal, and Enrique Umana. Besides the ten persons sent by the audiencia under grave charges, five others were brought to the attention of the Council of the Indies as minor offenders. The decision of the Council respecting all of these was that they should be set free and placed in full possession of all their rights, and be permitted to continue their studies and professions as if no proceedings against them had been taken. Their property, which had been confiscated, should be restored to them without cost; and those having a legal domicile in New Granada should be returned to Bogotá, or to the towns of their previous residence. Rieux having no legal residence in that dependency, might not return to it without permission granted by the king, who, however, found it just that Rieux should be allowed to return and recover his prop-

erty. Twelve of these persons were young men under thirty years of age. Of the others, the Frenchman Rieux was the oldest, forty-four, while Ayala and Cifuentes were thirty-three and thirty-four respectively. Nariño was thirty-four, and thus the whole group was composed of men who were about to assume, or who had already assumed recently, the duties and the obligation of the new generation.¹⁸

XII

From Madrid Nariño fled to France, where he remained until he considered himself in danger. At Paris he fell in with José Caro, a Cuban, who was urging the French revolutionary government to support an insurrection that he had projected in Peru. At Paris he also interviewed Tallien, and presented to him a project for bringing about a revolt in New Granada, and for transforming the viceroyalty into a republic. To this proposition Tallien replied that although he could not support the project publicly, because of the peace existing between France and Spain, in secret he would furnish such assistance as might be possible, so arranging affairs that the Spaniards would not send a fleet of sufficient force to prevent the contemplated movement. At the same time he affirmed that in England more effective action might be taken.¹⁹

¹⁸ This decision is printed in *El Pervisor*, 121-143.

¹⁹ *El Pervisor*, 217.

Encouraged by this statement, Nariño went to London, where he endeavored to form a plan to promote an insurrection in New Granada, and to make an agreement under which Great Britain would furnish arms, munitions, and a squadron that would attack Cartagena and by making use of the Orinoco take advantage of the resources of the interior of the country. Nariño's note to Pitt on this subject remained unanswered; he, however, obtained an interview with Lord Liverpool. From London Nariño returned to Paris. Then he went to St. Bartholomew by way of Bordeaux. Afterwards he passed over to St. Thomas, and later to Curazao. From the islands he went to New Granada, and proceeded to the capital in disguise.²⁰

Espeleta's administration ended January 2, 1797, and on the same day his successor, Pedro Mendieta (1797–1803), assumed the duties of the viceregal office. Complete tranquility prevailed at this time throughout the country; but the report that Nariño had escaped and had returned to New Granada caused a certain popular agitation. This news was satisfactory to the radicals, but it alarmed the conservatives.

In his *Relación* to his successor, Mendieta affirmed that "one of the greatest tasks of the government was that of maintaining good order in internal affairs, public peace, and submission to the magistrates, a task which in more fortunate

²⁰ *El Precursor*, Preface.

times cost little anxiety. Communication with foreigners by means of contraband; the introduction of books and public papers prohibited as prejudicial to religion and the state; certain flattering maxims imperfectly understood; a philosophical fanaticism, and more than all a spirit demanding always something new, succeeded in turning some few heads and making them adopt various notions which they announce as their own ideas. In these circumstances is found the origin of the changes and the radical doctrines manifest in the capital in 1794.²¹

Nariño was, in fact, already in Bogotá, under the protection of the archbishop, by whom advances in his behalf were made to the viceroy. On the 30th of July, 1797, Nariño addressed a communication to Mendoza, giving an account of his sojourn in France and England, and of his interviews with Lord Liverpool, with whom he had discussed the question of subjecting his country to foreign domination, and the proposition that England should offer assistance with arms, munitions, and a squadron that would cruise off New Granada and prevent the entrance of succor from Spain. It was agreed that, in consideration of this assistance, certain advantages respecting commerce with New Granada would be accorded to the British. This document closed with the fol-

²¹ *Relaciones re Mando* (*Bibl. de hist. Nacional*, III), 584. "La capital del virreinato era un foco de ardoroso patriotismo, unido al deseo mas violento de aprender y de estudiar todas las ciencias."—*Bulletin de historia y antigüedades*, II, 676.

lowing remarkable profession of conversion by Nariño:

"I hope that, re-established in the sovereign confidence of the king by your Excellency, I shall be able to employ the rest of my days in repairing the past and giving authentic and unequivocal proof of my repentance, occupying all the moments of my life in the service of both their Majesties. And if resentment led me to the borders of the precipice, I assure your Excellency that from today onward my obligation and the recognition of his great goodness will lead me even to shedding the last drop of my blood in the service of the king, at whose royal feet, humbly prostrated and with the most profound respect, I implore his sovereign piety, in order that in his personal goodness he may deign not only to grant me pardon for my past errors, but that, restoring me to his royal confidence, which is what my heart earnestly desires, I may remain in such a state that by my works I may be able to give evidence of my repentance and of being able to come to the support of my disgraced country."

On the 4th of August, 1797, the viceroy asked for an elucidation of certain passages of this communication, concluding with the statement that if in good faith Nariño wished to render this service to the sovereign, in accordance with his protestations, he could not do less than to reply categorically to the government.²²

In responding to this request Nariño made an elaborate and detailed comment on his narrative, and on the 11th of September, 1797, Mendaro granted him amnesty, and sent a report of this

²² *El Precursor*, 238-246.

action to the king for confirmation. The king, however, ordered that Nariño should not be liberated until after the conclusion of peace.

It is not probable that any concession by the king at this time would have prevented Nariño from ultimately becoming a factor in the struggle for independence; but by accepting his promised loyalty, the most forceful early advocate of emancipation would have been withheld from the movement, at least in its preliminary stages.

During the period of these events the government of the United States had become more thoroughly organized, and the officers and people of New Granada were receiving abundant information of the hopeful prospects of the young republic. From France, moreover, came reports of the overthrow of feudalism and absolute government and the abolition of political privileges; the announcement of the sovereignty of the people; that the essential basis of government was equality before the law, the liberty of the individual, freedom of conscience, of speech, and of the press; the right of all citizens to be elected or appointed to public office; the just distribution of the burdens of taxation; the responsibility of public officials; and the security and inviolability of property. It was not merely the doctrines of liberty that reached the governors and the people of the dependencies. They learned of the spread of these doctrines in Europe, the transformation of governments, and the rise of new republics, in

France, in the Netherlands, in Italy, and the popular revolt of the Poles against their oppressors. The forces that caused the disappearance of colonial isolation and ignorance overturned the cornerstone of Spanish rule. In New Granada the rest of the foundation was wrecked by the indolence, the corruption, the political blindness, and stupidity of Viceroy Antonio Amar y Borbon, who succeeded Mendoza in 1803.

CHAPTER XI

LIMA AND SANTIAGO AT THE END OF THE CENTURY

- I. The position and external form of Lima.
- II. The earthquake of 1746.
- III. The court of the viceroy and the institutions of Lima.
- IV. Social characteristics.
- V. Santiago de Chile.
- VI. The classes.

I

THE city of Lima presented the most advanced phase of social development in Spanish South America at the end of the eighteenth century. It was the residence of the highest officers of the government and of the most important dignitaries of the church. Here resided, moreover, a considerable body of titled nobles, and here the differentiation of the social classes was carried to the extreme, giving to the city many of the features of an Old-World capital.

In Mexico the Spaniards had established their capital at the center of the dominant Indian community. To have followed this example in Peru would have placed the new city at an inconvenient elevation, and in a position difficult of access from the sea. In Mexico the Spaniards wished to live

away from the unsanitary coast. In Peru the valley of the Rimac near the coast offered an agreeable and healthful climate and an abundance of pure water for the use of a city and for irrigation in a rainless region. The population of Lima at the beginning of the eighteenth century was 57,250. It had increased to 60,000 in 1746. The earthquake of that year caused a loss of between 6000 and 8000 persons; and, therefore, in 1755 the number of the inhabitants was only 54,000. In 1781 the number had again reached 60,000, and during the next nine years there was a loss of 7373. It may be presumed that by the end of the century there was a certain increase over the 52,627 given as the population in 1790, but the amount of this increase has not been accurately determined.¹

When Tadeo Haënke wrote his description of Lima, the city was still surrounded by walls. These walls were between eighteen and twenty-five feet high, without moat or outworks. They enclosed an area that was about a mile in extent from north to south, and about the same extent from east to west. It was divided into two parts by the river Rimac. Communication between these two parts passed over the stone bridge built during the administration of Montesclaros. At first there was a wooden bridge, and later the Marquis of Cañete, while viceroy, caused a bridge

¹ *Mercurio Peruano*, February 3, 1791 (I, 97); *Present State of Peru*, 139-141.

to be constructed of brick near the site of the present stone bridge. This was subsequently destroyed by the force of the water. Then, several years after its destruction, the present structure was begun, in 1608, and two years later it was completed. The plans were made by Friar Geronimo Villegas, a native of Lima, and the work was carried on under the direction of Juan de Corral. The expenses of the construction were met in part by a tax of two reals on every sheep consumed in the city, and by certain contributions required of other cities in the viceroyalty. Some of these cities were unable to see any justice in being required to pay for work that lay entirely beyond the limits of their jurisdiction; and Quito, in particular, complained at being compelled to furnish this assistance. The total cost of the structure, including the replacing the arch that was thrown down by the earthquake of 1746, was seven hundred thousand pesos.

The principal plaza, now only a breathing place for the citizens, a place of rest and recreation, appears to have been used as a market at the end of the eighteenth century. It was supplied abundantly with products of Europe and America. Negresses generally conducted the sales, "and judging from their good clothing and the manner in which they conduct themselves one may conclude that many of them pass a life of comfort and the most of them acquire wealth."²

² Haenke, Tades, *Descripción del Perú*, Lima, 1901, 3.

The principal streets were broad and straight, dividing the city into blocks one hundred and fifty yards square, and were paved and kept notably clean. Many of the houses were large, built about one or more patios, or courts, and were constructed of adobes and of studs interwoven with cane or bamboo, and covered with plaster or stucco. The roofs, in the absence of rain, were of little importance, except to keep out the sun, and were in many cases formed of a framework of timber and reeds covered with earth. This form of construction, particularly the basketwork walls covered with plaster, were thought to be well adapted, by their lack of rigidity, to withstand the shocks of the frequent earthquakes. There were, in the last decade of the eighteenth century, 3641 houses in the city, which was divided into thirty-five wards, in each of which there was an *alcalde de barrio* elected to watch over the particular interests of his ward, and who was subject to the central authority.

II

The inhabitants of Lima entered upon the second half of the eighteenth century with the task of reconstructing the city only partially accomplished. The earthquake of 1746 had transformed a large part of the buildings into masses of ruins, and those persons who had occupied the houses destroyed had sought safety in the public

squares and in the suburbs. At the time of the earthquake, after the first stupefying effect of the shock had passed, and the inhabitants had learned that a tidal wave had completely destroyed Callao, and even carried ships from the harbor directly over the town, they were seized by an unreasonable fear that the same calamity might overtake them. A rumor was spread through all the city that the sea was rising and advancing towards Lima. Apparently forgetting that the city was six miles from Callao and five hundred feet above the level of the sea, they were seized by a panic that prevented all sober reflection, and sent them in wild confusion towards the neighboring mountains.

The number of victims of the earthquake and the flood in Lima and Callao is set down at somewhat more than sixteen thousand. Some of the members of the clergy added to the terror of the event by noisily proclaiming that the catastrophe was a Divine punishment for the sins of the people. The provincial of the San Franciscans preached against those persons who had affirmed that the earthquake was the effect of natural causes. The destruction of the shops and the bakeries caused an immediate scarcity of provisions; but the embarrassment was soon removed by the influx of food from the country, and by the arrival of ships from Chile with cargoes of wheat. A greater source of danger appeared in the possible infection from the large number of unburied

bodies of men and animals. And to these evils was added the plundering of the dead and the ruins by bands of outlaws.

III

Somewhat of the social character of Lima was due to the fact that the city was the residence of the viceroy of Peru. Representing the king, he maintained much of the style of royalty. He was attended by two companies of guards, one of cavalry and one of halberdiers. Before 1784 the cavalry company contained one hundred and forty-seven men, but in that year it was reduced to a captain and thirty-four men. The halberdiers were reduced to a captain and twenty-four men. When the viceroy drove through or about the city, four of the cavalrymen preceded him and four followed. His court was made to resemble that of a European monarch. The presence in Lima of a group of families distinguished by their wealth or titles contributed to the imitation. The highest title in this society was that of duke, held by Formin de Carvajal y Vargas, who was born in Chile in 1722. His father, Luis de Carvajal, was a regidor of Concepción. Formin de Carvajal was later an alcalde of Lima, a familiar of the inquisition, and an incumbent of other important offices. As holder of the office of *correo mayor*, he received the revenues of the post-office, and when these were resumed by the crown, in 1768.

Charles III granted him as compensation an annual income of fourteen thousand dollars. Eleven years later, in 1779, he was made Duke of San Carlos, a grandee of Spain of the first class, and a field marshal.

Among the institutions established at Lima, the most conspicuous was the royal audiencia, created in 1546. At the end of the eighteenth century, it was composed of a regent, eight judges, four *alcaldes de corte*, and two prosecuting attorneys. The viceroy was the president. For the administration of justice, the audiencia was organized in three divisions. Two divisions, composed of *oidores*, or judges, considered civil cases, while the third division, composed of the *alcaldes de corte*, dealt with criminal cases.

The superior council of the royal treasury was composed of the viceroy as president, and five members including the regent of the audiencia. Created in 1784, the principal object of this body was to supervise the affairs of the treasury and the economical affairs of the department of war. A court of accounts, properly a bureau of auditing; a bureau charged with making a census of Indians; a commercial tribunal known as the consulado; a court of mines; and the royal mint were some of the other institutions established at Lima.³ There were various other organizations or offices that helped to give the city the appearance and character of a capital. Among these were the

³ On the institutions of Lima, see *Memorias de los vireyes*, VI, 79-86.

University of San Marcos, the central post-office, the commission for managing the royal monopolies, the custom-house, and the commission for managing the royal monte de piedad, or pawn-shop. There were established here also a large number of religious orders, that had acquired a large amount of property and were receiving extensive annual revenues.⁴

⁴ The following tabular statement presents the religious houses in Lima at the period in question, together with the numbers of the members and the amounts of their annual revenues stated in dollars:

	No. of members	Revenues
Dominicans:		
Convento grande del Rosario	146	\$35,389
Santa Rosa	9	2,519
Magdalena	19	8,869
Santo Tomas	30	6,802
Franciscans, three monasteries:		
Convento grande de Jesus	161	-----
College of San Buenaventura de Guade- lupe	20	-----
Recolección	33	-----
Augustinians, three houses:		
Casa grande	129	34,150
Recolección de Guia	9	1,928
University of San Ildefonso	30	4,104
Mercedarios, three houses:		
Casa grande	140	19,922
Recolección de Bethlem	16	2,945
College of San Pedro Nolasco	34	3,900
Order of San Francisco de Paula	42	7,139
Hospitalarios de San Juan de Dios	43	4,561
Agonizantes, two houses:		
Convento de Nuestra Señora de la Buena Muerte	53	19,724
Santa Liberata	5	2,500
Oratorio de San Felipe Neri	41	3,283
Hospitium of St. Benedict	2	1,630

	No. of members	Revenues
Beletmitas, two houses:		
Casa grande	22	3,640
Casa de Incurables	2	1,630
Fourteen Convents of Nuns	572	119,504
Beaterios, or houses inhabited by pious women:		
Real Casa de Amparados de la Purisima Concepción	210	5,300
Nuestra Señora de Copacabana	12
Santa Rosa de Viterbo	12	1,141
Patrocinio	11
Camilas	5
Real Casa de Ejercicios, retreat for religious women	—	1,200

A less detailed statement is found in the *Relación* by Viceroy Francisco Gil de Taboada y Lemos, made on the basis of the enumeration of 1791; it gives the number of monks as 1100, nuns as 572, and beatas as 84.—*Memorias de los vireyes*, VI, 28.

Besides these houses devoted exclusively to the life of the religious, there were also many hospitals and other institutions having charitable or public purposes, that were directed and controlled by the church. But the large amount of wealth held by the religious orders may not be taken as conclusive evidence that the king of Spain and the Council of the Indies favored the accumulation of real property in the hands of the church. The following statement in the Laws of the Indies points to an opposite view: "Let the lands be distributed reasonably among the discoverers and *pobladores antiguos* and their descendants, who may remain in the country, and let them not be able to sell them either to a church or to a monastery or to any other ecclesiastical per-

son, under pain of the lands reverting to the king and being conferred upon other persons.”⁵

This law, however, like many others made for the Indies with excellent intentions, was not effective; for real property was brought into the hands of ecclesiastics to such an extent that, as it has been said, “secular persons came to be mere administrators of estates possessed by the church.”⁶ In Lima and some of the other cities, the monasteries owned a large part of all the real estate; and in the middle of the eighteenth century it was said “there are but few who do not pay rent to the church, either for their houses or their farms.”⁷

IV

From contemporary records we are able to derive a sufficiently clear idea of the personal qualities of the inhabitants of Lima as well as of their general activity, during the last years of Spanish rule. They were generous, and spent their money lavishly, often going beyond reasonable limits even to their ruin. This was particularly true of the creoles, who, perhaps recognizing their social inferiority, sought to overcome this prejudice by extravagant display. There was little crime among them, but, when a crime had been

⁵ *Leyes de Indias*, lib. 4, tit. 12, ley 10.

⁶ Oliveira, 27, 28.

⁷ *A True and Particular Relation of the Dreadful Earthquake*, London, 1748, 279, 280.

committed, their inclination to mercy led them to seek to protect the culprit. This humanity was manifested also in their treatment of their slaves. It was very rare that slaves complained of severe treatment by their masters. Living in a society dominated by the viceroy, the inhabitants of Lima acquired somewhat of the refinements and formality of manners characteristic of dwellers near a royal court. Their desire for wealth and its uses led even members of illustrious houses to oppose the prejudices that existed in Spain, and engage openly in trade. They possessed a peculiar pride, or vanity, which tended to manifest itself in extravagant sentiments and statements concerning their surroundings. In their language every white man was a *caballero*; every instrumental concert was an *opera*; every man with the elements of education was a *savant*; and any one showing any evidence of devotion was a *saint* or an *angel*. They were given to pleasure and gambling, and in general to a life of entertainment and idleness. Idolizers of women, they almost always held their own wives in little esteem. The youth were easily corrupted, and the luxury of the demi-monde indicated that a large number of contributions were made to their wealth.

"Lima," says Haenke, "like the cities of Spain, has its bull-ring where bull-fights are held at appointed times. The bull-fighters, the most active and daring, have the custom of hamstring-

ing the bull if he will not attack. The people of Lima count among their public amusements the drama, for the representation of which they have a sufficiently capacious theatre. Good order and neatness are maintained in the theatre in spite of the fact that the spectators smoke during the play. The decorations are mediocre, and the actors are ordinary. Generally no other plays are given than those which we call magic or religious plays. The public applauds them heartily, and the time appears still very remote when these coarser productions will be driven from the stage, which, far from instructing, vitiate the understanding and confirm bad taste."⁸

Among the popular amusements of the city, *pelota* and cock-fighting were especially conspicuous, and furnished occasions for extensive betting. The cock-fights were at first held in the streets, public squares, and vacant lots. In 1762 Viceroy Amat, acting on a proposition by Juan Garial, ordered the construction of a cockpit, Garial bind-

⁸ Haënke, Tadeo, *Descripción del Perú*, Lima, 1901, 29.

Before the year 1771 cafés were not known in Lima. This year Francisco Serio proposed to establish a café, and his project was supported by Viceroy Manuel de Amat. This was a new institution and was much frequented. Its extensive patronage induced a person called Salazar to open another the next year. This second café was known as *Francisquín*; later it became an inn, the *León de Oro*. Serio's venture proved so profitable that in 1775 he opened a larger place called *Café de las Animas*. A third café was established near the bridge, called the *Café de Puente*. Others were established later, but the first three or four were extensively patronized, and through their influence the café became a favorite place of resort.—Mendiburu, *Apuntes históricos*, 79, 82; *Mercurio Perúano*, I, 108-111.

ing himself to pay annually five hundred pesos to the hospital of San Andrés, and one thousand pesos into the treasury of the city. This pit was constructed in the plaza of Santa Catalina. The fights were held on holidays and two other days of the week.

The basis of the life and prosperity of Lima was commerce. The precious metals from the mines and the wares from Europe were received and forwarded or distributed by the inhabitants of the city. But in 1794 Arica had begun to receive European goods, and this took away from Lima the trade of the rich provinces of Cuzco and Arequipa.⁹ The increase of direct shipments between Spain and Buenos Aires helped, moreover, to detract from Lima's trade; and the disappearance of the corregidor as the sole trader in his district diminished materially the demand for wares at Lima. In connection with these facts, and perhaps as their consequence, there was observed a marked increase in the number of the unemployed.¹⁰

The inquisition continued throughout the century to maintain its principal colonial office at Lima, and here it continued its nefarious inquiries and its fiendish punishments.

⁹ *Memorias de los vireyes*, VI, 121.

¹⁰ "Discurso sobre el destino que debe darse a la gente vaga que tiene Lima," by Joseph Ignacio de Legunada, in *Mercurio Peruano* for February 16, 1794 (X, 115). The author of the *Discurso* called attention to the fact that the son of an artisan was not willing to follow the career of his father, preferring, in case no other occupation was at hand, to join the ranks of the unemployed.

V

In Peru the sandy lowlands near the coast and the mountains of the interior made life in towns or cities the preferred form of existence; but the physical characteristics of Chile, the fertile lands and the agreeable climate, rendered rural life there to such an extent attractive that the inhabitants had in a large measure resisted the efforts that had been made to cause them to live in cities. At the end of the century two-thirds of the population were still living scattered about the country, on the estates or at the mines. Except Santiago, no city had more than six thousand inhabitants. Concepción had about five thousand. The cities next in size were Valparaíso and Serena. After these came Chillán and Talca. Each of the last two had about four thousand inhabitants. In general the dwellers in the cities had few opportunities for getting information of events in other countries, and at the same time they had very little interest in such events. But, as the majority of the cities were small, they were intensely interested in local feuds and factions. These arose naturally where the towns were isolated, and where large numbers of persons were idle and without incentives to higher aspirations. There were no amusements but card-playing, bowling, cock-fighting, and horse-racing.

Santiago, the capital of the colony, the residence of the governor, or the captain-general, the

seat of the audiencia, was the center of the most pretentious society of Chile. It had about thirty thousand inhabitants. With respect to its public buildings it was not below the standard of Lima or Mexico. But the private houses were generally simple, one-story structures, and the interior furnishings were necessarily plain, on account of the expensiveness of European wares and the rudeness of nearly all colonial products. The streets were usually dirty, but this feature of the city's affairs was greatly improved under the republic. The practice of burying larged numbers of bodies in the churches led to "the propagation of epidemics that made great ravages among the inhabitants. The churches in which the soil was constantly removed for new burials emitted an unhealthy and pestiferous odor, which made it necessary to open and ventilate them every morning before the faithful assembled."¹¹

In Santiago, as in the other important Spanish-American capitals, there was a limited class of men who had acquired titles of nobility, and whose wealth enabled them to live in luxury as compared with the bulk of the inhabitants. Corvallo, describing them, said: "They use costly carriages and fine liveries, and show themselves on the public drives, and visiting and at balls with rich costumes and valuable jewels."¹² The city had no public market, but the plaza in front of

¹¹ Barros Arana, *Hist. de Chile*, VII, 459.

¹² *Descripción histórico-geográfica*, Part II, Chap. 4.

the cathedral was used for this purpose. The streets were not lighted, except as those who went out at night or their servants carried lanterns. The state of the city in this respect was an incentive to vice and disorder. But the character of many of the lower class made any incentive of this kind superfluous, for "drunkenness was a vice much more common than in our day, as were also robbery, brawls, and assassinations."¹³ Begging had attained such alarming proportions that many persons were inclined to seek a remedy, and hoped to find it in the development of industries; and to this end they sought to suppress the obstacles that had stood in the way of industrial progress.

The filth, the vice, the ignorance, and the lack of sanitary measures and of proper medicinal remedies, both in the country and in the cities, in spite of the general healthfulness of the climate, made it possible for diseases to become epidemic. In the records of the municipal council of Santiago, the existence of the epidemics was carefully noted, as was also the action taken to provide prayers, offerings, and processions to allay the evil. But the records give no pathological indications sufficient to inform us of the character of the diseases in question. From other sources, however, it is known that syphilis and smallpox were two of the diseases that spread their ravages through the colony. Smallpox was first introduced into Chile in 1561, and from time to time

¹³ Barros Arana, *Hist. de Chile*, VII, 463.

throughout the colonial period it appeared and carried off its victims by thousands. In 1765, the municipal council of Santiago recorded the fact that, in the few preceding months, smallpox had caused the death of more than five thousand persons. In 1788–1789 the city of Concepción, having a population of not more than six thousand, lost fifteen hundred by smallpox. The ravages of the disease, as it swept through the cities and over the country, left horror and desolation in its path. Those persons who escaped death were often greatly disfigured, and many of them were left blind. Its appearance in one province, Santiago or Concepción, led the other province to establish a quarantine line along the river Maule, but the precautions were always ineffective. In the last half of the century successful vaccination was introduced, but it could not be made general. Except among the cultivated classes, it met with insurmountable opposition.

VI

In the society of Chile where a small minority of the inhabitants—the Spaniards and the creoles—sought to preserve the lines of class separation, the mestizos constituted a large lower class, the members of which found it difficult to keep above the line of positive misery. They inherited vices as well as virtues from both of the races from which they were descended. The mestizos, like their ancestors on the side of the Indians,

were both physically and mentally strong; yet they were rough, malicious, superstitious, given to gambling, intoxicating drinks, and robbery, and they were easily drawn into bloody quarrels. They might have become a powerful factor in the material progress of the country, if the political authorities and the upper class had known how to provide the conditions in which their labor would have been demanded. But in the isolation imposed by nature and under the restrictive legislation imposed by Spain, there was only a limited market for the wares which the country might most readily produce, and as a consequence those persons who might have become most effective laborers were wasted, without employment, in recklessness and poverty. There was no lack of laborers to complete promptly the wheat harvest in spite of its abundance, or to perform the work of the vintage. The market was inadequate to receive the wares that were produced, or, especially, that would have been produced if all the laborers had been employed. These circumstances made the increase of vagrancy inevitable.

Negroes formed only a small part of the colonial population of Chile. The first colonists, instead of buying negroes, availed themselves of the labor of the Indians, with little or no cost. There were, however, three or four thousand African slaves in Chile before the middle of the seventeenth century, but a later rise in their price caused many to be transported to Peru and

there sold; and, but for the prohibition of the governor, all of them would probably have been taken away. Valparaiso was the port from which the slaves were shipped; and with this beginning, it became a somewhat important market for slaves brought from Africa by way of Buenos Aires. Many negroes and mulattoes born in Chile were also sold there for transportation to Peru. The low wages of free laborers in Chile made it unprofitable to keep slaves, particularly since the price had risen from 250 to 600 dollars. Yet at the close of the eighteenth century, there were in Chile ten or twelve thousand negroes and mulattoes, including both sexes. Of this number only four or five thousand were slaves, and these were almost all in domestic service. They were kept by the wealthy families largely for ostentation. They were generally dressed well, sometimes in showy livery, and were treated with kindness. Some of them who appeared to be sufficiently intelligent and trustworthy, were made superintendents on estates in the country, while others were taught trades. They became tailors and shoemakers, and made the clothing and shoes for the family of their masters. Among the negroes and mulattoes who were free, there were tailors, shoemakers, carpenters, silversmiths, and some who followed other trades. Those living in Santiago formed a small battalion, under officers of the white race; and in the struggle for independence they rendered important service in the battle of Maipo.

CHAPTER XII

THE STATE OF VENEZUELA AND MIRANDA'S EXPEDITION

- I. External attempts to overthrow Spanish rule. II. The captaincy-general at Venezuela. III. The revolt led by España and Gual in 1797. IV. Manners and sentiments of the inhabitants of Venezuela. V. The unemployed and the remedy. VI. The economic confusion in the province. VII. Miranda's project. VIII. Plans of Great Britain and the United States. IX. The expedition from the United States.

I

THE internal rebellions and conspiracies against the government of Spain's dependencies in South America were followed by assaults relying on external support. The primary aim of the internal revolts was relief from burdensome taxes. The objects of the external attacks were commercial and political advantages. If the revolting colonies had plans for the overthrow of the government, such plans were developed only after reform had appeared to be impossible. For many years Great Britain and France had coveted the

opportunities for wealth and political power offered by Spain's American possessions. The inhabitants had, therefore, reason to suppose that their appeals to foreign governments for assistance would be successful, since they were addressed to the cupidity and political ambition of those governments. Negotiations concerning those appeals were a part of the elaborate web of European diplomacy in the century's later decades.

Two conspicuous late attempts from without to overthrow the Spanish authority before the beginning of the campaign for independence were the invasion of Venezuela by Francisco de Miranda, with men enlisted in the United States, and the taking of Buenos Aires by the British.¹ Miranda was a native of Caracas, and much of his remarkable activity was directed to obtaining foreign support for his revolutionary project. His first conference with Pitt concerning the emancipation of the colonies was held in February, 1790. At this time the plans of the revolutionists had become definite. The free and independent state

¹ The expeditions of Admiral Vernon and Commodore Anson were undertaken, if not with a conscious determination to overthrow completely the rule of Spain in South America, at least to open the colonial ports to British trade. Vernon expected to establish the power of Britain in the Gulf of Mexico and on the northern coast of South America, while Anson was to penetrate the southern seas, sack the open ports of Peru, and effect communication with Vernon across the Isthmus of Panama. These expeditions occupy a place midway between the raids of the earlier freebooters and the later more elaborately prepared attempts to supplant Spanish power in America.

to be created was designed to supersede the Spanish colonies, and to embrace all of their territory, but the initial effort was intended to supplant the rule of Spain in Venezuela.

II

This province, formerly a part of the vice-royalty of New Granada, had been finally organized as a captaincy-general in 1777. At this time an intendant was appointed, who, assisted by the governors of the subordinate districts, was charged with the financial affairs of the dependency. The local governors, or delegates, directed all ordinary expenses in their districts, but for all extraordinary expenses they required the approval of the intendant. From their decisions relating to affairs within their jurisdiction, there was an appeal to the intendant, but if no appeal was taken the delegate might submit his decision to the intendant for approval. The intendant was president of the general assembly of the consulado, and was the judge of appeals from that court.²

The audiencia established in 1786 included within its jurisdiction all the territory subject to the captain-general: the provinces of Venezuela, Maracaibo, Cumaná, Varinas, Guayana, and the

² Depons, F., *A Voyage to the eastern part of Terra Firma, or the Spanish Main in South America*, New York, 1806, 11, 105, 106.

island of Margarita. The captain-general was its president, and it served as his advisory council in affairs of administration; it was also the supreme court of the captaincy-general. Appeals might be taken to it from the decisions of the municipal court of the alcaldes. The consulado of Caracas, created in 1798 for the purpose of settling commercial controversies, performed its functions not only at the capital, but also through deputies at the important ports. This tribunal was composed of the intendant as its president, a prior, two consuls, nine counsellors, and a syndic, with a secretary, an assessor, and deputies. The process in its trials was simple and direct, the judges making an effort to effect an amicable settlement. If the case was especially complicated, the parties were permitted to make written statements, but they were obliged to swear that no lawyer had been concerned in preparing the papers. The consulado was expressly charged by the king to report measures for the encouragement of agriculture, industry, and commerce; to further the construction of roads; to improve the port of La Guayra; and to facilitate the use of such rivers as might serve for the transportation of produce. But the practical achievements of this body responded only indifferently to the expectations entertained concerning it. The trade it was created to stimulate declined during the years following its establishment. The exports from the captaincy-general between 1793 and 1796

amounted to \$12,252,415; between 1796 and 1800, to only \$6,442,318.³

Somewhat of the inefficiency of the consulado was due to the election of persons who sought membership more for the honor conferred upon them than for the opportunity for service. The diminution of exports was in large measure owing to the failure of the harvests in 1798 and 1799. In the latter year there was such a scarcity of food that the cabildo of Caracas passed a resolution to encourage the merchants to import grain from the Antilles. The execution of this measure was, however, suspended by the opposition of the commandant of La Guayra. The inhabitants appeared to be facing a famine; and this state of affairs was aggravated by the conspiracy of 1797.

III

The creoles in Venezuela, as well as elsewhere, had adopted the principles of the French Revolution. They recognized the inability of Spain to send adequate forces to America, and in their dissatisfaction they began to expect support from England. Three state prisoners, condemned in Spain, arrived in La Guayra, and, under the liberty allowed them in their prison, they became propagandists of revolutionary doctrines. They escaped and joined the conspirators who were led by José María España and Manuel Gual. In July,

³ Depons, 11, 346.

1797, the conspiracy was discovered. The leaders fled to Trinidad, but many of their adherents were arrested. España, interpreting the dilatoriness of the courts to indicate the possibility of an armistice, returned to Venezuela. He went to join his wife at La Guayra. Although he had entered the town disguised and lived in hiding, he was discovered April 29, 1799, and a few days later was hanged in the plaza of Caracas. His head was placed in an iron cage at La Guayra, and his limbs were distributed among several towns.⁴

On July 12, 1799, Manuel Gual wrote to Miranda from Trinidad: "Our enterprise failed only from this circumstance, that of my being absent from Caracas: the government discovered the plan through the imprudence of a simpleton; they arrested many persons, and took the most active measures, both at La Guayra and Caracas; so that our combinations being defeated, I was obliged to make my escape, with the view of seeking succor in the English colonies, as the hopes of my countrymen are still alive. This, in a few words, is an account of the miscarriage of our attempt; since which, the desire of independency has but increased."⁵

When Charles IV learned of the revolt, he sent to the audiencia a secret order recommending the

⁴ Baralt and Diaz, *Resumen de la historia de Venezuela*, Cura-
zao, 1887, 11, 19.

⁵ Antepara, José María, *South American Emancipation; Documents*, London, 1810, 185; Robertson, *Francisco de Miranda, Am. Hist. Assn.*, 1907, 1, 225; Depons, 1, 150.

court "to refrain from sanguinary measures, to exercise towards those who were concerned in that affair all the leniency which their fidelity deserved, and not to punish as a crime what might be only the effect of seduction and ignorance."⁶ This recommendation may have caused fewer to suffer capital punishment than otherwise might have been executed; still ninety were sentenced in May and June, 1799; some to be hanged and some to be imprisoned in irons, and some condemned to deportation.⁷

IV

There appears to be no authoritative statement of the number of Venezuela's inhabitants at the end of the century. The guesses range from 728,000 upwards. This is Depons' estimate, whose distribution recognizes two-tenths as whites, three-tenths as slaves, four-tenths as the descendants of freedmen, and one-tenth as Indians. Somewhat more than two-thirds of the whole population, or 500,000, lived in the province of Venezuela, while 100,000 of the remainder occupied the territory of Maracaibo. From this estimate it appears that the majority of the whole was composed of members of the colored races. The bulk of the real property in both the towns and the country was in the hands of the creoles,

⁶ Depons, 1, 150.

⁷ Gonzalez Guinan, Francisco, *Historia contemporánea de Venezuela*, Caracas, 1909, 1, 13.

while the Spaniards controlled the commerce and held the political power. The possession of the public wealth by one of two antagonistic classes, and the public power by the other, furnished the conditions of an inevitable conflict, a conflict involving not merely political but also economical questions.⁸

The creoles by reason of their wealth had become influential in all matters except the affairs of the actual government. Many of them had devoted much time to the cultivation of their minds, and, "by reason of their travels, had become informed of the most recent ideas and events of Europe." Their wealth moreover made it possible for them to gratify their desire for display.⁹ Dauxion observed that "the luxury of European capitals is found in the town of Caracas, and a refinement or exaggeration of their politeness, which partakes of the Spanish gravity, and the voluptuous manner of the creoles. It may be said that their manners are a mixture of those of Paris and those of the large towns of Italy; the same taste for dress, sumptuous furniture, ceremonious visits, balls, shows, music, and even for painting, which is in its infancy."¹⁰

In spite of the habit of the Spanish government to discriminate against the creoles with

⁸ Level, L. D., *Historia patria*, Caracas, 1911, 247, 248.

⁹ Rivas, Angel Cesar, *Origines de la independencia de Venezuela*, Caracas, 1909, 70.

¹⁰ Dauxion, Jean François, *Description of Venezuela, Trinidad, Margarita, and Tobago*, London, 1820, 189.

respect to offices in the colonies, there was developed among them, in the later decades of the century, a strong sentiment of patriotism. They felt "a kind of pride in being born on the soil of the New World."¹¹ Their interest in Spain as the mother country declined, and they fell under the influence of the French. They imitated French fashions, and were ambitious "to assimilate their manners to those of the French."¹² When the restrictions on the importation of European books was relaxed, there was a demand for the political writings of revolutionary or pre-revolutionary France. The Count of Ségur, after his sojourn in the United States, visited Venezuela. At Victoria he met a physician, who took him to his house and showed him with great pleasure the works of Rousseau and Raynal.¹³

V

Restrictions on immigration were also relaxed. The Council of the Indies by an edict issued in 1783 removed most of the barriers: any foreigner of the Roman Catholic faith might establish himself in the colony. It protected, for a period of five years, immigrants from debts contracted in the countries they had left.¹⁴ But from

¹¹ Depons, 112.

¹² Depons, 122.

¹³ *Memories ou souvenirs et anecdotes*, 1, 140.

¹⁴ Dauxion, 326.

such immigrants it was later (1801) proposed to raise a revenue by imposing a tax of four hundred dollars, and an equal amount as a fee for naturalization. The emigration from Spain to Venezuela during this period did not exceed one hundred persons annually. Fewer returned to Spain, thus indicating a weakening connection between the colony and the mother country.

Following the subjection of Trinidad to Great Britain, in 1797, a strong tide of emigration set from the lower classes of that island towards Venezuela. These immigrants were not only without resources, but also lacked the will to work. At the same time Caracas became the goal of the unemployed from the country. They came either in search of work or to get food without work. The embarrassment produced by the large number of vagabonds and beggars was so great that a special committee of the consulado was formed to investigate the subject. After due consideration, the prior reported that the first evil to be remedied was that concerning the agricultural laborers and the elaboration of their products; "for even in the actual limited state of the harvests not enough persons are found to gather them, not even for an exorbitant wage, in spite of the existing abundance of idle men."¹⁵ Accustomed to the conditions of poverty, they preferred them and independence to the mildest form of labor and its attendant restraints. There were ten thou-

¹⁵ Level, *Historia patria*, 238.

sand persons in the capital without productive employment adequate for their maintenance. They gathered in great numbers in front of the episcopal palace Saturday, twelve hundred appearing as public beggars. All but a few of them were able to work. But they preferred the life of vagabonds to engaging in any continuous and laborious occupation.

The consulado formed a plan for setting aside the evil. It was to collect all the beggars at the door of the bishop's palace on a specified day, and at all other places where they were accustomed to resort for alms; to have them examined before a judge as to what hindered them from working in the fields. Unemployed persons, found competent to work, were sent to pueblos in charge of local officers, who assigned them to estates where laborers were needed, but with the special recommendation that they should be treated with humanity, and induced to become willing to work. The committee considered also the wages that should be given to persons forced to labor, and concluded that they should be adjusted to the cost of subsistence, varying with the changes in the price of important articles of food.

The captain-general accepted this project; the beggars were rounded up; and the vagabonds, who knew what awaited them, left Caracas to work according to their pleasure, rather than under compulsion. Freed from the useless consumers, the authorities undertook to supply the

city with needed provisions. One of the measures taken was to prohibit the exportation of food from La Guayra.¹⁶

VI

The regulation of the trade with colonial ports had passed in large measure to the local authorities. The laws providing for the exportation of products to the colonies near the Gulf of Mexico made permission for such exportation to depend on the assent of the intendant.¹⁷ It was in the exercise of this power that Captain-General Vasconcelos, supported by the intendant, undertook to relieve the distress of Caracas by opening the port of La Guayra for the importation of food from neutral nations. But their effort was not hopefully successful. The price of corn was eight times as high as the normal price; still few ships came to the port. The British fleet did not permit ships to depart from Spain; not even those carry-

¹⁶ Level, *Historia patria*, 239.

To these economic disturbances there were added serious social embarrassments, violations of local traditions, and interference with the long-standing prerogatives of the white element of the population. Under the royal decree of August 3, 1801, one might legitimate a son for a small payment of money; he might become an *hidalgo* or obtain a Castilian title (*titulo de Castilla*) without the applicant being obliged to make known the services he had rendered. He might acquire the distinction involved in the right to prefix *Don* to his name; and for one hundred and twenty-five dollars a negro might whiten himself, or become legally a white man.—Level, *Historia Patria*, 236.

¹⁷ Deponz, 1, XXVII.

ing the mails. The mail that arrived on the 20th of February, 1799, was the first to arrive for fourteen months.¹⁸

Barcelona and Cumaná, however, continued an advantageous trade with the colonies, and were supplied with food, while Caracas suffered want. Trinidad, moreover, after it fell into the hands of the British, became a depot of large stores of British wares. At the same time it became a market for a large contraband trade, rendered especially flourishing by the practice of selling on credit.¹⁹ British smugglers, principally residents of the island of Trinidad, purchased three-fifths of what Venezuela had to sell, and paid in wares of British manufacture.²⁰

During this period of economic disturbance the political affairs fell into confusion. There was a strong drift towards decentralization. The cabildos in the provinces enlarged their powers to an unprecedented degree, extending their authority over all departments of social control except the military.²¹ The captain-general regarded the future with evil foreboding. Addressing a council of war at Caracas on the 21st of November, 1798, he said: "Our situation, gentlemen, is truly deplorable! An expedition threatens the whole coast, and all the coast is without defense; and the king's fleets, blockaded in his ports,

¹⁸ Level, *Historia patria*, 236.

¹⁹ Level, *Historia patria*, 235.

²⁰ Dauxion, 131.

²¹ Depons, 11, 36.

cannot come to our support. And *the people, already wearied with our government, look up to the English as their protectors and friends.*”²²

The central figure in the negotiations relating to the threatened expedition was Francisco de Miranda, who had been trained in Spain. After he left the Spanish service, much of his activity was directed to a project to supplant Spanish rule with a government having a revolutionary origin. His persuasion was effective; even Catharine of Russia became interested in his undertaking, and expressed her determination to support the independence of South America. She, moreover, by a circular letter to her ambassadors in Europe, ordered them to accord to him their assistance and protection whenever he might need it.²³

VII

At a conference at Hollwood, on the 14th of February, 1790, Miranda presented his project to Mr. Pitt, who approved of it, but expressed his inability to assist in its execution except in case of war with Spain. While the Nootka sound controversy threatened to lead to war, Miranda urged his plan for the emancipation of Spanish America. In September, 1791, he presented to the British minister the outline of a government he “thought proper to be introduced into South America

²²Antepara, 189.

²³Antepara, 15, 41.

according to the principles of Freedom and Independency.”²⁴

It was proposed to enlist the sympathy of the Indians, who had not ceased to regret the destruction of their ancient state, by reviving the title of Inca for the person holding the executive power and serving as the hereditary head of the federal empire. The senate was to be composed of caciques or senators, appointed by the inca for life. The members of the lower house were to be chosen by popular election. The inca was to appoint distinguished jurists to be judges, who would hold office for life, unless removed by impeachment. Among other officers with titles borrowed from ancient Rome, two censors were to be nominated by the citizens and confirmed by the inca. They were to watch over the morals of the senators, of the youth, and of teachers. The doctrine of the relation of statute law to the constitution was evidently borrowed from the United States. No law contrary to the spirit of the constitution would be valid. The plan for amending the proposed constitution was also clearly drawn from the United States. Although the proposed state was to be a federation, no mention was made in the constitution of the subordinate political organizations or their relation to the supreme government. But elaborate provision was made for the period of transition until the establishment of the permanent government.

²⁴ Miranda to Pitt, September 8, 1791. *Am. Hist. Rev.*, VII, F. 13.

Miranda's design was to obtain the support of the United States in order to supplement that expected from Great Britain; but his letters to General Knox and Alexander Hamilton brought no satisfactory results. Great Britain continued to be moved by the ambition to extend her power in America at the expense of Spain, and Spain's declaration of war in 1796 appeared to offer a favorable occasion for attaining the desired end. The intrigues of Blount supported for a short time the hope of acquiring Florida and Louisiana, but the expulsion of Blount from the senate of the United States nullified all expectations of advantage in that direction. It was known in Spain that Miranda was interested in the British enterprises, and the king admonished the viceroy of New Spain, the captain-general of Yucutan, and the captain-general of Caracas to be on their guard against the machinations of the conspirator and the undertakings of the British.

After the capture of Trinidad, the British secretary of war directed Thomas Picton, the governor and commander of the island, to keep the inhabitants of the neighboring part of the continent under careful observation, and to assure them of succor from his Britannic Majesty, whenever they were disposed to renounce the rule of Spain. The course pursued by Picton constituted a distinct propaganda of revolution; and by his presentation of the advantages of holding Caracas and Santa Thomé, he sought to induce the British

government to adopt an aggressive policy. He declared "it would be no difficult matter to subvert the Spanish government in the provinces of Cumaná and Caracas, the example and effects of which would shake their empire over the whole continent, and would open immediate as well as immense commercial advantages to Great Britain."²⁵

Miranda continued his negotiations with Great Britain in December, 1797, announcing himself as the representative of a *junta* said to be composed of deputies from the principal provinces of Spanish America. He requested that Great Britain would support the movement for emancipation with twenty-seven ships of the line, 8000 infantry, and 2000 cavalry, and suggested, as a means for preserving liberty, an alliance of Great Britain, the United States, and Spanish America. At the same time it was proposed that inter-oceanic navigation should be provided for both at the Isthmus of Panama and by way of Lake Nicaragua. The next month Miranda attempted to enter into relations with the United States. He visited Rufus King, and through him he hoped to approach Hamilton. Later he unfolded to King his plans, and emphasized the advantages England and the United States would enjoy in the trade of Spanish America.

²⁵ Picton to Dundas, September 18, 1797, quoted by Robertson in *Annual Report of the Am. Hist. Assn.*, 1907, 1, 315.

VIII

The policy of the British government was communicated to King by Granville: "If Spain should be able to preserve her independence and prevent a revolution of her government, they should not enter into the project respecting South America; but if it was really to be apprehended that Spain should fall beneath the control of France, then it was their intention to endeavor to prevent France from gaining to their cause the resources of South America. In this event they should immediately open their views and commence a negotiation upon the subject with the United States. At present they deemed it impolitic to engage in the plan of Miranda."²⁶

The British government, however, continued to keep in mind the possibility of an expedition to South America, and to make preparations for it. Miranda was solicitous to learn the decision reached in England, and at the same time sought to enlist the interest of the administration in America. Hamilton was not enthusiastic over either the plan of the proposed undertaking or its chief advocate; he did not hesitate to call him "an intriguing adventurer."²⁷ King endeavored to persuade the United States to action by affirming that South America was on the eve of revo-

²⁶ King, Charles R., *Life and correspondence of Rufus King*. New York, 1896, 111, 561.

²⁷ *Report of Am. Hist. Assn.*, 1907, 1, 327.

lution, and that if England did not assist at the movement the work would be done by France to the great disadvantage of the United States. Four months after this, Hamilton appears to have changed his view.²⁸ He at least wrote favorably of "the enterprise in question. I wish it much to be undertaken, but I should be glad that the principal agency was in the United States—they to furnish the whole land force necessary."²⁹

The project that was forming involved the coöperation of Great Britain and the United States in revolutionizing South America. But it failed to ripen with sufficient rapidity to satisfy Miranda's extravagant imagination. In his disappointment, he entertained for a brief period the idea of going to Trinidad, where Governor Picton had formed a plan to begin the revolution by an attack on the town of Cumaná. The British-American coöperative plan to emancipate South America was wrecked. Adams and Pinckney opposed it; Great Britain was withheld from it by her engagements on the continent, and by her fear of causing the scenes of the French Revolution to be repeated in America. The ministers, however, thought of this failure to act as only a postponement of the project. This was again taken up in 1799. In the subsequent negotiations, Manual Gual, the exiled leader of the conspiracy of 1797,

²⁸ King to Pickney, Marshall, and Gerry, London, April 2, 1798. *Life and Correspondence*, 11, 300.

²⁹ Hamilton to King, Aug. 22, 1798, King, *Life and Correspondence*, 11, 659.

appears in correspondence with Miranda and the British commander of the Windward Islands.

Later projects for British participation were defeated by the opposition of Granville, yet Miranda was retained in England against his will when he wished to go to France, where he hoped his plans might receive more favorable consideration. The treaty of Amiens, March 27, 1802, halted all revolutionary negotiations; but the prospect of renewed hostilities with France and Spain in 1803 caused Miranda's schemes to be revived. And soon after this the plans for attacking South America took a wider range. Sir Home Popham urged the government to send an expedition against Buenos Aires. Preparations for such an expedition were made in 1804, but the project was suddenly abandoned; England and Spain were still nominally at peace. Again disappointed, Miranda determined to go to Trinidad, taking with him such arms and munitions as would be needed in beginning a revolution. But this project also failed.

In 1804 Spain declared war on Great Britain. Pitt returned to power, and plans for an attack on South America found new advocates. Sir Home Popham was chosen to command an expedition against Buenos Aires, while Miranda continued to urge his plan for a revolution in Venezuela. The Spanish minister in London communicated to his government information concerning the designs of the British and the

preparations for an attack on Buenos Aires were set aside as well as the proposition to assist Miranda. Thus after negotiating with the British government for fifteen years, Miranda was doomed to see all his schemes come to naught. He made his will, and prepared to go to the United States.³⁰

IX

Miranda arrived in New York in November, 1805. For several months he was engaged in efforts to induce the government of the United States to lend its assistance to his revolutionary undertaking. After his unsuccessful attempts in this quarter, he entered into relations with Smith and Ogden in New York. Mr. Ogden offered the ship *Leander*, that had been engaged in the trade between New York and Santo Domingo. He also promised to place at his service another ship, then at Santo Domingo, called the *Emperor*. The *Leander* put to sea on the 2nd of February, 1806.³¹

In his charge to the jury in the trial of William S. Smith, Judge Talmadge said that the *Leander* "had a very crowded cargo, and was laden almost

³⁰ Miranda's negotiations with the British government are presented at length in *Francisco de Miranda and the revolutionizing of Spanish America*, by William Spence Robertson, in *Annual Report of the Am. Hist. Assn.*, 1907, 1, 191-528.

³¹ *Miranda and the British Admiralty, 1804-1806*, containing "Memorandum by Captain Sir Home Popham" and correspondence concerning Miranda's Expedition of 1806, in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, VI, 508-530.

entirely with articles of warlike preparation. From 180 to 200 men were engaged in the enterprise, several of them immediately after took military title and rank, and all were submitting to subordination and discipline; eleven or twelve hundred suits of soldiers' uniforms, about six hundred swords and cutlasses, and a great number of belts, pouches, and cartridge boxes, about four thousand five hundred pikes, a number of muskets, horsemen's pistols and blunderbuses, all of which were principally in boxes or sacks. Exclusive of her complement of seventeen guns, the *Leander* had on board about thirty-four cannon, with several field carriages, one hundred and fifty casks of gunpowder, and a quantity of balls suited to cannon and muskets of different caliber.³²

Knowledge of Miranda's departure provoked unwonted activity on the part of the Spanish minister to the United States. He dispatched accounts of this event to the captain-general of Caracas, to the viceroy of New Spain, and to the governors of Cuba and the Floridas. By giving the number of men in the expedition as 1200 instead of 180 or 200, he alarmed the inhabitants of the provinces that appeared to be open to invasion. He also protested against the attitude of the United States government in regard to the expedition. The French also found the action or

³² Lloyd, Thomas, *The trials of William S. Smith and Samuel G. Ogden*, New York, 1807, 238.

inaction of the government blameworthy; and the protests of these two nations had doubtless much influence in bringing Smith and Ogden to trial; but public sentiment was in favor of the accused, and their acquittal was sometimes interpreted as a verdict against the government.

The *Leander* was halted by the British ship *Cleopatra* on the 12th of February, and was obliged to surrender to Captain Wight about a score of her crew. Miranda visited the British vessel and presented to the captain his papers showing the relations he had sustained to the British government. He also caused a number of Americans recently captured by the British to be released and added to the forces of the expedition. Having been permitted to proceed, Miranda now organized his one hundred and eighty men as the "Columbian Army." He caused the arms and equipment on board to be repaired and made fit for service. Finding at Jacquemel that the *Emperor* would not join the expedition, Miranda secured two schooners, the *Bacchus* and the *Bee*, and transferred to them a number of his men, in spite of their mutinous protest. The three vessels reached the island of Aruba on the 11th of April. The troops were landed and drilled, and five days later they continued their voyage. Guevara Vasconcelos, the captain-general of Caracas, warned by Yrujo, had taken measures for defense, and sent abroad information of the proposed invasion. On the 2nd of May, Lieutenant Brierly, who had

been at Cumaná on the 20th and the 21st of April wrote to Rear-Admiral Cochrane:

"The country is in a dreadful state, and embargo on every vessel on this coast, no person suffered to quit his dwelling on pain of death, every person under arms, that is able to bear them, the prisons full of Miranda's friends, and in short everything in the greatest confusion imaginable. In the meantime no person has any knowledge of the present situation of Miranda, nor is it even conjectured in which part of the West Indies he is; this I am certain, he has a multitude of friends who will join him the moment he appears."³³

On the 28th of April the vessels of the expedition fell in with two armed Spanish ships, a brig of twenty-two guns, and a schooner of eighteen guns. After a few shots had been exchanged, the *Leander* ran away, and the persons on the other vessels were taken prisoners and landed at Puerto Cavallo. That night they were "cramed into a small dungeon shackled two and two."³⁴

After the loss of the schooners, the *Leander* went to the island of Granada, and then to Barbados, arriving at the latter island in the first week in June. Cochrane, who was stationed there, replied to Miranda's petition for assistance, that he would furnish a number of small vessels and

³³ *Am. Hist. Rev.*, VI, 522.

³⁴ *Diary and Letters of Henry Ingersoll*, in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, III, 681; (Sherman, John A.) *A general account of Miranda's Expedition, including the trial and execution of ten of his officers*, New York, 1808, giving also some account of the fate of the other prisoners; Smith, Moses, *History and adventures and sufferings of Moses Smith*, Albany, 1814.

such additional support as he might be able to give. He also extended to him permission to enlist recruits in Barbados and Trinidad. Miranda's petition to General Bowyer, of the British land forces of the Leeward Islands, called forth a more cautious reply. The general proposed, before making a decision, to receive instructions from Great Britain. Miranda was, however, not disposed to wait for such instructions, and left Barbados, accompanied by three small British vessels. At Trinidad the little squadron was increased by the addition of six or seven other ships. The vessels of "the expedition attached to General Miranda" were by order of Admiral Cochrane, under the command of Captain Campbell. They arrived in the bay of La Vela de Coro on the 1st of August. The troops landed on the 3rd, and took the forts and the town of Coro. Instead of the popular uprising in favor of emancipation, the greater part of the inhabitants fled, carrying with them whatever property they could take away.

Miranda's proclamation, setting forth his design with respect to the form of the government to be established, and a "letter to the Spanish Americans" produced no assuring effect. Moreover, his letters to Admiral Cochrane, Admiral Dacres, of the Jamaica naval station, and Sir Eyre Costo, the governor of Jamaica, brought no favorable reply, except that Admiral Cochrane proposed to continue such assistance as the small squadron under Captain Campbell could furnish.

In the meantime the officers of the province had sent forth a call for troops. The merchants exaggerated reports concerning Miranda's forces and the designs of the leader; and in the face of the increasing numbers of the enemy the invaders found it advisable to withdraw to the island of Aruba. In September Captain Dundas, of the British ship *Elephant*, warned Miranda that the protection of the British naval force would be withdrawn unless he retired from Aruba. On the 21st of October, Miranda, with some of his officers, arrived at Granada. Meanwhile Vasconcelos, ignorant of the extent of Great Britain's participation in the revolutionizing projects, continued to maintain the captaincy-general in a state of tense anxiety with respect to the next move of the champions of emancipation. But at Granada, the military uniforms and the flag of the expedition disappeared; the *Leander* was sold; the insignificant remnant of the troops received a partial payment; and how to meet or avoid his other obligations constituted for Miranda one of the residuary cares of the campaign.³⁵

³⁵ An intimate and unsympathetic account of the expedition is presented in Biggs' letters: *The History of Don Francisco de Miranda's attempt to effect a Revolution in South America*, Boston, 1811.

CHAPTER XIII

THE BRITISH CAPTURE AND LOSS OF BUENOS AIRES

- I. The trade of Buenos Aires. II. Plans of Great Britain respecting South America. III. The British advance and capture of the city. IV. Liniers and the overthrow of Beresford. V. The cabildo and Liniers in power. VI. British reinforcements and the recall of Popham. VII. The final British attack and failure.

I

THE second attempt to overthrow from without the rule of Spain in South America was directed against the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata. After the extension of commercial freedom in 1778, there was a noteworthy increase of shipping at Buenos Aires. In the three years from 1792 to 1795 forty-seven vessels left that port, and fifty-three vessels arrived from Spain. The value of the exportations and the importations for this period amounted to somewhat more than \$8,000,000. There was also a great increase in the internal trade. Mendoza and San Juan sold annually large quantities of wine and brandy; and Tucuman had an extensive trade in hides and textile fabrics. Paraguay's trade was chiefly in

maté, tobacco, and lumber. Of the maté exported, Chile consumed about 4,000,000 pounds, and paid for it with exported gold and silver.

The mules sent to Peru from the eastern provinces of the viceroyalty were driven by easy stages to Salta, where they were kept over the winter; and in the spring they were taken to Potosi. In the province of Buenos Aires they cost at that time between three and four dollars a head, but at Potosi they brought eight or nine dollars a head. In case they were taken farther into the country, they brought a larger price, amounting in some places to forty or fifty dollars apiece. They were required in Peru for use in the mines, but the hard conditions under which they worked caused many of them to be short-lived, thus making the demand for them greater than it would have been if they had been employed under more favorable circumstances.

Cordova, Salta, and Jujui lay on the main route from Buenos Aires to Peru, and the inhabitants of these towns, by furnishing means of transportation, derived important advantages from this overland trade. The goods were generally carried in carts drawn by four or more oxen; and the freight rate from Buenos Aires to Jujui was four dollars a quintal, or approximately four cents a pound. For transportation beyond Jujui mules were substituted for oxen and carts, and the rates varied according to the season and the abundance or scarcity of mules.

The early policy to make Buenos Aires dependent on Lima for European wares was checked, as has been indicated already, by the rise of contraband trade with the Portuguese; and the commercial emancipation of the eastern provinces from Peru was finally completed by the increase of importations at Buenos Aires directly from European ports. In this later trade with Peru, therefore, Buenos Aires, having a cheaper source from which to obtain European wares, received in return for her exportations large quantities of gold and silver, products of the Peruvian mines.

The trade between Buenos Aires and the western coast by sea was inconsiderable. Now and then a vessel arrived at Montevideo from Callao with wares intended for shipment to Spain. Ships were also occasionally sent from Montevideo to Arica with quicksilver for the mines, and they carried at the same time small quantities of maté and tallow.

The principal trade of Buenos Aires with Chile was through the province of Cuyo, on the eastern side of the Andes. The exports from Chile and Cuyo to the eastern provinces were woollen goods, particularly ponchos, wines, brandy, and oil; raisins and dried peaches; apples, snuff, and sugar; and copper, gold, and cordage.

The enlarged freedom of commerce gave an increased value to the products of the herds of Rio de la Plata. Hides and salted beef could now be profitably exported in the numerous vessels

that brought European wares to Buenos Aires. The wealth of the inhabitants increased rapidly, and justified the expenditure of large sums on private houses; and the viceroy took advantage of this prosperity to embellish the city with important public buildings. The city hall and the mint were begun in the last quarter of the eighteenth century.

Buenos Aires had previously grown very slowly under the severe restriction which Spain had placed upon her trade. In 1608 the town contained 2000 inhabitants. During the following one hundred and seventy years its population increased from 2000 to 24,205, an average addition of only about 130 persons a year. The progress was more rapid after the organization of the viceroyalty and the establishment of commercial freedom. The last quarter of the eighteenth century added somewhat more than 15,000 persons to the city's population, so that at the beginning of the nineteenth century Buenos Aires contained 40,000 inhabitants, and 46,000 in 1810.¹

II

The British government had contemplated for a long time the conquest of some part of South America. It was solicitous to obtain a New World market as compensation for the loss of the North American colonies. The projects of Miranda

¹ Lopez, V. F., *Historia de la República Argentina*, Buenos Aires, 1883, I, cap. XXVI.

seemed to offer an opportunity for gaining control of Venezuela. It was not less solicitous to prevent any diminution of British power and prestige in the East Indies, menaced chiefly by the Dutch in possession of Cape Colony.

Preparations for a campaign against South America had already been undertaken, as already suggested, in 1804. In that year Sir Home Popham was appointed to the ship *Diadem*, "with a view of coöoperating with General Miranda, to the extent of taking advantage of any of his proceedings, which might lead to our obtaining a position on the continent of South America, favorable to the trade of this country."²

The point to be aimed at in the projected attack was revealed by the testimony of Lord Melville at the trial of Popham.

"At all times," he said, "and in every conversation that I had with Mr. Pitt on the subject, I make no doubt Buenos Aires was often the subject of discussion. My reason for being confident in that opinion is, that in all the considerations I ever gave to the subject of South America, whether the attack was to be made on a smaller or larger scale, I always considered the Rio de la Plata as the most important position for the interest of Great Britain upon that side of South America."³

The proposed attack was not made directly from Great Britain. In August, 1805, an expedition to the Cape sailed from Cork. The naval

² Lord Melville, head of the Board of Admiralty; see *Minutes of a court-martial for the Trial of Sir Home Popham*, London, 1807, 139.

³ *Ibid.*, 140.

forces were under the command of Sir Home Popham; General David Baird commanded a land force of 6600 men. This expedition arrived at its destination on the 4th of January, 1806.

The Cape fell into the hands of the British without great cost, and soon afterwards it was determined to make an attempt on Buenos Aires. Sir Home Popham and Brigadier-General Beresford commanded the expedition to the Rio de la Plata, which consisted of three frigates, three corvettes, and five transports, carrying in all one hundred and seventy-eight guns. The Board of Admiralty took the view that this expedition to Buenos Aires was undertaken by the officers at the Cape without any superior "direction or authority whatever," leaving the Cape, "which it was Sir Home Popham's duty to guard, not only exposed to attack and insult, but even without the means of affording protection to the trade of his Majesty's subjects, or of taking possession of any ships of the enemy, which might have put into any of the bays or harbors of the Cape or ports adjacent."⁴

Sir Home Popham had been directed, however, by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, to send a frigate to cruise on the east coast of South America between Rio de Janeiro and Rio de la Plata, as soon as he should have accomplished the object of the expedition on which he was about to proceed, for the purpose of procuring intelli-

⁴ Admiralty Order in *Trial of Sir Home Popham*, 4.

gence of the enemy's motions, in order that he might be prepared against any attack they might be disposed to make on the settlement.⁵ And in September he was directed from the Admiralty office to retain all the transports under his command at the Cape of Good Hope, after the reduction of that settlement, until he should receive further orders.⁶

While at Portsmouth in 1805, Sir Home Popham had received information of the weak state of the garrison at the Cape of Good Hope. "This intelligence," he said, "appeared to me so important, not only from the advantage to be derived from the capture of the Cape of Good Hope itself, but from the facility which the possession of that settlement would afford to the projected conquest of the dependencies on the east coast of South America, that I lost no time in coming up to town and communicating it to Mr. Pitt." The communication was made through Mr. Sturges Bourne, then one of the secretaries of the Treasury, whom Mr. Pitt immediately authorized to make further inquiries on the subject "in the quarter from which the communication was stated to be derived." The result of the information obtained by this means "was a complete confirmation of the statement made by Sir Home Popham; and Mr. Pitt instantly determined to take the necessary measures for the execution of an expe-

⁵ John Barrow to Sir Home Popham, August 2, 1805; see *Trial*, 17.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 18.

dition against the Cape.” The suggestion of Sir Home Popham appears thus to have been the origin of Pitt’s plan; for Sturges Bourne said before the court-martial: “I am quite sure that Mr. Pitt had no such expedition in his contemplation at the time Sir Home Popham made his proposal, and I have no reason to believe that any other of the king’s ministers had such an object in view.” But whatever their origin, Mr. Pitt’s views with respect to South America were not confined to introducing British manufactures, but took a wider range.⁷

The origin of the plan to take Buenos Aires which was carried out at this time may be seen in the correspondence produced at the trial of Popham. In a letter written by Popham to William Marsden, of the Admiralty Office, and dated April 9, 1806, he announced that, on account of the unsettled weather, he proposed to remove his squadron from its position in Table Bay, and that he considered the coming of Admiral Willeaumez very improbable. As it was expected that the French fleet would be obliged to resort to Rio de la Plata or the coast of Brazil for supplies, he thought “employing the squadron in cruising a short time off that coast, instead of remaining idle, will be a disposition fraught with some advantages, and which I hope will appear so evident to their Lordships as to induce them to approve the measure.” Starting on the 10th, the

⁷ *Trial of Sir Home Popham*, 142, 146.

lack of the requisite breeze led him to anchor in the outer bay, and here he received "intelligence respecting the weak state of defence which Montevideo and Buenos Aires were in." With this information, confirming what he had already learned from other sources, he "suggested the expediency of sparing a few troops for a short time, to enable us to bring a question of such importance to an immediate issue."⁸ Popham urged this undertaking, "from a conviction of the great and splendid benefit which the country would derive by a conquest of such a nature at this moment." Sir David Baird after considering the subject seriously and consulting with General Beresford acceded to the proposition, and ordered that the 71st regiment should be embarked under the direction of General Beresford. The main advantage of the conquest suggested at this time was the opportunity "to supply several millions of inhabitants with the manufactures of the United Kingdom."⁹

The conquest, moreover, was not expected to be difficult, for Popham was convinced as the result of his examinations that there were "not above five hundred regular troops at the two places, some provincial cavalry and militia; that the walls of Montevideo are in a very ruinous state; and the inhabitants disaffected beyond any calculation." In his letter of April 13, 1806,

⁸ Popham to William Marsden, April 13, 1806.

⁹ Popham to William Marsden, April 30, 1806.

Popham expressed the hope that his superiors in London would consider the undertaking "as far preferable to the alternative of allowing the squadron to moulder away its native energy, by wintering in False Bay, and eventually become paralyzed."

III

While on the voyage Popham had a plan to take Montevideo as soon as he neared the coast, and then to pass on to Buenos Aires. But information received from a British pilot who fell into his hands as he entered the river persuaded him that it would be expedient to move immediately against the latter city.

Major-General Baird in his instructions to Brigadier-General Beresford directed him to assume the office of lieutenant-governor, "and to draw whatever salary and allowances may have been enjoyed by the Spanish Governor, his immediate predecessor, until His Majesty shall be graciously pleased to make known his pleasure."¹⁰

During the advance of the British the city was in confusion, and the authorities displayed only weakness and indecision. After the vessels had been observed entering the river, José de la Pena, the chief pilot of the royal fleet, went along the coast in search of definite information concerning these vessels. On the night of the 23d

¹⁰ Major-General Baird to Right Hon. Lord Castlereagh, April 14, 1806, *Trial of Sir Home Popham*, 59.

of June, 1806, in accordance with Viceroy Sobremonte's orders, he reported to that officer at Buenos Aires. But the viceroy refused to adopt Pena's advice, and held that the vessels were only cruising, and had not come to attack the colony. On the 24th, Pena returned to Ensenada to await the viceroy's orders. At daybreak, on the 25th, British vessels appeared off Buenos Aires. The viceroy now caused a call to arms to be sounded, and between seven and nine o'clock the inhabitants gathered at the fort. "But in spite of all this, still no preparations were made; on the contrary, the viceroy remained inactive, notwithstanding the fact that the ships of the enemy were seen approaching Quilmes, three or four leagues from the city, and disembarking in boats and launches."¹¹ Finally as a result of persistent urging the viceroy caused arms to be distributed to the militia of Buenos Aires. This force, having been joined by 800 lancers under the command of Nicolas de la Quintana, was sent to Quilmes to attack the enemy, and was to be under the command of Sub-Inspector Pedro de Arce. In the meantime 1000 citizens had been given arms at the fort, but they had no cartridges and their guns had no flints. These things they were to get from their respective captains in the afternoon. On the 26th, at eleven o'clock in the morning, 600 of the provincial militia with their officers marched to Barracas, with the viceroy as their rear-guard.¹²

¹¹ Calvo, *Tratados*, IV, 387.

¹² *Ibid.*, IV, 388.

In the meantime the British had landed; the Argentinos after firing from a distance fled, leaving three cannon and a howitzer which were immediately taken possession of by their enemy.

During this skirmish a second call to arms was sounded in the city, announcing to the rest of the inhabitants who remained in the town that their compatriots found themselves in great need of assistance.

During these operations the alarm had spread through all parts of the city. The inhabitants were terrified by the news of the arrival of the British forces. The panic was, moreover, intensified by the ringing of the bells; and the viceroy, abandoning all hope of effective resistance, was fully occupied in preparing for flight. But before his departure for the interior of the country, he published, June 26, 1806, a manifesto to the inhabitants he was cowardly deserting.

There were in the city no disciplined troops, and no competent leaders. In the companies that were formed to ward off the impending invasion, the officers were as ignorant as the rank and file. On the 27th of June the British troops, numbering fifteen hundred and sixty men, entered Buenos Aires. The population of the city at this time was about 45,000 and the more spirited of the inhabitants felt deeply the humiliation of their subjugation, particularly when they saw how small was the body of the conquerors who took possession of the streets and squares, and pro-

ceeded to make their power effective in the government.¹³

Having taken possession of the city, and raised the British flag, with much firing of cannon both by the fleet and the artillery on shore, Beresford ordered the public treasure to be put into his hands. Under the circumstances compliance with this demand was inevitable. The money was surrendered and transferred to London. A large amount of merchandise also fell into the hands of the British. It consisted principally of chinchona and quicksilver, and was estimated to be worth between one million and two million dollars, namely, \$1,438,514. The arrival of the spoils in London aroused general joy, and filled the British nation with extravagant expectations of commercial gains. The government of Great Britain had not authorized this conquest, but now it approved and confirmed it.

The effect of the fall of Buenos Aires and of the plan of the British to invade Chile was to stimulate the government in Peru to undertake

¹³ In his Autobiography, Belgrano makes the following statement respecting the taking of the city by the British:

"Confieso que me indigné, y que nunca sentí más haber ignorado, como ya dije anteriormente, hasta los rudimentos de la milicia; todavía fué mayor mi incomodidad cuando ví entrar las tropas enemigas, y su despreciable número para una población como la de Buenos Aires; esta idea no se apartó de mi imaginación, y poco faltó para que me hubiese hecho perder la cabeza: me era muy doloroso ver á mi patria bajo otra dominación, y sobre todo en tal estado de degradación que hubiese sido subyugada por una empresa aventurera, cual era la del bravo y honrado Beresford, cuyo valor admiro y admiraré siempre en esta peligrosa empresa."

preparations for the defense of the western coast of South America. The viceroy Abascal sent forces and supplies to Chiloé, aroused the Peruvians to enlist in the militia, and proposed to lead a body of troops to Chile, and, if necessary, to Buenos Aires. The struggle of the inhabitants of Buenos Aires to drive out the British and regain the city moved the Peruvians under the leadership of Abascal to lend assistance. They sent 100,000 pesos by way of Cuzco, and 200,000 from the treasuries of Arequipa and Puno. From Chile were sent 1800 quintals of powder, 200,000 cartridges and 200 quintals of balls, and other munitions and supplies.

After the surrender of the funds, the intentions of the British government were made known to the inhabitants through proclamations, dated June 28 and June 30, and issued by the commanding officers. These proclamations affirmed, among other things, that a free trade should be opened and permitted to South America, similar to that enjoyed by all others of His Majesty's colonies, particularly the island of Trinidad, the inhabitants of which had derived peculiar benefits from being under the government of a sovereign powerful enough to protect them from any insult, and generous enough to give them such commercial advantages as they could not enjoy under the administration of any other country.

The terms granted to the inhabitants of Buenos Aires by Popham and Beresford were

published on the second of July. They provided that the troops belonging to the king of Spain, who were in the town at the time of the entry of the British troops, should be allowed to meet in the fortress of Buenos Aires, to march out of the fort with all the honors of war, and should then lay down their arms and become prisoners of war; but such officers as were natives of the country, or legally domiciled, should be at liberty to continue in the province as long as they behaved themselves properly, taking the oath of allegiance to His Britannic Majesty; or they might proceed to Great Britain with regular passports, having previously passed their parole of honor not to serve until they should be regularly exchanged. Moreover, all bona fide private property, whether belonging to individual persons, the churches, or public institutions, should be unmolested; all the inhabitants should receive protection; the different taxes should be collected by the magistrates, as usual, until His Majesty's pleasure should be known; every protection should be afforded to the exercise of the Roman Catholic religion; the coasting vessels in the river should be delivered to their owners; and all public property should be surrendered to the captors.¹⁴

By proclamation, dated August 4, 1806, Major-General Beresford made known the conditions

¹⁴ The document setting forth these terms, dated July 2, 1806, is printed in Wilcocke, S. H., *History of Buenos Aires* (London, 1807), 352; see *Annual Register*, 1806, 599; the original, printed in Spanish and English, is found in *Colec. Carranza: Invasiones Inglesas*, 1806-1807, i.

under which trade with Buenos Aires and its dependencies might be carried on. He informed the people

"that the system of monopoly, restriction and oppression has already come to an end; that the people will be able to enjoy the products of other countries at a moderate price; that the manufactures and productions of their country are free from the hindrance and oppression that has burdened them, and prevented the country from becoming what it is capable of being, the most flourishing in the world; and that the object of Great Britain is the happiness and prosperity of these countries."

The regulations announced by this proclamation¹⁵ provided that a lawful trade in all merchandise, fruits, manufactured articles, and products from Great Britain, Ireland, and her colonies might be carried on with Buenos Aires and its dependencies, in British ships owned by His Majesty's subjects, or by inhabitants of that country, upon paying, in general, a duty of twelve and one-half per cent ad valorem, on entering any port of Rio de la Plata; and that all commodities produced in that country should be permitted to be imported into the United Kingdom, in the ships already mentioned, under the same terms as from the West India islands.

¹⁵ The original proclamation is found in *Colec. Carranza: Invaciones Inglesas*, 1806-1807. The order of the king in council affirming possession of the conquered city and territory and confirming the terms of Beresford's proclamation made it clear that the British government had adopted the results of the conquest, and held the city and the territory as a part of the dominions of the British sovereign.

IV

Beresford was not ignorant of the preparations a part of the inhabitants were making to resist the invaders and to drive them out of the city. Through his spies he was kept informed of the steps taken to organize a patriotic force at Perdriel, a place about fifteen miles from the city. Against these patriots, who had raised their standard of blue and red, Beresford led a body of five hundred men with six pieces of artillery. In spite of the brave resistance of Pueyrredon and his followers Beresford was victorious. The killed and wounded on both sides, however, did not amount to more than a dozen persons. Although those who had determined on the reconquest of the city were temporarily scattered, they were not discouraged nor were their plans changed. They were almost immediately united with certain forces under Liniers, that had been collected at Colonia, and had left that town for the southern shore on the 3d of August.

On the eve of his departure from Colonia, Liniers issued a proclamation to his troops, in which he expressed his confidence in their zeal and patriotism, but affirmed

"that if, contrary to his expectations, some forgetting their principles should turn their face from the enemy, they should know that there will be a cannon in the rear charged with grape-shot, with orders to fire on fugitive cowards."

"Valor without discipline," this proclamation continues, "only leads to immediate ruin; forces united and subordinate to the voice of those who direct them furnish the most secure means of attaining victory; therefore I order and command that the most scrupulous obedience be observed, under the most severe penalties of the ordinances for such cases."¹⁶

In crossing from Colonia the Spanish forces took advantage of a gale that swelled the waters on the bank of Palmas permitting their ships to pass over in safety. They were favored, moreover, by the violent rains that set in, making the roads practically impassable by any force but cavalry; and they were abundantly supplied with horses, while the British had only a few they were able to obtain in the city. Recognizing his disadvantageous position, Beresford deemed it advisable to withdraw from the center of the town to the right bank of the Riachuelo. He sent over the wounded and the treasure, but here the Spaniards intervened and prevented his retreat.

General Beresford had expected to be able to keep Liniers' forces at a distance from the town, but his inadequate means of communication and the condition of the roads prevented the execution of his plan. On the 10th of August the Spaniards had closed in upon the town, and occupied the principal avenues, while the inhabitants had

¹⁶ This proclamation was dated August 1, and the forces left Colonia on the 3d (Liniers to the Prince of Peace, August 16, 1806); for this and other documents relating to the English invasion, see Calvo, *Tratados de la América Latina*, V, 1-118.

armed themselves and taken possession of the housetops and the churches, prepared to carry on guerilla warfare from their posts of advantage. Only a part of the force that had been collected under Liniers was armed; and as it entered the city it continued to be attended by a large number of persons who had neither the arms nor the discipline of soldiers. The people were aroused to do what they might, whether with or without arms, to further the cause of their emancipation; and the unarmed were especially helpful in assisting to bring up the artillery.

Liniers' success in life had hitherto been limited by his personal character. He was a man, according to General Mitre's description, of "high spirit, sensitive imagination, reckless temperament, with more good-nature than energy, and with more zeal in taking up projects than perseverance in carrying them out; he was intelligent, active, and brave, uniting to an heroic yet vacillating ambition the frivolous passions of a superficial man; although he was not wanting in moral elevation and had the characteristics of a gentleman, he was guided rather by his emotions than his judgment."¹⁷

On the 10th of August Liniers demanded from Beresford the surrender of the city. To his request the British general replied that he would defend it as long as it might be done with-

¹⁷ Mitre, *Historia de Belgrano*, I, 128; Groussac, Paul, *Santiago de Liniers, Conde de Buenos Aires*, Buenos Aires, 1907.

out overwhelming the inhabitants in calamity. Liniers received this answer at eleven o'clock at night, and three hours later his forces began the march; at five o'clock in the morning they occupied the square, Retiro, and here the contest for the possession of the city began. The result of the fighting which followed in the streets and from the housetops was the unconditional surrender of Beresford and his troops, on the 12th of August. The lost in killed and wounded was three hundred; twelve hundred laid down their arms and became prisoners of war. The victors lost two hundred in killed and wounded.¹⁸

V

After the overthrow of the British the fate of Buenos Aires was in the hands of the popular army. The viceroy, the representative of the sovereign, had fled before the invaders, and was hopelessly discredited. Under the circumstances it devolved upon the municipality to initiate a movement to effect an organization. This was done by calling a congress of one hundred persons known as notables. This congress was opened, according to Mitre, "in the presence of more than four thousand spectators resolved to intervene in the discussion if it was necessary."¹⁹

¹⁸ Liniers to the Prince of Peace, August 16, 1806; Sir Home Popham to W. Marsden, August 25, 1806.

¹⁹ *Historia de Belgrano*, I, 141.

Under the strong pressure of a clamorous public, the chief military command was formally conferred upon Liniers, and a committee carrying a notification of this appointment was sent to Sobremonte. The viceroy was found about forty leagues from Buenos Aires at the head of a force of three thousand men, and he professed to be advancing to reconquer the city which had already been reconquered by the citizens themselves. At first he refused to assent to the appointment of Liniers, but was soon convinced by the attitude of the municipality that opposition was useless. He was also convinced that the period of his service as viceroy was ended.

This change left the civil and military power distributed among the audiencia, the cabildo, or municipal corporation, and Liniers, as the military chief. Under this new order, two of the authorities, the cabildo and the military chief, had a popular basis for their power. It was the voice of the populace which had insisted that Liniers should be formally recognized as the leader of the armed force; and the cabildo was the representative body of the municipal republic. In the process of colonial emancipation the audiencia, whose members were appointed by the king, and represented absolute power, appeared destined to diminish relatively in influence as the people grew in power.

VI

After the surrender of the troops in the city under Beresford, the fleet remained in the river blockading the ports of both shores. The first reinforcements to arrive were 1400 men from Cape Colony; the next were 4300 men sent from England under the command of General Samuel Auchmuty. Admiral Stirling, who was in command of the convoying fleet from England, was ordered to relieve Sir Home Popham. Both of these expeditions were dispatched before it was known in London that Beresford had been defeated; and they were originally designed to assist him in holding the position he had won. Another expedition of 4400 men had been prepared to invade Chile, but was ordered to the Rio de la Plata when the result of the popular uprising in Buenos Aires had become known to the British government. A little later still another body of 1630 men was sent, under the immediate command of Major-General Levison Gower. In the beginning of the year 1807, the British had assembled near Buenos Aires an army of about 12,000 men, a fleet of eighteen war vessels, and more than eighty transports. The chief command over all the land forces serving in this region was conferred upon Lieutenant-General Whitelocke.²⁰ General Whitelocke was commanded, in case the

²⁰ Whitelocke's military commission was dated February 24, 1807; see *Trial of Lieut.-Gen. Whitelocke*, London, 1808, I, 5.

British succeeded in establishing their authority in the southern provinces of South America, to assume and exercise the civil government of the conquered territory, and to pay himself a salary of four thousand pounds sterling per annum out of any revenues that might be collected in these provinces.

Before the news of the disaster reached London an order was issued for the recall of Sir Home Popham. The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty had before them Popham's letter of July 6, containing information that the city of Buenos Aires and its dependencies had surrendered to His Majesty's arms: and they found it advisable to take note of the irregularity of the conquest. On September 25 their secretary, William Marsden, wrote to Popham:

"I have received their Lordship's commands to acquaint you, that although they have judged it necessary to mark their disapproval of a measure of such importance being undertaken without the sanction of his Majesty's government, and of your having left the station it was your duty to guard without any naval defence, they are nevertheless pleased to express their entire approbation of the judicious, able, and spirited conduct manifested by yourself, the officers, seamen, and mariners employed under your orders on the above occasion."

Rear admiral Stirling, appointed to succeed Popham, was authorized to determine in which ship Popham should return to England and, in performing this duty, he indicated the *Sampson*,

which had a convoy in charge for the Cape of Good Hope, and was then to proceed to Saint Helena on the way to Europe. In protesting against this order Sir Home Popham wrote:

"It is natural, Sir, for me to feel mortified at the idea of having, by any act of mine, given their Lordships cause to supersede me in this country; but when, in addition to this, I learn that it is proposed that I should be subject to all the aggravation of a voyage lengthened by proceeding from South America to South Africa, thence to Saint Helena for convoy, on my way to England, I cannot but say it is the severest punishment that could be inflicted on me. To a mind sensible, as I trust mine is, to every reproach—to any man of proper feeling—it is that sort of punishment which I consider secondary to scarcely any but death: it is carrying me in a situation humbled in the extreme to the place which, in conjunction with Sir David Baird, I had the honor to capture. There are also reasons, too evident to need any explanation, which would make a visit to Saint Helena, situated as I am, equally galling to my feelings."²¹

The subsequent correspondence on this subject showed Stirling's meanness of spirit under circumstances where he could have afforded to be generous.

After his arrival in England Sir Home Popham was tried by a court-martial, held on the *Gladiator*; and at the conclusion of the trial the following verdict was rendered:

"The Court is of the opinion, that the charges have been proved against the said Captain Sir Home Popham.

²¹ Sir Home Popham to Rear-Admiral Stirling, December 7, 1806.

That the withdrawing, without orders so to do, the whole of any naval force from the place where it is directed to be employed, and the employing it in distant operations against the enemy; more especially if the success of such operations should be likely to prevent its speedy return, may be attended with the most serious inconvenience to the public service, as the success of any plan formed by his Majesty's Ministers for operations against the enemy, in which such naval force might be included, may by such removal entirely be prevented. And the Court is further of opinion, that the conduct of the said Captain Sir Home Popham, in the withdrawing the whole of the naval force under his command from the Cape of Good Hope, and the proceeding with it to the Rio de la Plata, was highly censurable, but in consideration of circumstances doth adjudge him to be only severely reprimanded; and the said Captain Sir Home Popham is hereby severely reprimanded accordingly.”²²

VII

The British forces took possession of Montevideo, Maldonado, and Colonia, and appeared to have established their authority firmly on the left bank of the river.

“Merchant vessels had followed in the wake of the ships of war, and the river, lately so deserted, was encumbered with vessels having on board more merchandise than the country would be able to consume in five years. Montevideo had all the appearance of an English city; English placards covered the walls; in all the streets English shops were opened, where English cloth was sold at half the price which had hitherto been paid for it, on account of the thousand hindrances of the Spanish cus-

²² *Trial of Sir Home Popham*, 179, 180.

toms, and the unreasonable demands of the smugglers. Finally a Spanish-English journal, *The Star of the South*, was established under the patronage and with the assistance of the English administration, with the purpose of undermining the authority of Spain, whose decadence and weakness it was pleased to expose.”²³

About three months after the taking of Montevideo, Whitelocke and Crawford arrived. In view of the firm footing that had been gained on the left bank of the river, and the fact that 1600 men had previously taken the city, the task of the commander-in-chief, at the head of an army of twelve thousand men, did not appear difficult. On the 28th of June, 1807; the British forces landed at Ensenada, a little port about sixteen leagues southeast of Buenos Aires. Since Beresford’s easy victory the spirit of the inhabitants of Buenos Aires had undergone a great change, which was in a measure manifest in their expulsion of the invaders, and they now found themselves directed by leaders of energy and foresight. Alzaga stood at the head of the municipality, and the national battalions were commanded by Saavedra, Belgrano, Esteban Romero, Balcarce, Viamont, and Martin Rodriguez. The bulk of the inhabitants, in view of the force and skill that were brought against them, appreciated the difficulties of the situation; but at the same time they felt confident of success.

The British, advancing towards the city, crossed the Riachuelo, and inflicted upon the

²³ Arcos, *La Plata*, Paris, 1865, 214.

Spaniards a partial defeat. This defeat destroyed the hopeful expectations of the people and spread a pall of evil foreboding over the city. In the night which followed, Alzaga caused the city to be placed in a condition of defense. The streets around the plaza were cut by deep trenches; the troops were distributed on the roofs of the churches and other buildings; and the artillery was placed behind street barricades, and where it might command the trenches. Confidence returned to the defenders of the city. The leaders of the attacking party appeared also to be confident of victory, for in summoning the city to surrender he offered the following conditions:

“1. All British subjects detained in South America must be delivered up, and sufficient hostages placed in the power of the British commander till their arrival at Buenos Aires.

“2. That all persons holding civil offices dependent on the government of Buenos Aires, and all military officers and soldiers become prisoners of war.

“3. That all cannon, stores, arms, and ammunition be delivered up uninjured.

“4. That all public property of every description be delivered up to the British commanders.

“5. That free and unrestrained exercise of the Roman Catholic religion be granted to the inhabitants of Buenos Aires.

“6. That all private property on shore shall be respected and secured to its owners.”

In replying to this proposition, the Spaniards refused to consider any terms which involved the laying down of their arms. The day following the

date of this reply, namely, the 4th of July, General Whitelocke wrote to Liniers, stating that he had another column of troops awaiting his orders within little more than a league of the capital; that he had considerable reinforcements on board ship; and that the navy was ready to support such military operations as might be adopted. But Liniers appears not to have been profoundly impressed by the assurance of the invader, and replied, on the same day, that whilst he had ammunition and whilst the spirit which animated the garrison and the people continued to exist, he would not think of delivering up the post which had been confided to him, convinced that he had more than sufficient means to resist all the forces that were ready to be brought against him. Active hostilities began in the city on the 5th of July; and as the result of this day for the British there were 1130 killed and wounded, including 70 officers, and 120 officers and 1500 private soldiers made prisoners. It was now the Spaniards' turn to assume a tone of confidence. At five o'clock on the evening of the conflict, Liniers wrote the following letter to General Whitelocke:

"The same sentiments of humanity which induced your Excellency to propose to me to capitulate, lead me, now that I am fully acquainted with your force, that I have taken 80 officers and upwards of 1000 men, and killed more than double that number, without your having reached the centre of my position; the same sentiments I say, lead me in order to avoid a greater effusion of blood, and to give your Excellency a fresh proof of

Spanish generosity, to offer to your Excellency, that if you choose to reëmbark with the remainder of your army, to evacuate Montevideo, and the whole of the River Plate, leaving me hostages for the execution of the treaty, I will not only return all the prisoners which I have now made, but also all those which were taken from General Beresford: at the same time I think it necessary to state, that if your Excellency does not admit this offer, I cannot answer for the safety of the prisoners, as my troops are so infinitely exasperated against them, and the more so, as three of my Aids-de-Camp have been wounded bearing flags of truce; and for this reason I send your Excellency this letter by an English officer, and shall wait your answer one hour.”²⁴

Whitelocke's reply was dated July 6, and in it he affirmed that the idea of surrendering the advantage which the army had gained was quite inadmissible; but the tone of this communication did not suggest a boasting spirit on the part of the writer, and in the treaty which was signed on the following day, he acceded to virtually all of the demands made by Liniers. What the conditions of the final agreement were, can hardly be more succinctly stated than in the language of the treaty itself:

“I. There shall be from this time a cessation of hostilities on both sides of the River Plata.

“II. The troops of his Britannic Majesty shall retain for the period of two months the fortress and place of Montevideo, and as a neutral country there shall be considered a line drawn from San Carlos on the west to Parido on the east, and there shall not be on any part of that line hostilities committed on any side, the neu-

²⁴ *Trial of Lieut.-Gen. Whitelocke*, Appendix, vol. I, p. xxxviii.

trality being understood, only that the individuals of both nations may live freely under their respective laws, the Spanish subjects being judged by theirs, as the English by those of their nation.

"III. There shall be on both sides a mutual restitution of prisoners, including not only those which have been taken since the arrival of the troops under Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, but also all those his Britannic Majesty's subjects captured in South America since the commencement of the war.

"IV. That for the promptest dispatch of the vessels and troops of his Britannic Majesty, there shall be no impediment thrown in the way of the supplies of provisions which may be requested for Montevideo.

"V. A period of ten days from this time is given for the reembarkation of his Britannic Majesty's troops to pass to the north side of the River La Plata, with the arms which may be actually in their power, stores, equipage, at the most convenient points which may be selected, and during this time provisions may be sold to them.

"VI. That at the time of the delivery of the place and fortress of Montevideo, which shall take place at the end of the two months fixed in the second article, the delivery will be made in the terms it was found, and with the artillery it had when it was taken."

"VII. Three officers of rank shall be delivered for and until the fulfillment of the above articles by both parties, being well understood that his Britannic Majesty's officers who have been on their parole cannot serve against South America until their arrival in Europe."²⁵

This treaty was signed by Lieutenant-General Whitelocke and Rear-Admiral George Murray, on the part of the British, and by Santiago Liniers,

²⁵ *Trial of Lieut.-Gen. Whitelocke, Appendix, vol. I, p. xxv.*

Cesar Balbiani, and Bernardo Velasco for Spain. The British were required to evacuate Buenos Aires within forty-eight hours, and Montevideo within two months, and they complied strictly with these requirements. At the expiration of the term fixed, the posts which they had held on the Plata were abandoned.

The complete victory won by the inhabitants of Buenos Aires had come after brief periods during the conflict when it was feared that all was lost; and the announcement of peace, with these extraordinary and unexpected conditions, was received with many signs of public joy. The patriots owed their deliverance not merely to their own bravery, but also, in large part, to the stupidity of the British leader. Their loss during the days of fighting was 302 killed and 514 wounded, of whom 37 were officers.

Concerning the attitude of the Spanish towards the English in Montevideo, an English resident of that city made the following statement in a volume published in 1808:

"The intercourse which subsisted between the Spaniards and English in Montevideo, gave them an idea of our character, conduct, and liberal intentions, so different from what they had been taught to expect, that could they have followed their own wishes, and what they knew to be their own interest, by far the greater part of them would have rejoiced at our continuance among them. They confessed that they had never before seen such commerce, that they had never enjoyed under their former government such security and happiness, or

known such strict impartiality in the administration of justice.

"It indeed seemed, without exaggeration, that the inhabitants of Montevideo, on the news of our repulse at Buenos Aires, felt even more severely than ourselves, and lamented, instead of rejoicing, at the successes of their countrymen. As the period of our departure approached, and when they found by our preparations that the place was really to be abandoned, which was a circumstance that they for a long time thought incredible, a gloom seemed to pervade every countenance. Not the most distant appearance of exultation could anywhere be discovered. They took leave of us with regret, and seemed by the tears that were shed, to be parting from their friends and relations, rather than from enemies."²⁶

Whitelocke returned to England, and was there tried by a court-martial on four distinct charges. The essential points of these charges were as follows:

"1. That Whitelocke had sent a message to the Spanish commander, demanding, among other things, 'the surrender of all persons holding civil offices in the government of Buenos Aires as prisoners of war.'

"2. That during the march from Ensenada to Buenos Aires he 'did not make the military arrangements best calculated to ensure the success of his operations against the town,' and ordered the forces to enter the city with arms unloaded, and on no account to fire, thus unnecessarily exposing the troops to destruction, without the possibility of making effectual opposition.

"3. That he 'did not make, although it was in his

²⁶ *Notes on the Viceroyalty of La Plata in South America*, London, 1808, 104-106.

power, any effectual attempt, by his own personal exertion or otherwise, to co-operate with or support the different divisions of the army under his command, when engaged with the enemy in the streets of Buenos Aires, on the 5th of July.'

"4. That he, subsequently to the attack on the town of Buenos Aires, and at a time when the troops under his command were in possession of posts on each flank of the town, and of the principal arsenal, with a communication open to the fleet, and having an effective force of about five thousand men, did enter into, and finally conclude a treaty with the enemy, whereby he acknowledged in the public dispatch the 10th of July, 1807, that he resolved to forego the advantages which the bravery of his troops had obtained, and which advantages had cost him about two thousand five hundred men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and by such treaty he unnecessarily and shamefully surrendered all such advantages, totally evacuated the town of Buenos Aires and consented to deliver, and did shamefully abandon and deliver up to the enemy the strong fortress of Montevideo, which had been committed to his charge, and which, at the period of the treaty and abandonment, was well and sufficiently garrisoned and provided against attack, and which was not, at such period, in a state of blockade or siege."²⁷

General Whitelocke was found guilty of these charges, with the exception of that part of the second charge which relates to the order prohibiting firing on entering the city. He was in consequence "cashiered and declared totally unfit and unworthy to serve His Majesty in any military capacity whatsoever."

²⁷ *Trial of Lieut.-Gen. Whitelocke*, Appendix, vol. I, pp. i-iv.

The city of Buenos Aires, by its heroic achievements in expelling Beresford and resisting the assault of Whitelocke, won marked distinction. By the king it was ennobled and permitted to employ the title of Excellency; and all the other cities of the viceroyalty sent deputations congratulating it on its heroism.²⁸

Although this episode cost Buenos Aires many lives and not a little destruction of property, by it the inhabitants acquired a valuable experience. It showed that the authority of Spain in this part of America might be easily overthrown; at the same time it made manifest the fact that the new society already stood prepared to assert itself. By this struggle the inhabitants of these provinces had moved forward to a new position. They had been deserted by their official ruler, and in the presence of a powerful enemy, they had been obliged to take up the reins of public power which he had cowardly thrown down in his flight. By their experience, gained in successfully defending themselves, they had been politically transformed. They had acquired the spirit of an independent commonwealth. They had the power to be free, and wanted only the will to be free. The revolt against Spain was, therefore destined to appear

²⁸ See *Trial of Lieut.-Gen. Whitelocke*; also Watson, Robert Grant, *Spanish and Portuguese South America*, London, 1884, II, chap. XVIII, and Appendix; an account of the taking and the reconquest by a contemporary resident of Buenos Aires is contained in Ignacio Nuñez, *Noticias históricas de la República Argentina*, Buenos Aires, 1857, 3-50.

whenever the community arrived at a consciousness of its real position. The events of these two years had tended to arouse their self-consciousness. The British carried off the spoils of the colony, but they contributed to the development of a nation.

CHAPTER XIV

PERU AND CHILE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

- I. The viceroys.
- II. *El Mercurio Peruano.*
- III. Ambrosio O'Higgins.
- IV. The Araucanian question.
- V. Agriculture and the system of encomiendas.
- VI. Fear of foreign trade and foreign ideas.
- VII. The last viceroy of the eighteenth century.
- VIII. The population.
- IX. Commerce, and industry.
- X. Titles of nobility and entailed estates.
- XI. Life in the country.
- XII. Hindrances to production.
- XIII. Royal drafts on the resources.

I

AFTER the final establishment of the viceroyalty of New Granada in 1739, and the creation of the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata, in 1776, the jurisdiction of the viceroy of Peru, including the partially dependent captaincy-general of Chile, was limited to a region embracing approximately the territory at present claimed by the republics of Peru, Bolivia, and Chile. From 1776 to the end of the colonial period, the viceregal power within this territory was exercised by a series of seven viceroys. These were Manuel de Guirior (1776–1780), Agustín de Jauregui (1780–1784), Theo-

doro de Croix (1784–1790), Francisco Gil de Taboada y Lemos (1790–1796), Ambrosio O'Higgins (1796–1801), Gabriel Avilés, the Marquis of Avilés (1801–1806), and José Fernando Abascal (1806–1816). Under the political organization of this region during this period, Chile was dependent on Peru with respect to military affairs and matters relating to the royal treasury, but the local affairs of the province were controlled by the captain-general of Chile. There was a modification of the boundary of the viceroyalty, in 1796, when certain districts northwest of Lake Titica were withdrawn from the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata, and added to the viceroyalty of Peru.

The four years of Guirior's reign were marked by the local disturbances preliminary to the great Indian revolt, and by the military preparations that absorbed much of the attention of both Amat, who preceded him, and Jauregui who followed him. Although it was now fifteen years after the expulsion of the Jesuits, the government was still engaged with measures relating to the disposition of the confiscated property.¹

In the upturning between 1780 and 1782, the system of the forceful distribution of goods among the Indians disappeared together with the corregidores, but other abuses hardly less grave subsisted. Not the least of these was the treatment of the Indians in the mines. This was an

¹ Guirior's *Relación* to his successor is printed in *Relaciones de los vireyes y audiencias que han gobernado el Perú*, Madrid, 1872, III, 1–113.

ancient field of cruelty. For two hundred years the employers had held their laborers as slaves, not nominally slaves; but it was maintained that they could not leave the works while they were in debt, and they were kept in debt by the proprietors selling them goods at exorbitant prices. This form of bondage was not an invention of the Spaniards. It is an inheritance from the Orient. The viceroy Guirior uttered a severe prohibition of the practice, but whatever may have been the immediate effect of his injunction, the abuse still lingers in many parts of the world, and doubtless in many obscure corners of America.

At this time there was communication by post between Lima and Buenos Aires once a month for correspondence, and a special post once every two months for packages. There was also a monthly post between Lima and Cerro de Pasco and Huánuco by way of Jauja. In some of the civil institutions of the country, hospitals, for example, there was observed a marked decadence due at least in part to a decline in their resources. This decline was often owing to maladministration. In the earlier decades the prodigality of the mines permitted lavish expenditure and encouraged no emphasis on the need of careful and economical management. It was not strange that public foundations later suffered from careless or unwise control. Somewhat of the weakness of the civil administration was doubtless attributable also to the fact that most of the chief officials sent

from Spain to govern the colonies were men of military training and experience, and consequently fitted to take a wise initiative only in military affairs, only in expenditure and destruction, not in the creative work on which the well-being and the progress of civil life depends.

The loosening of the joints of the social structure was illustrated by the affairs of the University of San Marcos. The academic community was divided into hostile parties. It was a conflict between the old and the new, and between ecclesiastical and secular control. In a project to elect a new rector, the inhabitants of the city became partisans for one or an other candidate. As in the election of the head of a monastery or convent, persons having no connection with the institution became intense partisans. It was the case of a community having few opportunities to express its contentious spirit, seizing upon and becoming partisans in matters that did not vitally concern it. Respect for the traditional seemed to triumph, when the viceroy suppressed the professorship of Indian languages and used its foundation in establishing a chair for instruction in the ethics, politics, and economics of Aristotle.

Among the royal decrees arriving at Lima in the reign of Jauregui, relating to details of administration, significant and insignificant, one provided that the squadron in the Pacific should be under orders of the viceroy and of no other chief. Another provided that troops sent from Spain to

Peru or Rio de la Plata should return after four years including the time of the outward and home voyage. Jauregui was succeeded in the viceregal office by Teodoro de Croix on the 3d of April, 1784. Twenty-four days later he died as the result of a violent accident.

Teodoro de Croix gave his chief attention to internal reforms and material improvements. He caused an audiencia to be installed at Cuzco. The oidores on their arrival in the city were greeted with great manifestations of rejoicing, and the coming of the royal seal a little later was made the occasion of the usual elaborate ceremony that attended its reception. The viceroy caused a cabildo to be created in Tarma and also in Huaráz. He applied the ordinance of intendants to Peru; made certain long-discussed improvements of the harbor at Callao; formed a project for constructing a system of sewers for Lima, but in undertaking to carry out his plan he encountered insurmountable difficulties. He had to deal with the irrepressible question of monopolies and taxes, arising here as it had arisen elsewhere, and always exciting a hostile controversy. He had to execute the royal order of January 20, 1784, which provided that no foreign ship would be permitted to enter the ports of the Spanish dominions of the Indies under any pretext whatsoever. It was under this order that Blas Gonzalez, the governor of the island of Juan Fernandez, was condemned for harboring the disabled *Columbia* while it was

undergoing repairs. By a royal decree of the following year, May 10, 1785, the organization of the Philippine Company was announced. The first ship of this company to enter Callao from Manila was called the *Hercules*; it was assigned to the Count of San Isidro.²

Viceroy Croix entered with excessive zeal upon the execution of the order of August 10, 1785, concerning printing and the possession of books. In obedience to the terms of this decree he caused to be collected and burned all copies that could be found of the works of Montesquieu, Raynal, Machiavelli, and other works, like the *Encyclopédie*, that seemed to contain doctrines endangering the stability of the state. Some of the owners of these works were accustomed to keep them in secret receptacles, in hollow beams or in hidden places in the walls of their houses. This decree required, moreover, that no printed paper or document of any kind should be issued without permission given by the government. The viceroy entered into an agreement with the Inquisition for the purpose of uniting the forces of these two agencies in the attempt to prohibit the importation of prohibited books. A joint committee was organized and commissioned to examine all public libraries and withdraw such works as in the opinion of this committee ought not to be circulated. These measures appearing when the intellectual revolt of the late eighteenth century

² Mendiburn, II, 443.

was in full swing tended rather to widen than to close the breach between the colonies and the mother country.

The production of the mines had declined to such an extent in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, that Charles III saw the need of making a special effort to revive the industry. For this purpose he called Baron von Nordenflicht from Curland to Madrid in 1788 and sent him to Peru as chief of a metallurgical commission. Nordenflicht was born in Prussia. On this Peruvian expedition he was accompanied by a number of chemists and metallurgists, who, in 1791, established a chemical laboratory at Lima for the instruction of youth. At the mines of Potosí the commission undertook to put in practice a system of exploitation that would produce more satisfactory results than those hitherto followed. But the expected results, neither in instruction nor in the practical business of mining, were realized, and Nordenflicht withdrew from America after a number of years, with a greatly diminished reputation.

Viceroy Gil de Taboada y Lemus, of the royal navy, arrived at Cartagena January 1, 1789. While there he received the extensive *Memoria* prepared by his predecessor, Góngora, who had held the two offices of archbishop and viceroy of New Granada. After an uneventful career of seven months as the head of the government of New Granada, he relinquished his authority, and assumed the duties of viceroy of Peru.

II

The awakening interest in literary cultivation was encouraged by Viceroy Francisco Gil de Taboada y Lemus. He approved the project to establish a periodical publication designed to present articles relating to the state and progress of the kingdom. He, moreover, offered from the archives and from the various offices and vice-regal institutions such information as might be desired for publication. Through the efforts of an interested company of persons under the patronage of the viceroy the *Mercurio Peruano* came into existence. A few months before it appeared there had been issued a periodical called the *Diario erudito*, that began to be published October 1, 1790. It was issued by a society known as "Filopolita." Its existence was limited to about two years. The obstacles to its continuing were lack of funds and the rigorous official censorship exercised over all articles submitted for publication. This censorship was so firmly fixed in the order of affairs that not even the viceroy was competent to set it aside.³

The first number of the *Mercurio Peruano* was issued on the 2nd of January, 1791. An association known as the *Sociedad de Amantes del País* was formed to guarantee the permanency of the publication. The number of members was limited to thirty. Twenty-one of them were required to

³ Mendiburu, IV, 70.

be residents of Lima, and persons of literary attainments. After the completion of twelve volumes, the publication was suspended in 1796.⁴

Another publication of the period in question was *El Seminario critico*, undertaken by Padre Antonio Olavarrieta. It was announced as designed to discuss questions relating to education, public customs, and in general the social affairs of the community. From 1793 to 1798 Dr. Unanue edited and caused to be published an annual official guide. In 1793 the viceroy made arrangement for the publication of the *Gaceta de Lima*. It was said that the "alarming events of the French nation" made this periodical necessary, "in order that the capital and the viceroyalty might have an accredited journal through which the inhabitants might inform themselves concerning the excesses that are now reported to their ears in an informal manner."⁵ The *Gaceta* was continued until 1821, publishing only such matters as were found to be agreeable to the government, and not hesitating to present information in a garbled form. In 1791 there was also formed an association of writers called "Tertulia poética." The viceroy extended to it his patronage and support. It held frequent meetings, where the members submitted their compositions for examination. Some of these were found worthy of

⁴ *Mercurio Peruano*, February 27, and March 20, 1794. The names of the members of the society are given by Mendiburu, IV, 70.

⁵ *Memorias de los vireyes*, VI, 97.

publication in the *Mercurio Peruano* but the association itself had only a brief existence.

The establishment of the *Gaceta* was not the only act the viceroy was induced to take by the events of the French Revolution; he was moved also to create a secret police in Lima, whose function was to find out the subjects of public and private communications among the inhabitants, and to keep a careful watch over the books and other writings that were brought into the country. The members of this force were enjoined especially to prevent the circulation of *The Rights of Man*, that Nariño had printed and made known in New Granada. It was also made the business of the secret police to take account of all persons who had entered the kingdom after 1790, and to inquire into their manner of life. The viceroy issued an order prohibiting the game of pelota, in order to prevent the assembling of discontented persons at the courts.

In his *Memoria* to his successor, Viceroy Gil set forth the advantages for Peru and the royal treasury of direct trade with Spain by way of Cape Horn. Through statements published in the *Mercurio*, the inhabitants of Peru had their first opportunity to learn the relation of their imports to their exports. According to this source, during the lustrum from 1785 to 1789 the imports from Spain amounted to 42,099,313 pesos, while the exports to the Peninsula were valued at 35,979,339 pesos. These exports were in money and products

of the country. During the lustrum from 1790 to 1794, the imports amounted to 29,091,220 pesos, and the exports to 31,889,500 pesos. The greater part of the exports in both cases consisted in gold and silver both coined and in other forms.⁶

III

Viceroy Gil turned over the affairs of the vice-regal office, on the 6th of June, 1796, to Lieutenant-General Ambrosio O'Higgins, the Marquis of Osorno. O'Higgins came to Peru from Chile, where he had held the office of governor and captain-general. It is noteworthy that the most distinguished of the Chilean captains-general, the person who made the most profound impression on the affairs of Chile, entered upon the duties of his office at an age when public officials are often supposed to have outlived the period of their greatest usefulness. This man was Ambrosio O'Higgins, who was born in Ireland in 1720. The agitation against the Catholics in Ireland, their exclusion from public offices, and other limitation of their civil and political rights persuaded him, as many others had been persuaded, to emigrate, and seek to establish himself in a foreign country. Spain received him hospitably and assigned him

⁶ Statistics relating to the reign of Viceroy Gil de Taboada y Lemus may be referred to in the *Mercurio Peruano*, in the viceroy's *Memoria* to his successor (*Memorias de los vireyes*, VI), and in Mendiburu's monograph on the viceroy in *Dic. Biog.*, IV, 69-103.

a position in the army. A few years later he went to Peru, interested in a mercantile venture. This resulted disastrously, and in 1761 he sought occupation in Chile where Governor Barroeta gave him a subordinate position as engineer. After twenty-seven years of efficient service, he was appointed captain-general of Chile and after a vigorous administration of eight years he was promoted, in 1796, at the age of seventy-six, to the office of viceroy of Peru. This office he held nearly five years, until his death in 1801.

In the later years of the colonies the king of Spain sought to promote to the highest offices persons who had experience in either the civil or military service of the Indies. At the time of his appointment to the office of captain-general, O'Higgins had served many years as an engineer, a military officer, and an intendant, and had become familiar with the character and needs of the different parts of the Chilean territory.

This policy doubtless helped to make the government of the colonies more efficient, at the same time the colonists, in so far as they could think of the government as embracing many officials long familiar with their affairs, were disposed to think of it as their government. Under this view they would assume that a viceroy, a captain-general, or a judge sent from Spain without American experience, was not in sympathy with it. Thus the carrying out of this very reasonable policy could not but emphasize the distinction between the

Spanish rule and a local or domestic administration.

The northern part of Chile had not been visited by any of the previous governors or captains-general, while the southern districts, lying between the Araucanian frontier and the capital, had been constantly within the range of the captain-general's observation. The expeditions against the Araucanians had crossed these districts, and, through the numerous conferences with the Indians, this region had been kept in mind by both parties. But the northern end of the territory had remained in isolation, and both the economical affairs and the affairs of the administration needed the supervision and stimulus of the central government. The fact that the captain-general made this northern journey of hundreds of leagues over a region with few roads, studying the needs of the inhabitants and seeking to promote their material interests in all possible ways, is a sufficient indication of the zeal and force which he brought to the task of government.

IV

In the long course of the Araucanian war treaties had been made from time to time, but they were rarely more than temporary interruptions of hostilities. These interruptions permitted the belligerents to recover from their losses and make ready for a new attack with re-

newed force. In the conflict the rules of warfare that prevail among civilized nations were disregarded. Both parties kept forces on the frontier, made raids at every opportunity into the enemy's territory, and committed all kinds of depredations. Neither party trusted the promises of the other, and time seemed only to increase the bitterness of their hostility. In this state of affairs the southern districts might not be neglected. Moreover, the almost continuous warfare had a very marked influence on the military arm of the colony. It made the militia a vital and active force. Imminent war made military discipline possible.

As a means of establishing peace between the two races, Jauregui, when he became captain-general in 1773, caused four Araucanian chiefs to be brought to Santiago as ambassadors representing the various Indian tribes. It was intended that these chiefs should be witnesses to the disposition of the Spaniards to deal fairly with their neighbors; that they should be employed as mediators or interpreters in future negotiations; and that through them the complaints of the Indians might be carried to the Spanish authorities. They should be clothed and supported at the expense of the government. They arrived at Santiago in April, 1774, and were placed under the protection of the local authorities; and the public was solemnly ordered, under severe penalties, not to show them any disrespect. This plan received the

endorsement of the viceroy of Peru, but there were not wanting persons who saw that it involved an overestimate of the civilization of the Indians and was consequently visionary. It was, nevertheless, confirmed by an agreement between the Indians and the Spaniards made at the conference in 1774. In this agreement it was stipulated that peace should be maintained among the various Indian tribes, and that the Indians should send their sons to be educated in a school to be opened in Santiago for this purpose. The Araucanians, however, hesitated to comply with the provision respecting the education of their sons. The few who were sent to Santiago acquired a certain amount of elementary knowledge; but difficulties arose when attempts were made to give them more advanced instruction. It was found that the barbarian was only a good beginner in learning. In 1780 the Santiago school for Indians was transferred to Chillan.

V

With respect to agricultural reform, O'Higgins entertained certain ideas and plans that, under the prevailing natural conditions, could not be fully carried out. He seems to have exaggerated the possibilities of governmental influence in economic affairs. His efforts to foster the production of sugar was a case in point. In some of the northern valleys where it was planted on a

small scale, the enterprise was in a measure successful; but the attempt to create larger plantations in other districts encountered difficulties, and the cultivation was abandoned after three or four years of experiment. The efforts to extend the production of rice had no better result, and the attempt to introduce the cultivation of tobacco met with an insurmountable obstacle in a royal decree of prohibition issued in the interest of the existing monopoly. The motive in these and other proposed agricultural reforms was the betterment of the condition of the people; and, although some of the specific undertakings were unsuccessful, attention was called to the need of more careful cultivation.

But more important for the social well-being of Chile was the effort of the captain-general to set aside the abuses of the encomiendas, and even to abolish the system itself. In the beginning this system was thought to be necessary in order to provide laborers for the fields and the mines; for it was understood that the Indians, like all savages, lacked the habit of consecutive work, and that compulsion would be necessary to make them persistent laborers. The power to compel the Indians to work having been granted to the encomenderos, there remained no practical obstacle to making them slaves, and to this position they were reduced with all the attendant miseries that have become historic. But after two hundred years and more, a class of persons

had come into existence who were accustomed to obtain their livelihood by more or less regular work. The reason for compulsory labor originally advanced was no longer valid, and it is to the credit of the captain-general as an administrator that he gave a powerful impulse to the movement for abolishing this system.

The encomenderos carried to the King their protests against the action of the governor, but O'Higgins by frequent reports kept the king informed of his motives in this reform, and of the advisability of causing it to be adopted throughout Spain's American possessions.

The fact that the initiative in a reform as important as this was taken by a governor of a dependency in America indicates that the Spanish rule was declining, and that local authority in local affairs was leading the rule of the king. By a decree of April 3, 1791, Charles IV approved the action taken by the governor of Chile, and by a later decree, June 10, of the same year he ordered that the encomiendas of private persons should be definitely suppressed.

VI

While the captain-general was engaged in these and other internal reforms, the coming of foreign vessels to participate in the trade of the colony provoked the opposition of the officials both in Chile and Peru. Even the presence of foreign

vessels excited alarm, whether they came to trade or merely halted at a Spanish-American port on their way to another destination. In 1788 an American vessel named *Columbia*, battered by storms, put into the port of the island of Juan Fernandez. The governor of the island, Blas Gonzalez, permitted repairs to be made. Although the vessel was bound for Alaska, and had no design to trade at the ports of South America, Governor Gonzalez was deposed and tried for having furnished succor to the distressed vessel. The viceroy had no warships with which to pursue strange vessels, but a ship furnished by a merchant of Lima was armed and sent to Juan Fernandez; it failed to find any offenders. The coming of foreign vessels from the United States was opposed by the authorities not merely because they would tend to overthrow the ancient trade régime, but also because they would help to propagate the political ideas of the young republic, and thus contribute to the destruction of the Spanish colonial system.

During the last decades of the eighteenth century, the radical philosophy of the time, as already indicated, was gradually modifying the ideas of the Spanish colonists, while the kings of Spain continued to think as their ancestors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries thought. They held that the cession of Alexander VI and their conquests made them absolute masters of their American possessions and the exclusive

lords of the adjacent oceans. But the colonists had already begun to regard this view as a fiction; for they saw that foreigners did navigate these seas and trade at colonial ports in spite of the royal prohibition. They saw also that the demand of the increased population could not be satisfied by Spanish traders dealing solely in Spanish wares. But, although unable to meet the requirement of the colonists, Spain still persisted in her attempt to exclude foreign trade and foreign ideas, with the inevitable result of alienating her transatlantic subjects, and weakening her control over them.

After the *Columbia* other ships appeared off the coast, and when these were reported to the king, he again ordered the colonial authorities to prevent foreign vessels from navigating American waters or from approaching the ports. But the efforts of the colonial government were ineffective, the contraband trade was continued; and the colonists, finding the supply of desired wares increased by it, were not in sympathy with the order of prohibition. On the etiquette of certain packages introduced from the United States appeared the figure of a woman holding a flag, with the motto, “American Liberty.” This fact, brought to the attention of the king, induced him once more to issue his futile injunction against contraband trade.

While the inhabitants of the viceroyalty were contemplating the results that might proceed from

the encroachments of foreigners it was announced that Charles III was dead. He had died in December, 1788, but information of the fact did not reach Chile and Peru until April of the following year. After elaborate funeral ceremonies had been had in the capital cities, preparations were made to celebrate the accession of Charles IV. The enthusiastic chronicler of these ceremonies in Chile affirmed that persons familiar with the grandeur of the most important courts and cities of both worlds maintained that nowhere else had they seen such magnificence as was here displayed. This was the last occasion of this kind on which public enthusiasm was especially manifest; for when Ferdinand VII, the son and successor of Charles IV, ascended the throne in 1808, the Spanish monarchy was already falling under the shadow of Napoleon's expanding empire, and the loyalty of the people was undermined by the spread of revolutionary doctrines.

The fear of foreign encroachment had already led the authorities of the viceroyalty to petition the king to send them arms and ammunition. O'Higgins repeated this request, and acting on orders from the king the viceregal government proceeded to put the coast in a state of defense; for active hostilities appeared to be imminent in 1789 as a result of the controversy between England and Spain concerning the possession of a part of the island of Vancouver. The Spanish government, in withdrawing its pretensions, con-

ceded to the English the right to fish in the Pacific and at the same time to make use temporarily of certain points on the coast that were not occupied by the Spaniards. In order to prevent this concession from serving as a pretext for unlawful trade with the Spanish colonies, it was expressly stipulated that English subjects should not navigate the Pacific within ten maritime leagues of any point of the coast occupied by the Spanish. This concession gave English vessels recognized rights on the Spanish-American coast, but the Spanish authorities found it difficult to confine them within the limits of these rights; for vessels that came ostensibly to fish were naturally led to engage in the much more profitable business of smuggling, and the government was not in a position to prevent them.

VII

On the 16th of May, 1796, O'Higgins surrendered his functions as head of the government of Chile into the hands of the regent of the audiencia, who exercised them until the arrival of O'Higgins' successor, the Marquis of Avilés. He entered Lima as the viceroy of Peru on the 24th of July, and thus, clothed with the highest official dignity in the New World, he came back to the city where in poverty he had attempted unsuccessfully to enter upon a very humble mercantile career. It was in the first year of his administration that

the intendency of Puno was withdrawn from the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata, and added to the territory of Peru. Although he was seventy-six years of age on his arrival in Lima, the activity he had displayed in Chile appears to have suffered no abatement. He caused a fort to be constructed at Pisco, and manned it with a force of artillery; he strengthened the fortress of Callao, armed certain vessels of war, established a camp for the instruction and discipline of troops, and constructed barracks for soldiers at Lima. His support of mills for spinning cotton, flax, and hemp, that had been established by a company, indicates a certain emancipation from the restraints imposed by the government in Spain. He saw more clearly than most of his predecessors the economic advantage of good roads. In Chile he had found the country almost wholly without roads; they existed only in and immediately around the cities. The Spanish colonists everywhere were generally content to travel or to transport their goods on beasts of burden. Even between Valparaiso and Santiago there was no wagon road before the last decade of the century. O'Higgins had to make this journey three times during the first two years of his rule as captain-general, and these journeys were sufficient to make him appreciate the need of a road suited to vehicles on wheels. The inhabitants of the capital of Chile, as the foreign trade of the country increased, recognized the advantage that would accrue to them from

better means of transportation; but when it was proposed to begin the construction, the captain-general encountered two obstacles; the lack of funds and the unwillingness of many proprietors to have the road traverse their lands. Finally, however, certain funds were obtained by imposing a slight additional tax on goods imported and exported at Valparaiso, and some of the proprietors were made to see that their prejudices were groundless, and that the road would be a benefit rather than an injury. The work of construction was begun in 1792.

Two years later Captain Vancouver passed over this road going from Valparaiso to Santiago.

"The making of the new road," he wrote, "had doubtless been a work of great labor, and to a people who are not very industriously inclined, and who are all bigoted to former practices and original habits, it is no wonder that the manifest advantages that must result to the inhabitants of the country from his Excellency's wise undertaking, should be overlooked, or rather not be seen by them; and that the execution of his judicious plan should have deprived him, amongst the lower orders of the people, of much of his popularity."⁷

In Peru itself O'Higgins found the roads in a lamentable state, and undertook to improve them. He built a new road from Lima to Callao, the most elaborate of all of his constructions of this

⁷ *A Voyage of Discovery*, VI, 258.

kind. The end at the entrance of the city was adorned with an architectural gate bearing the royal arms and the arms of Lima and the consulado.

VIII

The population of Peru at the end of the century, according to Humboldt's estimate, was 1,200,000.⁸ Negroes and mestizos, particularly at Lima, formed a considerable part of the inhabitants; and there were about 400,000 Indians. The population of Chile is set down in the returns of the first census as 259,646 in 1778. The estimate for the end of the century is approximately 400,000, counting the Spaniards, the creoles and the mestizos. The presence of the alien and mixed races, in this viceroyalty as elsewhere in Spanish America, made the Spaniards especially solicitous to maintain lines of social distinction. The coexistence of these classes created a prejudice in the Spanish mind against many kinds of work, thus giving to the society of the viceroyalty the spirit characteristic of communities composed of slave-holders and slaves. The Spaniards refused to engage in certain occupations that were honorable in themselves, because they were accepted by persons of color, suffering any degree of poverty rather than do violence to their prejudices.

⁸ Humboldt to Viceroy Mendoza, November 7, 1802, printed by Groot, II, Appendix No. 47; *Memorias de los vireyes, Lima, 1859*, VI, 4.

The persons who constituted a subject class were Indians, mulattos, and negroes. They were required to pay tribute. The mestizo was no farther removed from the Spaniard than the mulatto, yet he was not under this obligation. The basis of this difference was the Spaniard's different estimates of the Indians and the negroes. The Spanish-Indian union might produce a child destined to freedom. The Spanish-negro union might produce only a member of a subject class. The mestizos formed the bulk of the free laboring class, the artisans, and the subalterns in the offices of administration.⁹

The long discussion concerning the relation of the Indians to the Europeans, particularly in the southern part of the viceroyalty, finally culminated in 1791 in the abolition of personal service and the incorporation of the encomiendas in the crown. This last act was, in fact, a revocation of the privilege enjoyed by the encomenderos of holding Indians for service on their lands. The decree making these changes provided also for allotting to the Indians such lands as might be necessary, when cultivated, for their support.¹⁰

One of the beneficent effects of this measure was the pacification of the Araucanians, who had been stimulated by the cruelties inflicted on their compatriots to maintain themselves in a state of hostility towards the Spaniards. An equally pro-

⁹ See Amunátegui, *Los Precursoros de la independencia de Chile*, Santiago de Chile, 1910, III, 15.

¹⁰ This edict is printed in Amunátegui, *Los Precursoros*, II, 493.

voking cause of this hostility was the reluctance of the Indians to depart from their ancient manner of living, a change destined inevitably to follow the encroachment of their northern neighbors. Having been brought by this measure into a friendly attitude with respect to the power they had known for many decades, they might be expected to adhere to it rather than to go over to a party that seemed to be opposed to it. Thus the Araucanians appear in sympathy with the royalists rather than with those who were hostile to the legitimate government. Although the revolutionary party as developed later drew no physical support from the Araucanians, the heroic struggle of that people to preserve its independence encouraged the revolutionists to persist in their cause. Ercilla, in *Araucana*, wrote to magnify the power and glory of Spain, but the characters and the deeds that stand out conspicuously in the poem, and that furnished an inspiration to Chilean patriotism are the characters and deeds of Araucanians. In the early years of the revolutionary movement, there were many evidences of this influence. Parents caused their children to be baptized with the names of Caupolicán, Lautaro, Tucapel, and of other Indians who had achieved fame in the long conflict. The examples of these heroes as set forth by Ercilla and Chilean historians were cited in proclamations to awaken the zeal of Chilean soldiers in the cause of independence.

IX

A large part of the trade between Peru and other dependencies was carried on by sea, chiefly from the port of Callao. The merchandise exported consisted of textile fabrics, sugar, and rice. The articles imported were wheat, tallow, hides, copper, cordage, maté, and tobacco. The maté and tobacco came to Peru from Paraguay by way of Chile. The trade between Lima and Bogotá passed in part overland through the province of Quito, and in part through the ports of Guayaquil and Panama. The viceroyalty of New Granada sent to Lima, among other things, cacao and coffee. The effect of the liberal policy respecting trade, established in 1778, and carried into general execution in 1783, may be seen in the great increase in shipping at Callao. In 1785 sixteen vessels arrived at that port with cargoes estimated at twenty-four million dollars. At that time the value of the annual production of gold and silver in the country was only about four million dollars, and these were the principal commodities produced that might be exported to pay for imports. Thus the zeal to embrace the new opportunities for trade brought to Peru goods to the value of twenty-four million dollars in a period when four million dollars represented the normal consumption of imports. The result of this oversupply was to glut the market completely and to cause a temporary interruption of trade.

In some cases the wares could not find a market at any price, and were committed to the flames. This was a warning to shippers, and caused them to withhold their goods. By this means the imports were reduced to the quantity and the kinds of commodities needed.¹¹

The Spanish colonists, like the Spaniards in Spain, did not look with favor on commercial or industrial corporations. They raised a great outcry against the Philippine Company¹² and other corporations on the ground that they were destructive of the commercial undertakings of private persons; that they absorbed all the trade the viceroyalty could maintain; and that by their

¹¹ *The Present State of Peru*, London, 1805, 108–110; at the beginning of the nineteenth century a large part of the wares in use in Lima were English. Writing from his observations made at the time, Stevenson says “the windows were glazed with English glass—the brass furniture and ornaments on the commodes, tables, and chairs were English—the chintz or dimity hangings, the linen and cotton dresses of the females, and the cloth coats and cloaks of the men were all English; the tables were covered either with plate or English earthenware, and English glass, knives, and forks; and even the kitchen utensils, if of iron, were English; in fine, with very few exceptions, all was either of English or South American manufacture. Coarse cotton, nankeens, and a few other articles were supplied by the Philippine company. Spain sent some iron, broadcloth, Barcelona prints, linen, writing paper, silks, and ordinary earthenware. From the Italians they had silks and velvets; from the French, linens, lace, silks, and broadcloth; from Germany linens, common cutlery, and glass; everything else was either English or of home manufacture.”—*Twenty Years in South America*, I, 349.

¹² The *Compañía Filipinas* was established in 1785 for a period of twenty years. It was designed to carry on trade directly with the East Indies. It gave a powerful impulse to Spanish commerce.—Palacio, Edward de, *España desde el primer Borbón hasta la revolución de Setiembre*, Madrid, 1868, I, 487.

extensive capital they were enabled to sell at a reduced price. It was affirmed that by these means they drove the private trader to the wall.¹³ The association of capitalists in industrial and commecrial corporations was unknown in Chile in the colonial period. "There was no other commercial association than that of certain brothers, who, after the death of their fathers, continued together for a certain number of years in the business which their fathers had established."¹⁴ There were, moreover, no companies for insuring against the risks of transportation by sea, or against losses by fire. In view of this fact and the great risks attending the route around the southern end of the continent, in the course of time more and more of the wares imported from Europe were carried by way of Buenos Aires and the Andes, while the sea route was almost entirely neglected.

The conduct of business was further impeded by the absence of a system of credit and exchange, necessitating the actual transfer of coin for the payment of debts, whether within or without the limits of a province or dependency. The exportation of money required by this method of making payments sometimes threatened to exhaust the supply of currency. This difficulty was in a measure set aside by the circulation of clipped coins that passed for their nominal value but could not be exported without loss. The coins of circulation were of the same system as those used in Spain,

¹³ *Present State of Peru*, 117.

¹⁴ Barros Arana, *Hist. de Chile*, VII, 401.

but the copper coins that circulated in Spain were not employed. The attempt made in 1781 to introduce them met with vigorous opposition; and it was not until after the establishment of the republic that the project to circulate copper coins was resumed with success.

Among all the obstacles to industrial and commercial progress, the chief was the deadening grip of Spain's restrictions. With natural conditions that might have been turned to good account in the production of sugar, the Spanish government prohibited the introduction of material for the equipment of sugar mills, and prohibited also the construction of sugar refineries in Peru. The prohibition of making brandy from cane was designed as a direct discouragement to the cultivation of cane. This order not proving effective, a tax of twelve per cent was imposed upon brandy, and later it was definitely decreed that Indians might not work in sugar mills, and they might not be employed in cutting and carting cane without express governmental authorization.¹⁵

By a series of decrees extending over many decades, the cultivation of the grape and the making of wine were prohibited, and all these acts of prohibition had one general purpose, namely, to leave the markets of America open to Spanish wine. It was, however, seen in the course of time that these restrictions were disadvantageous to Spain as well as to the colonies, and they were

¹⁵ *Leyes de Indias*, lib. 6, tit. 13, ley 11.

relaxed; yet even while the laws existed without modification they were not completely effective; frequently they were not obeyed. But as long as they stood unrepealed the production of wine was necessarily a precarious business; for it could not with entire safety be presumed that the policy of one viceroy to allow planters to ignore the law would be followed by his successor.¹⁶

Although an act of prohibition might be directed to the authorities of a specified captaincy-general or viceroyalty to cure a specific evil in the district in question, yet it was often the purpose of the decree that its application should be general, and affect all regions where the conditions to be remedied might exist. By Philip IV, the prohibition concerning the cultivation of the grape had already been made to apply generally, when it was "prohibited to plant vines in the Indias Occidentales, and ordered that the viceroys should give no license for new planting or for cultivating the vines already planted."¹⁷ An indication of the declining force of Spanish law in America is seen in the fact that the vineyards had greatly increased in the later decades of the century, in spite of the general and specific decrees of prohibition.

The acts of prohibition by the government, provoked by the complaints of Spaniards, ran directly counter to the purposes of the Spaniards

¹⁶ *Leyes de Indias*, lib. 4, tit. 18, ley 15.

¹⁷ *Leyes de Indias*, lib. 4, tit. 17, ley 18; Amunátegui, *La crónica de 1810*, I, 89.

settled in America, whose attention in the beginning was directed to the cultivation of the various grains and other food products they had used in Spain. The lack of frequent communication with any civilized country made such cultivation necessary to their existence and thus as early as 1501 "there were cultivated on this continent wheat, rice, and all the nutrious grains of Spain; there had been introduced the Spanish domestic fowls, sheep, hogs, goats; the ox and the ass and the horse aided man in the cultivation of the fields, where before he had worked alone."¹⁸

It is noteworthy that the government early assumed an attitude of opposition to the cultivation and use of the coca plant. This was the sacred tree of the incas, and it was employed in their religious ceremonies. It was conceived to have power to placate the anger of their gods. The curling smoke of coca burning on the altar brought divine favor; and only the priest chewing the sacred leaf could hear the voice of the oracles. The right to cultivate the coca plant belonged only to the inca, son of the sun, the Supreme King, and the Supreme Priest. The public action at first taken by the Spanish authorities was in some sense prompted by ideas of religion and charity.¹⁹

¹⁸ Benzoni, *History of the New World*, 91.

¹⁹ "The plant grew in unhealthy regions, and experience had taught that the Indians who went to the coca plantations, if they did not lose their lives, came back to their homes with weakened bodies. To seek to abolish the coca plantations was, therefore, in a certain way, to spare the sufferings of the oppressed race."—Oliveira, *La política económica de la metrópoli*, 34.

By an ordinance issued by Viceroy Toledo under royal authority, it was provided that no person might plant coca. As a penalty for violation of this ordinance, it was ordered that the plants should be pulled up and burned, the culprit should pay a fine of two thousand dollars, and he should be banished for four years. But while the Indians were prevented from working on the coca plantations, they were permitted to work under the much more destructive conditions of the mines. The reason of this discrimination may perhaps be found in the fact that the mines contributed one-fifth of their product to the king, while, in the view of the authorities, "coca was the diabolical instrument of superstition."²⁰ Working in the mines might kill the body, but the use of coca tended to demoralize the spirit. The absurdity of this legislation appears to have been perceived at last by the viceroy himself, for he subsequently issued an ordinance permitting the establishment of new coca plantations.²¹

While the government of the viceroyalty of Peru sought to discourage the cultivation of wine and coca, it was active in promoting the cultivation of wheat; but the fields had been rendered unproductive by the earthquake of 1687, and remained sterile for nearly forty years. After 1722 the production of wheat was revived, and with this arose the policy of protecting the Peruvian

²⁰ Oliveira, 45.

²¹ Oliveira, 47-49.

wheat market from the more abundant and cheaper production of Chile. The first step towards this end was to reduce the tax burden on Peruvian farmers who raised wheat. Then it was ordered that dealers should sell Chilean and Peruvian wheat in equal quantities, and, later, that Chilean wheat should be sold only after the Peruvian wheat had been exhausted. In order to render the protection still more effective, still later a tax of a dollar per *fanega* was imposed on wheat from Chile. Finally, under Viceroy O'Higgins, action was taken that suggests one phase of the culture system of Java. The farmers of central and western Peru were required to devote a part of their estates to the cultivation of wheat, the amount in individual cases to vary with the size of the estate in question.

Yet in spite of these protective measures, Peru had not great expectations regarding her agriculture. A large part of her territory was composed of mountains, and another large part was made up of deserts. More might have been done if systematic and persistent efforts had been devoted to irrigation. But with profitable mines at hand and with an energetic part of the population in eager search for others, it was not to be expected that large sums would be invested in carrying out elaborate plans for irrigation, when the profits of such undertakings would be realized only after some years. There was wanting both an adequate local demand for the products and also the

requisite labor to stimulate and develop agricultural production. The devastating scourge of smallpox, the violent and unaccustomed efforts of the Indians taken to work in the mines under the oppressive system of the mita, and the introduction and immoderate use of spirituous liquors destroyed a large part of the original inhabitants, and the immigration was not sufficient to compensate for the loss. A savage people unused to the regular tasks which civilized man imposes upon himself appears to be unable to maintain itself when subjected to the conditions of civilized life. The mere fact, therefore, that savages disappear when brought into contact with civilized society does not necessarily involve a condemnation of the superior race. Unnecessary hardships imposed upon the inferior may hasten the inevitable decline. For imposing such hardships a nation may be justly blamed, and on this point the verdict has been rendered against the Spaniards.

Agricultural production was embarrassed not only by lack of internal consumption but also by the difficulties of transportation. Sugar shipped from Havana to Spain brought the owner a clear profit of fifty cents a quintal. The white sugar of Martinique sold in France brought a profit of sixty-two and a half cents a quintal. On account of the larger freight charges, sugar from Peru sold in Europe in competition with that from Havana caused the owner a very considerable loss. In the same way cotton from Peru could not

successfully compete in Holland with that from other parts of the world. In view of these facts, Peru had to rely on gold and silver as exports.

Other causes leading to the decline of agriculture were the diminution of the number of inhabitants, the lack of an organized and effective system of cultivation especially needed in a country where much depended on irrigation, and the general aversion of the natives to work on being released from the authority of their traditional rulers. Under these conditions the support of the population became increasingly difficult.

The importation of the African negro, as an agricultural laborer, did not greatly improve the condition of affairs. As a slave laborer, he had all the economic defects of his class. But the defects of colonial agriculture were not all due to the laborers. The creole proprietors were only interested in spending their income in ease. They brought to their undertakings a minimum of that practical intelligence which should manifest itself in new appliances and improved methods of cultivation. With respect to those who tilled the soil independently on a small scale, the circumstances were hardly more favorable. Under the communism of the inca period, the work of the Indian was prescribed by a superior authority. When, therefore, this authority was removed the Indian was deprived of his accustomed direction, and he did not possess sufficient power of initiative to make his efforts extend much beyond the satisfaction of

his immediate wants. The early gains in gold and silver and the hope of finding rich mines made the Spanish and creole population impatient of the meagre returns from cultivating the soil, and the presence of slave laborers brought the work of the agriculturist into disrepute. Furthermore, the arid lands of the rainless coast and the broken region of the Sierra offered few attractions to agricultural undertakings, and the Spanish government took no steps toward storing the waters of the mountain streams, or systematically utilizing them in irrigation, a work clearly transcending individual effort.

X

In Chile the fitness of the soil and climate for agriculture made this branch of production prosperous; its chief obstacle to expansion was the limited demand for the products. The early distribution of the lands among many proprietors was later counteracted by the accumulation of many estates in the hands of the Jesuits. Some of those that remained in private hands passed from one generation to another in the same family. This direct descent was furthered by the law upholding primogeniture. There were, however, no estates to which this procedure had been applied prior to the middle of the seventeenth century. The number of them increased in the early part of the eighteenth century, but declined towards the end. At the end of the colonial period

there were only eighteen important estates taking advantage of this law. There were others subject to certain restriction as to transmission, although they were not properly under the law of primogeniture. The heads of some of the families holding estates under this law bore titles of nobility.

The system of inheritance under the law of primogeniture contributed to maintain the prestige of certain families, but it came to be regarded as a cause of the backwardness of Chilean agriculture. It was, therefore, decreed in 1789 that no more foundations of this kind should be made without the express permission of the king. The titles of nobility were eagerly sought, particularly by the creoles; they were conferred by the crown on the presentation of a nobiliary, a statement of services rendered, and the payment of a certain amount of money, ordinarily not less than twenty thousand dollars. As might have been expected, many persons not worthy to be made prominent in their communities received titles of nobility; and this abuse led the king, in 1790, to undertake to make such regulations as would set it aside. Whether owing to any measures formed by the king or to the increasing influence of the new society, in the last years of the colonial period no new titles were granted to Chile. Persons seeking some mark of distinction limited their aspirations to the possession of a decoration in the order of Santiago, of Calatrava, of Alcántara, of Montera, or, later, to the order of Charles III.

XI

While life in the cities lacked many attractions, the country presented much less favorable conditions. On the estates of even the more wealthy families, there were few conveniences for comfortable living. The houses of the proprietors were in some cases large, but they contained only a few rooms. They had very little furniture, and this was usually in the last stages of its usefulness. The windows were without glass. A few plates and other dishes, often presenting evidence of rough usage, made up the table service, and everywhere there was a lack of cleanliness. The food was only such as was produced on the estate. Fresh meat was available usually only at the annual period of slaughtering; for it was found to be too expensive to kill an ox or other animal in order to provide fresh meat for a family for four or five days. In the last years of the century a few of the more wealthy owners of land, particularly those in the neighborhood of Santiago and Lima, showed a disposition to increase the conveniences of living in the country. The proprietors who lived on their estates for only a few months in the year constituted a very small part of the country population. The large majority was composed of tenants who were nominally free, but whose condition was not greatly different from the vassals of the medieval landlord. Each of them received a small farm, or piece of ground, for cultivation. In return for the use of this he

was required to work for the owner. "There were without doubt," as Barros Arana says, "kind and charitable proprietors who treated their tenants humanely, who helped them in their times of need, and who were interested in their well-being; but the greater number maintained with respect to their dependents a regimen that was very little different from that to which the Indians of the encomienda were subjected."²² The great proprietors frequently exercised the power of public officials, either as agents of the subdelegates or as merely owners of the soil, and their orders had practically the authority of law. They arrogated to themselves the right to administer justice and even to impose punishments. Although the tenant might legitimately leave the estate on which he lived, few of them did it voluntarily, for they either acquired a sentimental attachment to the places where they had spent many years, or they saw nothing to be gained in going from one estate to another. Like the very poor everywhere, who have some permanent abiding-place, they hesitated to move lest they should lose the very small advantage of their actual state, and fall into the more miserable condition of the floating population that wandered over the country seeking work wherever they fancied it might be found. The feudal relations that thus came into existence were generally characteristic of the later colonial society, especially of that portion of it outside of the cities, in the southern part of the continent.

²² *Hist. de Chile*, VII, 466.

XII

Although the mines were one of Peru's most important sources of wealth, this industry was subject to certain inconveniences. It could not be carried on advantageously without the mita, but the continuance of the enforced labor of the mita caused the rapid destruction of the Indians. It was, moreover, carried on without adequate scientific knowledge. It was burdened with the payment of a fifth of the product to the king. It suffered from lack of credit, or from credit obtained under onerous conditions. Banks for assisting mining enterprises either did not exist, or when created were opposed and discredited. Stock companies that might have brought together the requisite capital were, if formed at all, of little importance. The bank proposed in Arequipa in 1792, with a capital stock of fifty thousand dollars divided into five hundred shares, found that the country was not accustomed to such projects and failed for lack of support. Progress in mining was, moreover, hindered by the Spaniard's lack of initiative; also by the desire of the creole, who had a fortune, to consume it in ease instead of increasing it by means of work; or, if he invested it, by his search for such investments as would cause him the least trouble. The ill-success that attended the quicksilver mine of Huancavelica at certain periods was due to maladministration and the neglect or hostility of the government favoring the Spanish mine of Almaden.

A striking feature of Spain's policy respecting industry in the dependencies was its vacillation. The views of one king were sometimes not the views of his successor, and the Council of the Indies did not always render the same interpretation of facts. The viceroys and captains-general, moreover, sometimes had policies of their own, inconsistent with the orders set forth in royal decrees. An instance of the misinterpretation of facts is shown by the action of the government in Spain, when prices were rising there as a consequence of the importation of gold and silver from America. It was assumed that the rise was due to a strong demand for Spanish wares by the colonists. The rise in the price of textile fabrics offered a specific case. To provide the remedy desired by the consumers in Spain, the government prohibited the inhabitants of the dependencies from purchasing cloth in Spain. This action taken by the Cortes in Valladolid, in 1548, furnished protection for the manufacturer of the articles in question in America. Whatever advantage was derived by the American manufacturer was not designed by the Spanish authorities, but accrued as a consequence of an act taken in ignorance of the influences affecting their trade. This hallucination later caused the issuance of ordinances to further manufactures in different parts of America.

This direct reversal of the original policy was not consistently maintained subsequently. Philip II undertook to encourage the purchase of

American wool by Spaniards, "hoping that the textile industry of the colonies would be destroyed by being deprived of one of its most essential materials."²³ The great distance from Europe and the difficulties of transportation furnished, however, sufficient protection to keep the industry alive. Yet a little later it was dealt a severe blow by an ordinance issued by Philip II, in 1595, providing that "in no province or part of the Indies may the Indians work in the mills for making woollen, silk, or cotton cloth."²⁴ But this ordinance did not apply to those manufacturing establishments belonging to communities of Indians and carried on by them exclusively; it also did not apply to those belonging to the king. It affected only those owned by private persons and those in which Indians and Spaniards were engaged to work together. The motive of these acts of prohibition was revealed in the instructions to Viceroy Velasco, when it was required "that he should prohibit the manufacture in order that the trade and commerce in cloth might not be weakened." But the viceroy was unwilling to carry out this policy, and affirmed "that the manufactories are so necessary and the cloth made in them of so great importance and service for the poor people, and that which comes from Spain is so dear, that the Indians, the negroes, and even the Spaniards would go naked if the manufactories were closed;

²³ Oliveira, 92, 93.

²⁴ Solórzano, *Politica Indiana*, lib. 11, cap. 12.

and this could not be done without great resentment from many private persons in this kingdom, who have them and who are supported by them."²⁵

In the beginning of the eighteenth century, the textile industry in Peru suffered an apparently fatal shock. The viceroy and the audiencia received orders to destroy all the factories and mills which had not been established by the express permission of the king; to give an account of those demolished and of those that remained.²⁶

It might have been possible to avert the destructive effect of royal orders, but the abundant importations to the viceroyalty by the French in the early decades of the eighteenth century was fatal to the undertakings of American manufacturers. The wares thrown on the American market were of a superior quality and cheap; and American production could not resist this competition. The cessation of the French trade later in the century, after the collapse of colonial production, left the colonists in want of many articles important for their well-being. Imports from Spain were interrupted by the fear of hostile ships. The arrival of Spanish ships at American ports was to such an extent prevented by the watchfulness of the British that there was not only a great scarcity of European goods at very high prices, but also a corresponding fall in the

²⁵ Mendiburu, VIII, 288; Oliveira, 95.

²⁶ The royal order was received by Viceroy Ladron de Guevara on the 4th of November, 1711; for the terms, see Mendiburu, IV, 372.

price of American products. In order to remedy this evil, officials in America exercised functions that legally belonged to the king and the Council of the Indies. They assumed towards foreign traders essentially the same attitude that the Peruvian and Chilean officials held towards the French in the first and second decades of the century. In the first decade of the nineteenth century they were even more open and specific in their action. In November, 1808, Juan de Cásas, the president of Venezuela, declared commerce with the British colonies and neutral nations to be lawful, and reduced by one-fifth the duties that had been established.²⁷ This action was recognized as temporary, but it indicates to what extent the local authorities in the colonies were usurping the legitimate powers of the government in Spain. The merchants of Cadiz were indignant; they preferred, quoting Amunátegui, "to see the colonists given over to nakedness and hunger rather than to run the most remote risk of losing their monopoly."²⁸

The independent action of the authorities in America, when not reversed by the king or the Council of the Indies, encouraged further action of a similar character; but sometimes such action was annulled, and thereby a sentiment of hostility was provoked. From this it would appear that

²⁷ Amunátegui, *Lo crónica de 1810*, Santiago de Chile, 1876, I, 77.

²⁸ *La crónica de 1810*, I, 72.

after the colonists had begun to think of acting on their own initiative, the results would be essentially the same, whatever course might be pursued by the government in Spain. The viceroy's or captain-general's superior knowledge of the local circumstances often enabled him to see that a strict execution of the king's orders would cause an unjust hardship, and, in his growing independence, he not infrequently assumed the responsibility of adapting the execution of the orders to the known circumstances of the persons subject to them.

Part of the weakness of Spain's hold on the dependencies lay in the fact that the connection was a personal union. Whatever common sentiments the colonies and the parent nation may have entertained in the beginning were enfeebled as the American possessions became conscious of their individuality and distinct interests. The growth of this consciousness was inevitably attended by a decline of loyalty to the government in Spain; it produced an impulse to rejecting Spain's domination.

XIII

Perhaps the most effective hindrance to production and to the advance of the colonies in material prosperity was the draft made on their resources by Spain. The colonies were conceived as existing for the advantage of the mother coun-

try, and whether their resources were insignificant or abundant little remained, after the exorbitant demands of the crown had been satisfied, to promote the general welfare of the colonies. There was in each of the principal cities an office, or agency, of the royal treasury. This office received the funds designed to be transported to Europe to the credit of the government in Spain, and to meet in the colonies such expenses as were borne by the royal government. These funds were derived from many sources, among which the tax known as the alcabala was one of the more productive. This tax had been long known in Spain, and was originally imposed to provide means for carrying on the war against the Moors. In the course of time its imposition and collection came to be regarded almost as a prerogative of the crown; and when the question arose as to the propriety of introducing it into America, it was assumed that without any new grant it might be extended by the king to all possessions annexed to the Spanish empire. It was thus established in Mexico in 1574, and in Peru in 1591. It was a percentage tax on the price of every article sold, and was due at every sale of the article in question, whether this article was a bundle of faggots or a great estate. The rate fixed for the colonies was two per cent, and this rate was maintained for a number of years, but about the middle of the eighteenth century it was raised to five per cent. In the case of a retail dealer it would have been

evidently inconvenient to collect the tax on the occasion of each sale. An account of such a trader's stock was, therefore, taken annually, and the annual sales estimated. The tax was then collected on the estimated sales for the year. On land or other property that was seldom sold this tax was not burdensome, but it tended to absorb the value of wares that passed from hand to hand many times during the year. Under this system, if trade was dull and few exchanges were made, the annual profits were naturally small; if trade was brisk, the profits were absorbed by the royal treasury. The universal effect was to discourage exchanges.

The import and export duties varied with the articles involved and with the ports where they were landed, the larger ports having a higher rate than the smaller. The impost known as the armada was a tax collected for the purpose of maintaining government vessels designed to protect the coast from pirates. In the course of time it was found that smaller vessels than those at first employed were better adapted to this purpose, and an additional impost was established for maintaining them. This tax was called armadilla. Later the pirates ceased to infest the coast, but the tax to provide means for warding them off continued to be collected.

A small special import and export tax was levied to pay the salaries and other expenses connected with the consulate. It amounted to an

average duty of one per cent on all articles imported from Spain and from different parts of Spanish America, or shipped to those regions. The import and export taxes levied for this purpose on such trade as was permitted with foreign countries were much higher, averaging about three per cent. There were some exceptions to these rates: horses and mules paid a specific duty of one dollar a head.

In the larger cities there was a license for the sale of intoxicating liquors. The amount of this license for saloons, or shops, for this traffic, was fixed in proportion to estimated sales, but this payment did not release the dealers from the alcabala; this they were obliged to pay, in addition, as retail traders.

The practice of selling titles had been resorted to in Spain as a means of increasing the royal revenues, and this was extended to the colonies. A resident of Spanish America who wished the distinction of a title of nobility paid the king a prescribed sum; or he might even enter into an agreement to pay annually interest on the sum prescribed. These payments and the interest on the sums promised constituted a source of revenue for the king. Back of this practice lay, as already indicated, the desire and purpose of the king to maintain in America social conditions similar to those of Spain.

There was a long list of other sources from which revenues flowed more or less abundantly

into the royal treasury. The following were the most important:

1. The *media anata* was half of the salary, or yearly product, of places or offices under the government to which appointments were made. It was paid into the treasury for the first year. In case of an increase of salary by promotion or otherwise, the half of the increase was paid for the first year after it was granted.

2. The royal ninths comprised the parts of the tithes not allotted to ecclesiastical or other institutions. The tithes established in America by an edict of Charles V, October 5, 1501, were at first applied solely to the support of the church. Forty years later, it was provided that they should be divided into four parts. One part, or one-quarter of the whole amount, was given to the bishop of the diocese, and one part to the chapter. Of the remaining half of the whole amount collected, two-ninths (one-ninth of the whole) went to the crown; three-ninths were set apart for the foundation of churches and hospitals; and the remainder, four-ninths, was devoted to the support of curates or other officiating ecclesiastics. Later this last amount was increased to seven-ninths of the half of the whole amount, absorbing the three-ninths previously devoted to founding churches and hospitals.

3. The tribute paid by the civilized Indians constituted an important contribution to the royal revenue. This was the annual personal tax im-

posed upon every male Indian between the ages of eighteen and fifty, over whom the Spaniards had acquired jurisdiction. The amount of the tribute varied both with respect to persons and with respect to provinces. It was collected by the corregidores, or governors of districts, who were allowed six per cent of the sums collected, in accordance with the assessment placed in their hands. In the colonial system established by Spain, every Indian was regarded as a vassal either immediately subject to the king or dependent on an encomendero. During the years in which the Indians were being brought into subjection to Spanish authority, the king made numerous grants of lands, and large numbers of Indians were assigned to the various holders of these lands. Making these grants was a part of the process of conquest; for a Spaniard on whom had been bestowed an extensive territory, together with a large number of Indians, would necessarily be disposed to dominate his possessions and maintain peace among his dependents. In the course of time these grants that were made for only one or two lives, reverted to the crown, and the tribute that had been paid previously to the encomendero was, after this reversion, paid into the king's treasury. The effect of this change was to increase the king's revenue, and to make a larger part of the Indian population dependent immediately on him. This tax gradually came to be regarded with dissatisfaction; for those who paid

it looked upon it as a sign of personal subordination or bondage.

4. The royal treasury received also a large sum from the sale of offices, particularly municipal offices. Appointments to these offices were made frequently after a considerable payment to the crown by the candidate.

5. The income derived from the sale of stamped paper increased with the increase of the population and the growth of official business.

6. The royal treasury received, moreover, a certain increment from lost property and strays, which, having been found and held unclaimed for a year, belonged to the king.

7. The fifth part of the product of the mines was the most noteworthy element of the royal income. A large part of the income from the mines was the net product of the quicksilver mine of Huancavelica owned by the government. During the two hundred and nineteen years from 1570, when the mine was purchased by the crown, to 1789, the mine of Huancavelica produced 1,040,469 quintals of mercury, an average annual product of 4751 quintals. The price of the metal extracted was sixty dollars per quintal in 1786 and seventy-three dollars in 1791. At the average price of the whole period in question, the value of the product was 67,629,396 dollars. After deducting the expenses of the mine there remained a profit for the crown of about 65,000,000 dollars.

It is impossible to make an accurate statement

of the output of the other mines of South America, from which the king drew the allotted twenty per cent. It is estimated that the mines of Potosi alone, in their first ninety years, produced 395,-619,000 dollars; and that between 1545 and 1800 the king's fifth from the product of these mines amounted to 163,000,000 dollars. On the basis of this estimate the total output of the mines of Potosi for these years would appear to have been 815,000,000 dollars. It has been estimated, moreover, that Spain received from America, during two hundred and forty-eight years ending in 1740, the sum of 9,000,000,000 dollars. These figures are, however, only estimates, as the condition of the accounts of the mines has always made it impossible to derive from them an accurate and trustworthy statement.

8. The proceeds of the salt tax belonged to the crown, but it was one of the less productive sources of income.

9. The king also received the fees paid by ships on entering and clearing at the ports.

10. The proceeds from the sale of the bull of *Crusada*, although this was apparently an institution of the church, were gathered into the royal treasury. The *Crusada* mentioned here as a source of revenue was a bull published every two years, carrying absolution from past offences and containing certain privileges with respect to the future. The prices paid for the bull ranged from a few cents to several dollars.

11. The crown received an important addition

to its revenues from various kinds of concessions and monopolies, but these created great dissatisfaction, and, as has already been pointed out, provoked revolts that endangered the stability of the royal government. There was also a tax on titles of nobility. This was, however, of very little importance except in Lima and the city of Mexico. In Lima at the beginning of the nineteenth century there were sixty-three persons who were expected to pay this tax.

The viceroys and captains-general, recognizing their loyalty and obligations to the crown, sometimes sent special contributions to the king, from any available funds, thus depriving the dependencies of means that might have been used for public improvements, or to facilitate social progress.

In the last years of the eighteenth century and in the beginning of the nineteenth, the drift of affairs clearly indicated that the great colonial enterprise had failed. The viceroy found evidence of it in the decreasing population, and proposed remedies that would have had some chance of success if they had been applied two hundred years earlier: To guard with care the treatment of the Indians by the priests and the corregidores; to prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages; to transfer to the decadent provinces a sufficient number of families from the more densely populated provinces; to prevent the creation of too great a number of convents and monasteries; to rehabilitate the arts and trades;

and to oppose the increase of luxury.²⁹ But the only remedy that involved a promise of success, the complete overthrow of Spain's traditional policy, did not enter the mind of the king. There were, moreover, almost insurmountable difficulties that opposed the application of the only remedy destined to work a cure. The inhabitants of the dependencies had been subject to an autocratic rule from the beginning. The viceroys, the captains-general, the judges, the corregidores, and all the higher ecclesiastical functionaries were the appointees of an absolute authority in the other half of the world. Neither the colonists nor their ancestors had had an opportunity to learn the difficult business of self-government. Unlike the British colonists of North America, they lacked both the political instinct and experience in organization and administration; and during these last decades of the century their reaction under governmental abuses hardly went beyond protests. Their plans for constructive political efforts were visionary or impractical. In this state of affairs ends the colonial enterprise. The growth of a new spirit, the development of a will to be free, the rise in the creole-mestizo society of the power and the determination to organize itself for emancipation, and the long struggle to overthrow the ancient régime fill a new period in the history of Spanish South America.

²⁹ *Memorias de los vireyes*, III, 133.

INDEX

- Abascal sends aid to Buenos Aires, 350, 373.
- Abipones, account of, 88.
- Acevedo advocates viceroyalty of Buenos Aires, 158; real head of Chilean government, 237.
- Acosta, José (the historian), provincial, 128.
- Acosta, Friar, opposes Vértiz's theatre, 250.
- Admiralty's view, 342; orders as to Cape, 343; on Popham's irregularity, 359.
- Agriculture, in Chile, xv, 408; in Argentina, xvii; hindrances to, in Peru, 406-408.
- Alcabala, increased, 177; not imposed on Indians, 178, 418.
- Alcohol, monopoly of, 99; destroyed in Quito, 100.
- Alcoholic liquors, consumed by Indians, 37.
- Alcedo, president, 53.
- Alcedo's *Diccionario*, 54.
- Aldunate in Buenos Aires, 15.
- Alexander VI, 74.
- Aliaga, corregidor, 183, 184.
- Altamirano, Jesuit, 80.
- Alvarez, J. F., state secretary of *Comun*, 212.
- Alzaga at head of Buenos Aires, 362; organizes defense, 363.
- Amantes del País*, 379.
- Amar y Borbon, viceroy, 291.
- Amaru, Tupac, 180.
- Amat y Junient, governor and viceroy, 97; his military régime, 98, 177; in Chile, 228.
- Amnesty to rioters in Quito, 101.
- Amunátegui on Rojas, 234.
- Ana de Ricuarte, held mint pension, 58.
- Andean route, 42; passes guarded, 136.
- Andes, slopes of, xiv.
- Andonaegui, Governor of Uruguay, 34; to attack reductions, 81; moves on missions, 1754, 82; to priests, 91; returns to Spain, 93.
- Angostura, 63.
- Angulo y Olarte, alcalde, addresses insurgents, 207.
- Anson, 14; his plan, 312, n.
- Antequera, in Paraguay, 14; executed in Lima, 20; his rebellion, 157.
- Aponte, Governor of Chile, 35; Chile under, 38; death, 1733, 40.
- Aperger, Padre, remained in Misiones, 126.
- Aranda, Count of, receives decree expelling Jesuits, 106; instructions, 106; his circular letter, 107, 129; objects to leaving Jesuits in Quito, 142; instructions, 151.
- Araucanians, resistance by, xvi; drafted into service, 35; would expel Spaniards, 36, 46; chiefs in Santiago, 385; pacified, 396; sympathized with royalists, but inspired patriots, 397.
- Archbishop of Bogotá and the *Comun*, 217; his hypocrisy, 218; pastoral visit to rebels, 220; becomes viceroy, 225, 266.
- Architects among Jesuits, 133.

- Areche, 177; increased taxes, 178; charges against Gui-
 rior, 179; his forces at Cuzco, 186; with Del Valle
 at Cuzco, 186, 191; his re-
 ply to Tupac, 192; attitude,
 193; sentences Tupac, 195.
 Arequipa, 179, 246; trade
 with Arica, 304.
 Arévalo, commander at Isth-
 mus, 270-272.
 Argentina, x.
 Arica becomes a port, 304.
 Armada, tax, 419.
 Armadilla, 419.
 "Armienna," frigate, 32.
 Arms and munitions distrib-
 uted by Amat, 98.
 Armistice of 1737, 32, 73.
 Army, Superintendent of, 168.
 Arregui, Bishop, at Asuncion,
 21; as mediator, 22; elected
 Governor, 23; his false posi-
 tion, 23; retires to Buenos
 Aires, 24.
 Articles furnished by corre-
 dor, 175.
 Aruba, Miranda at, 333, 336.
Asesor general, 156.
 Asuncion, stagnant, xvii;
 without authority, 23; Jes-
 uits removed from, 114, 243.
 Astete, Pablo, commands at
 Cuzco, 191.
 Atrato river, xii; route to Pa-
 cific, 272.
 Auchmuthy, General, 358.
 Audience, Quito and Pana-
 ma, 50, 55; of Buenos Aires,
 243; in Venezuela, 1786,
 313.
 Auditor's office, 172.
 Avilés, 373; O'Higgins' suc-
 cessor in Chile, 392.
 Aymaras, 7.
 Azúa, agent of cabildo on
 university, 47.
 Azúa, Archbishop, on priests'
 traffic in alcohol, 59.
 Azores, Portuguese from, 163.
 "Bacchus" and "Bee" join
 Miranda, 333.
 Baird, General, 342; to Beres-
 ford, 346.
 Balmaseda, agent to expel
 Jesuits from Chile, 136, 137.
 Bank at Arequipa, 412.
 Barcelona, province of, 61, 68.
 Barquisimeto, xi, 68.
 Barreiro, president of comu-
 neros, 19.
 Barreda, José, provincial of
 Paraguay, 80.
 Barreda y Vera, succeeds
 Aponte, 40.
 Barrera, Captain, 211, 212.
 Barros Arana, on Jesuit am-
 bitions, 133.
 Bastides, Miguel, campaign
 east of Titicaca, 197.
 Battle, reduction Indians de-
 feated, 89; of Cuzco, 191;
 at Checacupe, 194; of
 Puente Real, 211.
 Barúa, in Paraguay, 15, 17,
 18.
 Bauzá on war against mis-
 sions, 94.
 Belgrano on loss of Buenos
 Aires, 349, n.
 Benavides, Governor of Chile,
 237; intendant of Santiago,
 246.
 Berbeo, chief of *Comun*, 210;
 commanding general, 212;
 commissioners' note to, 213;
 his vacillation, 215; pro-
 poses peace conference, 216;
 corregidor of Socorro, 219.
 Beresford, General, to Rio de
 la Plata, 342; salary, 346;
 victorious at Perdriel, 353.
 Berlanga, Juan de, and arrest
 of Jesuits, 109.
 Berney, his conspiracy, 232;
 forms constitution, 235;
 sentenced, 238.
 Berrio, Antonio de, 62.
 Bishops, authority of, 244.
 Bishoprics and intendencies,
 242.
 Blanco and royal revenues,
 230; transferred to Potosí,
 231.
 Blount, intrigues of, 324.
 Bogotá, position of, xiv, 4;
Comun advance upon, 213;
 population of, 260, 261; be-
 comes fashionable, 275.

- Bolivia, x.
Books, importation prohibited, 8; on politics in Venezuela, 319; hunted by Viceroy Croix, 377.
Borja, authorized Jesuits in Peru, 127.
Botanical Expedition, approved by the King, 269; change in purpose, 272-274; transferred to Bogotá, 275; in Peru, 277-281.
Bougainville on Nanguirú, 88, n.
Bourne, Sturges, to Pitt, 343.
Boundary controversy, 26; commissioners, 79; commissioners for Portugal, 80; question, 93.
Bridge over the Rimac, 293.
Brierly on Cumaná, 334.
British policy communicated to King, 328.
British designs on South America, 340.
British vessels at Buenos Aires, 347, 348.
British proclamation as to trade at Buenos Aires, 350-352.
British in Montevideo, 361; reinforcements at Buenos Aires, 358; advance on Buenos Aires, 362; demands, 363.
Brunete, Joseph, 278; died in Pasco, 1787, 280.
Bucareli, Governor of Rio de la Plata, 104; receives order to be sent to Chile and Peru, 108; his edict at Buenos Aires, 109; on Cordova Jesuits, 112; on latest Jesuit arrivals, 114; goes to Misiones, 125; enters Yapeyu, 126; sends papers to Chile, 135.
Buenos Aires, lost and rewon, Chap. XIII; British at, x, xvii; lack of privileges, 6; new shipping orders, 42; state of, 155, 249; and trade, 167; shipping point for interior, 168; audiencia of, 243, 244; provinces of, 244; intendency of, 245; relation to other cities, 251; agriculture and commerce, 252; trade with Spain, 304; later trade, 339; increased wealth, 340; population, 340; project against, discussed, 345; offers resistance, 347; prepares for defense, 353; commanders of battalions, 362; victory, 370.
Bull fights at Lima, 303.
Caballero, his toleration, 266; *Relacion de mando*, 268, 273.
Cadiz, in Spain's commerce, 167; merchants of, 416.
Caesares, Orejuela's expedition to, 235.
Cafés in Lima, 303. n.
Callao, destroyed, 1746, 13; fortress of, 98; under viceroy, 157.
Canary Islands, 167.
Cannon east at Lima, 98.
Cape captured, 342.
Capuchin missions, 64.
Cartagena, xii; defended by Eslaba, 57; defenses of, 261.
Carabobo, 68.
Carvajal, Duke, 297.
Casa de Contratación, 42.
Cásas, Juan de, on British commerce, 416.
Casanare, 64.
Caracas, xi, 4, 68.
Cauca Valley, xii.
Cauquenes, 44.
Castel-Fuerte, 13, 14; appoints Salamanca governor, 40.
Ceballos, his fleet and army, 162; lands at Montevideo, 162; received at San Borja, 93; his commission, 159; his orders, 159; his power, 161; promoted, 163; succeeded by Vertiz, 168; and reform, 172; repatriation of Portuguese, 170-172.
Celebrations, 55.
Cession of reductions, 76.

- Chaco, Jesuits of, 118.
 Charcas, audiencia of, 157, 244; advises the King, 158, 170.
 Charles II, Spain under, 27.
 Charles III, xx; King of Naples, 57; accession, 95, 103; appoints Bucareli, 104; reply to Clement XIII, 107; his reforms, 153; economic legislation, 166, 172, 229; death, 391.
 Charles IV, accession, 391; revolt in Venezuela, 316.
 Charlevoix, quoted, 14, 15.
 Checacupe, battle of, 194.
 Chibchas, xii, 7.
 Chiloé, province of, 247.
 Chinchona monopoly, 265.
 Chiquitos, 170.
 Chile, x; middle part of, xv; mining in, xv; southern, xvi; monotony of life in, 34; trade with Peru, 42; rural life in, 305, 384. See Agriculture, Aponte, etc.
 Chomé, Padre, died going into exile, 122.
 Chuquito, 170.
 Chuquisaca, xiv, 251.
 Church, attitude towards the Indians, 2; and riot in Quito, 180; extent of property, 301.
 Cities, of Chile, 305; life in, 410.
 Clement XIII, on expulsion of Jesuits, 107.
 Clergy, their irregular living, 14; against Tupac, 188.
 Coast, sandy, xiv.
 Cochrane, furnishes ships to Miranda, 334.
 Cock-fights, 303.
 Code of 1778, 167, 172, 173, 398.
 Coining in Chile, 43.
 Colegio del Rosario, Mutis at, 263.
 Colombia, x, xi.
 "Columbia," at Juan Fernandez, 389.
 Colonia, contraband trade, xvi; held by Portuguese, 26, 27; taken by Ross, 28; ceded to Portugal, 28; under Vasconcellos, 31; besieged by Salcedo, 32, 33; fort strengthened, 72; ceded by Portugal, 74; Ceballos advances on, 162; prisoners sent to Mendoza, 163; ceded to Spain, 1777, 164; receives English goods, 166; Portuguese inhabitants, 171. Colonial history, xviii.
 Colonial system, failure of, 171.
 Colonists of Buenos Aires after 1778, 167.
 Commercial code, 166-173.
 Comuneros, Chap. VII; of Paraguay, 15-43; of New Granada, 209-219.
 Comun, 221-224.
 Communism of missions, 147.
 Concepcion, Bishop of, 36; earthquake, 39; intendency of, 246, 305; smallpox in, 308.
 Condorcanqui, Tupac's name, 180.
 Conspiracies, secret, 232, 241.
 Conspiracy of Gramuset and Berney, Chap. VIII.
 Consulado for Santiago, 43; Caracas, 314; on unemployment, 321; tax for, 419.
 Contensiosa, court of, 247.
 Contraband trade, 27, 31, 41, 165, 339.
 Copiapó, 44.
 Cordova, 4; Gorro retained at, 27; capital, 34, 251.
 Coro, xi, 68.
 Corral, Juan de, built Lima bridge, 294.
 Corregidores, as sole traders, 14; purpose of office, 174; and Indians, 241; suppressed, 243, 373.
 Correo mayor, resumed by crown, 297.
 Corporations in South America, 399.
 Corsica, Jesuits in, 117.
 Corvallo on Santiago, 306.
 Council of the Indies, xx, 15, 47, 156.
 Country, life in, 410.

- Court of *junta superior de gobierno*, 248.
Crawford at Buenos Aires, 362.
Credit, absence, 8, 400.
Creoles, ix, 4; excluded from office, 4, 9; and mestizo opposition, 5-11; party at Quito, 102; acquire Jesuit property, 103; intellectual awakening, 275, 301, 315, 318; attachment to New World, 319.
Crime, increase of, 53.
Croix, viceroy, 373.
Crusada, proceeds from, 424.
Cumaná, xi, 61, 68, 313, 334.
Cundinamarca, plateau of, xii.
Curicó, 44.
Cuyo, province of, 244.
Cuzco, xiv; college of, 128, 158; on corregidores, 176, 179; panic in, 186; prepared for war, 188; abolishes repartimientos, 189; battle of, 191, 246; trade with Arica, 304.
Dangers met by Ruiz and Pavon, 280.
Darien, Indian war ended, 272.
Dauxion on luxury at Caracas, 318.
Dead hand, King opposed, 300.
Decline of Spain's power, xix.
Decree expelling Jesuits, 104.
Defeat at Puente Real, 212.
Del Valle, against insurgents, 192-194; brutality, 194.
Diario eruditio, 379.
Diary of Segurola, 192, n. 198.
Diego and Inca at Paucartambo, 191; after Inca, 197.
Diguja, Governor, 66; succeeds Zelaya at Quito, 102; prepared to expel Jesuits, 141.
Disaster at Sangarara church, 187.
Divine right of Kings, 237.
Dobrizhoffer, 76, 88.
Dombey, of Botanical Expedition, 278.
Dominance of creole-mestizo class, 10.
Dominicans, their instruction, 46.
Donations to church, 51.
Draft on colonies by Spain, 417.
Dual government, 173.
Duke of San Carlos, 298.
Dundas warns Miranda, 336.
Dutch, in Java, 3; West India Company, 62; view of Santo Thomé.
Earthquake, 1730, in Chile, 39; 1687, 42; 1746, 295; "divine punishment," 296.
Ecclesiastics, Spanish, 8.
Echaurre, Captain, 25; appointed governor, 26.
Economic facts, misinterpreted, 413.
Ecuador, x, xiii; under New Granada, 99.
Education, lack of interest in, 49.
Election in Paraguay, 25.
Elhuyar, reforms mining, 267, 274.
Emeralds in New Granada, 51.
"Emperor" offered to Miranda by Ogden, 331; refused to join Miranda, 333.
Encomenderos, 2; and Jesuits, 103.
Encomiendas, abuses of, O'Higgins on, 387; incorporated in crown, 396.
Endeiza, house plundered, 185.
England protects Portugal, 27.
English, the, in the Orinoco, 1740, 69.
English colonies, 8; goods at Colonia, 166; protection of Venezuela, 324; right to fish, 392; wares in Lima, 399.
Equality on fate of Indians, 2.
Ercilla's *Araucana*, 397.
Escuela de la Concordia, 258.
Eslabá, viceroy of New Granada, 55, 260.
España, revolutionist, 315.
Espeleta, viceroy, 258, 275.

- Espinosa, commandant of Trinidad, 70.
Essequibo, slaves of, 63.
Estevez, *Comun* council, 210.
Estudios de Quito, 1791, 258.
Europeans *vs.* Americans, 101.
Execution of Aliaga, 184.
Export duties, 419.
Expulsion of Jesuits, Chap. IV; decree in Chile, 137; as an event in history, 149; general effect of, 152.
- Fabro, to arrest Cordova Jesuits, 112.
Failure of colonial system, 425.
Falkland Islands, 170.
Ferdinand VI, influenced by Jesuit rumors, 84; succeeded by Charles III, 103.
Ferdinand VII, 391.
Fernandez, general intendant, 173, 245.
Feudal subjection of Indians, 7.
Feuillée, 278.
Fiesta on eve of Jesuit expulsion, 143.
Flora Bogotana, 276.
Flórez, viceroy, 204; resigned, 224, 266.
Florida Blanca, 164.
Flores assists La Paz, 192, 200.
Food problem in Venezuela, 322.
Forces of reductions, 85.
Foreign vessels in Pacific, 389.
Foreign invasion, fear of, 391.
Foreigners expelled from Montevideo, 33, 34.
Founder, title of, 131.
France, as market, 41; supports Portugal, 27; influence of, in New Granada, 290.
Frazier, 278.
Free trade, effect of, 339.
French academicians, 54; in Ecuador, 56.
French importations, 36; merchants, 12.
- French Revolution, influence in New Granada, 277, 282; in Lima, 381.
French trade, 1700-1715, 415.
Funds withdrawn, 38, 52, 178.
- Gaceta de Lima*, 380.
Galán, Bartolomé, 19.
Galán, José Antonio, at Guáduas, 214; fight at Facatativa, 214; ordered to Honda, 214; renews the rebellion, 219; chief, 222; executed, 223.
Gálvez, José de, 179.
Garay, Miguel de, 19.
Garcia, P. A., Mutis' assistant, 270.
Genoa, Jesuits would settle at, 118.
German Jesuits sent to Germany, 120.
Gil de Toboada, 373, 378.
Giron, opposes *Comun*, 215.
Gonzalvez Manrique, Antonio and Francisco, 50.
Gorro, Governor of Chile, 27.
Government, civil, of Paraguay, 19; policy towards *Comun*, 221; weakness of, 101, 242.
Governors, provincial, 172.
Gower, General, 358.
Gramuset and Berney, 232, 235; denounced, 237; their fate, 239.
Gran Chaco, missions of, 171.
Great Britain, ambition of, 326; coöperating with U. S., 329.
Grnesso, J. M., 257.
Gual, revolutionist, 315, 316; with Miranda, 329.
Guamanga, 246.
Guaranis, detained in Buenos Aires, 124.
Guayana, 61; first governor, 62, 68, 313.
Guill y Gonzaga, 135; in Chile, 228.
Guirior, viceroy, 177, 178; goes to Peru, 266, 372; arrives, 1773, 264; liberal, 265.

- Gumilla, Padre, on crop failure, 68.
Guayaquil, port for Quito, xiii.

Haciendas of Jesuits, 131.
Haenke, Tadeo, 293; on Lima, 302.
Hamilton, Miranda to, 326, 327; changed view of Miranda, 328.
Herds in Argentina and Uruguay, xvii; of Misiones, 65.
Herrera, Juan Diaz, in Quito, 99, 100.
Hides and beef, trade in, 339.
Honda, xii.
Hooper intervenes in favor of Spanish on Isthmus, 281.
Hospitals, 300.
Huarochiri in revolt, 13.
Huancavelica, 179, 246, 412; product, 423.
Huéyobro, held mint monopoly, 59.
Humboldt on Spain's supporting research, 281, n.

Ideals, new, 11.
Ideas, imported, 10.
Ignorance of lower classes, 49.
Immigration, 319.
Import duties, 419.
*Imprenta de los Niños expo-
sitos*, 253.
Inca's titles, 193; Inca and followers prisoners at Cuzco, 195; in new state, 325.
Indian raids on Buenos Aires, 249.
Indians, in Spanish society, 2; adoption by Spaniards, 7; with creole-mestizo party, 8; revolt in Peru, 13; under mita, 14; in Uruguay, 31; uprising, 1723, 37; oppose treaty of 1750, 76; and removal of Jesuits, 119; oppressed by corregidores, 171, 175; after Tupac, 202; as laborers, 406-408.
Independence, spirit of, x.
Industry, Spain's policy on, 413; textile, 414.
Intellectual awakening, 257, 282.
Inhabitants, differing groups of, 6; of Lima, their character, 301.
Inquisition, 304.
Institutions of Lima, 298.
Insurance companies, 400.
Insurgents, in Quito, 98-102; in Trinidad, 320.
Insurrection, 196, 202.
Intendant, 168; in Chile, 240; territory, 242; in Peru, 246, 248.
Intendancies, 169; and bish-
oprics, 242; their capitals, 243; in Chile, 246.
Invasion, 312.
Irrigation, 405.
Isolation, effect of, 8.

Jauregui, Guirior's successor, 179; in Chile, 229, 372.
Janszoon Pater, Adriaen, burns Santo Thomé, 62.
Juan and Ulloa, 13, 174, 176.
Jesuits, expulsion of, Chap. IV; xi, xx, 15, 16, 17; driven from college, 20; hostility to, 23, 24, 26; reinstated in Asuncion, 26; saw Araucanian danger, 36; their instruction, 46; land-owners in Ecuador, 52; in New Granada, 57; work in education, 58; hostility to, 66; protest to audiencia, 78; oppose treaty, 78; in Quito, 100; property confiscated, 102; and encomenderos, 103; charges against, 104; arrested in Buenos Aires, 108, 115; church closed, 110; arrested at Santa Fé, 110; at Cordova, 112; journey, Cordova to Ensenada, 113; from Spain, 1766, 115; drowned in Rio de la Plata, 116; at Buenos Aires, 117; of Chaco, 118; from Chiquitos, 120; German sent to Germany, 120; from Paraguay, 123; number in Misiones, 126; in Peru, 127; their wealth,

- 128, 129, 130; devotion to Indians, 129; their slaves, 130; their libraries in Peru, 130; property in Chile, 131; industries, 132; houses, 133; relation to government, 134; at Chillan, 134; of Cuyo, 137; from Chile, 137-139; their pension, 140; from Chile to Lima, 140; at Quito, 141; from Quito to Guayaquil, 142; from New Granada, 142-144; routes, 145; *Llanos*, 145; isolation, 147; communism, 147; residence in Europe, 149; novices, 151; effect of expulsion, 263.
- Keymis quoted on Santo Thomé, 62.
- King's C. R., aim, 328; King, Miranda visits, 327.
- Knox, Miranda to, 326.
- Labor and market in Chile, 309.
- La Condamine in Ecuador, 56.
- Le Guayra, xi, 314.
- Land tax, 30.
- Landa, and Tupac, 187; Landa killed, 187.
- La Plata, 243; archbishop of, 251.
- La Paz, besieged, 192, 197; position of, 197 n., 243, 253.
- La Serena, 246.
- Laws on Indians after Tupac, 202.
- "Leander" offered by Ogden, 331; its cargo, 331; halted by British, 333; at Granada, 334; sold, 336.
- Leo, Francisco de, revolt, 240; *Rights of Man*, 283.
- Liberalism, opposed, 10.
- Libraries of Jesuits, 130.
- Library, public, with Jesuits' books, 263.
- Life in cities, 410; in country, 410.
- Lima at end of century, Chap. XI; position of, xiv, 4, 6; in 1746, 13, 168, 178, 246; position of, 292; population, 293; walls, 293;
- streets, 295; houses, 295; after earthquake of 1746, 296; social character, 297; institutions, 298.
- Linnaeus and Mutis, 262.
- Liniers, orders on desertion, 353; crosses Rio, 354; Mitre on, 355; demands Beresford's surrender, 356; military chief, 357; reply to Beresford, 364.
- Liquors, tax on sale, 420.
- Lisbon, destroyed, 93.
- Literature, periodical, 276.
- Llanos*, x.
- Loayza, archbishop, 127.
- Local government, 153, 154.
- Lobo, captured at Colonia, 27.
- Looting in Oruro, 186.
- Lopez, Tupac's instructor, 181.
- Lopez, S. J., attacks Mutis, 277.
- Lorrain, president of Quito, 50.
- Lost property, 423.
- Louis I succeeds Philip V, 54.
- Loyalty in New Granada, 282; loyalty to Spain declines, 417.
- Lozano quoted, 19, n.
- Madariaga, rector of Jesuit College, 137.
- Magdalena, x, xii.
- Mails to Venezuela, 323.
- Malouine, 170.
- Mandagure, campaign east of Titicaca, 197.
- Manso de Velasco, Governor of Chile, 41; sells titles, 44; founds towns, 44; viceroy of Peru, 45.
- Manso Maldonado, President of New Granada, 50.
- Mantiel to Ruiloba, 22.
- Maracaibo, population of, 317.
- Margarita Island, 314.
- Markets for Chile and Peru, 41.
- Markham on the Inca, 189.
- Martinez, B., pursues comuneros, 25.
- Marsden, Popham's letter to, 344.

- Martin García, treaty of 1750, 81.
Maté from Paraguay, 338, 398.
Matiz, Mutis' draughtsman, 270.
Media anata, 421.
Melipilla, founded by Manso, 44.
Melville at trial of Popham, 341.
Mendoza receives Portuguese soldiers, 163.
Mercurio peruano, 38, 258, 259, 379.
Mena, Juan de, executed at Lima, 20; daughter in Paraguay, 20.
Mendieta commands force of clergy, 188.
Mendinueta, viceroy, 287.
Mesia de la Zerda, 143.
Messner, Padre, 122.
Mestizos, 5; in Chile, 308.
Middle Class, absence of, 8.
Military affairs in Peru, 98; escort at missions, 146, 162.
Mines, Charles III would revive, 378; output, 424; low state of, 262; and the mita, 412; fifth, 423.
Minoa, expedition to, 62.
Mint for Santiago, 43; monopoly, 58; at Popayan, 59.
Miranda's expedition, Chap. XII, 312, 324; requests of Great Britain, 327; on U. S. support, 326; retained in England, 330; with Smith and Ogden, 331; support from Cochrane, 335; ships attacked, 334; takes Coro, 335.
Missions in Orinoco region, 63–65; support from royal treasury, 65; of the plains, 65; Jesuits expelled, 119, 146; of Guarani, 170, 243, 266.
Mitre on Liniers, 355.
Mompó in Asuncion, 16–19.
Monasteries, conflicts in, 14; at Santo Thomé, 62; in Chile, 231, 375.
Mojos, 170.
Molina, Jesuit, sent from Chile, 140.
Molina, Antonio de, officer of *Comun*, 210.
Money, lack of, 53, 400.
Mohino, to treat with Portugal, 164.
Monks, 4.
Monopoly of alcohol, 99; of food by Jesuits, 132.
Monopolies, 42, 98, 265, 276, 425.
Monsalve, *Comun* council, 210.
Montesclaros, viceroy, 178, 293.
Montevideo, xvii, 29, 30, 32, 33, 110, 167, 170, 361.
Moráles, Juan Bautista, sent to England, 215; imprisoned, 226.
Moráles, F. J., in Chile, 228.
Moreno, his school system, 263.
Mules, trade in, prices, 338; duty on, 420.
Mutis, x, 260–276; life and writings, 277, n.
Nanguirú, Nicholas, 84; succeeds, Sepee, 87.
Nariño, x, 282; prints *De rechos de Hombre*, 283; tried, 283–284; defense, 284; escaped at Cadiz, 285; in France, 286; in England, 287; conversion, 289; imprisoned by King's order, 291.
Nationalism revived in Spain, 9.
Natural sciences in *Colegio del Rosario*, 276.
Negroes in Chile, 309.
Neiva, riot in, 220.
Nemocon, Indians of, 221; fight at, 222.
New Andalucía, 68.
New Granada, xi, 50; condition of people, 51; viceroy, 99, 154, 261.
Newton, doctrines of, 262.
Nicholas I, 87.
Nieto, Pedro, 207.
Ninths, royal, 421.
Nitrate deposits, xv.

- Nobility in New World, 1; titles of, 409.
- Nobles at Lima, 297.
- Nootka Sound, 324.
- Nordenflicht in Peru, 378.
- Noticias secretas*, 14, 56, 172, 174.
- Nueva Guayana, 63.
- Obando, interim governor of Chile, 45.
- Obelar, succeeds Arregui, 24.
- Obrajes*, oppression in, 180, 185.
- Observationists, 64.
- Ocean for Indians and Spaniards, xiv.
- Official delinquency, 12; independence in America, 416.
- Officials in America, 179; sent from Spain, 9.
- Offices in America, 1; given to Spaniards, 4; sale of, 423.
- O'Higgins, intendant, 246, 273; in Peru, 282; agricultural experiments, 386; goes to Peru from Chile, 392; work in Peru, 393.
- Olano, García, 207.
- Olavarrieta, editor, 380.
- Olivares sent from Chile, 140.
- Oppression by corregidores, 175.
- Orders instead of nobility, 409.
- Ordinance of intendants, 173, 242, 243, 245; of 1802, 247.
- Orejuela, Chilean conspirator, 235.
- Organization under intendants, 242.
- Orinoco, x; missions of, 266.
- Oropesa, Marquis of, 181.
- Ortiz, Secretary of *Comun*, 210.
- Oruro, xiv; revolt in, 185; looted, 186; troops from, at La Paz, 201.
- Osorio and crown of *Comun*, 212.
- Paleozzi, Padre, died at Porto Bello, 123.
- Palos, Bishop, 14, 24, 24.
- Polpaico, Rojas' estate, 235; Panama, audiencia, 50; in New Granada, 58; university, 58.
- Papel Periódico*, 258, 259.
- Paraguay, x, 21, 24, 170; province of, 244; Indian population, 252.
- Paraguayans and reductions, 15.
- Parlamento with Indians, 41.
- Patriotic unions, 256.
- Pastoral life in Venezuela, xi.
- Patagonia, sovereignty over, 169.
- Paula Sanz, general intendant, 245.
- Pavon, José, 278.
- Peace after 1723, 41.
- Pelota at Lima, 303.
- Pena's inquiry, 346.
- Perdriel, fight at, 353.
- Peru, xii, xiv, 13; internal state, 14; viceroy of, 15; and Tupac's forces, 191; intendencies, 246; Botanical Expedition to, 277.
- Peruvian market glutted, 398.
- Personal service abolished, 396.
- Philip II, 181.
- Philip V, ignorance of America, 28; appoints Aponte governor, 35; and university, 47; abdication, 54; death, 57; sells coining right, 58.
- Philippine Islands, 105-107.
- Philippine Company, 397, 399.
- Picton, governor of Trinidad, 326; propaganda, 326; plan 329.
- Pimienta, viceroy, 224.
- Piñéres, visitador in New Granada, 204, 207; prepares for flight, 212; mal-administration, 266.
- Pisco, Ambrosio, honored as Zipa, 216; supports Indians, 222; fate, 224; returned to Chia, 225.
- Pitt, Miranda with, 312, 324; returned to power, 1804, 330; plan as to South America, 344.

- Pizarro, viceroy, 57, 59, 260.
Plains of Argentina, xvi, 253—
255.
Plata, *Comun* council, 210.
Plaza, quoted on property of
Jesuits, 448.
Plaza of Lima, 294.
Police, secret, of Lima, 381.
Politics, interest in, Chap. X.
Popayan, destroyed, 56.
Popham, on expedition to
South America, 330; chosen
to command, 330; "Dia-
dem," 341, 342; weakness
of Cape, 343; letter to
Marsden, 344; to take Mon-
tevideo, 346; recalled, 359;
to Sterling, 360; trial, 360;
sentence, 360.
Population, in Peru, xv; dif-
ferences in, 5; of Chile, 39,
46; of reductions, 79; of
Lima, 293; decreasing, 425.
Port of Spain, capital of
Trinidad, 72.
Port charges, 424.
Ports, under code of 1778,
168; large and small, 419.
Portillo, provincial, 127.
Porto Bello and trade, 167.
Portugal supported by Eng-
land, 74.
Portuguese after armistice, 33;
at Colonia, 26; advance on
Uruguay, 31; defend Colo-
nia, 72; at Mendoza, 171.
Patagonia, settlements on
coast, 170.
Paraguayan missions after
Jesuits, 171.
Post, Lima to Buenos Aires,
374.
Potosí, xiv, 170, 243, 253;
mules taken to, 338.
Poverty in New Granada, 51;
in Quito, 52.
Prieto Salazar, mint monop-
oly, 58;
Priest, arrested by Viana, 91;
on alcohol, 59; exactions of,
180.
Primogeniture in Chile, 408.
Prince of Bogotá, 216.
Printing office in Buenos
Aires, 252.
Property in Paraguay, con-
fiscated, 24; of Jesuits in
Chile, 131.
Protection, Peru *vs.* Chile, 42.
Protestant miners, 267, 275.
Provinces of Rio de la Plata,
170.
Provincial's instructions to
Jesuits, 79.
Public works planned by Solis,
60.
Pueyrredon's resistance, 353.
Puente Real, battle of, 211.
Puno, siege of, 197, 246;
added to Peru, 393.
Quesada, advances to Bogotá,
xii.
Quichua, Kingdom, xiii, lan-
guage, and dramas forbid-
den, 190.
Quina, from New Granada,
273.
Quiroz, Canon, killed, 53.
Quispicanchi, Tupac against,
184.
Quito, seat of audiencia, xiii;
position of, xiv; audiencia
of, 50; poverty in, 52; re-
volt in, 98.
Radical philosophy, 389.
Raleigh, 62.
Rancagua, 44.
Raynal, 319.
Real Decreto de Ejecución,
104.
Real estate in church hands,
301.
Reductions, the seven, 23;
ceded, 75, 85; submit, 91;
Indians in military service,
94; of Chiquitos, 120.
Reform needed, 172; by Cuzco,
189; internal, 376; difficul-
ties of, 426.
Religious houses in Lima, 299,
n.
Reseguin, commands Oruro
troops, 201.
Restrictions by Spain, 401—
405.
Residencia inefficient, 41.
Revenues royal, 420—425.

- Revolt, of Tupac, extent of, 192; local, 179; in Bogotá, leaders, 207; internal, 311. Revolution in Paraguay, 104. Revolutionists sent to Spain, 285. Reyes, Diego de los, 16. Rimac at Lima, xiv; valley of, 298. Rio de la Plata, x; viceroyalty of, xiv; takes Colonia, 27. Rio Negro, 169. *Rights of Man*, 381. Riot in Quito, 100. River systems, x; of the south-east, 154. Road, Santiago to Valparaiso, 394. Rodriguez, Tupac's instructor, 181, 183. Rodriguez, M. S., chief of Bogotá library, 275. Rodriguez, Socorro, Manuel de, 257. Rojas, J. A., with Berney, 233, 240. Rosas, succeeds Salcedo, 33. Rozas, Ortiz de, Governor of Chile, 45, 46. Rousseau, works of, 319. Royal exactions in Chile, 229. Royal orders on Colonia, 179. Ruiloba, Governor of Paraguay, 17, 21, 22; death, 23; his murderers executed, 25. Ruiz de Berecedo, on University of Chile, 47. Ruiz, José, studied under Wallerius, 267. Ruiz, H., botanist, 278. Rumors in Europe as to Jesuits, 84.
- Salamanca, Aponte's nephew, 35; governor of Chile, 40; residencia, 41; not confirmed by king, 41. Salcedo succeeds Zabala, 31; Governor, 32; lays siege to Colonia, 33; deposed, 33. Sales by corregidor, 175. Salt tax, 424. Salta, 251; mules at, 338. Salinas of Nemocon, 221. Sangarara, Landa at, 187. St. Bartholomew, visited by Nariño, 287. San Bernardo, College of, 128. "San Esteban," frigate, 32. "San Felipe," 44. San Fernando, 44. San Gabriel, island added to Spain, 164. San Gil, 208. San Ildefonso, treaty of 1777, 164. San Juan River, xiii. San José de Oruña, in ruins, 69. San Miguel, ceded pueblo, 90. Santa Catalina Island, 165. Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Jesuits of, 121, 170, 243. Santa Fé, Jesuits arrested, 110. Santa Marta, xii. Santa Rosa de los Andes, 44. Santiago, valley of, xv, 4; at end of eighteenth century, Chap. XI; intendency of, 246, 305-308. Santo Thomé, 61; different sites, 63. Sorata destroyed, 197. Saravia denounced Berney, 237. Savages disappear, 406. Science and politics, x. Secretary of viceroyalty, 172. Segurola at La Paz, 192; diary, 192-198, 202. Ségur in Venezuela, 319. *Seminario critico*, 380. Sentence of Tupac, 195. Sepee, Guarani chief, 87. Serena, 305. Settlers at Montevideo, 29, 30. Seville in Spain's commerce, 167; monopoly broken, 168. Shipping at Buenos Aires, 337. Ships, of register, 42; used by Botanical Expedition, 279. Siege of La Paz, 198-202. Slaves, 165; in Chile, 309; trade in, 74. Smallpox, in Chile, 39, 307; at Trinidad, 69.

- Smuggling, effect on Peru, 166.
- Sobremonte, viceroy, x, 357.
- Social movements in Quito, 177; character of Lima, 297; classes in Peru, 395.
- Society, designed by Spain, 1; Spanish and creole, 7, 9, 11; in Chile, 306.
- Socorro, revolutionary center, 206; revolt at, 207; suspends taxes, 208; document in verse, 209; insurgents, 210.
- Solis Folch, viceroy, 59; charity, 142; enters monastery, 143, 260.
- Soroeta, Governor of Paraguay, 16-19.
- Southeastern districts, 154.
- Souzey, quoted, 79.
- Souza Coutinho, of treaty commission, 164.
- Spain's control of Indians, 1; declining power, 6; declares war on Great Britain, 330.
- Spanish-creole separation, 4; merchants, 12; succession, war of, 28; defeat at Sangarara, 187; minister's activity, 332; on English at Montevideo, 367; on appointments, 383; and British colonies, 426.
- Spaniards on new ideas, 10; reinforced at Cuzco, 190.
- Squadron, Pacific, 45.
- Stamped paper, 423.
- State designed by Miranda, 325.
- Statistics by Solis, 61.
- Stevenson, quoted, 156 n.
- Sterling, Admiral, 358; on Popham's return, 359.
- Stock companies, 412.
- Strays, 423.
- Suffering of Indians, 180.
- Superintendent of treasury, 168, 173.
- Superunda (Velasco), 13.
- Table Bay, British squadron at, 344.
- Tafalla, professor of botany at Lima, 289.
- Talca, 44.
- Tallien to Nariño, 286.
- Talmadge, Judge, on "Leander's" cargo, 331.
- Tarija, Jesuits at, 114.
- Tarma, 246.
- Taxes, 205; in Chile, 229-231.
- Tea of Bogotá, 273.
- Tebicuary River, 17-24.
- Temple, quoted, 200, n.
- Temperature in Venezuela, xi.
- Tenants on estates, 410.
- Terms granted Buenos Aires by British, 351; of White-locke's surrender, 365.
- "Tertulia eutropélica," 257; "poetica," 38.
- Tesorero blanquecedor*, 58.
- Textiles, of Quito, 53; industry, 414.
- Theatre at Lima, 303.
- Tinta, province of, 181.
- Titles, sold in Chile, 44, 420; taxed, 425.
- Toledo, viceroy, 181.
- Tordesillas, treaty of, 74.
- Trade, 34; Chile-Peru, 42; Rio de la Plata, 166; tea in Bogotá, 273, 323, 381, 398.
- Traffic, Buenos Aires to Lima, 338.
- Treachery with Tupac, 194.
- Treasury, royal, 168, 173, 418.
- Treaty, Spanish-Portuguese, 28, 74, 75, 78, 95, 164.
- Tribute, by Indians, 16, 396, 421.
- Trinidad, revolt, 68-72, 323.
- Troops, unpaid, 38, 84, 200, n.
- Truce with reductions, 84.
- Tucuman, 34, 170, 243, 244, 251.
- Turbaco, residence of viceroy, 272.
- Tupac Amaru, revolt, Chap. VI, 177-217.
- Ulloa and Araujo, 54.
- Unanue, Dr., 380.
- Unemployed in Venezuela, 320, 321.
- United States, influence of, 282; in New Granada, 290; constitutions, 325, 390.

- Unions, patriotic, 256.
 University of San Felipe, 46-49; of San Marcos, 258, 299, 375; at Panama, 58.
 Upper Peru, xiv, xv; province of, 244.
 Uprising in Quito, 1765, 98; 1782, 373.
 Urabá, Gulf of, xii.
 Uriarte, on fort at Montevideo, 33.
 Uruguay, x; scene of contest, 26.
 Utrecht, treaty of, 28.
 Valdelerios, boundary commissioner, 79.
 Valencia, xi.
 Valenzuelas, Elroy de, under Mutis, 269.
 Valparaiso, 305; slave market, 310.
 Vancouver, quoted, 394.
 Varinas, province of Venezuela, 313.
 Vasconcellos, Pedro Antonio de, commands Colonia, 31.
 Vasconcelos, Manuel de Guevara, captain-general of Venezuela, 322, 336.
 Vargas, Francisco, 207.
 Venezuela, geography of, x; Chap. XII; provinces of, 313; trade, 315; population, 317; bad state of, 320-323.
 "Venus, La," sails with Jesuits, 113.
 Vera Cruz, and trade, 167.
 Veraguas, province of New Granada, 58.
 Vergara, Francisco, regent of tribunal of accounts, 61.
 Vergara, Padre Manuel, dies going into exile, 126.
 Vernon, 14; his plan, 312, n.
 Vertiz, as governor, 161; in command after Ceballos, 163; viceroy, 168; settlements under, 169, 245, 250; establishes a theatre, 250; founds printing office, 252.
 Viana, campaign against reductions, 85; message to Indians, 86.
 Viceroy, of Peru, 13; repudiates treaty, 28; Villa García on Chilean consulado, 44; Bucareli, letter, 129; power and duties, 153; of Mexico and Peru, 155; relation to audiencia, 156; restrictions on, 156; Stevenson on, 156, n.; relation to Callao, 157; in Buenos Aires permanent, 168; power limited, 168; report to successor, 170; under law of Indies, 172; powers of, 243; and intendants, 244, 272; in Peru, 1776-1816, 372-373.
 Viceroyalty of Rio, Chap. VI; of New Granada, 55; of Peru, 153; of Buenos Aires, 155, 158; of Buenos Aires province, 159; independence of Peru, 161; organization, 170, 244.
 Viceregal office suspended, 50.
 Vieja Guayana, 64.
 Vilcamayu, troops at, 194.
 Villegas, J. A. de, on mines, 262.
 Villegas, Geronimo, plans Lima bridge, 294.
 Vine culture near Mendoza, 163.
Voyage to South America, 56.
 War, England and Spain, 169.
 Warships equipped by Amat, 98.
 Wheat in Chile, xv; growing in Peru, 42; price fixed in Peru, 43, 405.
 Whitelocke arrives at Buenos Aires, 362; reply and surrender, 365; trial and sentence, 368.
 Women, unmarried, refused emigration, 5; education of, 49.
 Yrujo, Spanish minister, war on Caracas, 333.
 Yturriaga boundary commissioner for the north, 79, 261.
 Zabala in Paraguay, 14, 21, 24; attacks comuneros, 25; leaves Paraguay, 26, 30-40.
 Zelaya at Quito, 101.
 Zapata, leader at Nieva, 220.
 Zerda, viceroy, 260, 264.

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